Don't list prototypes for internal functions.

[openssl.git] / doc / crypto / RAND_add.pod

diff --git a/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod b/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod
index 9eeb3993770397f9d0b983252240c060bfc96a24..927c59d4c3a582b8af08068f8b11da06169b1763 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ RAND_add, RAND_seed, RAND_screen - Add entropy to the PRNG
 
  void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
 
- void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, int entropy);
+ void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
 
  void RAND_screen(void);
 
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ increases the uncertainty about the state and makes the PRNG output
 less predictable. Suitable input comes from user interaction (random
 key presses, mouse movements) and certain hardware events. The
 B<entropy> argument is (the lower bound of) an estimate of how much
-randomness is contained in B<buf>. Details about sources of randomness
-and how to estimate their entropy can be found in the literature,
-e.g. RFC 1750.
+randomness is contained in B<buf>, measured in bytes. Details about
+sources of randomness and how to estimate their entropy can be found
+in the literature, e.g. RFC 1750.
 
 RAND_add() may be called with sensitive data such as user entered
 passwords. The seed values cannot be recovered from the PRNG output.
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state is unique for each thread. On
 systems that provide C</dev/urandom>, the randomness device is used
 to seed the PRNG transparently. However, on all other systems, the
 application is responsible for seeding the PRNG by calling RAND_add()
-or RAND_load_file(3).
+or L<RAND_load_file(3)|RAND_load_file(3)>.
 
 RAND_seed() is equivalent to RAND_add() when B<num == entropy>.
 
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ These functions do not return values.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
-rand(3), RAND_load_file(3), RAND_cleanup(3)
+L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<RAND_load_file(3)|RAND_load_file(3)>, L<RAND_cleanup(3)|RAND_cleanup(3)>
 
 =head1 HISTORY