/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-#include <stdio.h>
+/*
+ * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/refcount.h"
#include "crypto/bn.h"
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
+#include "crypto/security_bits.h"
#include "rsa_local.h"
+static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
RSA *RSA_new(void)
{
- return RSA_new_method(NULL);
+ return rsa_new_intern(NULL, NULL);
}
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa)
}
RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
+{
+ return rsa_new_intern(engine, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+RSA *ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ return rsa_new_intern(NULL, libctx);
+}
+
+static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
{
RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (ret == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
ret->references = 1;
ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (ret->lock == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
OPENSSL_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
+ ret->libctx = libctx;
ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
if (engine) {
if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->engine = engine;
if (ret->engine) {
ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
if (ret->meth == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
goto err;
}
+#endif
if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
goto err;
}
if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
r->meth->finish(r);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
#endif
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data);
+#endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
+
+#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
+ ossl_rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
- sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
+#endif
BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
- OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data);
OPENSSL_free(r);
}
return i > 1 ? 1 : 0;
}
+OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(RSA *r)
+{
+ return r->libctx;
+}
+
+void ossl_rsa_set0_libctx(RSA *r, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ r->libctx = libctx;
+}
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg)
{
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
}
+#endif
/*
* Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic.
* NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC
* Modulus Lengths.
*
+ * Note that this formula is also referred to in SP800-56A rev3 Appendix D:
+ * for FFC safe prime groups for modp and ffdhe.
+ * After Table 25 and Table 26 it refers to
+ * "The maximum security strength estimates were calculated using the formula in
+ * Section 7.5 of the FIPS 140 IG and rounded to the nearest multiple of eight
+ * bits".
+ *
+ * The formula is:
+ *
* E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)}
* \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)}
* The two cube roots are merged together here.
*/
-uint16_t rsa_compute_security_bits(int n)
+uint16_t ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(int n)
{
uint64_t x;
uint32_t lx;
- uint16_t y;
+ uint16_t y, cap;
- /* Look for common values as listed in SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
+ /*
+ * Look for common values as listed in standards.
+ * These values are not exactly equal to the results from the formulae in
+ * the standards but are defined to be canonical.
+ */
switch (n) {
- case 2048:
+ case 2048: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
return 112;
- case 3072:
+ case 3072: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
return 128;
- case 4096:
+ case 4096: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
return 152;
- case 6144:
+ case 6144: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
return 176;
- case 8192:
+ case 7680: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
+ return 192;
+ case 8192: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
return 200;
+ case 15360: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
+ return 256;
}
+
/*
* The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs
* for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n
if (n < 8)
return 0;
+ /*
+ * To ensure that the output is non-decreasing with respect to n,
+ * a cap needs to be applied to the two values where the function over
+ * estimates the strength (according to the above fast path).
+ */
+ if (n <= 7680)
+ cap = 192;
+ else if (n <= 15360)
+ cap = 256;
+ else
+ cap = 1200;
+
x = n * (uint64_t)log_2;
lx = ilog_e(x);
y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690)
/ log_2);
- return (y + 4) & ~7;
+ y = (y + 4) & ~7;
+ if (y > cap)
+ y = cap;
+ return y;
}
+
+
int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa)
{
int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
/* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */
int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos);
- if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits))
+ if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > ossl_rsa_multip_cap(bits))
return 0;
}
- return rsa_compute_security_bits(bits);
+#endif
+ return ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(bits);
}
int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
return 1;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
/*
* Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure
* and related functions to let user pass a triplet?
old = r->prime_infos;
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
- pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
+ pinfo = ossl_rsa_multip_info_new();
if (pinfo == NULL)
goto err;
if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) {
BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else {
- rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
+ ossl_rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
goto err;
}
(void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
- if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
+ if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
r->prime_infos = old;
goto err;
}
* be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
* with other *set0* functions: just free it...
*/
- sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free);
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
}
r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
return 1;
err:
/* r, d, t should not be freed */
- sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
return 0;
}
+#endif
void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
*q = r->q;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r)
{
int pnum;
return 1;
}
+#endif
void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
*iqmp = r->iqmp;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
const BIGNUM *coeffs[])
{
return 1;
}
+#endif
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r)
{
return r->iqmp;
}
+const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r)
+{
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ return NULL;
+#else
+ return r->pss;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Internal */
+int ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(RSA *r, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss)
+{
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ return 0;
+#else
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
+ r->pss = pss;
+ return 1;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Internal */
+RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(RSA *r)
+{
+ return &r->pss_params;
+}
+
void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
{
r->flags &= ~flags;
return r->version;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r)
{
return r->engine;
return -1;
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2);
}
+#endif
DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
-int rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
- const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
- const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
+int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
+ const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
+ const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
{
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL;
+#endif
int pnum;
if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL)
sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0)))
return 0;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
old_infos = r->prime_infos;
+#endif
if (pnum > 2) {
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int i;
prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL))
goto err;
- /* Using rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */
+ /* Using ossl_rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */
if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
- if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
+ if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
r->prime_infos = old_infos;
goto err;
}
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (old_infos != NULL) {
/*
* This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
* be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
* with other *set0* functions: just free it...
*/
- sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
}
+#endif
r->version = pnum > 2 ? RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI : RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT;
r->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
err:
/* r, d, t should not be freed */
- sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
return 0;
+#endif
}
DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM)
-int rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes,
- STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps,
- STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs)
+int ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs)
{
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
int i, pnum;
+#endif
if (r == NULL)
return 0;
- pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r);
+ /* If |p| is NULL, there are no CRT parameters */
+ if (RSA_get0_p(r) == NULL)
+ return 1;
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_p(r));
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_q(r));
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmp1(r));
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmq1(r));
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, RSA_get0_iqmp(r));
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r);
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, pinfo->r);
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, pinfo->d);
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, pinfo->t);
}
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+/* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */
+static int int_set_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ /* For checks */
+ int keytype, int optype,
+ /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() */
+ const char *mdkey, const char *mdname,
+ const char *propkey, const char *mdprops)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ switch (keytype) {
+ case -1:
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
+ && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype)))
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, 0);
+ if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx) && mdprops != NULL) {
+ /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(propkey, (char *)mdprops, 0);
+ }
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
+}
+
+/* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */
+static int int_get_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ /* For checks */
+ int keytype, int optype,
+ /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() */
+ const char *mdkey,
+ char *mdname, size_t mdnamesize)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ switch (keytype) {
+ case -1:
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
+ && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype)))
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, mdnamesize);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ return evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
+ * simply because that's easier.
+ */
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode)
+{
+ return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING,
+ pad_mode, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
+ * simply because that's easier.
+ */
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode)
+{
+ return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING,
+ 0, pad_mode);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
+ * simply because that's easier.
+ */
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *mdname,
+ const char *mdprops)
+{
+ return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST, mdname,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
+ * simply because that's easier.
+ */
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+ const char *mdprops)
+{
+ return
+ int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, mdname,
+ OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name,
+ size_t namesize)
+{
+ return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST,
+ name, namesize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
+ * simply because that's easier.
+ */
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md)
+{
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
+ * simply because that's easier.
+ */
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+ const char *mdprops)
+{
+ return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, mdprops);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name,
+ size_t namesize)
+{
+ return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, name, namesize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
+ * simply because that's easier.
+ */
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *mdname)
+{
+ return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname,
+ NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
+ * simply because that's easier.
+ */
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md)
+{
+ return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL,
+ (void *)label, (size_t)llen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ if (!evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, rsa_params))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Ownership is supposed to be transfered to the callee. */
+ OPENSSL_free(label);
return 1;
}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params;
+ size_t labellen;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
+ return -1;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL,
+ (void **)label, 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params))
+ return -1;
+
+ labellen = rsa_params[0].return_size;
+ if (labellen > INT_MAX)
+ return -1;
+
+ return (int)labellen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
+ * simply because that's easier.
+ */
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * For some reason, the optype was set to this:
+ *
+ * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY
+ *
+ * However, we do use RSA-PSS with the whole gamut of diverse signature
+ * and verification operations, so the optype gets upgraded to this:
+ *
+ * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG
+ */
+ return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, saltlen, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
+ * simply because that's easier.
+ */
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * Because of circumstances, the optype is updated from:
+ *
+ * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY
+ *
+ * to:
+ *
+ * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG
+ */
+ return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, saltlen);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
+ return -1;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN,
+ &saltlen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, pad_params);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+ size_t bits2 = bits;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
+ && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
+ return -1;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS, &bits2);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp)
+{
+ int ret = RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp);
+
+ /*
+ * Satisfy memory semantics for pre-3.0 callers of
+ * EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(): their expectation is that input
+ * pubexp BIGNUM becomes managed by the EVP_PKEY_CTX on success.
+ */
+ if (ret > 0 && evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx)) {
+ BN_free(ctx->rsa_pubexp);
+ ctx->rsa_pubexp = pubexp;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * When we're dealing with a provider, there's no need to duplicate
+ * pubexp, as it gets copied when transforming to an OSSL_PARAM anyway.
+ */
+ if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx)) {
+ pubexp = BN_dup(pubexp);
+ if (pubexp == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp);
+ if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx) && ret <= 0)
+ BN_free(pubexp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int primes)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+ size_t primes2 = primes;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
+ && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
+ return -1;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PRIMES, &primes2);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
+}
+#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff