2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
388 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
391 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
392 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
393 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
394 * lists in the first place.
395 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
396 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
397 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
399 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
400 const unsigned char **pcurves,
403 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
406 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
407 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
411 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
412 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
414 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
415 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
419 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
420 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
424 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
425 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
429 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
430 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
434 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
435 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
439 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
448 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
453 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
454 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
456 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
459 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
460 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
462 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
463 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
464 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
467 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
470 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
471 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
473 const unsigned char *curves;
474 size_t num_curves, i;
475 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
476 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
478 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
481 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
484 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
486 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
489 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
491 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
494 else /* Should never happen */
497 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
499 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
501 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
502 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
507 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
508 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
512 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
514 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
515 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
517 /* Can't do anything on client side */
524 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
525 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
528 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
529 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
530 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
531 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
532 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
533 /* Should never happen */
536 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
540 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
541 * but s->options is a long...
543 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
546 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
550 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
552 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
553 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
555 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
557 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
561 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
562 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
573 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
574 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
576 unsigned char *clist, *p;
578 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
579 * while curve ids < 32
581 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
582 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
585 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
587 unsigned long idmask;
589 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
591 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
602 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
606 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
611 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
614 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
616 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
620 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
622 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
624 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
626 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
627 if (nid == NID_undef)
628 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
629 if (nid == NID_undef)
630 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
631 if (nid == NID_undef)
633 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
634 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
636 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
639 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
640 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
645 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
649 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
651 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
652 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
657 const EC_METHOD *meth;
660 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
661 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
664 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
667 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
671 /* Determine curve ID */
672 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
673 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
674 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
678 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
690 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
692 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
695 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
697 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
700 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
704 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
705 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
706 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
708 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
709 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
711 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
712 * is supported (see RFC4492).
714 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
716 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
717 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
718 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
720 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
723 if (i == num_formats)
728 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
729 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
731 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
733 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
735 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
736 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
741 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
748 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
751 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
753 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
755 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
756 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
760 *pformats = ecformats_default;
761 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
763 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
765 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
769 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
770 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
772 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
774 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
777 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
780 /* If not EC nothing to do */
781 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
786 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
790 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
791 * supported curves extension.
793 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
796 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
797 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
799 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
806 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
807 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
808 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
809 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
810 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
812 return 0; /* Should never happen */
813 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
814 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
816 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
820 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
821 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
823 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
828 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
829 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
831 unsigned char curve_id[2];
832 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
833 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
834 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
835 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
838 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
839 * no other curves permitted.
843 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
844 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
845 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
846 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
847 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
851 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
852 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
854 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
855 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
857 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
860 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
863 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
865 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
871 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
873 /* Need a shared curve */
874 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
880 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
885 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
887 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
891 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
897 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
902 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
906 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
907 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
910 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
911 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
913 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
916 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
917 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
919 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
922 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
923 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
925 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
928 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
929 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
930 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
931 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
933 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
935 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
936 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
939 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
940 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
943 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
947 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
948 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
949 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
952 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
954 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
958 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
960 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
961 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
962 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
964 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
965 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
968 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
969 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
973 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
974 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
976 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
977 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
979 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
981 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
982 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
986 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
987 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
990 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
991 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
993 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
994 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
996 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
997 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
998 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
999 /* Should never happen */
1002 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1003 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1009 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1011 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1012 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1013 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1015 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1020 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1025 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1027 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1030 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1034 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1036 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1039 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1047 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1051 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1052 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1053 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1055 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1058 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1059 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1064 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1070 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1071 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1072 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1078 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1081 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1082 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1086 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1087 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1088 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1089 * session and not global settings.
1092 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1097 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1098 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1099 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1102 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1103 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1104 * signature algorithms.
1106 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1107 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1108 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1109 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1110 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1111 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1113 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1115 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1116 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1120 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1121 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1123 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1124 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1126 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1128 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1130 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1131 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1137 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1140 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1142 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1145 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1147 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1149 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1152 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1155 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1156 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1158 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1160 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1163 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1164 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1166 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1168 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1170 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1171 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1172 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1173 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1184 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1186 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1191 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1197 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1199 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1202 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1211 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1214 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1216 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1217 unsigned long size_str;
1220 /* check for enough space.
1221 4 for the servername type and entension length
1222 2 for servernamelist length
1223 1 for the hostname type
1224 2 for hostname length
1228 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1229 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1232 /* extension type and length */
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1234 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1236 /* length of servername list */
1237 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1239 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1240 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1242 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1247 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1248 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1249 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1251 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1252 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1258 /* check for enough space.
