#ifndef RSA_NULL
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
- RSA_eay_public_decrypt,
- RSA_eay_private_encrypt,
+ RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
+ RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
RSA_eay_mod_exp,
- BN_mod_exp_mont,
+ BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
RSA_eay_init,
RSA_eay_finish,
- 0,
+ 0, /* flags */
NULL,
+ 0, /* rsa_sign */
+ 0 /* rsa_verify */
};
-RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
{
return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
}
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
const RSA_METHOD *meth;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
-#ifndef NO_SHA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
break;
if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
{
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx))
- goto err;
+ BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+ if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
+ {
+ rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
+ bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ if (bn_mont_ctx)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
}
-
+
if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+/* signing */
+static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
const RSA_METHOD *meth;
if (i <= 0) goto err;
if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
const RSA_METHOD *meth;
/* make data into a big number */
if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
break;
-#ifndef NO_SHA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
break;
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+/* signature verification */
+static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
const RSA_METHOD *meth;
}
if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* do the decrypt */
if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
{
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx))
- goto err;
+ BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+ if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
+ {
+ rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
+ bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ if (bn_mont_ctx)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
}
-
+
if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
{
const RSA_METHOD *meth;
- BIGNUM r1,m1;
+ BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
int ret=0;
BN_CTX *ctx;
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_init(&m1);
BN_init(&r1);
+ BN_init(&vrfy);
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
{
if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
{
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_p=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_p,rsa->p,
- ctx))
- goto err;
+ BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+ if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
+ {
+ rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
+ bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ if (bn_mont_ctx)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
}
+
if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
{
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_q=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_q,rsa->q,
- ctx))
- goto err;
+ BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+ if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
+ {
+ rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
+ bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ if (bn_mont_ctx)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
}
}
-
+
if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
+ if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
+ {
+ if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+ /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
+ * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
+ * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
+ * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
+ if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (vrfy.neg)
+ if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
+ /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+ * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
+ * mod_exp and return that instead. */
+ if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+ }
ret=1;
err:
BN_clear_free(&m1);
BN_clear_free(&r1);
+ BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return(ret);
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff