#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "vpm_int.h"
/* CRL score values */
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
}
#endif
+/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
+static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
+ {
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
+
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+ X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+ int i;
+ /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
+ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+ if (certs == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ /* Look for exact match */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
+ {
+ xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
+ CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ else
+ xtmp = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ return xtmp;
+ }
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
*/
/* If we are self signed, we break */
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
-
+ if (cert_self_signed(x))
+ break;
/* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
{
i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
+ if (cert_self_signed(x))
{
/* we have a self signed certificate */
if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
if (depth < num) break;
/* If we are self signed, we break */
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
+ if (cert_self_signed(x))
+ break;
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
- /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
- if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
+ i = check_trust(ctx);
+
+ /* If explicitly rejected error */
+ if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ goto end;
+ /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's
+ * a single self signed certificate in which case we've indicated
+ * an error already and set bad_chain == 1
+ */
+ if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain)
{
if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
{
if (!ok) goto end;
- /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
-
- if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
+ ok = check_id(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
if(!ok) goto end;
+ i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
+ ctx->param->flags);
+ if (i != X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ ctx->error = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
if (ctx->verify != NULL)
ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
return 1;
}
+static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
+ {
+ ctx->error = errcode;
+ ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ }
+
+static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
+ {
+ int i;
+ int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
+ unsigned char *name;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
+ {
+ name = (unsigned char *)sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
+ if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags) > 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return n == 0;
+ }
+
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
+ X509 *x = ctx->cert;
+ if (id->hosts && !check_hosts(x, id) <= 0)
+ {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0)
+ {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0)
+ {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
- return 1;
-#else
int i, ok;
- X509 *x;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
- i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
- if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
- return 1;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
- else
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- return ok;
-#endif
+ /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
+ for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+ /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
+ if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
+ * not overridden.
+ */
+ if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ {
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
+ * certificate return success.
+ */
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+ {
+ X509 *mx;
+ if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+ mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+ if (mx)
+ {
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+ X509_free(x);
+ ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
+ * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
+ */
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
X509 *x;
int ok, cnum;
+ unsigned int last_reasons;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
{
+ last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
if (ctx->get_crl)
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
crl = NULL;
dcrl = NULL;
+ /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
+ * another iteration, so exit loop.
+ */
+ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
err:
X509_CRL_free(crl);
}
else
{
+ int rv;
+ rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ ctx->error=rv;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
/* Verify CRL signature */
if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
{
* a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
* critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
*/
- if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
{
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- return 1;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok)
xs=xi;
else
{
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+ {
+ xs = xi;
+ goto check_cert;
+ }
if (n <= 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
xs->valid = 1;
+ check_cert:
ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
if (!ok)
goto end;
return 1;
}
+/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
+
+X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
+ EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
+ {
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
+ /* CRLs can't be delta already */
+ if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
+ if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Issuer names must match */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
+ X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* AKID and IDP must match */
+ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* CRLs must verify */
+ if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
+ X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Create new CRL */
+ crl = X509_CRL_new();
+ if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
+ goto memerr;
+ /* Set issuer name */
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
+
+ if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
+ * CRL number to correct value too.
+ */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
+ {
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+ ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+ if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
+ goto memerr;
+ }
+
+ /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
+
+ revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
+ {
+ X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
+ rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
+ /* Add only if not also in base.
+ * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
+ * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
+ */
+ if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
+ {
+ rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
+ if (!rvtmp)
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
+ {
+ X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
+ goto memerr;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
+
+ if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ return crl;
+
+ memerr:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (crl)
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- int i;
- X509 *x;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
- if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
- {
- x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
- return chain;
+ if (!ctx->chain)
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
}
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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