1259 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1260 1 for the srp user identity
1261 + srp user identity length
1263 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1265 /* fill in the extension */
1266 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1267 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1268 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1269 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1277 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1279 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1280 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1282 unsigned char *etmp;
1284 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1286 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1287 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1288 if (num_formats > 255)
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1294 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1295 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1296 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1297 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1298 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1301 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1302 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1303 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1306 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1307 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1308 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1315 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1317 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1318 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
1320 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1322 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1323 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1327 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1329 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1330 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1331 ret += curves_list_len;
1333 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1335 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1338 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1339 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1340 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1341 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1343 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1344 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1345 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1347 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1348 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1350 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1354 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1355 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1357 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1360 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1365 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1371 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1374 const unsigned char *salg;
1375 unsigned char *etmp;
1376 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1377 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1379 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1381 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1383 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1384 /* Fill in lengths */
1385 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1390 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1391 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1393 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1395 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1397 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1400 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1403 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1408 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1411 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1415 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1417 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1418 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1424 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1426 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1433 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1434 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1435 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1437 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1438 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1440 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1442 /* save position of id len */
1443 unsigned char *q = ret;
1444 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1445 /* skip over id len */
1447 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1453 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1457 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1458 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1463 * 1: peer may send requests
1464 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1466 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1467 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1469 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1473 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1475 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1476 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1477 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1479 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1484 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1486 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1489 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1490 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1491 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1492 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1493 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1496 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1500 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1502 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1504 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1507 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1514 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1515 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1516 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1518 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1519 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1523 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1524 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1526 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1527 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1529 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1531 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1532 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1533 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1534 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1536 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1538 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1540 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1546 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1548 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1555 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1558 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1562 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1565 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1566 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1568 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1571 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1572 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1573 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1574 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1578 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1580 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1584 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1592 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1595 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1604 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1605 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1608 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1610 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1612 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1619 const unsigned char *plist;
1621 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1624 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1626 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1627 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1635 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1636 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1637 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1641 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1642 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1644 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1646 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1651 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1653 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1654 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1658 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1659 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1661 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1663 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1665 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1668 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1671 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1676 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1680 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1682 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1684 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1687 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1695 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1696 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1697 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1698 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1699 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1700 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1701 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1702 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1703 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1704 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1705 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1711 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1712 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1714 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1716 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1719 * 1: peer may send requests
1720 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1722 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1723 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1725 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1731 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1732 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1733 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1735 const unsigned char *npa;
1736 unsigned int npalen;
1739 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1740 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1742 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1743 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1745 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1747 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1751 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1753 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1754 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1756 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4
1757 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1759 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1760 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1761 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1764 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1770 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1772 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1773 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1775 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1777 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1781 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1787 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1790 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1794 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1796 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1797 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1798 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1801 * returns: 0 on success. */
1802 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1803 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1807 const unsigned char *selected;
1808 unsigned char selected_len;
1811 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1817 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1818 * length-prefixed strings. */
1819 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1820 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1829 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1831 proto_len = data[i];
1837 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1843 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1844 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1845 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1846 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1847 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1848 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1849 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1851 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1854 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1855 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1860 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1865 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1866 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1867 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1872 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1873 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1874 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1875 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1877 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1878 unsigned short type, size;
1879 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1880 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1881 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1882 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1883 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1884 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1885 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1887 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1888 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1889 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1890 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1893 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1894 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1895 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1896 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1897 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1898 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1899 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1900 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1901 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1902 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1905 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1914 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1917 if (data+size > d+n)
1921 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1923 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1924 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1926 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1928 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1930 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1935 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1937 if (data + len != d+n)
1939 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1943 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1945 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1948 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1950 unsigned short type;
1951 unsigned short size;
1953 unsigned char *data = *p;
1954 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1956 s->servername_done = 0;
1957 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1959 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1962 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1964 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1965 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1969 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1970 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1974 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1975 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1976 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1978 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1979 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1981 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1982 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1985 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1986 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1989 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1993 if (data > (d+n-len))
1996 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2001 if (data+size > (d+n))
2004 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2006 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2007 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2008 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2009 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2011 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2013 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2015 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2017 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2019 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2020 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2021 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2022 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2023 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2024 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2025 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2026 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2027 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2028 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2029 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2030 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2031 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2032 the value of the Host: field.
2033 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2034 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2035 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2036 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2040 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2042 unsigned char *sdata;
2048 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2055 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2062 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2071 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2072 switch (servname_type)
2074 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2077 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2084 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2087 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2089 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2092 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2093 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2094 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2095 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2096 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2097 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2100 s->servername_done = 1;
2104 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2105 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2106 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2118 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2124 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2126 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2128 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2133 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2136 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2138 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2139 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2141 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2143 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2152 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2153 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2155 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2156 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2158 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2163 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2165 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2166 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2168 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2169 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2171 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2174 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2175 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2178 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2179 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2180 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2181 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2182 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2185 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2187 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2188 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2189 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2191 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2192 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2193 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2194 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2196 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2201 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2203 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2207 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2209 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2212 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2213 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2216 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2217 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2218 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2219 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2220 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2223 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2224 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2225 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2227 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2231 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2235 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2241 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2242 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2243 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2244 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2246 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2247 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2249 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2254 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2256 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2257 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2259 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2263 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2266 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2268 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2273 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2275 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2278 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2293 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2295 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2297 const unsigned char *sdata;
2299 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2304 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2317 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2321 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2330 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2335 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2336 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2339 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2340 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2341 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2343 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2344 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2347 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2348 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2350 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2351 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2356 /* Read in request_extensions */
2359 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2372 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2374 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2375 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2378 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2379 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2381 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2382 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2384 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2389 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2393 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2396 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2400 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2401 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2403 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2404 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2405 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2407 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2413 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2414 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2415 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2417 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2420 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2421 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2422 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2423 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2424 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2425 * anything like that, but this might change).
2427 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2428 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2429 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2430 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2431 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2432 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2436 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2437 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2438 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2440 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2443 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2444 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2448 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2449 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2450 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2452 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2456 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2458 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2460 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2461 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2462 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2463 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2464 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2468 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2479 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2481 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2482 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2484 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2486 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2493 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2496 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2497 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2499 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2503 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2512 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2513 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2514 * the length of the block. */
2515 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2517 unsigned int off = 0;
2531 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2533 unsigned short length;
2534 unsigned short type;
2535 unsigned short size;
2536 unsigned char *data = *p;
2537 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2538 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2541 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2543 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2545 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2547 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2548 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2552 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2553 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2556 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2557 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2560 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2564 if (data+length != d+n)
2566 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2570 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2575 if (data+size > (d+n))
2578 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2579 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2580 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2583 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2585 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2587 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2589 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2591 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2593 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2595 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2598 tlsext_servername = 1;
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2602 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2604 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2605 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2607 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2609 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2614 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2615 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2616 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2618 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2621 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2622 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2625 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2626 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2627 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2628 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2629 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2632 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2634 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2636 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2637 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2639 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2642 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2647 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2649 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2650 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2652 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2656 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2659 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2660 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2662 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2666 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2667 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2668 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2669 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2671 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2673 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2675 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2680 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2682 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2683 * a status request message.
2685 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2687 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2690 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2691 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2694 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2695 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2697 unsigned char *selected;
2698 unsigned char selected_len;
2700 /* We must have requested it. */
2701 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2703 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2706 /* The data must be valid */
2707 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2709 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2712 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2714 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2717 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2718 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2720 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2723 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2724 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2725 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2729 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2733 /* We must have requested it. */
2734 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2736 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2741 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2744 /* The extension data consists of:
2745 * uint16 list_length
2746 * uint8 proto_length;
2747 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2751 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2753 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2757 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2759 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2762 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2763 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2764 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2765 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2767 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2770 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2771 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2774 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2778 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2779 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2781 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2782 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2783 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2785 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2790 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2792 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2796 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2797 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2799 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2800 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2801 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2802 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2805 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2806 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2808 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2816 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2820 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2822 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2824 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2826 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2827 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2829 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2835 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2845 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2846 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2847 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2848 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2849 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2850 * absence on initial connect only.
2852 if (!renegotiate_seen
2853 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2854 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2856 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2858 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2866 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2869 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2873 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2875 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2880 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2882 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2883 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2885 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2886 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2888 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2889 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2894 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2898 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2899 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2906 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2911 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2913 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2914 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2917 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2918 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2920 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2921 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2925 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2926 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2927 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2928 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2930 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2932 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2933 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2934 * so this has to happen here in
2935 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2939 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2941 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2944 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2945 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2950 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2951 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2952 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2954 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2956 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2957 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2959 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2960 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2962 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2963 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2965 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2966 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2968 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2969 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2972 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2976 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2978 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2979 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2980 * abort the handshake.
2982 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2983 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2991 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2992 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2995 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2996 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2999 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3000 s->servername_done=0;
3006 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3010 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3011 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3013 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3014 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3016 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3017 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3019 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3020 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3023 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3024 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3026 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3029 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3030 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3033 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3034 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3037 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3038 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3043 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3046 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3050 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3052 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3055 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3056 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3057 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3058 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3060 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3063 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3064 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3065 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3066 if (certpkey == NULL)
3068 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3071 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3072 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3074 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3075 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3078 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3079 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3080 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3082 /* status request response should be sent */
3083 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3084 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3085 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3087 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3089 /* something bad happened */
3090 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3091 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3092 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3097 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3102 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3103 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3106 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3107 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3115 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3117 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3118 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3121 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3122 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3123 * it must contain uncompressed.
3125 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3126 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3127 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3128 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3129 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3131 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3133 unsigned char *list;
3134 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3135 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3136 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3138 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3140 found_uncompressed = 1;
3144 if (!found_uncompressed)
3146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3150 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3151 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3153 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3154 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3155 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3156 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3158 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3159 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3161 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3162 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3164 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3166 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3167 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3170 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3171 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3172 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3173 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3175 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3176 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3181 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3184 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3185 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3188 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3189 * there is no response.
3191 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3193 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3194 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3196 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3197 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3200 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3201 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3205 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3206 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3212 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3213 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3216 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3217 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3220 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3221 s->servername_done=0;
3227 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3230 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3232 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3234 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3238 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3246 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3247 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3248 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3250 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3251 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3252 * extension, if any.
3253 * len: the length of the session ID.
3254 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3255 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3256 * point to the resulting session.
3258 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3259 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3260 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3263 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3264 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3265 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3266 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3267 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3268 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3269 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3272 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3273 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3274 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3275 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3276 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3277 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3279 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3280 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3282 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3283 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3287 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3289 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3290 * to permit stateful resumption.
3292 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3294 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3298 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3306 /* Skip past cipher list */
3311 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3316 /* Now at start of extensions */
3317 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3320 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3322 unsigned short type, size;
3325 if (p + size > limit)
3327 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3332 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3333 * currently have one. */
3334 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3337 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3339 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3340 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3341 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3342 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3343 * calculate the master secret later. */
3346 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3349 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3350 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3352 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3354 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3355 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3357 default: /* fatal error */
3366 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3368 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3369 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3370 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3371 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3372 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3373 * point to the resulting session.
3376 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3377 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3378 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3379 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3381 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3382 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3383 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3386 unsigned char *sdec;
3387 const unsigned char *p;
3388 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3389 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3392 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3393 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3396 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3397 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3398 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3399 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3401 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3402 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3413 /* Check key name matches */
3414 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3416 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3417 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3418 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3419 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3421 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3422 * integrity checks on ticket.
3424 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3427 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3431 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3432 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3433 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3434 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3435 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3437 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3440 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3441 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3442 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3443 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3444 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3447 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3450 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3451 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3453 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3461 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3465 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3466 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3467 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3468 * as required by standard.
3471 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3472 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3480 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3485 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3493 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3494 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3495 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3496 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3497 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3498 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3499 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3502 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3503 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3504 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3505 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3508 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3511 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3513 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3519 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3522 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3524 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3525 return table[i].nid;
3530 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3535 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3536 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3539 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3542 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3543 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3547 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3549 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3550 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3557 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3560 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3561 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3564 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3566 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3569 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3571 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3572 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3573 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3575 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3576 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3578 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3579 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3580 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3582 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3583 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3587 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3591 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3593 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3596 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3598 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3599 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3600 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3603 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3604 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3606 return inf->mfunc();
3609 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3614 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3615 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3618 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3619 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3622 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3623 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3629 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3630 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3631 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3633 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3634 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3636 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3638 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3639 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3641 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3643 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3645 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3646 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3648 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3652 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3653 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3654 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3656 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3659 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3660 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3662 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3663 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3664 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3666 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3667 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3669 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3670 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3673 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3674 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3675 * then RSA is disabled.
3678 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3680 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3681 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3682 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3683 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3684 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3685 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3688 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3689 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3694 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3695 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3700 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3701 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3706 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3707 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3714 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3716 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3718 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3721 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3722 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3724 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3726 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3728 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3730 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3731 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3734 return tmpout - out;
3737 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3738 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3739 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3740 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3742 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3743 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3744 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3746 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3747 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3749 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3751 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3756 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3757 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3758 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3760 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3771 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3772 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3774 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3775 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3777 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3779 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3780 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3782 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3783 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3785 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3786 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3788 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3789 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3791 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3793 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3794 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3797 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3798 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3802 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3803 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3809 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3810 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3812 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3815 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3818 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3819 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3820 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3825 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3827 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3830 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3831 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3833 /* Should never happen */
3837 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3838 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3839 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3840 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3842 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3843 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3847 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3853 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3854 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3857 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3858 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3860 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3861 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3863 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3865 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3867 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3870 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3871 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3872 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3873 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3874 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3876 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3877 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3883 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3884 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3886 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3887 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3889 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3890 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3891 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3892 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3894 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3895 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3900 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3901 * use the certificate for signing.
3903 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3905 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3906 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3909 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3910 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3913 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3915 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3916 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3920 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3921 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3928 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3929 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3930 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3932 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3938 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3945 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3947 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3950 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3951 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3952 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3954 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3955 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3959 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3961 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3963 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3965 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3967 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3968 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3974 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3976 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3977 unsigned short hbtype;
3978 unsigned int payload;
3979 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3981 if (s->msg_callback)
3982 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3983 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3984 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3986 /* Read type and payload length first */
3987 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3988 return 0; /* silently discard */
3991 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3992 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3995 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3997 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4000 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4001 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4002 * payload, plus padding
4004 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4007 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4008 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4010 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4012 /* Random padding */
4013 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4015 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4017 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4018 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4019 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4020 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4022 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4027 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4031 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4032 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4033 * sequence number */
4036 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4039 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4047 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4049 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4051 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4052 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4054 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4055 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4056 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4062 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4063 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4069 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4070 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4076 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4077 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4079 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4081 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4082 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4083 * some random stuff.
4084 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4085 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4086 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4087 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4090 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4093 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4094 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4096 /* Sequence number */
4097 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4098 /* 16 random bytes */
4099 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4101 /* Random padding */
4102 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4104 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4107 if (s->msg_callback)
4108 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4109 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4110 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4112 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4121 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4126 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4129 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4131 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4134 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4135 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4137 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4139 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4141 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4149 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4150 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4151 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4152 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4153 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4154 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4157 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4158 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4159 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4160 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4163 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4165 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4166 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4169 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4170 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4174 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4175 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4176 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4180 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4184 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4187 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4189 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4194 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4195 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4197 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4199 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4200 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4201 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4202 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4204 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4212 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4213 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4214 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4215 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4219 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4220 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4221 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4222 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4228 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4232 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4236 if (default_nid == -1)
4238 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4240 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4241 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4242 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4246 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4247 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4251 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4252 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4254 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4260 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4261 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4262 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4263 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4266 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4268 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4269 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4270 /* Strict mode flags */
4271 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4272 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4273 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4275 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4280 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4281 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4283 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4284 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4287 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4291 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4294 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4296 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4298 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4299 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4302 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4303 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4304 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4306 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4307 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4316 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4319 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4320 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4321 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4323 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4331 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4332 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4333 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4334 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4335 else if (!check_flags)
4339 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4340 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4343 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4346 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4347 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4349 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4354 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4355 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4356 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4357 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4358 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4361 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4362 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4363 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4364 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4368 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4369 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4377 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4378 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4381 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4384 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4385 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4387 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4390 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4398 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4399 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4401 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4404 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4405 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4406 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4408 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4413 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4421 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4422 else if(check_flags)
4423 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4425 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4426 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4427 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4428 else if (!check_flags)
4431 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4432 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4433 else if (strict_mode)
4435 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4436 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4438 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4439 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4443 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4451 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4453 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4458 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4461 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4464 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4469 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4470 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4471 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4472 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4473 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4478 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4483 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4487 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4488 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4490 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4492 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4494 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4498 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4502 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4505 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4507 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4508 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4510 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4512 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4513 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4515 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4517 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4519 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4520 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4522 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4527 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4531 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4533 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4534 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4538 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4540 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4541 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4542 else if (cpk->digest)
4543 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4546 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4548 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4549 * if the chain is invalid.
4553 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4554 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4557 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4558 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4565 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4566 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4568 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4569 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4570 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4571 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4572 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4573 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4575 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4576 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4578 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4584 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4586 int dh_secbits = 80;
4587 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4588 return DH_get_1024_160();
4589 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4591 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4598 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4599 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4602 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4609 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4610 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4611 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4613 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4614 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4621 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4622 return DH_get_2048_224();
4623 return DH_get_1024_160();
4627 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4630 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4633 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4634 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4639 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4641 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4644 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4646 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4647 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4648 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4649 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4652 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4653 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4656 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4658 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4661 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4664 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4667 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4668 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4672 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4673 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4675 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4676 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4680 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4681 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4682 * not sending one to the peer.
4683 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4686 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4688 int rv, start_idx, i;
4691 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4697 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4701 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4703 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4704 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);