/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include <time.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#include "internal/rand_int.h"
+#include "crypto/rand.h"
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <unistd.h>
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
+#include "rand_local.h"
#include "e_os.h"
-/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
-#define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+# include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+# include "prov/seeding.h"
-/*
- * Check for the existence and support of POSIX timers. The standard
- * says that the _POSIX_TIMERS macro will have a positive value if they
- * are available.
- *
- * However, we want an additional constraint: that the timer support does
- * not require an extra library dependency. Early versions of glibc
- * require -lrt to be specified on the link line to access the timers,
- * so this needs to be checked for.
- *
- * It is worse because some libraries define __GLIBC__ but don't
- * support the version testing macro (e.g. uClibc). This means
- * an extra check is needed.
- *
- * The final condition is:
- * "have posix timers and either not glibc or glibc without -lrt"
- *
- * The nested #if sequences are required to avoid using a parameterised
- * macro that might be undefined.
- */
-#undef OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-#if defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) && _POSIX_TIMERS > 0
-# if defined(__GLIBC__)
-# if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
-# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)
-# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# endif
-# endif
-# else
-# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
static ENGINE *funct_ref;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
-#endif
+# endif
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
-int rand_fork_count;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
-/*
- * IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code
- * because we are not sure about the amount of randomness it provides.
- * Some SP900 tests have been run, but there is internal skepticism.
- * So for now this code is not used.
- */
-# error "RDTSC enabled? Should not be possible!"
-
-/*
- * Acquire entropy from high-speed clock
- *
- * Since we get some randomness from the low-order bits of the
- * high-speed clock, it can help.
- *
- * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
- * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
- */
-size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- unsigned char c;
- int i;
-
- if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) {
- c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
- RAND_POOL_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
- }
- }
- return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
-size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
-size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+static int rand_inited = 0;
-extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
-
-/*
- * Acquire entropy using Intel-specific cpu instructions
- *
- * Uses the RDSEED instruction if available, otherwise uses
- * RDRAND if available.
- *
- * For the differences between RDSEED and RDRAND, and why RDSEED
- * is the preferred choice, see https://goo.gl/oK3KcN
- *
- * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
- * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
- */
-size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- size_t bytes_needed;
- unsigned char *buffer;
-
- bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8 /*entropy_per_byte*/);
- if (bytes_needed > 0) {
- buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-
- if (buffer != NULL) {
-
- /* If RDSEED is available, use that. */
- if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) {
- if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
- == bytes_needed)
- return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool,
- bytes_needed,
- 8 * bytes_needed);
- }
-
- /* Second choice is RDRAND. */
- if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
- if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
- == bytes_needed)
- return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool,
- bytes_needed,
- 8 * bytes_needed);
- }
-
- return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
- }
- }
-
- return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-#endif
-
-
-/*
- * Implements the get_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- * If the DRBG has a parent, then the required amount of entropy input
- * is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate().
- *
- * Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources
- * using RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy().
- *
- * If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then
- * its entropy will be used up first.
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
{
- size_t ret = 0;
- size_t entropy_available = 0;
- RAND_POOL *pool = RAND_POOL_new(entropy, min_len, max_len);
-
- if (pool == NULL)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (rand_engine_lock == NULL)
return 0;
-
- if (drbg->pool) {
- RAND_POOL_add(pool,
- RAND_POOL_buffer(drbg->pool),
- RAND_POOL_length(drbg->pool),
- RAND_POOL_entropy(drbg->pool));
- RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool);
- drbg->pool = NULL;
- }
-
- if (drbg->parent) {
- size_t bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8);
- unsigned char *buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- size_t bytes = 0;
-
- /*
- * Get random from parent, include our state as additional input.
- * Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
- * generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
- * if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
- */
- RAND_DRBG_lock(drbg->parent);
- if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent,
- buffer, bytes_needed,
- 0,
- (unsigned char *)drbg, sizeof(*drbg)) != 0)
- bytes = bytes_needed;
- RAND_DRBG_unlock(drbg->parent);
-
- entropy_available = RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- }
-
- } else {
- /* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
- entropy_available = RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(pool);
- }
-
- if (entropy_available > 0) {
- ret = RAND_POOL_length(pool);
- *pout = RAND_POOL_detach(pool);
- }
-
- RAND_POOL_free(pool);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Find a suitable system time. Start with the highest resolution source
- * and work down to the slower ones. This is added as additional data and
- * isn't counted as randomness, so any result is acceptable.
- */
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
-{
- uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
-
- if (res != 0)
- return res;
-#if defined(_WIN32)
- {
- LARGE_INTEGER t;
- FILETIME ft;
-
- if (QueryPerformanceCounter(&t) != 0)
- return t.QuadPart;
- GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ft);
- return TWO32TO64(ft.dwHighDateTime, ft.dwLowDateTime);
- }
-#elif defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
- return gethrtime();
-#elif defined(_AIX)
- {
- timebasestruct_t t;
-
- read_wall_time(&t, TIMEBASE_SZ);
- return TWO32TO64(t.tb_high, t.tb_low);
- }
-#else
-
-#if defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
- {
- struct timespec ts;
- clockid_t cid;
-
-# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
- cid = CLOCK_BOOTTIME;
-# elif defined(_POSIX_MONOTONIC_CLOCK)
- cid = CLOCK_MONOTONIC;
-# else
- cid = CLOCK_REALTIME;
-# endif
-
- if (clock_gettime(cid, &ts) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
- }
-# endif
-# if defined(__unix__) \
- || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
- {
- struct timeval tv;
-
- if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
- }
# endif
- return time(NULL);
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate additional data that can be used for the drbg. The data does
- * not need to contain entropy, but it's useful if it contains at least
- * some bits that are unpredictable.
- *
- * Returns 0 on failure.
- *
- * On success it allocates a buffer at |*pout| and returns the length of
- * the data. The buffer should get freed using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free().
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(unsigned char **pout, size_t max_len)
-{
- RAND_POOL *pool;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID thread_id;
- size_t len;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
- pid_t pid;
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
- DWORD pid;
-#endif
- uint64_t tbits;
-
- pool = RAND_POOL_new(0, 0, max_len);
- if (pool == NULL)
- return 0;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
- pid = getpid();
- RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&pid, sizeof(pid), 0);
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
- pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
- RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&pid, sizeof(pid), 0);
-#endif
-
- thread_id = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
- if (thread_id != 0)
- RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&thread_id, sizeof(thread_id), 0);
-
- tbits = get_timer_bits();
- RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&tbits, sizeof(tbits), 0);
-
- /* TODO: Use RDSEED? */
-
- len = RAND_POOL_length(pool);
- if (len != 0)
- *pout = RAND_POOL_detach(pool);
- RAND_POOL_free(pool);
-
- return len;
-}
-
-/*
- * Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- */
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
-{
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
-}
-
-void rand_fork()
-{
- rand_fork_count++;
-}
+ rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (rand_meth_lock == NULL)
+ goto err;
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
-{
- int ret = 1;
+ if (!rand_pool_init())
+ goto err;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- ret &= rand_engine_lock != NULL;
-#endif
- rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- ret &= rand_meth_lock != NULL;
+ rand_inited = 1;
+ return 1;
- return ret;
+ err:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
+ rand_meth_lock = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
+ rand_engine_lock = NULL;
+# endif
+ return 0;
}
void rand_cleanup_int(void)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
+ if (!rand_inited)
+ return;
+
if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL)
meth->cleanup();
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ rand_pool_cleanup();
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
-#endif
+ rand_engine_lock = NULL;
+# endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
+ rand_meth_lock = NULL;
+ rand_inited = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file descriptors are
+ * closed after use. This only applies to libcrypto/default provider,
+ * it does not apply to other providers.
