Correct serious bug in AES-CBC decryption when the message length isn't
[openssl.git] / crypto / des / fcrypt_b.c
index 86253bd5caec3ba785ae9e9270ffcc8f13cf7cf4..1390138787ff93e8e304922f39e25909e5de07f2 100644 (file)
 #define HPERM_OP(a,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)<<(16-(n)))^(a))&(m)),\
        (a)=(a)^(t)^(t>>(16-(n))))\
 
-void fcrypt_body(DES_LONG *out, des_key_schedule *ks, DES_LONG Eswap0,
+void fcrypt_body(DES_LONG *out, DES_key_schedule *ks, DES_LONG Eswap0,
                 DES_LONG Eswap1)
        {
        register DES_LONG l,r,t,u;
 #ifdef DES_PTR
-       register const unsigned char *des_SP=(const unsigned char *)des_SPtrans;
+       register const unsigned char *des_SP=(const unsigned char *)DES_SPtrans;
 #endif
        register DES_LONG *s;
        register int j;