static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
-static int parse_bags( STACK *bags, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca,
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch);
+static int parse_bags( STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+ char *keymatch);
static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca,
/* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
- if(!p12)
- {
+ if(!p12) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);
return 0;
- }
+ }
/* Allocate stack for ca certificates if needed */
- if ((ca != NULL) && (*ca == NULL))
- {
- if (!(*ca = sk_X509_new(NULL)))
- {
+ if ((ca != NULL) && (*ca == NULL)) {
+ if (!(*ca = sk_X509_new_null())) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
- }
}
+ }
if(pkey) *pkey = NULL;
if(cert) *cert = NULL;
/* Check the mac */
- if (!PKCS12_verify_mac (p12, pass, -1))
- {
+ /* If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases
+ * to determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that
+ * under PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length
+ * password are two different things...
+ */
+
+ if(!pass || !*pass) {
+ if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) pass = NULL;
+ else if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0)) pass = "";
+ else {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
goto err;
- }
+ }
if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, cert, ca))
{
err:
- if (pkey && *pkey) EVP_PKEY_free (*pkey);
- if (cert && *cert) X509_free (*cert);
- if (ca) sk_X509_pop_free (*ca, X509_free);
+ if (pkey && *pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);
+ if (cert && *cert) X509_free(*cert);
+ if (ca) sk_X509_pop_free(*ca, X509_free);
return 0;
}
static int parse_pk12 (PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
{
- STACK *asafes, *bags;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
int i, bagnid;
PKCS7 *p7;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL;
+
char keymatch = 0;
- if (!( asafes = M_PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_num (asafes); i++) {
- p7 = (PKCS7 *) sk_value (asafes, i);
+ if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num (asafes); i++) {
+ p7 = sk_PKCS7_value (asafes, i);
bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid (p7->type);
if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
- bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7data (p7);
+ bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
- bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata (p7, pass, passlen);
+ bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
} else continue;
if (!bags) {
- sk_pop_free (asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca,
&keyid, &keymatch)) {
- sk_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- sk_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
- sk_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
}
- sk_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
if (keyid) M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(keyid);
return 1;
}
-static int parse_bags (STACK *bags, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca,
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch)
+static int parse_bags (STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+ char *keymatch)
{
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_num(bags); i++) {
- if (!parse_bag((PKCS12_SAFEBAG *)sk_value (bags, i),
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
+ if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value (bags, i),
pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca, keyid,
keymatch)) return 0;
}
{
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
X509 *x509;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkey = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkey = NULL, *ckid = NULL;
ASN1_TYPE *attrib;
+ ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL;
+ if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_friendlyName)))
+ fname = attrib->value.bmpstring;
- if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_localKeyID)))
- lkey = attrib->value.octet_string;
+ if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_localKeyID))) {
+ lkey = attrib->value.octet_string;
+ ckid = lkey;
+ }
/* Check for any local key id matching (if needed) */
if (lkey && ((*keymatch & MATCH_ALL) != MATCH_ALL)) {
case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;
- if (!(p8 = M_PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))
+ if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))
return 0;
*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
case NID_certBag:
if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate )
return 1;
- if (!(x509 = M_PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag))) return 0;
+ if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag))) return 0;
+ if(ckid) X509_keyid_set1(x509, ckid->data, ckid->length);
+ if(fname) {
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);
+ if(len > 0) {
+ X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);
+ OPENSSL_free(data);
+ }
+ }
+
+
if (lkey) {
*keymatch |= MATCH_CERT;
if (cert) *cert = x509;
+ else X509_free(x509);
} else {
if(ca) sk_X509_push (*ca, x509);
else X509_free(x509);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff