-/* crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c */
/*
- * Written by Adam Langley (Google) for the OpenSSL project
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+
/* Copyright 2011 Google Inc.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
+#else
# include <stdint.h>
# include <string.h>
unsigned num_bytes;
/* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
- memset(b_out, 0, sizeof b_out);
+ memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) {
ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
/* As tmp[3] < 2^65, high is either 1 or 0 */
high <<= 63;
high >>= 63;
- /*-
- * high is:
- * all ones if the high word of tmp[3] is 1
- * all zeros if the high word of tmp[3] if 0 */
+ /*-
+ * high is:
+ * all ones if the high word of tmp[3] is 1
+ * all zeros if the high word of tmp[3] if 0 */
low = tmp[3];
mask = low >> 63;
- /*-
- * mask is:
- * all ones if the MSB of low is 1
- * all zeros if the MSB of low if 0 */
+ /*-
+ * mask is:
+ * all ones if the MSB of low is 1
+ * all zeros if the MSB of low if 0 */
low &= bottom63bits;
low -= kPrime3Test;
/* if low was greater than kPrime3Test then the MSB is zero */
low = ~low;
low >>= 63;
- /*-
- * low is:
- * all ones if low was > kPrime3Test
- * all zeros if low was <= kPrime3Test */
+ /*-
+ * low is:
+ * all ones if low was > kPrime3Test
+ * all zeros if low was <= kPrime3Test */
mask = (mask & low) | high;
tmp[0] -= mask & kPrime[0];
tmp[1] -= mask & kPrime[1];
felem_reduce_(out, in);
- /*-
- * out[0] > 2^100 - 2^36 - 2^4 - 3*2^64 - 3*2^96 - 2^64 - 2^96 > 0
- * out[1] > 2^100 - 2^64 - 7*2^96 > 0
- * out[2] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 5*2^64 - 5*2^96 > 0
- * out[3] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 7*2^64 - 5*2^96 - 3*2^96 > 0
- *
- * out[0] < 2^100 + 2^64 + 7*2^64 + 5*2^96 < 2^101
- * out[1] < 2^100 + 3*2^64 + 5*2^64 + 3*2^97 < 2^101
- * out[2] < 2^100 + 5*2^64 + 2^64 + 3*2^65 + 2^97 < 2^101
- * out[3] < 2^100 + 7*2^64 + 7*2^96 + 3*2^64 < 2^101
- */
+ /*-
+ * out[0] > 2^100 - 2^36 - 2^4 - 3*2^64 - 3*2^96 - 2^64 - 2^96 > 0
+ * out[1] > 2^100 - 2^64 - 7*2^96 > 0
+ * out[2] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 5*2^64 - 5*2^96 > 0
+ * out[3] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 7*2^64 - 5*2^96 - 3*2^96 > 0
+ *
+ * out[0] < 2^100 + 2^64 + 7*2^64 + 5*2^96 < 2^101
+ * out[1] < 2^100 + 3*2^64 + 5*2^64 + 3*2^97 < 2^101
+ * out[2] < 2^100 + 5*2^64 + 2^64 + 3*2^65 + 2^97 < 2^101
+ * out[3] < 2^100 + 7*2^64 + 7*2^96 + 3*2^64 < 2^101
+ */
}
/*-
felem_reduce_(out, in);
- /*-
- * out[0] > 2^105 - 2^41 - 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
- * out[1] > 2^105 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
- * out[2] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
- * out[3] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^103 > 0
- *
- * out[0] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
- * out[1] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
- * out[2] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
- * out[3] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^103 + 2^71 < 2^106
- */
+ /*-
+ * out[0] > 2^105 - 2^41 - 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
+ * out[1] > 2^105 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
+ * out[2] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
+ * out[3] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^103 > 0
+ *
+ * out[0] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
+ * out[1] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
+ * out[2] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
+ * out[3] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^103 + 2^71 < 2^106
+ */
}
/*
*
* Building on top of the field operations we have the operations on the
* elliptic curve group itself. Points on the curve are represented in Jacobian
- * coordinates */
+ * coordinates
+ */
/*-
* point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in)
* http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b
*
* Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed.
- * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested). */
+ * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested).
