Disable all renegotiation in TLSv1.2 and earlier. Do not send HelloRequest
messages, and ignore renegotiation requests via ClientHello.
+=item SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX
+
+In TLSv1.3 allow a non-(ec)dhe based key exchange mode on resumption. This means
+that there will be no forward secrecy for the resumed session.
+
+=item SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA
+
+When SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE is set, temporarily reprioritize
+ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphers to the top of the server cipher list if a
+ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher is at the top of the client cipher list. This helps
+those clients (e.g. mobile) use ChaCha20-Poly1305 if that cipher is anywhere
+in the server cipher list; but still allows other clients to use AES and other
+ciphers. Requires B<SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE>.
+
+=item SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
+
+If set then dummy Change Cipher Spec (CCS) messages are sent in TLSv1.3. This
+has the effect of making TLSv1.3 look more like TLSv1.2 so that middleboxes that
+do not understand TLSv1.3 will not drop the connection. Regardless of whether
+this option is set or not CCS messages received from the peer will always be
+ignored in TLSv1.3. This option is set by default. To switch it off use
+SSL_clear_options(). A future version of OpenSSL may not set this by default.
+
=back
The following options no longer have any effect but their identifiers are
The attempt to always try to use secure renegotiation was added in
Openssl 0.9.8m.
+B<SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA> and B<SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION> were added in
+OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy