/*
- * Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2007-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
*
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include "crypto/x509.h" /* for x509_set0_libctx() */
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *OSSL_CMP_MSG_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
+{
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+
+ msg = (OSSL_CMP_MSG *)ASN1_item_new_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_MSG),
+ libctx, propq);
+ if (!ossl_cmp_msg_set0_libctx(msg, libctx, propq)) {
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+ msg = NULL;
+ }
+ return msg;
+}
+
+void OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
+{
+ ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)msg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_MSG));
+}
+
+/*
+ * This should only be used if the X509 object was embedded inside another
+ * asn1 object and it needs a libctx to operate.
+ * Use OSSL_CMP_MSG_new() instead if possible.
+ */
+int ossl_cmp_msg_set0_libctx(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+ const char *propq)
+{
+ if (msg != NULL) {
+ msg->libctx = libctx;
+ OPENSSL_free(msg->propq);
+ msg->propq = NULL;
+ if (propq != NULL) {
+ msg->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq);
+ if (msg->propq == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
return 1;
}
-int ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
+int OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
return -1;
return msg->body->type;
}
+X509_PUBKEY *OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_certreq_publickey(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
+{
+ const OSSL_CRMF_MSGS *reqs;
+ const OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm;
+ const OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE *tmpl;
+ X509_PUBKEY *pubkey;
+
+ switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) {
+ case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
+ case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
+ case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
+ reqs = msg->body->value.ir; /* value.ir is same for cr and kur */
+ if ((crm = sk_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_value(reqs, 0)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_CERTREQMSG_NOT_FOUND);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((tmpl = OSSL_CRMF_MSG_get0_tmpl(crm)) == NULL
+ || (pubkey = OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_get0_publicKey(tmpl)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CRMF_R_POPO_MISSING_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return pubkey;
+ default:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PKIBODY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
/* Add an extension to the referenced extension stack, which may be NULL */
static int add1_extension(X509_EXTENSIONS **pexts, int nid, int crit, void *ex)
{
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
return NULL;
- if ((msg = OSSL_CMP_MSG_new()) == NULL)
+ if ((msg = OSSL_CMP_MSG_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_init(ctx, msg->header)
|| !ossl_cmp_msg_set_bodytype(msg, bodytype))
(sk_GENERAL_NAME_num((ctx)->subjectAltNames) > 0 \
|| OSSL_CMP_CTX_reqExtensions_have_SAN(ctx) == 1)
-static const X509_NAME *determine_subj(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
- const X509_NAME *ref_subj,
- int for_KUR)
+static const X509_NAME *determine_subj(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int for_KUR,
+ const X509_NAME *ref_subj)
{
if (ctx->subjectName != NULL)
- return ctx->subjectName;
-
- if (ref_subj != NULL && (for_KUR || !HAS_SAN(ctx)))
+ return IS_NULL_DN(ctx->subjectName) ? NULL : ctx->subjectName;
+ if (ctx->p10CSR != NULL) /* first default is from any given CSR */
+ return X509_REQ_get_subject_name(ctx->p10CSR);
+ if (for_KUR || !HAS_SAN(ctx))
/*
- * For KUR, copy subject from the reference.
+ * For KUR, copy subject from any reference cert as fallback.
* For IR or CR, do the same only if there is no subjectAltName.
*/
return ref_subj;
OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm = NULL;
X509 *refcert = ctx->oldCert != NULL ? ctx->oldCert : ctx->cert;
/* refcert defaults to current client cert */
- EVP_PKEY *rkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 0);
+ EVP_PKEY *rkey = ossl_cmp_ctx_get0_newPubkey(ctx);
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *default_sans = NULL;
const X509_NAME *ref_subj =
- ctx->p10CSR != NULL ? X509_REQ_get_subject_name(ctx->p10CSR) :
refcert != NULL ? X509_get_subject_name(refcert) : NULL;
- const X509_NAME *subject = determine_subj(ctx, ref_subj, for_KUR);
+ const X509_NAME *subject = determine_subj(ctx, for_KUR, ref_subj);
const X509_NAME *issuer = ctx->issuer != NULL || refcert == NULL
- ? ctx->issuer : X509_get_issuer_name(refcert);
+ ? (IS_NULL_DN(ctx->issuer) ? NULL : ctx->issuer)
+ : X509_get_issuer_name(refcert);
int crit = ctx->setSubjectAltNameCritical || subject == NULL;
/* RFC5280: subjectAltName MUST be critical if subject is null */
X509_EXTENSIONS *exts = NULL;
- if (rkey == NULL && ctx->p10CSR != NULL)
- rkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(ctx->p10CSR);
- if (rkey == NULL)
- rkey = ctx->pkey; /* default is independent of ctx->oldCert */
if (rkey == NULL) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PUBLIC_KEY);
return NULL;
#endif
}
}
/* extensions */
- if (refcert != NULL && !ctx->SubjectAltName_nodefault)
- default_sans = X509V3_get_d2i(X509_get0_extensions(refcert),
- NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
if (ctx->p10CSR != NULL
&& (exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(ctx->p10CSR)) == NULL)
goto err;
+ if (!ctx->SubjectAltName_nodefault && !HAS_SAN(ctx) && refcert != NULL
+ && (default_sans = X509V3_get_d2i(X509_get0_extensions(refcert),
+ NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL))
+ != NULL
+ && !add1_extension(&exts, NID_subject_alt_name, crit, default_sans))
+ goto err;
if (ctx->reqExtensions != NULL /* augment/override existing ones */
&& !add_extensions(&exts, ctx->reqExtensions))
goto err;
&& !add1_extension(&exts, NID_subject_alt_name,
crit, ctx->subjectAltNames))
goto err;
- if (!HAS_SAN(ctx) && default_sans != NULL
- && !add1_extension(&exts, NID_subject_alt_name, crit, default_sans))
- goto err;
if (ctx->policies != NULL
&& !add1_extension(&exts, NID_certificate_policies,
ctx->setPoliciesCritical, ctx->policies))
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
+ if (type == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR && crm != NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, type)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR) {
EVP_PKEY *privkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
- /*
- * privkey is NULL in case ctx->newPkey does not include a private key.
- * We then may try to use ctx->pkey as fallback/default, but only
- * if ctx-> newPkey does not include a (non-matching) public key:
- */
- if (privkey == NULL && OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 0) == NULL)
- privkey = ctx->pkey; /* default is independent of ctx->oldCert */
- if (ctx->popoMethod == OSSL_CRMF_POPO_SIGNATURE && privkey == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ /* privkey is ctx->newPkey (if private, else NULL) or ctx->pkey */
+ if (ctx->popoMethod >= OSSL_CRMF_POPO_SIGNATURE && privkey == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY_FOR_POPO);
goto err;
}
if (crm == NULL) {
if (!sk_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push(msg->body->value.ir, local_crm))
goto err;
local_crm = NULL;
- /* TODO: here optional 2nd certreqmsg could be pushed to the stack */
}
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certrep_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype,
- int certReqId, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
- X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
- STACK_OF(X509) *caPubs, int encrypted,
+ int certReqId, const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
+ X509 *cert, const X509 *encryption_recip,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain, STACK_OF(X509) *caPubs,
int unprotectedErrors)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_CERTREPMESSAGE *repMsg = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *resp = NULL;
- int status = -1;
+ int status = OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_unspecified;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && si != NULL))
return NULL;
status = ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_status(resp->status);
if (status != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection
&& status != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_waiting && cert != NULL) {
- if (encrypted) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
+ if (encryption_recip != NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_push(repMsg->response, resp))
goto err;
resp = NULL;
- /* TODO: here optional 2nd certrep could be pushed to the stack */
if (bodytype == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP && caPubs != NULL
&& (repMsg->caPubs = X509_chain_up_ref(caPubs)) == NULL)
goto err;
- if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
- msg->extraCerts = sk_X509_new_reserve(NULL, sk_X509_num(chain));
- if (msg->extraCerts == NULL
- || !X509_add_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain,
- X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP))
- goto err;
- }
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0
+ && !ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&msg->extraCerts, chain,
+ X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP))
+ goto err;
if (!unprotectedErrors
|| ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_status(si) != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection)
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_rr_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+ const X509_NAME *issuer = NULL;
+ const X509_NAME *subject = NULL;
+ const ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS *rd;
int ret;
- if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && (ctx->oldCert != NULL
- || ctx->p10CSR != NULL)))
+ if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL
+ && (ctx->oldCert != NULL || ctx->p10CSR != NULL
+ || (ctx->serialNumber != NULL && ctx->issuer != NULL))))
return NULL;
if ((rd = OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
+ if (ctx->serialNumber != NULL && ctx->issuer != NULL) {
+ issuer = ctx->issuer;
+ serialNumber = ctx->serialNumber;
+ } else if (ctx->oldCert != NULL) {
+ issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->oldCert);
+ serialNumber = X509_get0_serialNumber(ctx->oldCert);
+ } else if (ctx->p10CSR != NULL) {
+ pubkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(ctx->p10CSR);
+ subject = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(ctx->p10CSR);
+ } else {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* Fill the template from the contents of the certificate to be revoked */
- ret = ctx->oldCert != NULL
- ? OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_fill(rd->certDetails,
- NULL /* pubkey would be redundant */,
- NULL /* subject would be redundant */,
- X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->oldCert),
- X509_get0_serialNumber(ctx->oldCert))
- : OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_fill(rd->certDetails,
- X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(ctx->p10CSR),
- X509_REQ_get_subject_name(ctx->p10CSR),
- NULL, NULL);
+ ret = OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_fill(rd->certDetails, pubkey, subject,
+ issuer, serialNumber);
if (!ret)
goto err;
if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS_push(msg->body->value.rr, rd))
goto err;
rd = NULL;
-
- /*
- * TODO: the Revocation Passphrase according to section 5.3.19.9 could be
- * set here if set in ctx
- */
+ /* Revocation Passphrase according to section 5.3.19.9 could be set here */
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
goto err;
return NULL;
}
-OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_rp_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
- OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid, int unprot_err)
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_rp_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
+ const OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid, int unprotectedErrors)
{
OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rep = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si1 = NULL;
}
}
- if (!unprot_err
+ if (!unprotectedErrors
|| ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_status(si) != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection)
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
goto err;
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && itav != NULL))
return 0;
- bodytype = ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg);
+ bodytype = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg);
if (bodytype != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENM
&& bodytype != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENP) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
}
/*
- * Creates a new General Message/Response with an empty itav stack
+ * Creates a new General Message/Response with a copy of the given itav stack
* returns a pointer to the PKIMessage on success, NULL on error
*/
static OSSL_CMP_MSG *gen_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, body_type)) == NULL)
return NULL;
- if (ctx->genm_ITAVs != NULL
- && !ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push1_ITAVs(msg, itavs))
+ if (itavs != NULL && !ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push1_ITAVs(msg, itavs))
goto err;
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENP, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_GENP);
}
-OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_error_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
- int errorCode,
- const char *details, int unprotected)
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_error_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
+ int64_t errorCode, const char *details,
+ int unprotected)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+ const char *lib = NULL, *reason = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *ft;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && si != NULL))
if ((msg->body->value.error->pKIStatusInfo = OSSL_CMP_PKISI_dup(si))
== NULL)
goto err;
- if (errorCode >= 0) {
- if ((msg->body->value.error->errorCode = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(msg->body->value.error->errorCode, errorCode))
- goto err;
+ if ((msg->body->value.error->errorCode = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(msg->body->value.error->errorCode, errorCode))
+ goto err;
+ if (errorCode > 0
+ && (uint64_t)errorCode < ((uint64_t)ERR_SYSTEM_FLAG << 1)) {
+ lib = ERR_lib_error_string((unsigned long)errorCode);
+ reason = ERR_reason_error_string((unsigned long)errorCode);
}
- if (details != NULL) {
+ if (lib != NULL || reason != NULL || details != NULL) {
if ((ft = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
msg->body->value.error->errorDetails = ft;
- if (!ossl_cmp_sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_push_str(ft, details))
+ if (lib != NULL && *lib != '\0'
+ && !ossl_cmp_sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_push_str(ft, lib, -1))
+ goto err;
+ if (reason != NULL && *reason != '\0'
+ && !ossl_cmp_sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_push_str(ft, reason, -1))
+ goto err;
+ if (details != NULL
+ && !ossl_cmp_sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_push_str(ft, details, -1))
goto err;
}
return 1;
}
-/*
- * TODO: handle potential 2nd certificate when signing and encrypting
- * certificates have been requested/received
- */
-OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certConf_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int fail_info,
- const char *text)
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certConf_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int certReqId,
+ int fail_info, const char *text)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS *certStatus = NULL;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ int is_fallback;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *certHash = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_PKISI *sinfo;
- if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && ctx->newCert != NULL))
+ if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && ctx->newCert != NULL
+ && (certReqId == OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID
+ || certReqId == OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID_NONE)))
return NULL;
if ((unsigned)fail_info > OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_MAX_BIT_PATTERN) {
if ((certStatus = OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
/* consume certStatus into msg right away so it gets deallocated with msg */
- if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_push(msg->body->value.certConf, certStatus))
+ if (sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_push(msg->body->value.certConf, certStatus) < 1) {
+ OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_free(certStatus);
goto err;
+ }
+
/* set the ID of the certReq */
- if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(certStatus->certReqId, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID))
+ if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(certStatus->certReqId, certReqId))
goto err;
+
+ certStatus->hashAlg = NULL;
/*
- * the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
- * as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
+ * The hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
+ * as is used to create and verify the certificate signature.
+ * If not available, a fallback hash algorithm is used.
*/
- if ((certHash = X509_digest_sig(ctx->newCert)) == NULL)
+ if ((certHash = X509_digest_sig(ctx->newCert, &md, &is_fallback)) == NULL)
goto err;
+ if (is_fallback) {
+ if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_set_pvno(msg->header, OSSL_CMP_PVNO_3))
+ goto err;
+ if ((certStatus->hashAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ X509_ALGOR_set_md(certStatus->hashAlg, md);
+ }
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
if (!ossl_cmp_certstatus_set0_certHash(certStatus, certHash))
goto err;
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREQ)) == NULL)
goto err;
- /* TODO: support multiple cert request IDs to poll */
if ((preq = OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ_new()) == NULL
|| !ASN1_INTEGER_set(preq->certReqId, crid)
|| !sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ_push(msg->body->value.pollReq, preq))
{
int trid;
- if (rid == -1)
+ if (rid == OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID_NONE)
return 1;
trid = ossl_cmp_asn1_get_int(certReqId);
-
- if (trid == -1) {
+ if (trid <= OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID_INVALID) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_BAD_REQUEST_ID);
return 0;
}
/*-
* Retrieve the newly enrolled certificate from the given certResponse crep.
- * In case of indirect POPO uses the libctx and propq from ctx and private key.
+ * Uses libctx and propq from ctx, in case of indirect POPO also private key.
* Returns a pointer to a copy of the found certificate, or NULL if not found.
*/
-X509 *ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep,
- const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+X509 *ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
+ const OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep)
{
OSSL_CMP_CERTORENCCERT *coec;
X509 *crt = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
if (!ossl_assert(crep != NULL && ctx != NULL))
return NULL;
break;
case OSSL_CMP_CERTORENCCERT_ENCRYPTEDCERT:
/* cert encrypted for indirect PoP; RFC 4210, 5.2.8.2 */
+ pkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
+ /* pkey is ctx->newPkey (if private, else NULL) or ctx->pkey */
if (pkey == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
return NULL;
if (crt == NULL)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
else
- (void)x509_set0_libctx(crt, ctx->libctx, ctx->propq);
+ (void)ossl_x509_set0_libctx(crt, ctx->libctx, ctx->propq);
return crt;
}
|| ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg);
}
-OSSL_CMP_MSG *OSSL_CMP_MSG_read(const char *file)
+int OSSL_CMP_MSG_update_recipNonce(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
- OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+ if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL || msg->header == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->recipNonce == NULL) /* nothing to do for 1st msg in transaction */
+ return 1;
+ if (!ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1(&msg->header->recipNonce,
+ ctx->recipNonce))
+ return 0;
+ return msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL || ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg);
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *OSSL_CMP_MSG_read(const char *file, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+ const char *propq)
+{
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg;
BIO *bio = NULL;
if (file == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
- if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "rb")) == NULL)
+ msg = OSSL_CMP_MSG_new(libctx, propq);
+ if (msg == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, ERR_R_CMP_LIB);
return NULL;
- msg = d2i_OSSL_CMP_MSG_bio(bio, NULL);
+ }
+
+ if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "rb")) == NULL
+ || d2i_OSSL_CMP_MSG_bio(bio, &msg) == NULL) {
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+ msg = NULL;
+ }
BIO_free(bio);
return msg;
}
return res;
}
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *d2i_OSSL_CMP_MSG(OSSL_CMP_MSG **msg, const unsigned char **in,
+ long len)
+{
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
+ const char *propq = NULL;
+
+ if (msg != NULL && *msg != NULL) {
+ libctx = (*msg)->libctx;
+ propq = (*msg)->propq;
+ }
+
+ return (OSSL_CMP_MSG *)ASN1_item_d2i_ex((ASN1_VALUE **)msg, in, len,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_MSG),
+ libctx, propq);
+}
+
+int i2d_OSSL_CMP_MSG(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, unsigned char **out)
+{
+ return ASN1_item_i2d((const ASN1_VALUE *)msg, out,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_MSG));
+}
+
OSSL_CMP_MSG *d2i_OSSL_CMP_MSG_bio(BIO *bio, OSSL_CMP_MSG **msg)
{
- return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(OSSL_CMP_MSG, OSSL_CMP_MSG_new,
- d2i_OSSL_CMP_MSG, bio, msg);
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
+ const char *propq = NULL;
+
+ if (msg != NULL && *msg != NULL) {
+ libctx = (*msg)->libctx;
+ propq = (*msg)->propq;
+ }
+
+ return ASN1_item_d2i_bio_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_MSG), bio, msg, libctx,
+ propq);
}
int i2d_OSSL_CMP_MSG_bio(BIO *bio, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(OSSL_CMP_MSG, i2d_OSSL_CMP_MSG, bio, msg);
}
+
+int ossl_cmp_is_error_with_waiting(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
+{
+ if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ return (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_ERROR
+ && ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_status(msg->body->value.error->pKIStatusInfo)
+ == OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_waiting);
+}