- {
- unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
- int i,ret=0,rand_err=0;
- FILE *out = NULL;
- int n;
-
-#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(WIN32)
- /* For some reason Win32 can't write to files created this way */
-
- /* chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file,
- * permissions should be restrictive from the start */
- int fd = open(file, O_CREAT, 0600);
- if (fd != -1)
- out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
-#endif
- if (out == NULL)
- out = fopen(file,"wb");
- if (out == NULL) goto err;
-
-#ifndef NO_CHMOD
- chmod(file,0600);
-#endif
- n=RAND_DATA;
- for (;;)
- {
- i=(n > BUFSIZE)?BUFSIZE:n;
- n-=BUFSIZE;
- if (RAND_bytes(buf,i) <= 0)
- rand_err=1;
- i=fwrite(buf,1,i,out);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- ret=0;
- break;
- }
- ret+=i;
- if (n <= 0) break;
- }
-#ifdef VMS
- /* Try to delete older versions of the file, until there aren't
- any */
- {
- char *tmpf;
-
- tmpf = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(file) + 4); /* to add ";-1" and a nul */
- if (tmpf)
- {
- strcpy(tmpf, file);
- strcat(tmpf, ";-1");
- while(delete(tmpf) == 0)
- ;
- rename(file,";1"); /* Make sure it's version 1, or we
- will reach the limit (32767) at
- some point... */
- }
- }
-#endif /* VMS */
-
- fclose(out);
- memset(buf,0,BUFSIZE);
-err:
- return (rand_err ? -1 : ret);
- }
-
-const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, int size)
- {
- char *s;
- char *ret=NULL;
-
- s=getenv("RANDFILE");
- if (s != NULL)
- {
- strncpy(buf,s,size-1);
- buf[size-1]='\0';
- ret=buf;
- }
- else
- {
- s=getenv("HOME");
- if (s == NULL) return(RFILE);
- if (((int)(strlen(s)+strlen(RFILE)+2)) > size)
- return(RFILE);
- strcpy(buf,s);
-#ifndef VMS
- strcat(buf,"/");
-#endif
- strcat(buf,RFILE);
- ret=buf;
- }
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
+ int i, ret = 0, rand_err = 0;
+ FILE *out = NULL;
+ int n;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+ struct stat sb;
+
+# if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR)
+# ifdef _WIN32
+ /*
+ * Check for |file| being a driver as "ASCII-safe" on Windows,
+ * because driver paths are always ASCII.
+ */
+# endif
+ i = stat(file, &sb);
+ if (i != -1) {
+ if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
+ /*
+ * this file is a device. we don't write back to it. we
+ * "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort of random
+ * device. Otherwise attempting to write to and chmod the device
+ * causes problems.
+ */
+ return 1;
+ }
+# endif
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+ {
+# ifndef O_BINARY
+# define O_BINARY 0
+# endif
+ /*
+ * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions
+ * should be restrictive from the start
+ */
+ int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600);
+ if (fd != -1)
+ out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ /*
+ * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of
+ * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all
+ * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version
+ * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race
+ * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help
+ * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares
+ * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
+ * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code
+ * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete
+ * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop
+ * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The
+ * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid
+ * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the
+ * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent
+ * rand file in a concurrent use situation.
+ */
+
+ out = openssl_fopen(file, "rb+");
+#endif
+ if (out == NULL)
+ out = openssl_fopen(file, "wb");
+ if (out == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+#if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
+ chmod(file, 0600);
+#endif
+ n = RAND_DATA;
+ for (;;) {
+ i = (n > BUFSIZE) ? BUFSIZE : n;
+ n -= BUFSIZE;
+ if (RAND_bytes(buf, i) <= 0)
+ rand_err = 1;
+ i = fwrite(buf, 1, i, out);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ ret += i;
+ if (n <= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ fclose(out);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE);
+ err:
+ return (rand_err ? -1 : ret);
+}
+
+const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *s = NULL;
+ int use_randfile = 1;
+#ifdef __OpenBSD__
+ struct stat sb;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8)
+ DWORD len;
+ WCHAR *var, *val;
+
+ if ((var = L"RANDFILE",
+ len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0
+ && (var = L"HOME", use_randfile = 0,
+ len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0
+ && (var = L"USERPROFILE",
+ len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0) {
+ var = L"SYSTEMROOT",
+ len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (len != 0) {
+ int sz;
+
+ val = _alloca(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
+
+ if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, val, len) < len
+ && (sz = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+ s = _alloca(sz);
+ if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, s, sz,
+ NULL, NULL) == 0)
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ if (OPENSSL_issetugid() != 0) {
+ use_randfile = 0;
+ } else {
+ s = getenv("RANDFILE");
+ if (s == NULL || *s == '\0') {
+ use_randfile = 0;
+ s = getenv("HOME");
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
+ if (!use_randfile && s == NULL) {
+ s = DEFAULT_HOME;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s != NULL && *s) {
+ size_t len = strlen(s);
+
+ if (use_randfile && len + 1 < size) {
+ if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size) >= size)
+ return NULL;
+ } else if (len + strlen(RFILE) + 2 < size) {
+ OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "/", size);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, RFILE, size);
+ }
+ } else {
+ buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */
+ }
+
+#ifdef __OpenBSD__
+ /*
+ * given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be seen on a
+ * stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it fails, use /dev/arandom
+ * instead. this allows the user to use their own source for good random
+ * data, but defaults to something hopefully decent if that isn't
+ * available.
+ */
+
+ if (!buf[0])
+ if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (stat(buf, &sb) == -1)
+ if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ return buf;
+}