#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "vpm_int.h"
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
/* CRL score values */
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons,
/* If explicitly rejected error */
if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
goto end;
- /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
- if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+ /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's
+ * a single self signed certificate in which case we've indicated
+ * an error already and set bad_chain == 1
+ */
+ if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain)
{
if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
{
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
{
int i;
- X509 *issuer;
+ X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
{
issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
- return issuer;
+ {
+ rv = issuer;
+ if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1))
+ break;
+ }
}
- return NULL;
+ return rv;
}
/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
{
int ret;
+ if (x == issuer)
+ return cert_self_signed(x);
ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
if (ret == X509_V_OK)
{
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- return 0;
}
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
int allow_proxy_certs;
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
- /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
- -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
- use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
- 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
- used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
- 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
- all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
- */
+ /*-
+ * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+ * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+ * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+ * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
+ * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+ * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
+ * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+ */
must_be_ca = -1;
/* CRL path validation */
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
+static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
+ {
+ int i;
+ int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
+ char *name;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
+ {
+ name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
+ if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags,
+ &id->peername) > 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return n == 0;
+ }
+
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
X509 *x = ctx->cert;
- if (id->host && !X509_check_host(x, id->host, id->hostlen, 0))
+ if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0)
{
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
- if (id->email && !X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0))
+ if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0)
{
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
- if (id->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0))
+ if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0)
{
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
return 0;
return 0;
}
-/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
+/*-
+ * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
* 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
* 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
* 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
* a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
* critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
*/
- if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
{
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- return 1;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok)
return 1;
}
-static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
{
time_t *ptime;
int i;
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
+ if (quiet)
+ return 0;
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
if (i > 0)
{
+ if (quiet)
+ return 0;
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
+ if (quiet)
+ return 0;
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
if (i < 0)
{
+ if (quiet)
+ return 0;
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
xs=xi;
else
{
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0)
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
{
xs = xi;
goto check_cert;
xs->valid = 1;
check_cert:
- ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
+ ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
if (!ok)
goto end;