2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
469 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
504 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
516 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
551 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
569 if (i == num_formats)
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
601 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
688 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
714 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
723 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
730 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
736 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
739 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
745 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
748 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
753 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
772 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
810 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
898 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
910 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
927 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
944 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
951 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
971 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1026 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
1033 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1034 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1035 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1037 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1038 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1041 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1043 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1044 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1045 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1046 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1051 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1053 * TODO(TLS1.3): We always use ECC for TLSv1.3 at the moment. This will
1054 * change if we implement DH key shares
1059 if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1060 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1067 if (s->renegotiate) {
1068 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1069 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1070 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1071 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1072 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1078 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1081 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1082 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1084 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1086 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1087 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1089 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1090 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1098 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1099 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1100 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1101 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1102 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1104 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1105 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1106 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1107 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1108 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1109 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1119 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1121 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1125 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1127 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1128 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1130 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1131 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1139 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1140 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1141 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1147 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1148 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1149 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1150 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1155 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1156 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1157 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1158 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1172 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1174 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1175 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1176 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1177 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1178 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1179 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1180 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1185 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1186 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1189 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1190 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1193 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1194 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1204 const unsigned char *salg;
1206 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1208 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1209 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1211 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1212 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1213 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1214 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1215 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1221 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1224 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1225 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1226 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1227 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1228 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1229 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1234 unsigned char *idbytes;
1238 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1239 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1241 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1242 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1243 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1249 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1254 unsigned char *extbytes;
1255 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1262 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1276 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1278 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1279 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1282 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1290 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1291 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1292 * (see longer comment below)
1294 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1295 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1296 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1297 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1298 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1299 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1300 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1301 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1308 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1309 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1310 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1313 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1314 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1315 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1316 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1322 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1323 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1324 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1329 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1330 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1331 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1332 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1339 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1340 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1354 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1355 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1356 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1369 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1370 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1371 int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
1372 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1374 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1375 /* supported_versions extension */
1376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1377 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1388 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1389 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1392 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1393 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1394 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1411 /* key_share extension */
1412 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1413 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1415 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1416 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1423 * now, just send one
1425 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1426 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1427 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1428 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1429 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1432 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1433 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1440 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1441 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1442 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1447 /* Encode the public key. */
1448 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1450 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1452 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1456 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1458 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint,
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1461 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1463 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1468 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share
1469 * we're going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY
1470 * For now we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1472 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1473 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1475 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1478 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1486 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1487 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1490 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1491 unsigned char *padbytes;
1494 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1500 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1506 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1507 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1519 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1522 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1525 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1526 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1527 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1528 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1531 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1532 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1538 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1543 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1544 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1547 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1548 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1549 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1550 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1557 const unsigned char *plist;
1560 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1562 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1564 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1565 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1566 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1567 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1576 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1578 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1579 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1580 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1589 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1592 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1593 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1594 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1601 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1602 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1603 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1604 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1605 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1606 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1613 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1614 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1615 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1616 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1617 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1618 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1619 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1620 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1621 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1622 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1624 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1631 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1632 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1633 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1634 const unsigned char *npa;
1635 unsigned int npalen;
1638 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1640 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1641 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1642 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1643 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1652 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
1653 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1654 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1655 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
1657 ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1664 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1665 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1672 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1673 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1674 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1676 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1680 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1681 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1684 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1687 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1689 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1691 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1692 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1698 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1703 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1705 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1706 * for other cases too.
1708 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1709 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1710 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1711 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1712 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1714 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1715 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1721 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1722 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1723 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1729 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1730 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1731 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1732 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1733 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1734 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1735 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1736 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1737 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1744 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1752 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1753 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1754 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1755 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1757 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1759 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1761 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1763 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1764 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1768 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1770 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1771 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1772 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1775 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1777 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1778 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1779 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1787 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1788 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1789 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1791 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1793 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1794 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1796 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1797 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1798 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1799 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1800 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1802 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1803 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1804 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1805 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1806 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1809 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1811 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1812 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1815 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1825 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1826 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1827 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1832 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1833 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1834 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1835 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1837 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1843 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1844 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1845 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1846 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1847 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1848 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1849 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1851 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1852 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1853 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1854 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1855 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1856 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1857 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1858 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1859 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1860 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1861 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1862 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1863 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1866 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1867 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1869 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1871 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1872 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1873 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1877 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1880 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1881 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1883 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1886 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1890 * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
1891 * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
1897 static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1900 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1901 RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1902 hello->num_extensions,
1903 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
1905 if (suppgroups == NULL)
1908 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1909 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
1910 &supported_groups_list)
1911 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1912 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1917 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
1918 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
1919 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
1927 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1928 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1932 * 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is 1)
1935 static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
1936 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
1941 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1944 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1945 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
1946 if (group_id == share_id
1947 && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
1948 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1953 if (i == num_groups) {
1962 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
1963 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
1964 * object as required.
1966 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1967 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1970 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1971 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1973 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
1976 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1978 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1979 s->servername_done = 0;
1980 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1982 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1985 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1986 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1987 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1988 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1989 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1990 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1993 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1994 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
1995 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1997 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1998 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1999 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2000 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2003 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2004 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2007 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2010 * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
2011 * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
2013 if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
2014 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2019 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
2020 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
2023 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
2024 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
2026 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2027 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
2028 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2029 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2030 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2032 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2033 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
2034 &currext->data, al))
2036 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2037 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2040 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2042 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2043 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2044 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2045 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2046 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2047 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2048 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2049 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2050 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2051 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2052 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2053 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2054 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2055 * the value of the Host: field.
2056 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2057 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2058 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2060 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2064 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2065 unsigned int servname_type;
2066 PACKET sni, hostname;
2068 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
2069 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2070 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2075 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2076 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2077 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2079 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2080 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2081 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2083 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2084 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2086 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2087 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2088 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2093 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2094 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2098 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2099 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2103 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2104 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2108 s->servername_done = 1;
2111 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2112 * fall back to a full handshake.
2114 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2115 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2116 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2120 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2123 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
2126 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2130 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2131 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2133 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2134 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2141 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2142 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2144 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
2145 &ec_point_format_list)
2146 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2151 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2152 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2154 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2155 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2160 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2161 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2162 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2163 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2164 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2165 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2166 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2167 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2170 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2171 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2173 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2174 &supported_sig_algs)
2175 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2176 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2181 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2182 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2186 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2187 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2188 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2192 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2193 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2194 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2195 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2196 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2200 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2201 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2203 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2205 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2206 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2207 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2208 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2212 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2215 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2217 PACKET responder_id;
2218 const unsigned char *id_data;
2220 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2222 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2226 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2227 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2228 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2229 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2233 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2234 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2238 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2239 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2240 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2245 /* Read in request_extensions */
2246 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2247 &currext->data, &exts))
2250 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2251 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2252 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2253 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2254 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2255 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2256 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2257 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2258 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2266 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2268 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2272 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2273 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2275 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2278 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2279 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2280 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2281 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2282 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2283 * anything like that, but this might change).
2285 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2286 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2287 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2288 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2289 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2291 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2295 else if (currext->type
2296 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2297 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2298 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2299 &currext->data, al))
2303 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2305 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2306 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2307 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2308 &currext->data, al))
2312 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2313 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
2314 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2315 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2316 && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
2317 unsigned int group_id;
2318 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
2319 const unsigned char *curves;
2321 int group_nid, found = 0;
2322 unsigned int curve_flags;
2325 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
2326 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2331 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &key_share_list)) {
2332 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2334 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2338 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2339 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2340 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list,
2342 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2343 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2345 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2350 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
2351 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
2356 /* Check this share is in supported_groups */
2357 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &curves, &num_curves)) {
2358 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2363 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 0)) {
2364 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2366 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2370 /* Find a share that we can use */
2371 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
2372 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2374 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2377 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 1)) {
2378 /* Share not suitable */
2382 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2384 if (group_nid == 0) {
2385 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2387 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2391 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2392 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2393 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2395 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2396 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2401 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2403 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2404 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2406 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2407 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2409 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2410 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2412 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2415 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2418 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2420 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2421 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2422 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2423 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2432 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2433 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2437 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2438 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2439 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2440 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2441 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2444 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2445 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2446 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2451 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2453 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2454 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2455 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2457 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2462 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2463 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2464 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2465 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2470 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2473 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2474 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2475 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2478 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2487 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2488 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2489 * fill the length of the block.
2491 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2493 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2495 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2496 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2497 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2505 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2507 unsigned int length, type, size;
2508 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2509 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2512 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2514 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2516 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2517 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2519 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2521 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2523 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2526 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2527 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2531 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2532 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2536 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2537 const unsigned char *data;
2540 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2541 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2544 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2545 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2547 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2548 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2550 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2551 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2552 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2553 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2554 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2557 tlsext_servername = 1;
2559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2560 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2561 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2562 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2563 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2564 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2568 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2569 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2570 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2571 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2572 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2575 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2576 ecpointformatlist_length;
2577 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2578 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2579 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2580 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2586 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2588 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2589 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2590 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2591 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2593 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2596 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2597 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2600 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2601 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2603 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2606 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2607 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2610 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2611 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2615 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2616 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2617 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2619 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2620 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2621 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2622 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2623 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2624 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2626 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2628 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2629 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2630 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2633 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2638 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2639 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2640 unsigned char *selected;
2641 unsigned char selected_len;
2642 /* We must have requested it. */
2643 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2647 /* The data must be valid */
2648 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2649 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2652 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2655 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2656 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2657 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2661 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2662 * a single Serverhello
2664 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2665 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2666 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2667 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2670 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2671 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2672 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2676 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2678 /* We must have requested it. */
2679 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2680 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2684 * The extension data consists of:
2685 * uint16 list_length
2686 * uint8 proto_length;
2687 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2689 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2690 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2691 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2692 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2695 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2696 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2697 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2698 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2701 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2702 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2705 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2708 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2709 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2713 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2714 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2715 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2716 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2717 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2718 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2719 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
2720 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->version < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
2721 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2723 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2724 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2725 && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2726 unsigned int group_id;
2728 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
2732 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2737 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
2738 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2740 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2744 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
2746 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
2749 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2751 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2755 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
2757 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
2758 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2759 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2761 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2765 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2766 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2767 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2772 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
2773 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2775 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2778 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2780 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2781 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2783 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2787 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2788 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2792 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2793 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2794 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2795 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2796 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2797 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2798 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2802 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2811 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2812 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2813 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2814 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2815 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2817 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2818 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2819 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2821 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2827 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2830 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2831 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2832 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2841 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2843 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2847 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2852 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2854 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2855 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2859 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2860 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2863 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2864 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2868 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2870 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2871 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2872 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2873 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2875 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2877 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2880 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2881 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2884 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2885 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2888 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2889 s->servername_done = 0;
2895 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2896 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2898 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2900 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2903 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2904 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2906 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2907 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2910 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2913 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2914 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2915 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2919 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2924 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2925 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2926 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2927 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2928 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2929 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2930 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2931 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2934 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2935 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2936 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2938 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2941 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2942 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2944 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2945 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2949 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2953 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2958 * Upon success, returns 1.
2959 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2961 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2963 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2966 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2967 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2968 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2969 * influence which certificate is sent
2971 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2973 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2974 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2975 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2976 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2978 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2979 * et al can pick it up.
2981 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2982 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2984 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2985 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2986 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2988 /* status request response should be sent */
2989 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2990 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2991 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2993 /* something bad happened */
2994 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2996 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3002 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
3009 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3011 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3012 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3016 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3017 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3018 * must contain uncompressed.
3020 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3021 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3022 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3023 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3024 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3025 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3026 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3027 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3029 unsigned char *list;
3030 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3031 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3032 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3033 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3034 found_uncompressed = 1;
3038 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3040 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3044 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3045 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3047 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3049 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3050 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3051 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3052 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3054 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3056 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3059 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
3060 * that we don't receive a status message
3062 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3063 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3064 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
3067 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3068 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3071 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3072 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3075 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3076 s->servername_done = 0;
3082 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3085 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3087 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
3088 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3092 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3100 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
3101 * type and return it.
3103 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
3104 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
3105 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
3107 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
3109 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
3114 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
3115 if (exts[loop].type == type)
3123 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
3125 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
3126 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3127 * point to the resulting session.
3129 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3130 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3131 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3134 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3135 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3136 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3137 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3138 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3139 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3140 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3143 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3144 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3145 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3146 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3147 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3148 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3150 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3154 const unsigned char *etick;
3156 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
3159 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3162 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3165 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
3168 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3169 hello->num_extensions,
3170 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
3171 if (ticketext == NULL)
3174 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3177 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3180 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3183 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3185 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3186 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3187 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3188 * calculate the master secret later.
3192 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3193 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3196 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3197 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3199 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3200 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3203 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3206 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3207 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3210 default: /* fatal error */
3216 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
3217 * ClientHello and we can support it
3222 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
3224 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3226 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3228 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
3229 || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
3232 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3233 hello->num_extensions,
3234 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
3237 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3238 * client doesn't support EMS.
3243 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3244 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3247 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3253 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3255 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3256 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3257 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3258 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3259 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3260 * point to the resulting session.
3263 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3264 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3265 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3266 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3267 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3269 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3270 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3271 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3274 unsigned char *sdec;
3275 const unsigned char *p;
3276 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3278 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3279 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3280 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3281 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3283 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3284 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3287 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3292 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3293 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3294 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3305 /* Check key name matches */
3306 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3307 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3311 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3312 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3313 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3314 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3315 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3316 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3322 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3325 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3329 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3331 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3336 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3337 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3338 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3341 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3342 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3343 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3346 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3347 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3348 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3349 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3350 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3351 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3352 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3353 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3357 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3358 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3363 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3367 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3371 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3372 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3373 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3377 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3378 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3387 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3391 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3392 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3396 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3403 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3404 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3405 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3406 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3407 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3408 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3409 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3410 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3411 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3412 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3415 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3416 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3417 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3418 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3419 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3420 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3421 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3424 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3427 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3428 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3434 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3437 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3438 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3439 return table[i].nid;
3444 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3450 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3453 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3456 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3462 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3464 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3471 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3474 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3475 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3476 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3477 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3478 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3479 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3480 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3481 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3482 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3483 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3484 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3485 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3488 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3494 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3495 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3496 return tls12_md_info + i;
3502 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3504 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3505 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3507 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3510 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3513 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3517 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3518 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3521 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3522 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3525 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3526 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3529 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3530 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3532 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3533 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3535 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3536 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3542 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3543 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3544 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3546 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3547 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3549 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3550 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3552 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3554 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3555 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3557 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3559 if (psignhash_nid) {
3560 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3561 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3562 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3566 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3567 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3569 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3570 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3571 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3573 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3574 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3576 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3577 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3581 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3582 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3586 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3588 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3589 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3590 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3592 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3593 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3594 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3596 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3597 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3598 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3600 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3601 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3606 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3607 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3612 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3613 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3620 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3622 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3624 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3627 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3628 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3632 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3633 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3634 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3635 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3642 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3643 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3644 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3645 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3647 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3648 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3649 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3650 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3651 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3653 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3654 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3657 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3658 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3659 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3661 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3671 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3672 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3674 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3675 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3677 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3679 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3681 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3682 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3683 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3684 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3685 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3686 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3687 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3688 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3689 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3690 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3692 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3693 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3696 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3697 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3701 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3702 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3704 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3706 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3709 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3713 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3714 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3718 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3720 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3723 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3724 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3726 /* Should never happen */
3730 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3731 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3732 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3734 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3735 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3739 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3744 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3745 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3747 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3748 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3751 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3752 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3753 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3754 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3755 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3757 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3758 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3759 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3760 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3766 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3767 * the certificate for signing.
3769 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3771 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3772 * supported it stays as NULL.
3774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3775 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3776 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3779 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3780 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3781 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3785 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3786 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3789 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3790 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3791 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3792 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3793 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3794 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3795 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3796 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3802 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3803 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3804 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3806 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3807 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3808 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3812 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3819 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3821 return (int)numsigalgs;
3824 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3825 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3826 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3828 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3829 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3830 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3834 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3836 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3838 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3840 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3842 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3843 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3846 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3850 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3853 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3855 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3856 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3857 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3858 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3859 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3860 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3862 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3863 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3864 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3868 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3870 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3873 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3876 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3878 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3880 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3882 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3890 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3891 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3893 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3896 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3897 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3900 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3901 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3906 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3907 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3909 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3913 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3917 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3920 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3922 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3927 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3928 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3930 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3931 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3932 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3934 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3941 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3942 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3943 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3945 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3946 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3947 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3953 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3957 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3961 if (default_nid == -1)
3963 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3965 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3966 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3967 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3972 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3973 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3977 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3978 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3979 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3986 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3987 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3988 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3989 * attempting to use them.
3992 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3994 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3995 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3996 /* Strict mode flags */
3997 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3998 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3999 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4001 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4006 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4007 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4010 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4011 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4013 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4016 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
4018 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4019 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4021 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4023 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4024 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4030 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4033 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4035 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4036 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4038 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4045 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4046 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4047 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4048 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4049 else if (!check_flags)
4054 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4055 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4057 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4059 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4060 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4062 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4065 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4066 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4067 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4068 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4071 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4072 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4073 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4077 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4078 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4081 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4082 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4083 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4086 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4087 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4088 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4091 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4092 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4093 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4102 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4103 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4105 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4107 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4108 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4109 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4112 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4119 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4120 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4124 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4125 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4126 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4127 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4129 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4136 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4137 else if (check_flags)
4138 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4140 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4141 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4142 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4143 else if (!check_flags)
4146 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4147 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4148 else if (strict_mode) {
4149 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4150 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4151 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4152 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4154 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4161 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4162 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4164 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
4166 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4169 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4172 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4176 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4180 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4182 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4183 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4185 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4186 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4187 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4191 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4194 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4196 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4198 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4199 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4201 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4202 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4203 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4205 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4206 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4207 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4208 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4209 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4214 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4217 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4219 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4220 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4224 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4225 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4226 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4227 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4228 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4230 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4233 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4237 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4240 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4241 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4248 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4249 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4251 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4252 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4253 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4254 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4255 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4256 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4257 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4260 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4261 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4263 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4267 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4269 int dh_secbits = 80;
4270 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4271 return DH_get_1024_160();
4272 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4273 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4278 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4279 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4282 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4290 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4291 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4293 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4294 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4302 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4303 return DH_get_2048_224();
4304 return DH_get_1024_160();
4308 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4311 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4314 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4315 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4316 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4317 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4319 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4322 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4324 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4327 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4329 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4330 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4331 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4332 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4334 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4335 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4337 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4338 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4341 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4343 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4346 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4349 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4351 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4352 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4354 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4355 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4357 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4358 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4363 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4364 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4365 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4368 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4370 int rv, start_idx, i;
4372 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4377 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4381 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4382 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4383 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);