+ */
static void
point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in)
}
/*-
- * point_add calcuates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2)
+ * point_add calculates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2)
*
* The method is taken from:
* http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl,
* This function includes a branch for checking whether the two input points
* are equal, (while not equal to the point at infinity). This case never
* happens during single point multiplication, so there is no timing leak for
- * ECDH or ECDSA signing. */
+ * ECDH or ECDSA signing.
+ */
static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
const felem x1, const felem y1, const felem z1,
const int mixed, const smallfelem x2,
{
unsigned i, j;
u64 *outlimbs = &out[0][0];
- memset(outlimbs, 0, 3 * sizeof(smallfelem));
+
+ memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out) * 3);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
const u64 *inlimbs = (u64 *)&pre_comp[i][0][0];
u8 sign, digit;
/* set nq to the point at infinity */
- memset(nq, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem));
+ memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq));
/*
* Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples
}
/* Precomputation for the group generator. */
-typedef struct {
+struct nistp256_pre_comp_st {
smallfelem g_pre_comp[2][16][3];
- int references;
-} NISTP256_PRE_COMP;
+ CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void)
{
ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve,
ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve,
ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree,
+ ec_group_simple_order_bits,
ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant,
ec_GFp_simple_point_init,
ec_GFp_simple_point_finish,
0 /* field_div */ ,
0 /* field_encode */ ,
0 /* field_decode */ ,
- 0 /* field_set_to_one */
+ 0, /* field_set_to_one */
+ ec_key_simple_priv2oct,
+ ec_key_simple_oct2priv,
+ 0, /* set private */
+ ec_key_simple_generate_key,
+ ec_key_simple_check_key,
+ ec_key_simple_generate_public_key,
+ 0, /* keycopy */
+ 0, /* keyfinish */
+ ecdh_simple_compute_key
};
return &ret;
static NISTP256_PRE_COMP *nistp256_pre_comp_new()
{
- NISTP256_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL;
- ret = (NISTP256_PRE_COMP *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
- if (!ret) {
+ NISTP256_PRE_COMP *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+ if (ret == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return ret;
}
- memset(ret->g_pre_comp, 0, sizeof(ret->g_pre_comp));
- ret->references = 1;
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void *nistp256_pre_comp_dup(void *src_)
-{
- NISTP256_PRE_COMP *src = src_;
- /* no need to actually copy, these objects never change! */
- CRYPTO_add(&src->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP);
+ ret->references = 1;
- return src_;
+ ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
}
-static void nistp256_pre_comp_free(void *pre_)
+NISTP256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *p)
{
int i;
- NISTP256_PRE_COMP *pre = pre_;
-
- if (!pre)
- return;
-
- i = CRYPTO_add(&pre->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP);
- if (i > 0)
- return;
-
- OPENSSL_free(pre);
+ if (p != NULL)
+ CRYPTO_UP_REF(&p->references, &i, p->lock);
+ return p;
}
-static void nistp256_pre_comp_clear_free(void *pre_)
+void EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *pre)
{
int i;
- NISTP256_PRE_COMP *pre = pre_;
- if (!pre)
+ if (pre == NULL)
return;
- i = CRYPTO_add(&pre->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP);
+ CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&pre->references, &i, pre->lock);
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_nistp256", x);
if (i > 0)
return;
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof *pre);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(pre->lock);
OPENSSL_free(pre);
}
if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if (((curve_p = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
- ((curve_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
- ((curve_b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+ curve_p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ curve_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ curve_b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (curve_b == NULL)
goto err;
BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[0], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_p);
BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[1], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_a);
ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx);
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- if (new_ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
return ret;
}
EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
return 0;
}
- if ((!BN_to_felem(x_in, &point->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_in, &point->Y)) ||
- (!BN_to_felem(z1, &point->Z)))
+ if ((!BN_to_felem(x_in, point->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_in, point->Y)) ||
+ (!BN_to_felem(z1, point->Z)))
return 0;
felem_inv(z2, z1);
felem_square(tmp, z2);
BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar;
felem_bytearray g_secret;
felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
- smallfelem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
+ smallfelem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
smallfelem *tmp_smallfelems = NULL;
felem_bytearray tmp;
