If we really get a situation where the underlying mtu is less than the minimum

[openssl.git] / CHANGES

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index d90febcd514fb1fe8c5e5f4197fb17bbbc623921..066c279046be9c058263b98c94d4bf87f647da49 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.1.0  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Increased the minimal RSA keysize from 256 to 512 bits [Rich Salz],
+     done while fixing the error code for the key-too-small case.
+     [Annie Yousar <a.yousar@informatik.hu-berlin.de>]
+
   *) Experimental support for a new, fast, unbiased prime candidate generator,
      bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(). Not currently used by any prime generator.
      [Felix Laurie von Massenbach <felix@erbridge.co.uk>]
@@ -303,14 +307,7 @@
      whose return value is often ignored. 
      [Steve Henson]
 
- Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
-
-   *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
-      ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
-      the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
-      reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
-      announced in the initial ServerHello.
-      [Emilia Käsper]
+ Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
 
   *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64
      (other platforms pending).
@@ -634,11 +631,26 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+   *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
+      version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
+      version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
+      sanity and breaks all known clients.
+      [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
+
+   *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
+      early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
+      renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
+      [Emilia Käsper]
+
    *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
       ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
       the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
       reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
       announced in the initial ServerHello.
+
+      Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
+      was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+      ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
       [Emilia Käsper]
 
  Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]