+ Changes between 0.9.8l (?) and 0.9.8m (?) [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the
+ highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way
+ off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while...
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the
+ ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications
+ call CRYPTO_free_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when
+ restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later.
+ This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and
+ has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and
+ CVE-2009-4355.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
+ connect (but not renegotiate) with servers which do not support RI.
+ Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
+ a no_renegotiation alert as required by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation.
+ Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully
+ when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled
+ this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never
+ receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal
+ error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well
+ expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server
+ denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
+ peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer
+ renegotiation support in s_client/s_server.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with
+ the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Implement draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03. Re-enable
+ renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately,
+ SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a
+ bad idea. It has been replaced by
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
+ know what you are doing.
+ [Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Ben Laurie, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when
+ issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during
+ servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting
+ stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if
+ a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello
+ (several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in
+ the handshake.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(),
+ CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error
+ fixes for a few places where the return code is not checked
+ correctly.
+ [Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>]
+
+ *) Add --strict-warnings option to Configure script to include devteam
+ warnings in other configurations.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for --libdir option and LIBDIR variable in makefiles. This
+ makes it possible to install openssl libraries in locations which
+ have names other than "lib", for example "/usr/lib64" which some
+ systems need.
+ [Steve Henson, based on patch from Jeremy Utley]
+
+ *) Don't allow the use of leading 0x80 in OIDs. This is a violation of
+ X690 8.9.12 and can produce some misleading textual output of OIDs.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Dan Kaminsky]
+
+ *) Delete MD2 from algorithm tables. This follows the recommendation in
+ several standards that it is not used in new applications due to
+ several cryptographic weaknesses. For binary compatibility reasons
+ the MD2 API is still compiled in by default.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add compression id to {d2i,i2d}_SSL_SESSION so it is correctly saved
+ and restored.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Rename uni2asc and asc2uni functions to OPENSSL_uni2asc and
+ OPENSSL_asc2uni conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name
+ clash.
+ [Guenter <lists@gknw.net>]
+
+ *) Fix the server certificate chain building code to use X509_verify_cert(),
+ it used to have an ad-hoc builder which was unable to cope with anything
+ other than a simple chain.
+ [David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert()
+ by default (a flag can override this): it just wastes time without
+ adding any security. As a useful side effect self signed root CAs
+ with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message
+ is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory
+ allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack
+ with sending out of seq handshake messages until there is no memory
+ left. Additionally every future messege was buffered, even if the
+ sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake.
+ So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be
+ buffered. (CVE-2009-1378)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz]
+
+ *) Records are buffered if they arrive with a future epoch to be
+ processed after finishing the corresponding handshake. There is
+ currently no limitation to this buffer allowing an attacker to perform
+ a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no
+ memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to detemine
+ the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries.
+ (CVE-2009-1377)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz]
+
+ *) Keep a copy of frag->msg_header.frag_len so it can be used after the
+ parent structure is freed. (CVE-2009-1379)
+ [Daniel Mentz]
+
+ *) Handle non-blocking I/O properly in SSL_shutdown() call.
+ [Darryl Miles <darryl-mailinglists@netbauds.net>]
+
+ *) Add 2.5.4.* OIDs
+ [Ilya O. <vrghost@gmail.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]
+
+ *) Disable renegotiation completely - this fixes a severe security
+ problem (CVE-2009-3555) at the cost of breaking all
+ renegotiation. Renegotiation can be re-enabled by setting
+ SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION in s3->flags at
+ run-time. This is really not recommended unless you know what
+ you're doing.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]
+
+ *) Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by
+ underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in
+ zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789)
+ [Paolo Ganci <Paolo.Ganci@AdNovum.CH>]
+
+ *) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not
+ checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to
+ appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591)
+ [Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com>]
+
+ *) Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This
+ prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have
+ a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Set S/MIME signing as the default purpose rather than setting it
+ unconditionally. This allows applications to override it at the store
+ level.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Permit restricted recursion of ASN1 strings. This is needed in practice
+ to handle some structures.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Improve efficiency of mem_gets: don't search whole buffer each time
+ for a '\n'
+ [Jeremy Shapiro <jnshapir@us.ibm.com>]
+
+ *) New -hex option for openssl rand.
+ [Matthieu Herrb]
+
+ *) Print out UTF8String and NumericString when parsing ASN1.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support NumericString type for name components.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Allow CC in the environment to override the automatically chosen
+ compiler. Note that nothing is done to ensure flags work with the
+ chosen compiler.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j [07 Jan 2009]
+
+ *) Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values
+ (CVE-2008-5077).
+ [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Enable TLS extensions by default.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Allow the CHIL engine to be loaded, whether the application is
+ multithreaded or not. (This does not release the developer from the
+ obligation to set up the dynamic locking callbacks.)
+ [Sander Temme <sander@temme.net>]
+
+ *) Use correct exit code if there is an error in dgst command.
+ [Steve Henson; problem pointed out by Roland Dirlewanger]
+
+ *) Tweak Configure so that you need to say "experimental-jpake" to enable
+ JPAKE, and need to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE in applications.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add experimental JPAKE support, including demo authentication in
+ s_client and s_server.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Set the comparison function in v3_addr_canonize().
+ [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+ *) Add support for XMPP STARTTLS in s_client.
+ [Philip Paeps <philip@freebsd.org>]
+
+ *) Change the server-side SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG behavior
+ to ensure that even with this option, only ciphersuites in the
+ server's preference list will be accepted. (Note that the option
+ applies only when resuming a session, so the earlier behavior was
+ just about the algorithm choice for symmetric cryptography.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i [15 Sep 2008]
+
+ *) Fix NULL pointer dereference if a DTLS server received
+ ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386).
+ [PR #1679]
+
+ *) Fix a state transitition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c
+ (was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...).
+ [Nagendra Modadugu]
+
+ *) The fix in 0.9.8c that supposedly got rid of unsafe
+ double-checked locking was incomplete for RSA blinding,
+ addressing just one layer of what turns out to have been
+ doubly unsafe triple-checked locking.
+
+ So now fix this for real by retiring the MONT_HELPER macro
+ in crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c.
+
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Marius Schilder]
+
+ *) Various precautionary measures:
+
+ - Avoid size_t integer overflow in HASH_UPDATE (md32_common.h).
+
+ - Avoid a buffer overflow in d2i_SSL_SESSION() (ssl_asn1.c).
+ (NB: This would require knowledge of the secret session ticket key
+ to exploit, in which case you'd be SOL either way.)
+
+ - Change bn_nist.c so that it will properly handle input BIGNUMs
+ outside the expected range.
+
+ - Enforce the 'num' check in BN_div() (bn_div.c) for non-BN_DEBUG
+ builds.
+
+ [Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Allow engines to be "soft loaded" - i.e. optionally don't die if
+ the load fails. Useful for distros.
+ [Ben Laurie and the FreeBSD team]