=head1 NAME
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc - X509 verification parameters
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc - X509 verification parameters
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ unsigned long flags);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- unsigned long flags);
+ unsigned long flags);
unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose);
void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
+ ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies);
void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+ void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ int auth_level);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *name, size_t namelen);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
an existing policy set.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() sets the maximum verification depth to B<depth>.
-That is the maximum number of untrusted CA certificates that can appear in a
+That is the maximum number of intermediate CA certificates that can appear in a
chain.
+A maximal depth chain contains 2 more certificates than the limit, since
+neither the end-entity ceritificate nor the trust-anchor count against this
+limit.
+Thus a B<depth> limit of 0 only allows the end-entity certificate to be signed
+directly by the trust-anchor, while with a B<depth> limit of 1 there can be one
+intermediate CA certificate between the trust-anchor and the end-entity
+certificate.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() sets the authentication security level to
+B<auth_level>.
+The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and public
+key strength when verifying certificate chains.
+For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates
+must meet the specified security level.
+The signature algorithm security level is not enforced for the chain's I<trust
+anchor> certificate, which is either directly trusted or validated by means other
+than its signature.
+See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the definitions of the available
+levels.
+The default security level is -1, or "not set".
+At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
+Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
+interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys
+shorter than 1024 bits.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to
B<name> clearing any previously specified host name or names. If
must be set to the length of B<name>. When a hostname is specified,
certificate verification automatically invokes L<X509_check_host(3)>
with flags equal to the B<flags> argument given to
-B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags()> (default zero). Applications
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags() (default zero). Applications
are strongly advised to use this interface in preference to explicitly
calling L<X509_check_host(3)>, hostname checks are out of scope
with the DANE-EE(3) certificate usage, and the internal check will
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(),
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(),
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(),
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(),
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(),
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() and
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() return 1 for success and 0 for
failure.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth() returns the current verification depth.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level() returns the current authentication security
+level.
+
=head1 VERIFICATION FLAGS
The verification flags consists of zero or more of the following flags
signature is that disabled or unsupported message digests on the root CA
are not treated as fatal errors.
-The B<X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK> flag enables debugging of certificate
-issuer checks. It is B<not> needed unless you are logging certificate
-verification. If this flag is set then additional status codes will be sent
-to the verification callback and it B<must> be prepared to handle such cases
-without assuming they are hard errors.
+If B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> is set, when constructing the certificate chain,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)> will search the trust store for issuer certificates before
+searching the provided untrusted certificates.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled.
The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag suppresses checking for alternative
-chains. By default, when building a certificate chain, if the first certificate
-chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an
-alternative chain can be found that is trusted. With this flag set the behaviour
-will match that of OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.0.
+chains.
+By default, unless B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> is set, when building a
+certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then
+OpenSSL will attempt to replace untrusted certificates supplied by the peer
+with certificates from the trust store to see if an alternative chain can be
+found that is trusted.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, with B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> always set, this option
+has no effect.
+
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME> flag suppresses checking the validity period
+of certificates and CRLs against the current time. If X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time()
+is used to specify a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
=head1 NOTES
=head1 HISTORY
The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+The legacy B<X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK> flag is deprecated as of
+OpenSSL 1.1.0, and has no effect.
=cut