unsigned i, num_bytes;
if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
- ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
- ((z = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
- ((tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+ x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (tmp_scalar == NULL)
goto err;
if (scalar != NULL) {
- pre = EC_EX_DATA_get_data(group->extra_data,
- nistp256_pre_comp_dup,
- nistp256_pre_comp_free,
- nistp256_pre_comp_clear_free);
+ pre = group->pre_comp.nistp256;
if (pre)
/* we have precomputation, try to use it */
g_pre_comp = (const smallfelem(*)[16][3])pre->g_pre_comp;
*/
mixed = 1;
}
- secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
- pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(smallfelem));
+ secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+ pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
if (mixed)
tmp_smallfelems =
- OPENSSL_malloc((num_points * 17 + 1) * sizeof(smallfelem));
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*tmp_smallfelems) * (num_points * 17 + 1));
if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL)
|| (mixed && (tmp_smallfelems == NULL))) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
* we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity,
* i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination
*/
- memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
- memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(smallfelem));
+ memset(secrets, 0, sizeof(*secrets) * num_points);
+ memset(pre_comp, 0, sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points);
for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
if (i == num)
/*
* this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
* constant-timeness
*/
- if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, p_scalar, &group->order, ctx)) {
+ if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, p_scalar, group->order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp);
flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes);
/* precompute multiples */
- if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, &p->X)) ||
- (!BN_to_felem(y_out, &p->Y)) ||
- (!BN_to_felem(z_out, &p->Z)))
+ if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, p->X)) ||
+ (!BN_to_felem(y_out, p->Y)) ||
+ (!BN_to_felem(z_out, p->Z)))
goto err;
felem_shrink(pre_comp[i][1][0], x_out);
felem_shrink(pre_comp[i][1][1], y_out);
* this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
* constant-timeness
*/
- if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, &group->order, ctx)) {
+ if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, group->order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- if (generator != NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(generator);
- if (new_ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
- if (secrets != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(secrets);
- if (pre_comp != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(pre_comp);
- if (tmp_smallfelems != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(tmp_smallfelems);
+ EC_POINT_free(generator);
+ BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(secrets);
+ OPENSSL_free(pre_comp);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_smallfelems);
return ret;
}
felem x_tmp, y_tmp, z_tmp;
/* throw away old precomputation */
- EC_EX_DATA_free_data(&group->extra_data, nistp256_pre_comp_dup,
- nistp256_pre_comp_free,
- nistp256_pre_comp_clear_free);
+ EC_pre_comp_free(group);
if (ctx == NULL)
if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+ x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (y == NULL)
goto err;
/* get the generator */
if (group->generator == NULL)
*/
if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) {
memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp));
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
+ goto done;
}
- if ((!BN_to_felem(x_tmp, &group->generator->X)) ||
- (!BN_to_felem(y_tmp, &group->generator->Y)) ||
- (!BN_to_felem(z_tmp, &group->generator->Z)))
+ if ((!BN_to_felem(x_tmp, group->generator->X)) ||
+ (!BN_to_felem(y_tmp, group->generator->Y)) ||
+ (!BN_to_felem(z_tmp, group->generator->Z)))
goto err;
felem_shrink(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][0], x_tmp);
felem_shrink(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][1], y_tmp);
}
make_points_affine(31, &(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1]), tmp_smallfelems);
- if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&group->extra_data, pre, nistp256_pre_comp_dup,
- nistp256_pre_comp_free,
- nistp256_pre_comp_clear_free))
- goto err;
- ret = 1;
+ done:
+ SETPRECOMP(group, nistp256, pre);
pre = NULL;
+ ret = 1;
+
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- if (generator != NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(generator);
- if (new_ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
- if (pre)
- nistp256_pre_comp_free(pre);
+ EC_POINT_free(generator);
+ BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+ EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(pre);
return ret;
}
int ec_GFp_nistp256_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group)
{
- if (EC_EX_DATA_get_data(group->extra_data, nistp256_pre_comp_dup,
- nistp256_pre_comp_free,
- nistp256_pre_comp_clear_free)
- != NULL)
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
+ return HAVEPRECOMP(group, nistp256);
}
-#else
-static void *dummy = &dummy;
#endif
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