Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_diff to find the difference in days
+ and seconds between two tm structures. This will be used to provide
+ additional functionality for ASN1_TIME.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional
+ signature parameters can be passed using this option and in
+ particular PSS.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the
+ appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the
+ corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines.
+ New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised
+ EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on
+ the appropriate parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function
+ to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1
+ handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used.
+ Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked
+ against a number of sample certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs.
+ [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser <lists@kaiser.cx>]
+
+ *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method
+ can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump.
+
+ More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful
+ information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature
+ parameters r, s.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
+ trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs.
+ OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
+ intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
+ setting is used: whether to trust or reject.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification
+ parameters by name.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial CMAC implementation. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, API MAY CHANGE.
+ Add CMAC pkey methods.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Experiemental regnegotiation in s_server -www mode. If the client
+ browses /reneg connection is renegotiated. If /renegcert it is
+ renegotiated requesting a certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) Add an "external" session cache for debugging purposes to s_server. This
should help trace issues which normally are only apparent in deployed
multi-process servers.
whose return value is often ignored.
[Steve Henson]
- Changes between 0.9.8m (?) and 1.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher
+ context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in
+ case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality.
+ [Steve Henson]
*) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative.
[Steve Henson]
it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., <openssl/cast.h>): a CAST_KEY doesn't
- change when encrypting or decrypting.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
*) Add load_crls() function to apps tidying load_certs() too. Add option
to verify utility to allow additional CRLs to be included.
[Steve Henson]
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more
+ common in certificates and some applications which only call
+ SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
- Changes between 0.9.8l (?) and 0.9.8m (?) [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
+ update s->server with a new major version number. As of
+ - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type,
+ - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits,
+ the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when
+ receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload
+ protection is active. (CVE-2010-####)
+ [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley]
- *) The code that handled flusing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the
+ *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL
+ could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted).
+ [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]
+
+ *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245)
+ [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta]
+
+ *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to
+ accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause
+ excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround
+ include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the
BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused
the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can
trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions
CVE-2009-4355.
[Steve Henson]
+ *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., <openssl/cast.h>): a CAST_KEY doesn't
+ change when encrypting or decrypting.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
*) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
- connect (but not renegotiate) with servers which do not support RI.
+ connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI.
Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
[Steve Henson]
[Steve Henson]
*) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
- a no_renegotiation alert as required by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation.
- Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully
- when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled
- this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never
- receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal
- error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well
- expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server
- denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+ a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating
+ TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive
+ the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang
+ waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a
+ received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because
+ applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed
+ and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the
+ only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Implement draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03. Re-enable
- renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately,
- SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a
- bad idea. It has been replaced by
+ *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension
+ as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
know what you are doing.