Apparently, there are still chances we have to deal with buggy pod2man versions.

[openssl.git] / demos / tunala / cb.c

diff --git a/demos/tunala/cb.c b/demos/tunala/cb.c
index ebc69bc69063e200f2408e6af24aea9d6b0f3ef7..e64983896ebb443a937ba6a635783c622cc1bc61 100644 (file)
--- a/demos/tunala/cb.c
+++ b/demos/tunala/cb.c
@@ -4,12 +4,22 @@
 
 /* For callbacks generating output, here are their file-descriptors. */
 static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_info = NULL;
+static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_verify = NULL;
+/* Output level:
+ *     0 = nothing,
+ *     1 = minimal, just errors,
+ *     2 = minimal, all steps,
+ *     3 = detail, all steps */
+static unsigned int cb_ssl_verify_level = 1;
+
+/* Other static rubbish (to mirror s_cb.c where required) */
+static int int_verify_depth = 10;
 
 /* This function is largely borrowed from the one used in OpenSSL's "s_client"
  * and "s_server" utilities. */
-void cb_ssl_info(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
+void cb_ssl_info(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
 {
-       char *str1, *str2;
+       const char *str1, *str2;
        int w;
 
        if(!fp_cb_ssl_info)
@@ -21,12 +31,18 @@ void cb_ssl_info(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
        str2 = SSL_state_string_long(s);
 
        if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
-               fprintf(stderr, "%s:%s\n", str1, str2);
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) %s\n", str1, str2);
        else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
                if (ret == 0)
-                       fprintf(stderr, "%s:failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
+                       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
+/* In a non-blocking model, we get a few of these "error"s simply because we're
+ * calling "reads" and "writes" on the state-machine that are virtual NOPs
+ * simply to avoid wasting the time seeing if we *should* call them. Removing
+ * this case makes the "-out_state" output a lot easier on the eye. */
+#if 0
                else if (ret < 0)
-                       fprintf(stderr, "%s:error in %s\n", str1, str2);
+                       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:error in %s\n", str1, str2);
+#endif
        }
 }
 
@@ -35,5 +51,93 @@ void cb_ssl_info_set_output(FILE *fp)
        fp_cb_ssl_info = fp;
 }
 
+static const char *int_reason_no_issuer = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT";
+static const char *int_reason_not_yet = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID";
+static const char *int_reason_before = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD";
+static const char *int_reason_expired = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED";
+static const char *int_reason_after = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD";
+
+/* Stolen wholesale from apps/s_cb.c :-) And since then, mutilated ... */
+int cb_ssl_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+       char buf1[256]; /* Used for the subject name */
+       char buf2[256]; /* Used for the issuer name */
+       const char *reason = NULL; /* Error reason (if any) */
+       X509 *err_cert;
+       int err, depth;
+
+       if(!fp_cb_ssl_verify || (cb_ssl_verify_level == 0))
+               return ok;
+       err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+       err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+       depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+       buf1[0] = buf2[0] = '\0';
+       /* Fill buf1 */
+       X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf1, 256);
+       /* Fill buf2 */
+       X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf2, 256);
+       switch (ctx->error) {
+       case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+               reason = int_reason_no_issuer;
+               break;
+       case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+               reason = int_reason_not_yet;
+               break;
+       case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+               reason = int_reason_before;
+               break;
+       case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+               reason = int_reason_expired;
+               break;
+       case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+               reason = int_reason_after;
+               break;
+       }
+
+       if((cb_ssl_verify_level == 1) && ok)
+               return ok;
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
+       if(reason)
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%s\n", reason);
+       else
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%d\n", err);
+       if(cb_ssl_verify_level < 3)
+               return ok;
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> subject = %s\n", buf1);
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> issuer  = %s\n", buf2);
+       if(!ok)
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
+                       X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> verify return:%d\n",ok);
+       return ok;
+}
+
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_output(FILE *fp)
+{
+       fp_cb_ssl_verify = fp;
+}
+
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(unsigned int verify_depth)
+{
+       int_verify_depth = verify_depth;
+}
+
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_level(unsigned int level)
+{
+       if(level < 4)
+               cb_ssl_verify_level = level;
+}
+
+RSA *cb_generate_tmp_rsa(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+{
+       /* TODO: Perhaps make it so our global key can be generated on-the-fly
+        * after certain intervals? */
+       static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL;
+       if(!rsa_tmp)
+               rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
+       return rsa_tmp;
+}
+
 #endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */