=head1 SYNOPSIS
B<openssl> B<verify>
-[B<-CApath directory>]
+[B<-help>]
[B<-CAfile file>]
-[B<-purpose purpose>]
-[B<-policy arg>]
-[B<-ignore_critical>]
+[B<-CApath directory>]
+[B<-no-CAfile>]
+[B<-no-CApath>]
+[B<-attime timestamp>]
+[B<-check_ss_sig>]
+[B<-CRLfile file>]
+[B<-crl_download>]
[B<-crl_check>]
[B<-crl_check_all>]
-[B<-policy_check>]
+[B<-engine id>]
[B<-explicit_policy>]
+[B<-extended_crl>]
+[B<-ignore_critical>]
[B<-inhibit_any>]
[B<-inhibit_map>]
-[B<-x509_strict>]
-[B<-extended_crl>]
-[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-partial_chain>]
+[B<-policy arg>]
+[B<-policy_check>]
[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-purpose purpose>]
+[B<-suiteB_128>]
+[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
+[B<-suiteB_192>]
+[B<-trusted_first>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-untrusted file>]
-[B<-help>]
-[B<-issuer_checks>]
-[B<-attime timestamp>]
+[B<-trusted file>]
+[B<-use_deltas>]
[B<-verbose>]
+[B<-verify_depth num>]
+[B<-verify_email email>]
+[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
+[B<-verify_ip ip>]
+[B<-verify_name name>]
+[B<-x509_strict>]
+[B<-show_chain>]
[B<->]
[certificates]
-
=head1 DESCRIPTION
The B<verify> command verifies certificate chains.
=over 4
+=item B<-help>
+
+Print out a usage message.
+
+=item B<-CAfile file>
+
+A B<file> of trusted certificates.
+The file should contain one or more certificates in PEM format.
+
=item B<-CApath directory>
A directory of trusted certificates. The certificates should have names
of the B<x509> utility). Under Unix the B<c_rehash> script will automatically
create symbolic links to a directory of certificates.
-=item B<-CAfile file>
+=item B<-no-CAfile>
-A file of trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
-in PEM format concatenated together.
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
-=item B<-untrusted file>
+=item B<-no-CApath>
-A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
-in PEM format concatenated together.
+Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
-=item B<-purpose purpose>
+=item B<-attime timestamp>
-The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified,
-B<verify> will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
-Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
-B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> section for more
-information.
+Perform validation checks using time specified by B<timestamp> and not
+current system time. B<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
+01.01.1970 (UNIX time).
-=item B<-help>
+=item B<-check_ss_sig>
-Print out a usage message.
+Verify the signature on the self-signed root CA. This is disabled by default
+because it doesn't add any security.
-=item B<-verbose>
+=item B<-CRLfile file>
-Print extra information about the operations being performed.
+The B<file> should contain one or more CRLs in PEM format.
+This option can be specified more than once to include CRLs from multiple
+B<files>.
-=item B<-issuer_checks>
+=item B<-crl_download>
-Print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate of the
-current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer certificate was
-rejected. The presence of rejection messages does not itself imply that
-anything is wrong; during the normal verification process, several
-rejections may take place.
+Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate.
-=item B<-attime timestamp>
+=item B<-crl_check>
-Perform validation checks using time specified by B<timestamp> and not
-current system time. B<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
-01.01.1970 (UNIX time).
+Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
+If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
-=item B<-policy arg>
+=item B<-crl_check_all>
-Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
-RFC5280). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
-This argument can appear more than once.
+Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
+to look up valid CRLs.
-=item B<-policy_check>
+=item B<-engine id>
-Enables certificate policy processing.
+Specifying an engine B<id> will cause L<verify(1)> to attempt to load the
+specified engine.
+The engine will then be set as the default for all its supported algorithms.
+If you want to load certificates or CRLs that require engine support via any of
+the B<-trusted>, B<-untrusted> or B<-CRLfile> options, the B<-engine> option
+must be specified before those options.
=item B<-explicit_policy>
Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
+=item B<-extended_crl>
+
+Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
+signing keys.
+
+=item B<-ignore_critical>
+
+Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
+supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
+If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
+
=item B<-inhibit_any>
Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
+=item B<-partial_chain>
+
+Allow verification to succeed even if a I<complete> chain cannot be built to a
+self-signed trust-anchor, provided it is possible to construct a chain to a
+trusted certificate that might not be self-signed.
+
+=item B<-policy arg>
+
+Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
+RFC5280). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
+This argument can appear more than once.
+
+=item B<-policy_check>
+
+Enables certificate policy processing.
+
=item B<-policy_print>
Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
-=item B<-crl_check>
+=item B<-purpose purpose>
-Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
-If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
+The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified,
+B<verify> will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
+Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
+B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> section for more
+information.
-=item B<-crl_check_all>
+=item B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_192>
-Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
-to look up valid CRLs.
+enable the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128 bit or
+192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.
+See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported signature algorithms are
+reduced to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384 and only the elliptic curves
+P-256 and P-384.
-=item B<-ignore_critical>
+=item B<-trusted_first>
-Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
-supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
-If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
+When constructing the certificate chain, use the trusted certificates specified
+via B<-CAfile>, B<-CApath> or B<-trusted> before any certificates specified via
+B<-untrusted>.
+This can be useful in environments with Bridge or Cross-Certified CAs.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled.
-=item B<-x509_strict>
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
-For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken
-certificates.
+By default, unless B<-trusted_first> is specified, when building a certificate
+chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will
+attempt to replace untrusted issuer certificates with certificates from the
+trust store to see if an alternative chain can be found that is trusted.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, with B<-trusted_first> always on, this option has no
+effect.
-=item B<-extended_crl>
+=item B<-untrusted file>
-Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
-signing keys.
+A B<file> of additional untrusted certificates (intermediate issuer CAs) used
+to construct a certificate chain from the subject certificate to a trust-anchor.
+The B<file> should contain one or more certificates in PEM format.
+This option can be specified more than once to include untrusted certiificates
+from multiple B<files>.
+
+=item B<-trusted file>
+
+A B<file> of trusted certificates, which must be self-signed, unless the
+B<-partial_chain> option is specified.
+The B<file> contain one or more certificates in PEM format.
+With this option, no additional (e.g., default) certificate lists are
+consulted.
+That is, the only trust-anchors are those listed in B<file>.
+This option can be specified more than once to include trusted certificates
+from multiple B<files>.
+This option implies the B<-no-CAfile> and B<-no-CApath> options.
+This option cannot be used in combination with either of the B<-CAfile> or
+B<-CApath> options.
=item B<-use_deltas>
Enable support for delta CRLs.
-=item B<-check_ss_sig>
+=item B<-verbose>
-Verify the signature on the self-signed root CA. This is disabled by default
-because it doesn't add any security.
+Print extra information about the operations being performed.
+
+=item B<-verify_depth num>
+
+Limit the maximum depth of the certificate chain to B<num> certificates.
+
+=item B<-verify_email email>
+
+Verify if the B<email> matches the email address in Subject Alternative Name or
+the email in the subject Distinguished Name.
+
+=item B<-verify_hostname hostname>
+
+Verify if the B<hostname> matches DNS name in Subject Alternative Name or
+Common Name in the subject certificate.
+
+=item B<-verify_ip ip>
+
+Verify if the B<ip> matches the IP address in Subject Alternative Name of
+the subject certificate.
+
+=item B<-verify_name name>
+
+Use default verification policies like trust model and required certificate
+policies identified by B<name>.
+The trust model determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs are applicable
+to verifying the given certificate chain.
+See the B<-addtrust> and B<-addreject> options of the L<x509(1)> command-line
+utility.
+Supported policy names include: B<default>, B<pkcs7>, B<smime_sign>,
+B<ssl_client>, B<ssl_server>.
+These mimics the combinations of purpose and trust settings used in SSL, CMS
+and S/MIME.
+As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the trust model is inferred from the purpose when not
+specified, so the B<-verify_name> options are functionally equivalent to the
+corresponding B<-purpose> settings.
+
+=item B<-x509_strict>
+
+For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken
+certificates.
+
+=item B<-show_chain>
+
+Display information about the certificate chain that has been built (if
+successful). Certificates in the chain that came from the untrusted list will be
+flagged as "untrusted".
=item B<->
The verify operation consists of a number of separate steps.
Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate
-and ending in the root CA. It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built
-up. The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current
-certificate. If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed
-to be the root CA.
-
-The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number
-of steps. In versions of OpenSSL before 0.9.5a the first certificate whose
-subject name matched the issuer of the current certificate was assumed to be
-the issuers certificate. In OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later all certificates
-whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current certificate are
-subject to further tests. The relevant authority key identifier components
-of the current certificate (if present) must match the subject key identifier
-(if present) and issuer and serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition
-the keyUsage extension of the candidate issuer (if present) must permit
-certificate signing.
+and ending in the root CA.
+It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built up.
