void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
- void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, int entropy);
+ void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
void RAND_screen(void);
less predictable. Suitable input comes from user interaction (random
key presses, mouse movements) and certain hardware events. The
B<entropy> argument is (the lower bound of) an estimate of how much
-randomness is contained in B<buf>. Details about sources of randomness
-and how to estimate their entropy can be found in the literature,
-e.g. RFC 1750.
+randomness is contained in B<buf>, measured in bytes. Details about
+sources of randomness and how to estimate their entropy can be found
+in the literature, e.g. RFC 1750.
RAND_add() may be called with sensitive data such as user entered
passwords. The seed values cannot be recovered from the PRNG output.
OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state is unique for each thread. On
-systems that provide C</dev/random>, the randomness device is used
+systems that provide C</dev/urandom>, the randomness device is used
to seed the PRNG transparently. However, on all other systems, the
application is responsible for seeding the PRNG by calling RAND_add()
-or RAND_load_file(3).
+or L<RAND_load_file(3)|RAND_load_file(3)>.
RAND_seed() is equivalent to RAND_add() when B<num == entropy>.
=head1 SEE ALSO
-rand(3), RAND_load_file(3), RAND_cleanup(3)
+L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<RAND_load_file(3)|RAND_load_file(3)>, L<RAND_cleanup(3)|RAND_cleanup(3)>
=head1 HISTORY