2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
213 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
215 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
219 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
222 s->version = s->method->version;
225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 int nid; /* Curve NID */
229 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
230 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
233 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
234 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
236 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
281 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
285 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
288 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
289 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
293 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
294 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
297 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
298 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
299 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
300 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
301 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
304 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
305 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
306 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
309 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
311 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
312 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
313 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
315 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
318 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
320 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
322 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
326 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
328 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
330 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
332 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
334 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
336 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
338 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
340 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
342 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
348 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
350 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
352 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
356 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
358 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
360 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
362 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
364 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
366 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
368 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
370 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
372 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
374 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
376 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
384 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
386 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
387 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
388 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
389 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
390 * lists in the first place.
391 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
392 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
393 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
395 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
396 const unsigned char **pcurves,
399 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
401 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
402 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
404 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
405 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
406 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
407 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
408 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
411 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
412 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
417 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
421 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
422 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
425 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
430 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
431 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
441 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
442 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
444 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
447 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
448 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
450 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
451 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
452 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
455 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
458 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
459 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
461 const unsigned char *curves;
462 size_t num_curves, i;
463 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
464 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
466 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
468 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
472 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
474 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
475 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
477 } else /* Should never happen */
480 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
482 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
484 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
490 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
492 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
493 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
495 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
497 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
498 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
500 /* Can't do anything on client side */
504 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
506 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
507 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
509 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
511 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
512 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
513 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
514 /* Should never happen */
517 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
521 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
522 * but s->options is a long...
524 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
525 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
527 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
530 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
532 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
534 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
535 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
536 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
537 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
538 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
541 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
542 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
550 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
554 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
555 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
557 unsigned char *clist, *p;
560 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
563 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
564 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
567 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
568 unsigned long idmask;
570 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
572 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
582 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
586 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
590 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
593 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
595 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
601 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
603 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
605 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
607 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
608 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
610 if (nid == NID_undef)
611 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
612 if (nid == NID_undef)
614 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
615 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
617 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
621 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
622 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
627 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
631 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
634 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
635 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
640 const EC_METHOD *meth;
643 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
644 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
647 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
650 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
654 /* Determine curve ID */
655 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
656 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
657 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
660 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
669 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
671 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
673 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
675 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
677 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
682 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
683 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
684 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
686 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
687 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
690 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
691 * supported (see RFC4492).
693 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
694 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
695 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
696 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
697 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
700 if (i == num_formats)
705 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
706 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
707 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
709 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
710 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
715 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
722 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
726 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
729 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
730 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
732 *pformats = ecformats_default;
733 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
735 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
737 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
742 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
743 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
745 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
747 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
750 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
753 /* If not EC nothing to do */
754 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
758 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
763 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
766 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
770 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
771 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
773 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
779 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
781 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
782 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
783 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
785 return 0; /* Should never happen */
786 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
787 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
789 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
791 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
792 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
793 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
795 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
801 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
802 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
803 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
805 unsigned char curve_id[2];
806 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
807 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
808 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
809 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
813 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
816 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
818 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
819 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
820 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
821 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
825 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
826 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
828 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
829 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
831 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
833 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
836 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
838 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
845 /* Need a shared curve */
846 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
852 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
857 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
859 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
863 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
866 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
870 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
875 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
880 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
881 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
884 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
885 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
887 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
890 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
891 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
893 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
896 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
897 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
899 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
902 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
903 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
904 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
905 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
907 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
908 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
909 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
910 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
911 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
912 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
915 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
916 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
917 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
918 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
921 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
924 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
927 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
928 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
929 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
930 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
931 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
933 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
934 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
937 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
938 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
942 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
943 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
944 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
945 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
946 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
947 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
948 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
956 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
957 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
959 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
960 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
962 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
963 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
964 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
965 /* Should never happen */
968 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
969 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
973 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
974 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
983 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
984 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
987 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
988 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
990 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
993 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
994 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
996 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1002 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1006 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1007 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1008 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1009 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1012 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1013 if (i == sent_sigslen
1014 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1015 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1019 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1024 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1025 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1026 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1032 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1034 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1035 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1040 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1041 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1042 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1045 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1050 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1051 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1052 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1055 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1057 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1060 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1061 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1062 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1063 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1064 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1065 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1066 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1067 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1068 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1069 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1072 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1073 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1074 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1075 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1076 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1078 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1079 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1080 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1081 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1082 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1088 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1091 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1092 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1094 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1097 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1099 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1101 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1104 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1105 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1108 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1109 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1110 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1111 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1113 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1115 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1116 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1118 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1119 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1121 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1122 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1123 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1124 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1135 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1137 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1138 if (s->renegotiate) {
1141 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1152 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1160 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1163 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1164 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1165 unsigned long size_str;
1169 * check for enough space.
1170 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1171 * 2 for servernamelist length
1172 * 1 for the hostname type
1173 * 2 for hostname length
1177 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1179 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1182 /* extension type and length */
1183 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1184 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1186 /* length of servername list */
1187 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1189 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1190 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1192 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1195 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1196 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1197 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1198 * Client Hello message */
1200 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1201 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1207 * check for enough space.
1208 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1209 * 1 for the srp user identity
1210 * + srp user identity length
1212 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1215 /* fill in the extension */
1216 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1217 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1218 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1219 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1224 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1227 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1230 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1231 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1233 unsigned char *etmp;
1235 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1237 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1239 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1241 if (num_formats > 255) {
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1247 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1248 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1249 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1250 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1254 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1256 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1257 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1260 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1262 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1264 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1269 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1271 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1272 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1273 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1274 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1275 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1279 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1281 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1282 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1283 ret += curves_list_len;
1285 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1287 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1289 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1290 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1291 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1292 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1293 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1294 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1295 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1297 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1298 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1299 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1302 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1303 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1306 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1309 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1311 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1314 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1320 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1322 const unsigned char *salg;
1323 unsigned char *etmp;
1324 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1325 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1327 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1329 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1331 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1332 /* Fill in lengths */
1333 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1338 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1340 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1344 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1345 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1346 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1352 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1353 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1359 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1362 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1364 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1365 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1367 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1368 /* save position of id len */
1369 unsigned char *q = ret;
1370 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1371 /* skip over id len */
1373 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1379 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1385 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1389 * 1: peer may send requests
1390 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1392 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1393 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1395 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1398 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1399 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1401 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1402 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1404 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1406 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1411 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1412 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1414 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1415 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1416 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1417 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1418 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1420 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1421 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1424 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1426 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1432 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1440 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1441 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1443 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1451 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1452 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1453 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1456 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1457 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1459 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1460 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1463 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1465 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1466 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1474 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1481 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1484 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1488 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1489 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1492 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1493 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1494 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1495 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1497 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1498 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1499 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1500 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1501 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1502 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1507 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1509 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1512 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1517 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1520 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1523 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1531 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1532 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1535 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1536 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1537 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1540 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1543 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1545 const unsigned char *plist;
1548 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1552 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1554 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1556 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1558 if (plistlen > 255) {
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1563 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1564 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1565 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1566 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1571 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1574 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1576 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1577 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1579 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1583 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1584 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1586 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1590 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1591 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1594 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1596 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1602 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1610 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1611 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1612 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1613 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1614 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1615 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1616 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1617 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1618 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1619 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1621 if (limit - ret < 36)
1623 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1627 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1628 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1629 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1630 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1636 * 1: peer may send requests
1637 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1639 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1640 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1642 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1647 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1648 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1649 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1650 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1651 const unsigned char *npa;
1652 unsigned int npalen;
1655 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1657 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1658 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1659 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1663 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1665 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1669 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1671 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1672 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1674 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1675 * for other cases too.
1677 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1678 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1679 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1681 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1686 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1687 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1691 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1692 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1693 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1701 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1707 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1710 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1715 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1716 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1717 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1718 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1721 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1722 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1726 const unsigned char *selected;
1727 unsigned char selected_len;
1730 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1737 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1738 * length-prefixed strings.
1740 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1749 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1750 proto_len = data[i];
1756 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1762 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1763 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1764 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1765 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1766 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1767 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1768 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1769 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1772 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1773 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1778 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1782 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1784 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1785 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1786 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1791 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1792 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1793 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1794 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1796 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1797 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1799 unsigned short type, size;
1800 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1801 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1802 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1803 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1804 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1805 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1806 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1808 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1809 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1810 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1811 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1814 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1815 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1816 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1817 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1818 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1819 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1820 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1821 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1822 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1823 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1826 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1830 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1835 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1838 if (data + size > d + n)
1842 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1843 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1844 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1846 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1848 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1850 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1853 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1855 if (data + len != d + n)
1857 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1861 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1863 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1865 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1866 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1868 unsigned short type;
1869 unsigned short size;
1871 unsigned char *data = *p;
1872 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1874 s->servername_done = 0;
1875 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1876 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1877 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1880 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1881 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1882 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1884 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1885 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1886 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1889 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1890 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1891 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1892 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1894 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1895 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1896 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1897 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1899 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1900 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1903 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1904 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1905 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1906 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1910 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1912 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1916 if (data > (d + n - len))
1919 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1923 if (data + size > (d + n))
1925 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1926 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1927 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1928 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1930 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1931 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1934 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1936 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1937 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1938 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1939 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1940 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1941 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1942 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1943 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1944 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1945 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1946 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1947 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1948 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1949 * the value of the Host: field.
1950 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1951 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1952 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1954 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1958 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1959 unsigned char *sdata;
1964 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1970 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1976 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1981 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1984 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1985 switch (servname_type) {
1986 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1988 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1989 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1992 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1993 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1996 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1997 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1998 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2001 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2002 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2003 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2004 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2005 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2006 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2009 s->servername_done = 1;
2012 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2013 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2014 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2015 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2026 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2031 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2032 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2033 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2037 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2038 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2041 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2043 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2044 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2046 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2047 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2053 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2054 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2055 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2056 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2058 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2059 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2060 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2064 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2065 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2068 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2069 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2070 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2071 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2074 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2075 ecpointformatlist_length;
2076 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2077 ecpointformatlist_length);
2079 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2080 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2081 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2082 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2084 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2085 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2086 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2087 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2088 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2092 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2093 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2097 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2098 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2099 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2102 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2103 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2104 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2105 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2108 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2109 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2110 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2111 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2112 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2114 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2117 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2119 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2120 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2126 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2129 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2130 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2133 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2136 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2140 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2142 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2143 const unsigned char *sdata;
2145 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2149 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2156 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2160 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2163 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2170 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2173 if (data != sdata) {
2174 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2175 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2178 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2179 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2180 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2181 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2182 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2185 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2186 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2187 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 /* Read in request_extensions */
2194 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 if (dsize != size) {
2200 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2205 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2206 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2207 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2210 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2211 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2212 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2213 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2219 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2222 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2224 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2225 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2227 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2228 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2230 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2231 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2232 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2235 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2240 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2241 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2242 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2243 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2245 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2248 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2249 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2250 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2251 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2252 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2253 * anything like that, but this might change).
2255 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2256 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2257 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2258 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2259 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2261 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2265 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2266 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2267 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2269 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2270 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2271 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2275 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2276 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2277 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2278 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2279 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2283 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2284 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2285 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2287 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2289 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2292 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2293 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2294 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2295 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2296 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2299 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2310 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2312 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2313 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2314 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2316 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2323 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2327 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2328 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2329 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2333 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2340 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2342 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2343 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2344 * fill the length of the block.
2346 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2348 unsigned int off = 0;
2361 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2362 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2364 unsigned short length;
2365 unsigned short type;
2366 unsigned short size;
2367 unsigned char *data = *p;
2368 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2369 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2371 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2372 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2374 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2376 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2377 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2378 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2380 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2381 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2382 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2385 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2386 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2389 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2393 if (data + length != d + n) {
2394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2402 if (data + size > (d + n))
2405 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2406 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2408 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2409 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2411 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2412 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2413 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2414 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2415 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2418 tlsext_servername = 1;
2420 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2421 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2422 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2423 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2425 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2426 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2430 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2431 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2432 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2433 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2434 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2438 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2439 ecpointformatlist_length;
2440 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2441 ecpointformatlist_length);
2444 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2446 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2447 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2448 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2449 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2451 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2454 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2455 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2458 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2460 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2462 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2465 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2466 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2469 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2470 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2472 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2474 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2475 unsigned char *selected;
2476 unsigned char selected_len;
2478 /* We must have requested it. */
2479 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2483 /* The data must be valid */
2484 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2485 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2489 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2491 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2492 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2493 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2496 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2497 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2498 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2501 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2502 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2503 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2507 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2510 /* We must have requested it. */
2511 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2512 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2520 * The extension data consists of:
2521 * uint16 list_length
2522 * uint8 proto_length;
2523 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2528 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2529 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2533 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2534 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2537 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2538 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2539 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2540 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2541 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2544 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2545 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2547 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2548 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2550 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2551 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2553 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2554 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2555 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2558 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2563 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2564 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2565 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2569 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2570 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2571 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2572 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2573 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2574 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2577 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2579 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2582 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2583 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2585 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2591 if (data != d + n) {
2592 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2596 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2597 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2598 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2599 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2600 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2601 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2605 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2616 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2617 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2618 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2619 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2620 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2621 * initial connect only.
2623 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2624 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2625 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2627 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2634 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2640 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2645 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2647 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2648 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2650 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2652 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2653 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2656 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2657 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2661 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2663 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2664 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2665 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2666 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2668 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2670 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2673 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2674 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2677 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2678 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2681 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2682 s->servername_done = 0;
2688 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2692 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2693 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2694 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2695 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2696 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2698 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2699 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2700 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2701 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2704 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2705 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2706 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2708 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2711 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2712 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2714 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2715 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2719 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2722 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2726 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2728 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2732 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2733 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2734 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2735 * influence which certificate is sent
2737 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2739 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2740 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2741 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2742 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2743 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2747 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2748 * et al can pick it up.
2750 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2751 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2753 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2754 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2755 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2757 /* status request response should be sent */
2758 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2759 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2760 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2762 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2764 /* something bad happened */
2765 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2766 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2767 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2771 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2775 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2776 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2779 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2780 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2788 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2790 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2791 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2793 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2795 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2796 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2797 * must contain uncompressed.
2799 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2800 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2801 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2802 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2803 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2804 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2805 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2806 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2807 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2809 unsigned char *list;
2810 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2811 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2812 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2813 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2814 found_uncompressed = 1;
2818 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2820 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2824 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2825 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2827 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2829 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2830 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2831 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2832 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2834 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2836 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2839 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2842 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2843 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2846 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2849 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2850 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2851 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2853 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2854 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2856 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2857 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2860 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2861 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2866 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2867 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2870 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2871 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2874 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2875 s->servername_done = 0;
2881 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2885 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2887 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2888 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2892 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2900 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2901 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2902 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2904 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2905 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2906 * extension, if any.
2907 * len: the length of the session ID.
2908 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2909 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2910 * point to the resulting session.
2912 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2913 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2914 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2917 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2918 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2919 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2920 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2921 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2922 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2923 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2926 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2927 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2928 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2929 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2930 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2931 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2933 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2934 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2936 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2937 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2941 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2944 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2947 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2949 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2953 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2954 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2960 /* Skip past cipher list */
2965 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2970 /* Now at start of extensions */
2971 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2974 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2975 unsigned short type, size;
2978 if (p + size > limit)
2980 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2984 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2987 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2990 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2992 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2993 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2994 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2995 * calculate the master secret later.
2999 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3001 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3002 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3004 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3006 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3007 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3009 default: /* fatal error */
3019 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3021 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3022 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3023 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3024 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3025 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3026 * point to the resulting session.
3029 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3030 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3031 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3032 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3034 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3035 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3036 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3039 unsigned char *sdec;
3040 const unsigned char *p;
3041 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3042 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3045 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3046 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3049 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3050 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3051 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3052 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3053 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3054 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3063 /* Check key name matches */
3064 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3066 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3067 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3068 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3069 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3072 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3075 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3077 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3081 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3082 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3083 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3084 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3085 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3086 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3089 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3090 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3091 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3092 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3093 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3095 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3098 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3099 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3100 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3105 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3108 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3112 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3113 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3114 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3118 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3119 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3128 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3133 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3140 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3141 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3142 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3143 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3144 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3145 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3146 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3149 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3150 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3151 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3152 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3155 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3158 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3159 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3165 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3168 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3169 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3170 return table[i].nid;
3175 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3181 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3182 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3185 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3188 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3189 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3193 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3195 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3196 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3202 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3205 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3206 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3209 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3211 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3212 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3213 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3214 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3215 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3218 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3222 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3224 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3227 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3229 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3230 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3232 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3233 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3235 return inf->mfunc();
3238 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3241 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3242 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3243 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3245 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3246 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3247 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3249 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3250 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3251 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3257 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3258 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3259 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3261 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3262 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3264 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3265 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3266 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3268 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3270 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3271 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3272 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3274 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3276 if (psignhash_nid) {
3277 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3278 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3280 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3284 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3285 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3287 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3288 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3289 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3291 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3292 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3294 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3295 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3299 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3300 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3304 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3306 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3307 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3308 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3310 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3311 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3312 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3314 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3315 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3316 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3317 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3318 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3319 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3323 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3324 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3325 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3329 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3330 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3331 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3338 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3340 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3342 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3345 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3346 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3348 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3350 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3351 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3352 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3353 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3356 return tmpout - out;
3359 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3360 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3361 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3362 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3364 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3365 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3366 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3367 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3368 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3370 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3371 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3374 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3375 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3376 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3378 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3388 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3389 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3391 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3392 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3394 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3396 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3397 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3398 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3399 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3400 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3402 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3403 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3404 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3405 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3406 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3407 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3408 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3410 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3411 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3414 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3415 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3419 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3420 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3422 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3424 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3427 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3431 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3432 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3436 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3438 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3441 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3442 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3444 /* Should never happen */
3448 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3449 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3450 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3451 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3453 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3454 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3458 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3464 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3465 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3468 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3469 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3471 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3472 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3474 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3476 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3478 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3480 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3481 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3482 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3483 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3484 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3485 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3486 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3487 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3493 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3494 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3495 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3496 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3497 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3498 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3499 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3500 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3501 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3502 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3503 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3509 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3510 * the certificate for signing.
3512 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3514 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3515 * supported it stays as NULL.
3517 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3518 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3519 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3521 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3522 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3523 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3524 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3527 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3528 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3529 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3535 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3536 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3537 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3539 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3544 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3551 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3553 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3556 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3557 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3558 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3560 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3561 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3565 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3567 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3569 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3571 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3573 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3574 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3577 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3578 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3580 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3581 unsigned short hbtype;
3582 unsigned int payload;
3583 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3585 if (s->msg_callback)
3586 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3587 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3588 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3590 /* Read type and payload length first */
3591 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3592 return 0; /* silently discard */
3595 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3596 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3599 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3600 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3604 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3605 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3607 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3608 if (buffer == NULL) {
3609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3614 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3615 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3617 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3619 /* Random padding */
3620 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3622 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3623 3 + payload + padding);
3625 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3626 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3627 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3628 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3630 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3634 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3638 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3639 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3643 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3645 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3652 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3654 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3656 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3657 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3659 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3660 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3661 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3662 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3666 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3667 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3672 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3673 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3679 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3680 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3682 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3685 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3686 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3687 * some random stuff.
3688 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3689 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3690 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3691 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3694 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3701 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3702 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3704 /* Sequence number */
3705 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3706 /* 16 random bytes */
3707 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3709 /* Random padding */
3710 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3712 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3714 if (s->msg_callback)
3715 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3716 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3717 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3719 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3728 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3732 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3735 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3737 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3740 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3743 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3745 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3747 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3749 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3757 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3758 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3759 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3760 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3761 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3762 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3766 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3767 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3768 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3769 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3772 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3773 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3776 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3777 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3782 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3783 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3785 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3789 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3793 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3796 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3799 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3804 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3805 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3807 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3808 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3809 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3810 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3811 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3813 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3820 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3821 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3822 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3823 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3825 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3826 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3827 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3828 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3834 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3838 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3842 if (default_nid == -1)
3844 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3846 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3847 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3848 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3853 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3854 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3858 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3859 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3860 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3867 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3868 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3869 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3870 * attempting to use them.
3873 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3875 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3876 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3877 /* Strict mode flags */
3878 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3879 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3880 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3882 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3887 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3888 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3890 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3891 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3893 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3896 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3898 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3900 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3902 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3903 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3906 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3907 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3908 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3909 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3910 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3911 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3918 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3921 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3922 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3923 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3925 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3932 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3933 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3934 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3935 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3936 else if (!check_flags)
3941 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3942 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3944 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3946 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3947 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3949 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3952 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3953 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3954 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3955 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3956 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3959 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3960 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3961 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3962 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3966 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3967 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3976 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3977 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3979 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3981 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3982 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3983 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3986 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3993 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3994 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3998 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3999 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4000 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4001 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4003 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4010 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4011 else if (check_flags)
4012 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4014 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4015 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4016 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4017 else if (!check_flags)
4020 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4021 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4022 else if (strict_mode) {
4023 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4024 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4025 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4026 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4028 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4035 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4036 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4040 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4043 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4046 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4051 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4052 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4053 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4054 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4055 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4059 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4063 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4065 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4066 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4068 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4069 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4070 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4074 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4077 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4079 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4081 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4084 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4085 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4086 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4088 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4089 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4090 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4091 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4092 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4097 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4100 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4102 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4103 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4107 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4108 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4109 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4110 else if (cpk->digest)
4111 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4113 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4116 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4120 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4121 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4123 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4124 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4131 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4132 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4136 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4137 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4138 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4139 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4142 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4143 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4145 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4151 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4153 int dh_secbits = 80;
4154 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4155 return DH_get_1024_160();
4156 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4157 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4162 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4163 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4166 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4172 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4173 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4174 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4176 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4177 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4183 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4184 return DH_get_2048_224();
4185 return DH_get_1024_160();
4189 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4192 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4194 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4195 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4199 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4201 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4204 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4206 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4207 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4208 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4209 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4211 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4212 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4215 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4217 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4220 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4223 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4225 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4226 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4228 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4229 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4231 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4232 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4237 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4238 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4239 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4242 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4244 int rv, start_idx, i;
4246 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4251 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4255 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4256 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4257 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);