Mix time into the pool to avoid repetition of the Android duplicated PID problem.

[openssl.git] / crypto / rand / md_rand.c

diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 4e581f3917318c982de9f34b6f2f34d99fdedcbf..d479aa8a7626ee31da089feb9fa2bed9d67d8da4 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@
  *
  */
 
+#define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
+
 #ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG
 # ifndef NDEBUG
 #   define NDEBUG
@@ -118,15 +120,20 @@
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
 
 #include "e_os.h"
 
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "rand_lcl.h"
 
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
 #ifdef BN_DEBUG
 # define PREDICT
 #endif
@@ -157,13 +164,14 @@ const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
 static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
 static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 static int ssleay_rand_status(void);
 
-RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
+static RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
        ssleay_rand_seed,
-       ssleay_rand_bytes,
+       ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes,
        ssleay_rand_cleanup,
        ssleay_rand_add,
        ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
@@ -340,7 +348,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
        return ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
        }
 
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
        {
        static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
        int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
@@ -352,8 +360,12 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
        pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
 #endif
+       time_t curr_time = time(NULL);
+       struct timeval tv;
        int do_stir_pool = 0;
 
+       gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+
 #ifdef PREDICT
        if (rand_predictable)
                {
@@ -481,23 +493,41 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
                if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
                        {
-                       if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid))
+                       if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,
+                                      sizeof curr_pid))
                                goto err;
                        curr_pid = 0;
                        }
 #endif
+               if (curr_time) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+                       {
+                       if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_time,
+                                      sizeof curr_time))
+                               goto err;
+                       curr_time = 0;
+                       }
+               if (tv.tv_sec) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+                       {
+                       if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&tv,
+                                      sizeof tv))
+                               goto err;
+                       tv.tv_sec = 0;
+                       }
                if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
                        goto err;
                if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
                        goto err;
 
 #ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
-               /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+               /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small
+                * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised
+                * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to
+                * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal
+                * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on
+                * security.
+                */
                if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
                        goto err;
-               /* We know that line may cause programs such as
-                  purify and valgrind to complain about use of
-                  uninitialized data.  */
 #endif
 
                k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
@@ -539,7 +569,9 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
        if (ok)
                return(1);
-       else
+       else if (pseudo)
+               return 0;
+       else 
                {
                RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
                ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
@@ -553,22 +585,16 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 
        }
 
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+       {
+       return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
+       }
+
 /* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
    unpredictable */
 static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) 
        {
-       int ret;
-       unsigned long err;
-
-       ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num);
-       if (ret == 0)
-               {
-               err = ERR_peek_error();
-               if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND &&
-                   ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED)
-                       ERR_clear_error();
-               }
-       return (ret);
+       return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
        }
 
 static int ssleay_rand_status(void)