Correct serious bug in AES-CBC decryption when the message length isn't

[openssl.git] / crypto / o_time.c

diff --git a/crypto/o_time.c b/crypto/o_time.c
index 723eb1b5af781927047003144bc98f554fbe2a66..785468131e10f225305feb382643561363b80807 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/o_time.c
+++ b/crypto/o_time.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result)
        {
        struct tm *ts = NULL;
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && !defined(__CYGWIN32__) && (!defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(gmtime_r)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACOSX)
+#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && !defined(__CYGWIN32__) && (!defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(gmtime_r)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACOSX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS)
        /* should return &data, but doesn't on some systems,
           so we don't even look at the return value */
        gmtime_r(timer,result);