2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
27 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
31 tls1_generate_master_secret,
32 tls1_change_cipher_state,
33 tls1_final_finish_mac,
34 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
35 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 tls1_export_keying_material,
39 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
40 tls_close_construct_packet,
44 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
48 tls1_generate_master_secret,
49 tls1_change_cipher_state,
50 tls1_final_finish_mac,
51 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
52 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 tls1_export_keying_material,
55 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
56 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
57 tls_close_construct_packet,
61 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
65 tls1_generate_master_secret,
66 tls1_change_cipher_state,
67 tls1_final_finish_mac,
68 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
69 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 tls1_export_keying_material,
72 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
73 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
74 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
75 tls_close_construct_packet,
79 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
82 tls13_setup_key_block,
83 tls13_generate_master_secret,
84 tls13_change_cipher_state,
85 tls13_final_finish_mac,
86 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
87 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 tls1_export_keying_material,
90 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
91 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
92 tls_close_construct_packet,
96 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
99 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
100 * http, the cache would over fill
102 return (60 * 60 * 2);
109 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
113 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
115 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
119 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
122 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
123 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
125 s->version = s->method->version;
128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
131 int nid; /* Curve NID */
132 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
133 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
137 * Table of curve information.
138 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
139 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
141 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
142 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
143 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
144 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
145 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
146 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
147 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
148 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
149 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
150 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
151 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
152 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
153 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
154 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
155 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
156 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
157 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
158 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
159 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
161 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
162 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
163 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
164 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
165 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
166 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
167 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
168 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
170 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
173 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
175 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
179 /* The default curves */
180 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
181 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
182 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
183 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
184 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
187 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
188 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
189 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
190 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
191 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
192 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
193 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
194 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
197 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
198 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
200 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
201 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
202 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
203 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
204 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
205 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
206 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
207 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
208 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
209 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
210 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
211 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
212 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
213 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
214 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
215 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
216 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
217 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
218 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
219 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
220 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
221 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
224 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
225 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
226 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
229 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
231 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
232 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
233 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
235 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
237 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
241 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
244 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
245 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
252 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
254 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
255 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
256 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
257 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
258 * lists in the first place.
259 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
260 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
261 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
263 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
266 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
268 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
269 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
271 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
272 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
273 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
274 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
275 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
278 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
279 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
283 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
284 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
288 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
289 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
292 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
293 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
297 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
298 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
303 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
308 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
309 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
311 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
314 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
316 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
317 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
321 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
324 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
325 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
327 const unsigned char *curves;
328 size_t num_curves, i;
329 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
330 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
332 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
334 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
337 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
338 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
340 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
343 } else /* Should never happen */
346 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
348 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
349 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
350 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
356 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
357 * if there is no match.
358 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
359 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
360 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
362 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
364 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
365 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
367 /* Can't do anything on client side */
371 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
373 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
374 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
376 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
377 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
378 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
379 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
380 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
381 /* Should never happen */
384 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
388 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
389 * but s->options is a long...
391 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
392 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
394 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
395 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
396 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
397 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
401 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
404 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
406 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
407 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
408 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
410 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
414 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
415 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
416 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
417 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
418 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
421 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
422 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
430 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
434 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
435 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
437 unsigned char *glist, *p;
440 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
443 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
444 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
447 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
448 unsigned long idmask;
450 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
451 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
453 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
462 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
466 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
470 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
473 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
475 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
481 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
483 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
485 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
487 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
488 if (nid == NID_undef)
489 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
490 if (nid == NID_undef)
491 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
492 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
495 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
497 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
501 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
502 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
506 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
510 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
513 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
514 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
521 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
522 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
525 /* Determine curve ID */
526 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
527 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
528 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
532 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
534 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
536 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
537 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
539 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
542 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
548 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
549 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
550 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
552 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
553 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
556 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
557 * supported (see RFC4492).
559 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
560 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
561 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
562 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
563 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
566 if (i == num_formats)
571 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
572 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
573 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
575 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
577 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
578 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
579 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
580 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
581 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
585 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
586 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
591 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
598 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
602 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
604 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
605 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
606 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
608 *pformats = ecformats_default;
609 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
611 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
613 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
618 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
619 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
621 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
623 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
626 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
629 /* If not EC nothing to do */
630 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
632 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
636 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
639 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
643 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
644 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
646 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
652 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
653 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
654 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
655 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
656 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
658 return 0; /* Should never happen */
659 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
660 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
662 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
664 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
665 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
666 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
668 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
674 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
676 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
678 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
680 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
681 * is compatible with the client extensions.
683 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
685 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
688 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
691 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
692 unsigned char curve_id[2];
693 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
694 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
695 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
696 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
697 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
701 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
702 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
706 /* Need a shared curve */
707 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
711 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
715 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
720 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
723 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
724 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
727 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
728 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
730 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
733 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
734 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
736 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
740 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
742 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
745 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
746 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
747 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
748 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
750 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
751 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
752 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
753 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
757 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
758 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
759 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
764 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
765 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
766 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
769 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
772 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
776 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
777 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
778 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
779 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
781 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
782 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
785 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
786 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
790 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
791 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
792 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
793 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
794 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
798 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
799 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
804 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
805 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
807 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
808 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
810 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
811 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
812 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
813 /* Should never happen */
816 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
817 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
822 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
823 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
824 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
825 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
827 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
831 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
832 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
835 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
836 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
838 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
841 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
842 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
844 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
850 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
854 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
855 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
856 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
857 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
860 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
861 if (i == sent_sigslen
862 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
863 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
867 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
872 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
873 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
874 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
879 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
881 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
886 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
887 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
888 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
890 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
893 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
895 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
899 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
900 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
902 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
903 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
904 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
905 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
907 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
909 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
910 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
911 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
917 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
918 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
919 * @c: cipher to check
920 * @op: Security check that you want to do
922 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
924 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
926 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
927 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
929 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
931 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
932 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
934 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
938 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
941 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
943 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
945 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
948 /* Initialise digests to default values */
949 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
951 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
953 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
956 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
957 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
959 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
960 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
963 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
966 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
967 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
968 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
972 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
977 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
978 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
979 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
980 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
981 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
982 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
983 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
984 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
987 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
988 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
989 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
991 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
994 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
995 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
997 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
998 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1002 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1006 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1011 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
1012 * type and return it.
1014 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
1015 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
1016 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
1018 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
1020 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
1025 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
1026 if (exts[loop].type == type)
1034 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1036 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1037 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1038 * point to the resulting session.
1040 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1041 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1042 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
1045 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1046 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1047 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1048 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1049 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1050 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1051 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1054 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1055 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1056 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1057 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1058 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1059 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
1061 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1065 const unsigned char *etick;
1067 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1070 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1073 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1074 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1077 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1080 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1081 hello->num_extensions,
1082 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
1083 if (ticketext == NULL)
1086 ticketext->parsed = 1;
1088 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1091 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1094 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1097 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1099 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1100 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1101 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1102 * calculate the master secret later.
1106 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
1107 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
1110 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
1111 hello->session_id_len, ret);
1113 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
1114 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1117 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
1120 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
1121 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1124 default: /* fatal error */
1130 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1132 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1133 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1134 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1135 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1136 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1137 * point to the resulting session.
1140 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
1141 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1142 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
1143 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
1144 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
1146 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1147 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1148 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1151 unsigned char *sdec;
1152 const unsigned char *p;
1153 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
1155 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1156 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1157 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1158 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1160 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1161 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1164 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1169 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
1170 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1171 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1182 /* Check key name matches */
1183 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
1184 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1188 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
1189 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
1190 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1191 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1192 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
1193 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
1199 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1202 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1206 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1208 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1213 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1214 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1215 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1218 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1219 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1220 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1223 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1224 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1225 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1226 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1227 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1228 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1229 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1230 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1234 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1235 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1240 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1244 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1248 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1249 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1250 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1254 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1255 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1264 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1268 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1269 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1273 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
1280 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
1281 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
1282 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
1283 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
1284 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
1285 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
1286 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
1287 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
1288 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
1289 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
1292 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
1293 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
1294 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
1295 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
1296 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
1297 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
1298 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
1301 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
1304 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
1305 if (table[i].nid == nid)
1311 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
1314 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
1315 if ((table[i].id) == id)
1316 return table[i].nid;
1321 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
1327 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
1330 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
1333 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
1339 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
1341 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
1348 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
1351 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
1352 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
1353 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
1354 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
1355 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
1356 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
1357 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
1358 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
1359 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1360 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
1361 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1362 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
1365 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
1371 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
1372 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
1373 return tls12_md_info + i;
1379 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
1381 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
1382 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
1384 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
1387 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
1390 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
1393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1394 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1395 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
1397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1398 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1399 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1402 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1403 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1406 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
1407 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1409 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
1410 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1412 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
1413 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1419 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
1420 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
1421 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
1423 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
1424 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
1426 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
1427 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
1429 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
1431 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
1432 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
1434 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
1436 if (psignhash_nid) {
1437 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
1438 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
1439 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
1443 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1444 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
1446 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
1447 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
1448 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
1450 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1451 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
1453 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1454 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
1458 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1459 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1463 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1465 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1466 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1467 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1469 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1470 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1471 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1473 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1474 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
1475 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
1476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1477 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1478 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
1482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1483 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1484 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
1488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1489 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1490 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
1497 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1499 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1501 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1504 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1505 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
1509 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
1510 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
1511 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
1512 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
1519 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1520 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
1521 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
1522 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
1524 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
1525 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1526 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
1527 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1528 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
1530 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
1531 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
1534 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
1535 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
1536 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
1538 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
1548 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1549 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1551 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
1552 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1554 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
1556 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1558 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1559 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1560 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1561 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1562 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1563 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1564 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1565 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1566 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1567 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1569 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
1570 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1573 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1574 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1578 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1579 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1581 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1583 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
1586 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1590 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1591 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1595 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1597 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
1600 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1601 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1603 /* Should never happen */
1607 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1608 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
1609 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
1611 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
1612 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
1616 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1621 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1622 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1624 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
1625 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1628 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
1629 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
1630 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
1631 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
1632 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
1634 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1635 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
1636 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1637 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
1643 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
1644 * the certificate for signing.
1646 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1648 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
1649 * supported it stays as NULL.
1651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1652 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
1653 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1656 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
1657 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1658 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1662 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
1663 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1666 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
1667 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
1668 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
1669 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
1670 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
1671 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
1672 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
1673 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
1679 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1680 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1681 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1683 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1684 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
1685 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1689 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
1696 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
1698 return (int)numsigalgs;
1701 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1702 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1703 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1705 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
1706 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1707 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1711 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
1713 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
1715 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
1717 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
1719 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
1720 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1723 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
1727 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
1730 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1732 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1733 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1734 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1735 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1736 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1737 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1739 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1740 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1741 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1745 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1747 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1750 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1753 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
1755 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1757 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1759 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1767 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1768 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1770 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1773 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1774 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1777 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1778 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1783 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1784 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1786 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1790 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1794 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1797 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1799 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
1804 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
1805 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1807 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1808 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
1809 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
1811 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
1818 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1819 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1820 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
1822 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1823 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1824 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
1830 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1834 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1838 if (default_nid == -1)
1840 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1842 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1843 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1844 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
1849 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1850 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1854 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1855 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1856 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1863 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1864 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1865 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1866 * attempting to use them.
1869 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
1871 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1872 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1873 /* Strict mode flags */
1874 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1875 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1876 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1878 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1883 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1884 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1887 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1888 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1890 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1893 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1895 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1896 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1898 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1900 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1901 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1907 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
1910 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1912 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1913 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1915 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1922 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1923 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1924 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1925 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1926 else if (!check_flags)
1931 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1932 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1934 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1936 unsigned char rsign = 0;
1937 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1939 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1942 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
1943 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
1944 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
1945 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1948 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1949 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
1950 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1954 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
1955 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1958 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1959 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
1960 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1963 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1964 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
1965 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1968 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1969 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
1970 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1979 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1980 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1982 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1984 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1985 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
1986 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
1989 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
1996 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
1997 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2001 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2002 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2003 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2004 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2006 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2013 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2014 else if (check_flags)
2015 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2017 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2018 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
2019 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2020 else if (!check_flags)
2023 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2024 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2025 else if (strict_mode) {
2026 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2027 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2028 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2029 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2031 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2038 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2039 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2041 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2043 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2046 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2049 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2053 const unsigned char *ctypes;
2057 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
2059 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2060 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
2062 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
2063 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
2064 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2068 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2071 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2073 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
2075 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2076 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2078 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2079 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2080 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2082 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2083 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2084 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2085 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2086 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2091 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2094 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2096 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2097 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2101 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2102 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
2103 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2104 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
2105 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2107 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2110 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2114 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
2117 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2118 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2125 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2126 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2128 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
2129 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
2130 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2137 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
2138 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2140 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2144 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2146 int dh_secbits = 80;
2147 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2148 return DH_get_1024_160();
2149 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2150 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2155 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2156 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
2159 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2167 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2168 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2170 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2171 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2179 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2180 return DH_get_2048_224();
2181 return DH_get_1024_160();
2185 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2188 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2191 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2192 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2193 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2194 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2196 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2199 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2201 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2204 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2206 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2207 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
2208 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2209 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2211 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2212 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
2214 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
2215 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
2218 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2220 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2223 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2226 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2228 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2229 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2231 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2232 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2234 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2235 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2240 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
2241 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2242 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2245 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2247 int rv, start_idx, i;
2249 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2254 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2258 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2259 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2260 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);