+ */
+void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
+{
+ if (RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
+ rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep);
}
/*
*/
int RAND_poll(void)
{
- int ret = 0;
-
- RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
-
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ int ret = meth == RAND_OpenSSL();
+ RAND_POOL *pool;
- if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) {
- /* fill random pool and seed the master DRBG */
- RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
-
- if (drbg == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- RAND_DRBG_lock(drbg);
- ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
- RAND_DRBG_unlock(drbg);
-
- return ret;
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ return 0;
- } else {
+ if (!ret) {
/* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
- pool = RAND_POOL_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH,
- RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8,
- DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8));
+ pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
+ (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
+ RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
- if (RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
+ if (prov_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
goto err;
if (meth->add == NULL
- || meth->add(RAND_POOL_buffer(pool),
- RAND_POOL_length(pool),
- (RAND_POOL_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0)
+ || meth->add(rand_pool_buffer(pool),
+ rand_pool_length(pool),
+ (rand_pool_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0)
goto err;
ret = 1;
+ err:
+ rand_pool_free(pool);
}
-
-err:
- RAND_POOL_free(pool);
return ret;
}
-/*
- * The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random
- * input from various entropy sources. The pool has no knowledge about
- * whether its randomness is fed into a legacy RAND_METHOD via RAND_add()
- * or into a new style RAND_DRBG. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize the
- * random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and
- * 4) cleanup the random pool again.
- *
- * The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and
- * lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame.
- */
-struct rand_pool_st {
- unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */
- size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */
-
- size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */
- size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */
- size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */
- size_t requested_entropy; /* requested entropy count in bits */
-};
-
-/*
- * Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
- */
-
-RAND_POOL *RAND_POOL_new(int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
-{
- RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
-
- if (pool == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pool->min_len = min_len;
- pool->max_len = max_len;
-
- pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len);
- if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pool->requested_entropy = entropy;
-
- return pool;
-
-err:
- OPENSSL_free(pool);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer.
- */
-void RAND_POOL_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- if (pool == NULL)
- return;
-
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len);
- OPENSSL_free(pool);
-}
-
-/*
- * Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly).
- */
-const unsigned char *RAND_POOL_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- return pool->buffer;
-}
-
-/*
- * Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller.
- */
-size_t RAND_POOL_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- return pool->entropy;
-}
-
-/*
- * Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller.
- */
-size_t RAND_POOL_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- return pool->len;
-}
-
-/*
- * Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller.
- * It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer
- * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free().
- */
-unsigned char *RAND_POOL_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer;
- pool->buffer = NULL;
- return ret;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * If every byte of the input contains |entropy_per_bytes| bits of entropy,
- * how many bytes does one need to obtain at least |bits| bits of entropy?
- */
-#define ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(bits, entropy_per_bytes) \
- (((bits) + ((entropy_per_bytes) - 1))/(entropy_per_bytes))
-
-
-/*
- * Checks whether the |pool|'s entropy is available to the caller.
- * This is the case when entropy count and buffer length are high enough.
- * Returns
- *
- * |entropy| if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough
- * 0 otherwise
- */
-size_t RAND_POOL_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy)
- return 0;
-
- if (pool->len < pool->min_len)
- return 0;
-
- return pool->entropy;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns the (remaining) amount of entropy needed to fill
- * the random pool.
- */
-
-size_t RAND_POOL_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy)
- return pool->requested_entropy - pool->entropy;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns the number of bytes needed to fill the pool, assuming
- * the input has 'entropy_per_byte' entropy bits per byte.
- * In case of an error, 0 is returned.
- */
-
-size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_per_byte)
-{
- size_t bytes_needed;
- size_t entropy_needed = RAND_POOL_entropy_needed(pool);
-
- if (entropy_per_byte < 1 || entropy_per_byte > 8) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- bytes_needed = ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(entropy_needed, entropy_per_byte);
-
- if (bytes_needed > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- /* not enough space left */
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (pool->len < pool->min_len &&
- bytes_needed < pool->min_len - pool->len)
- /* to meet the min_len requirement */
- bytes_needed = pool->min_len - pool->len;
-
- return bytes_needed;
-}
-
-/* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */
-size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- return pool->max_len - pool->len;
-}
-
-/*
- * Add random bytes to the random pool.
