Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only
+ a few changes are required:
+
+ Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag.
+ Add TLSv1_1 methods.
+ Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1.
+ Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code).
+ Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Experiemental password based recipient info support for CMS library:
+ implementing RFC3211.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This
neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required
for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as
Changes between 0.9.8l (?) and 0.9.8m (?) [xx XXX xxxx]
- *) Implement
- https://svn.resiprocate.org/rep/ietf-drafts/ekr/draft-rescorla-tls-renegotiate.txt. Re-enable
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
+ connect (but not renegotiate) with servers which do not support RI.
+ Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
+ a no_renegotiation alert as required by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation.
+ Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully
+ when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled
+ this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never
+ receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal
+ error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well
+ expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server
+ denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
+ peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer
+ renegotiation support in s_client/s_server.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with
+ the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Implement draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation. Re-enable
renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately,
SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a
bad idea. It has been replaced by
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
know what you are doing.
- [Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> and Ben Laurie]
+ [Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Ben Laurie, Steve Henson]
*) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when
issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during