/*
- * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <string.h>
#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
return;
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
- if (r->meth->finish != NULL)
+ if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
r->meth->finish(r);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
return eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
}
+/*
+ * ECC Key generation.
+ * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
+ *
+ * Params:
+ * eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
+ * is stored in this object.
+ * Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
+ */
int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ok = 0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
-
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
+ const EC_GROUP *group = eckey->group;
if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
- priv_key = BN_new();
+ priv_key = BN_secure_new();
if (priv_key == NULL)
goto err;
} else
priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
- order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(eckey->group);
+ /*
+ * Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength.
+ * These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be
+ * stated in the security policy.
+ */
+
+ order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
if (order == NULL)
goto err;
+ /*
+ * Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]).
+ * Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively
+ * equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also
+ * faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing
+ * 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into
+ * rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here.
+ */
do
if (!BN_priv_rand_range(priv_key, order))
goto err;
while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
- pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+ pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto err;
} else
pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
+ /* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL))
goto err;
eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
+ priv_key = NULL;
+ pub_key = NULL;
ok = 1;
- err:
- if (eckey->pub_key == NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
- if (eckey->priv_key != priv_key)
- BN_free(priv_key);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+err:
+ /* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
+ if (!ok) {
+ BN_clear(eckey->priv_key);
+ if (eckey->pub_key != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, eckey->pub_key);
+ }
+
+ EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
+ BN_clear_free(priv_key);
return ok;
}
int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
{
+ /*
+ * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
+ * pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
+ */
return EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
}
return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey);
}
+/*
+ * Check the range of the EC public key.
+ * See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
+ * i.e.
+ * - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
+ * interval[0, p − 1], OR
+ * - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
+ * Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
+ */
+static int ec_key_public_range_check(BN_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *x, *y;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (y == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, key->pub_key, x, y, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(key->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ if (BN_is_negative(x)
+ || BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0
+ || BN_is_negative(y)
+ || BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ int m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(key->group);
+ if (BN_num_bits(x) > m || BN_num_bits(y) > m) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
+ * NOTES:
+ * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
+ * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
+ * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
+ */
int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ok = 0;
return 0;
}
+ /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
goto err;
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
+
if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
goto err;
- /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
+ /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
+ if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx, eckey)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}
- /* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */
+
order = eckey->group->order;
if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
goto err;
}
+ /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
goto err;
}
- /*
- * in case the priv_key is present : check if generator * priv_key ==
- * pub_key
- */
+
if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
- if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
+ /*
+ * 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
+ * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
+ */
+ if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
+ || BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
goto err;
}
+ /*
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
+ * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
+ */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
int ok = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- int tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
-#endif
if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
if (ty == NULL)
goto err;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
-
- if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
- is_char_two = 1;
+ if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, x, y, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx))
+ goto err;
- if (is_char_two) {
- if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
- x, y, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
- tx, ty, ctx))
- goto err;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point,
- x, y, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point,
- tx, ty, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
/*
- * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals and are less than field
- * order: if not values are out of range.
+ * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals. The range check is done
+ * inside EC_KEY_check_key().
*/
- if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)
- || (BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0)
- || (BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0)) {
+ if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
goto err;
{
size_t len;
unsigned char *buf;
+
len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0);
if (len == 0)
return 0;
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (buf == NULL)
+ if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
if (len == 0) {
OPENSSL_free(buf);
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