- *
- * It is expected that the |buffer| contains |len| bytes of
- * random input which contains at least |entropy| bits of
- * randomness.
- *
- * Return available amount of entropy after this operation.
- * (see RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool))
- */
-size_t RAND_POOL_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
- const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
-{
- if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (len > 0) {
- memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len);
- pool->len += len;
- pool->entropy += entropy;
- }
-
- return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
-/*
- * Start to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
- *
- * Reserves the next |len| bytes for adding random bytes in-place
- * and returns a pointer to the buffer.
- * The caller is allowed to copy up to |len| bytes into the buffer.
- * If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer
- * is returned without producing an error message.
- *
- * After updating the buffer, RAND_POOL_add_end() needs to be called
- * to finish the udpate operation (see next comment).
- */
-unsigned char *RAND_POOL_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
-{
- if (len == 0)
- return NULL;
-
- if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return pool->buffer + pool->len;
-}
-
-/*
- * Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
- *
- * Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by
- * RAND_POOL_add_begin() (see previous comment).
- * It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added
- * to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness.
- * It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved.
- */
-size_t RAND_POOL_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
-{
- if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (len > 0) {
- pool->len += len;
- pool->entropy += entropy;
- }
-
- return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
{
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
return 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
funct_ref = NULL;
-#endif
+# endif
default_RAND_meth = meth;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
return 1;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE *e;
/* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */
ENGINE_finish(e);
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
}
-#else
+# else
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
-#endif
+# endif
}
tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
return tmp_meth;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE)
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
{
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock);
return 1;
}
-#endif
+# endif
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth->seed != NULL)
+ if (meth != NULL && meth->seed != NULL)
meth->seed(buf, num);
}
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth->add != NULL)
+ if (meth != NULL && meth->add != NULL)
meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
}
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0)
+int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth != NULL && meth->pseudorand != NULL)
+ return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ return -1;
+}
+# endif
+
+int RAND_status(void)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth != NULL && meth != RAND_OpenSSL())
+ return meth->status != NULL ? meth->status() : 0;
+
+ if ((drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master()) == NULL || drbg->rand == NULL)
+ return EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED;
+ return EVP_RAND_state(drbg->rand) == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY;
+}
+#else /* !FIPS_MODULE */
+
+const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* !FIPS_MODULE */
+
/*
* This function is not part of RAND_METHOD, so if we're not using
* the default method, then just call RAND_bytes(). Otherwise make
* sure we're instantiated and use the private DRBG.
*/
-int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+int RAND_priv_bytes_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
- int ret;
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth != RAND_OpenSSL())
- return RAND_bytes(buf, num);
+ if (meth != NULL && meth != RAND_OpenSSL()) {
+ if (meth->bytes != NULL)
+ return meth->bytes(buf, num);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_PRIV_BYTES_EX, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ return -1;
+ }
- drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_private();
- if (drbg == NULL)
- return 0;
+ drbg = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(ctx);
+ if (drbg != NULL)
+ return RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num);
- /* We have to lock the DRBG before generating bits from it. */
- RAND_DRBG_lock(drbg);
- ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num);
- RAND_DRBG_unlock(drbg);
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
-int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-
- if (meth->bytes != NULL)
- return meth->bytes(buf, num);
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
- return -1;
+ return RAND_priv_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
}
-#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
-int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+int RAND_bytes_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth->pseudorand != NULL)
- return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
- return -1;
-}
-#endif
+ if (meth != NULL && meth != RAND_OpenSSL()) {
+ if (meth->bytes != NULL)
+ return meth->bytes(buf, num);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES_EX, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ return -1;
+ }
-int RAND_status(void)
-{
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ drbg = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(ctx);
+ if (drbg != NULL)
+ return RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num);
- if (meth->status != NULL)
- return meth->status();
return 0;
}
+
+int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ return RAND_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
+}