+The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current
+certificate.
+If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed to be the root
+CA.
+
+The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number of
+steps.
+Ater all certificates whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current
+certificate are subject to further tests.
+The relevant authority key identifier components of the current certificate (if
+present) must match the subject key identifier (if present) and issuer and
+serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition the keyUsage extension of
+the candidate issuer (if present) must permit certificate signing.
The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match
is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root CA
CA certificates. The precise extensions required are described in more detail in
the B<CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS> section of the B<x509> utility.
-The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The root
-CA should be trusted for the supplied purpose. For compatibility with previous
-versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL a certificate with no trust settings is considered
-to be valid for all purposes.
+The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The root CA
+should be trusted for the supplied purpose.
+For compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL, a certificate with no
+trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes.
The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity
period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore and notAfter
then 1 for the CA that signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text version
of the error number is presented.
-An exhaustive list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also
+An partial list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also
includes the name of the error code as defined in the header file x509_vfy.h
Some of the error codes are defined but never returned: these are described
as "unused".
the operation was successful.
+=item B<1 X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: unspecified certificate verification error>
+
+unspecified error, should not happen.
+
=item B<2 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate>
the issuer certificate of a looked up certificate could not be found. This
=item B<29 X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch>
-the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject name
-did not match the issuer name of the current certificate. Only displayed when
-the B<-issuer_checks> option is set.
+Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
+B<-issuer_checks> option.
=item B<30 X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch>
-the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject key
-identifier was present and did not match the authority key identifier current
-certificate. Only displayed when the B<-issuer_checks> option is set.
+Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
+B<-issuer_checks> option.
=item B<31 X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch>
-the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its issuer name
-and serial number was present and did not match the authority key identifier
-of the current certificate. Only displayed when the B<-issuer_checks> option is set.
+Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
+B<-issuer_checks> option.
+
+=item B<32 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN: key usage does not include certificate signing>
+
+Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
+B<-issuer_checks> option.
+
+=item B<33 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: unable to get CRL issuer certificate>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<34 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION: unhandled critical extension>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<35 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN: key usage does not include CRL signing>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<36 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION: unhandled critical CRL extension>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<37 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA: invalid non-CA certificate has CA markings>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<38 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: proxy path length constraint exceeded>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<39 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE: key usage does not include digital signature>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<40 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED: proxy certificates not allowed, please set the appropriate flag>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<41 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION: invalid or inconsistent certificate extension>
-=item B<32 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:key usage does not include certificate signing>
+TBA
-the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its keyUsage extension
-does not permit certificate signing.
+=item B<42 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION: invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<43 X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY: no explicit policy>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<44 X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE: Different CRL scope>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<45 X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE: Unsupported extension feature>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<46 X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE: RFC 3779 resource not subset of parent's resources>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<47 X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: permitted subtree violation>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<48 X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION: excluded subtree violation>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<49 X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX: name constraints minimum and maximum not supported>
+
+TBA
=item B<50 X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: application verification failure>
an application specific error. Unused.
+=item B<51 X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE: unsupported name constraint type>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<52 X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: unsupported or invalid name constraint syntax>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<53 X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: unsupported or invalid name syntax>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<54 X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR: CRL path validation error>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<55 X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP: Path Loop>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<56 X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION: Suite B: certificate version invalid>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<57 X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM: Suite B: invalid public key algorithm>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<58 X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE: Suite B: invalid ECC curve>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<59 X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM: Suite B: invalid signature algorithm>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<60 X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED: Suite B: curve not allowed for this LOS>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<61 X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256: Suite B: cannot sign P-384 with P-256>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<62 X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: Hostname mismatch>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<63 X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: Email address mismatch>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<64 X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: IP address mismatch>
+
+TBA
+
+=item B<65 X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: No matching DANE TLSA records>
+
+DANE TLSA authentication is enabled, but no TLSA records matched the
+certificate chain.
+This error is only possible in L<s_client(1)>.
+
=back
=head1 BUGS
Although the issuer checks are a considerable improvement over the old technique they still
suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP API. One consequence of this is that
trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the
-B<-CAfile> option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>. If they occur in both then only
+B<-CAfile> option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>). If they occur in both then only
the certificates in the file will be recognised.
Previous versions of OpenSSL assume certificates with matching subject name are identical and
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<x509(1)|x509(1)>
+L<x509(1)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<-show_chain> option was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+The B<-issuer_checks> option is deprecated as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 and
+is silently ignored.
=cut
+
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff