New option to enable/disable connection to unpatched servers

[openssl.git] / CHANGES

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 40319bcd02cf6114997925e5d2970aea94a87454..8041501448369fb58ac0408456bef1cd28f14133 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,16 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.1.0  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only
+     a few changes are required:
+
+       Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag.
+       Add TLSv1_1 methods.
+       Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1.
+       Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code).
+       Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) Experiemental password based recipient info support for CMS library:
      implementing RFC3211.
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -853,19 +863,42 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.8l (?) and 0.9.8m (?)  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
+     connect (but not renegotiate) with servers which do not support RI.
+     Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
+     a no_renegotiation alert as required by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation.
+     Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully
+     when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled
+     this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never
+     receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal 
+     error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well
+     expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server
+     denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
+     peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer
+     renegotiation support in s_client/s_server.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with
      the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
      [Steve Henson]
 
-  *) Implement
-     https://svn.resiprocate.org/rep/ietf-drafts/ekr/draft-rescorla-tls-renegotiate.txt. Re-enable
+  *) Implement draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation. Re-enable
      renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately,
      SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a
      bad idea. It has been replaced by
      SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
      SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
      know what you are doing.
-     [Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> and Ben Laurie]
+     [Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Ben Laurie, Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when
      issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during