+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
+ return -1;
+
+ crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
+ /* Copy verify params across */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
+
+ crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
+ crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+ /* Verify CRL issuer */
+ ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Check chain is acceptable */
+
+ ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
+ err:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+/* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
+ * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
+ * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
+ * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
+ * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
+ * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
+ */
+
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
+ {
+ X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
+ cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
+ crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
+ if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
+ * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
+ * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
+ * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
+ * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
+ */
+
+
+static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
+ {
+ X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
+ int i, j;
+ if (!a || !b)
+ return 1;
+ if (a->type == 1)
+ {
+ if (!a->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
+ if (b->type == 1)
+ {
+ if (!b->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+ nm = a->dpname;
+ gens = b->name.fullname;
+ }
+ else if (b->type == 1)
+ {
+ if (!b->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+ gens = a->name.fullname;
+ nm = b->dpname;
+ }
+
+ /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
+ if (nm)
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
+ {
+ gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+ if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
+ {
+ gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
+ {
+ genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
+ if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+ }
+
+static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
+ {
+ int i;
+ X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+ /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
+ if (!dp->CRLissuer)
+ return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+ if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
+
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
+ unsigned int *preasons)
+ {
+ int i;
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+ return 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
+ {
+ DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+ if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
+ {
+ if (!crl->idp ||
+ idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
+ {
+ *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }