OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 0.9.8m (?) and 1.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *)
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
+
+ *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
+ SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
+ g, A, B < N to SRP code.
+
+ Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
+ Group for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3512)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
+ TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
+ is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
+ downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
+ higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
+
+ Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
+ researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3511)
+ [David Benjamin]
+
+ *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
+ to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
+ with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
+ ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
+
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3510)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
+ to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3507)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
+ processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3506)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
+ whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
+ can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
+ this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3505)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
+ session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
+ up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
+
+ Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3509)
+ [Gabor Tyukasz]
+
+ *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
+ dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
+ properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+
+ Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
+ discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-5139)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
+ X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
+ from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
+ output to the attacker.
+
+ Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3508)
+ [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+ for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
+
+ *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
+ handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
+ SSL/TLS clients and servers.
+
+ Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
+ researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
+ [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
+ OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
+ in a DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-0221)
+ [Imre Rad, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
+ be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
+ client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
+ code on a vulnerable client or server.
+
+ Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+ [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
+ are subject to a denial of service attack.
+
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
+ [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
+ compilation flags.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
+ in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+ *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+ can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+ server.
+
+ Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+ Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+ preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+ ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+ by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+ Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+ flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+ [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+ *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+
+ Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
+ TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
+ less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
+ is at least 512 bytes long.
+
+ [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+ *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
+ handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
+ Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
+ (CVE-2013-4353)
+
+ *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
+ structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
+ to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+ avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+ Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+ several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
+ is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+ 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+ [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
+ supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
+ [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
+ ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
+ Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for discovering
+ and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
+ <wolfgang.ettlinger@gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2012-2686)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make openssl verify return errors.
+ [Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
+ if renegotiating.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
+ 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
+ approved.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
+ 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
+ mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
+ SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
+ TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
+ 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+ will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
+ inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
+ in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
+ disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
+ protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
+ that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
+ above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
+ SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
+ client side.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
+ record length exceeds 255 bytes.
+
+ 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
+ hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
+ 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
+ the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+ set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
+ -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
+ Most broken servers should now work.
+ 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
+ TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
+ STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP
+ and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when
+ OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular
+ those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect
+ the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate
+ support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA
+ encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum pemitted
+ client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy
+ and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats.
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>]
+
+ *) Add support for SCTP.
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>]
+
+ *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+ [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
+
+ *) Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably:
+
+ - x86[_64]: AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support;
+ - x86[_64]: SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES);
+ - x86_64: bit-sliced AES implementation;
+ - ARM: NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations;
+ - s390x: z196 support;
+ - *: GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations;
+
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup
+ (removal of unnecessary code)
+ [Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>]
+
+ *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705.
+ [Eric Rescorla]
+
+ *) Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764.
+ [Eric Rescorla]
+
+ *) Add Next Protocol Negotiation,
+ http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be
+ disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated
+ by Google.
+ [Adam Langley <agl@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224,
+ NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on
+ typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type __uint128_t is
+ required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds).
+ Code made available under Apache License version 2.0.
+
+ Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command
+ line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or
+ "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs:
+
+ EC_GFp_nistp224_method()
+ EC_GFp_nistp256_method()
+ EC_GFp_nistp521_method()
+
+ EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
+ EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
+ implementations).
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
+ all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
+ header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional
+ signature parameters can be passed using this option and in
+ particular PSS.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the
+ appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the
+ corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines.
+ New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised
+ EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on
+ the appropriate parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function
+ to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1
+ handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used.
+ Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked
+ against a number of sample certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs.
+ [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser <lists@kaiser.cx>]
+
+ *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method
+ can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump.
+
+ More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful
+ information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature
+ parameters r, s.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing
+ RFC3211.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This
+ neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required
+ for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as
+ password based CMS).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Session-handling fixes:
+ - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID,
+ but also support Session Tickets.
+ - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client
+ presented a ticket with an expired session.
+ - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable.
+ - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information.
+ - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets.
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix PSK session representation.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Intel.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split
+ the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record)
+ portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and
+ RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to inlclude GCM and
+ add a special AESGCM string for GCM only.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation
+ field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support.
+ As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for
+ versions of TLS earlier than 1.2.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method
+ as unset and return the appopriate default but do *not* set the default.
+ This means we can return the appopriate method in applications that
+ swicth between FIPS and non-FIPS modes.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an
+ ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we
+ keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities.
+ [Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>, Ben Laurie and Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use
+ FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not
+ all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen,
+ encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt
+ to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want
+ to use them can use the private_* version instead.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o
+ for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical
+ order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first.
+ This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers
+ and enable MD5.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying
+ FIPS modules versions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache
+ of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use
+ until after the certificate request message is received.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms
+ extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature
+ format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for
+ TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch
+ to new signature format when needed using client digest preference.
+ All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client
+ support yet and no support for client certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch
+ to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based
+ ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with
+ TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete
+ SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods
+ and version checking.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled
+ with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal
+ structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application
+ to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add SRP support.
+ [Tom Wu <tjw@cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function
+ SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated().
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>]
+
+ *) Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used
+ automatically instead of needing explicit application support.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705.
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only
+ a few changes are required:
+
+ Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag.
+ Add TLSv1_1 methods.
+ Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1.
+ Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code).
+ Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ (This is a backport)
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+ to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+ in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+ content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+ needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+ old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+ an MMA defence is not necessary.
+ Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
+ client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+ Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+ Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+ preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+ [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+ of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+ which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+ the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+ differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+ paper describing this attack can be found at:
+ http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+ <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+ for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+ *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+ (CVE-2011-4576)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+ Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+ Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027)
+ [Andrey Kulikov <amdeich@gmail.com>]
+
+ *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+ Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+ and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+ [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+ *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+ [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
+
+ *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+ interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+ BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+ threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+ This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+ lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+ BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+ the last update always remained unused).
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
+ [Bob Buckholz (Google)]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]
+
+ *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted
+ by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. (CVE-2011-3207)
+ [Kaspar Brand <ossl@velox.ch>]
+
+ *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
+ for multi-threaded use of ECDH. (CVE-2011-3210)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check
+ signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead.
+ Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
+ by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
+
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
+
+ [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0c and 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]
+
+ *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
+ [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
+ escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
+ ambiguous.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0b and 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]
+
+ *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
+ and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
+ Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
+ Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
+ Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0a and 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]
+
+ *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
+ overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
+ be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix WIN32 build system to correctly link an ENGINE directory into
+ a DLL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.0a [01 Jun 2010]
+
+ *) Check return value of int_rsa_verify in pkey_rsa_verifyrecover
+ (CVE-2010-1633)
+ [Steve Henson, Peter-Michael Hager <hager@dortmund.net>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]
*) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher
context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in
*) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to
output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL.
[Willy Weisz <weisz@vcpc.univie.ac.at>]
-
+
*) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the
compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining
it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm.
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
- Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]
+ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ (This is a backport)
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+ to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the
+ 'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
+ int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by
+ rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
+ [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+ in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+ content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+ needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+ old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+ an MMA defence is not necessary.
+ Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
+ client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+ Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+ Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+ preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+ [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+ of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+ which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+ the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+ differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+ paper describing this attack can be found at:
+ http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+ <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+ for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+ *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
+ [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
+
+ *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+ (CVE-2011-4576)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+ Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+ Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+ Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+ and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+ [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+ *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+ interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+ BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+ threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+ This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+ lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+ BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+ the last update always remained unused).
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
+ for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
+ by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
+
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
+
+ [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]
+
+ *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
+ [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
+ escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
+ ambiguous.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]
+
+ *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
+ and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
+ Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
+ Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
+ Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]
+
+ *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
+ overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
+ be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
+ the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of
+ some broken encodings work correctly.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT
+ is also one of the inputs.
+ [Emilia Käsper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
+
+ *) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist.
+ Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only
+ after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add
+ etc are non-op.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 1.0.0.]
+
+ *) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory
+ access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742)
+ [Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen <intercommit@gmail.com>]
+
+ *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more
+ common in certificates and some applications which only call
+ SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) VMS fixes:
+ Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com
+ Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com
+ Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com
+ [Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
+
+ *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
+ update s->server with a new major version number. As of
+ - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type,
+ - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits,
+ the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when
+ receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload
+ protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740)
+ [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>]
+
+ *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL
+ could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted).
+ [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]
+
+ *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245)
+ [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta]
*) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to
accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!).