2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
57 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 tls1_export_keying_material,
61 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
62 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
63 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
64 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
65 tls_close_construct_packet,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
86 tls_close_construct_packet,
90 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
93 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
94 * http, the cache would over fill
103 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
107 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
109 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
113 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
116 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
117 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
119 s->version = s->method->version;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
125 int nid; /* Curve NID */
126 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
127 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
131 * Table of curve information.
132 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
133 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
135 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
136 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
137 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
138 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
139 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
140 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
141 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
142 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
143 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
144 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
145 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
146 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
147 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
148 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
149 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
150 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
151 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
152 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
153 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
154 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
155 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
156 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
157 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
159 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
160 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
164 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
167 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
169 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
173 /* The default curves */
174 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
175 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
176 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
177 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
178 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
181 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
182 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
183 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
184 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
185 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
187 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
188 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
191 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
192 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
194 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
195 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
196 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
197 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
198 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
199 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
200 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
201 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
202 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
203 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
204 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
205 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
206 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
207 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
208 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
209 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
210 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
211 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
212 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
213 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
214 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
215 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
218 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
219 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
220 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
223 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
225 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
226 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
227 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
229 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
231 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
235 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
238 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
239 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
246 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
248 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
249 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
250 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
251 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
252 * lists in the first place.
253 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
254 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
255 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
257 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
258 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
260 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
262 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
263 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
265 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
266 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
269 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
282 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
283 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
286 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
287 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
291 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
292 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
302 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
303 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
305 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
308 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
310 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
311 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
312 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
318 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
319 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
321 const unsigned char *curves;
322 size_t num_curves, i;
323 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
324 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
326 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
328 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
334 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
335 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
337 } else /* Should never happen */
340 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
342 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
343 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
344 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
350 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
351 * if there is no match.
352 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
353 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
354 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
356 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
358 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
359 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
361 /* Can't do anything on client side */
365 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
367 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
368 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
370 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
371 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
372 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
373 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
375 /* Should never happen */
378 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
382 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
383 * but s->options is a long...
385 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
386 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
388 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
390 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
391 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
392 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
395 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
398 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
400 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
401 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
402 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
404 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
409 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
410 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
411 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
412 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
415 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
416 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
424 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
428 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
429 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
431 unsigned char *clist, *p;
434 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
437 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
438 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
441 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
442 unsigned long idmask;
444 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
446 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
455 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
459 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
463 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
466 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
468 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
474 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
480 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
481 if (nid == NID_undef)
482 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
483 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
485 if (nid == NID_undef)
487 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
488 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
490 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
494 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
495 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
499 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
503 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
506 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
507 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
514 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
515 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
518 /* Determine curve ID */
519 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
520 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
521 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
525 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
527 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
529 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
530 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
532 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
533 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
535 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
541 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
542 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
543 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
545 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
546 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
549 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
550 * supported (see RFC4492).
552 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
553 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
554 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
555 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
556 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
559 if (i == num_formats)
564 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
565 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
566 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
568 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
570 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
571 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
572 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
573 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
574 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
578 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
579 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
584 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
591 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
595 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
597 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
598 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
599 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
601 *pformats = ecformats_default;
602 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
604 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
606 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
611 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
612 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
614 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
616 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
619 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
622 /* If not EC nothing to do */
623 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
625 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
629 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
632 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
636 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
637 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
639 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
645 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
646 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
647 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
648 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
649 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
651 return 0; /* Should never happen */
652 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
653 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
655 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
657 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
658 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
659 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
661 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
667 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
669 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
671 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
673 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
674 * is compatible with the client extensions.
676 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
678 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
681 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
684 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
685 unsigned char curve_id[2];
686 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
687 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
688 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
689 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
690 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
694 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
695 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
699 /* Need a shared curve */
700 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
704 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
708 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
713 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
716 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
717 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
720 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
721 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
726 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
727 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
738 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
739 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
740 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
743 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
750 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
751 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
757 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
758 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
759 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
762 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
765 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
769 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
770 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
771 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
772 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
774 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
775 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
778 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
779 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
783 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
784 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
785 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
786 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
787 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
788 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
789 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
791 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
792 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
797 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
798 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
800 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
801 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
803 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
804 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
805 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
806 /* Should never happen */
809 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
810 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
815 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
816 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
817 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
818 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
820 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
824 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
825 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
828 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
829 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
831 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
834 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
835 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
837 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
847 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
848 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
849 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
850 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
853 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
854 if (i == sent_sigslen
855 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
856 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
860 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
865 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
866 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
867 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
872 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
874 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
879 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
880 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
881 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
883 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
886 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
888 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
890 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
891 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
892 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
893 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
895 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
896 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
900 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
902 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
903 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
904 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
910 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
911 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
912 * @c: cipher to check
913 * @op: Security check that you want to do
915 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
917 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
919 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
920 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
922 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
924 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
925 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
927 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
928 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
931 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
934 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
936 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
938 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
941 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
943 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
944 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
954 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
955 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
956 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
957 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
958 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
961 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
963 PACKET extensions = *packet;
964 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
965 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
968 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
969 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
973 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
979 if (num_extensions <= 1)
982 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
983 if (extension_types == NULL) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
989 extensions = *packet;
990 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
993 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
994 /* This should not happen. */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1005 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1006 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1007 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1012 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1016 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1019 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1021 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1023 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1024 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1027 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1029 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1030 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1031 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1032 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1040 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1041 if (s->renegotiate) {
1042 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1043 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1044 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1045 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1046 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1051 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1052 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1055 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1056 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1057 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1058 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1059 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1060 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1061 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1062 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1063 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1064 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1065 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1066 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1072 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1073 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1074 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1075 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1076 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1077 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1078 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1079 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1080 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1081 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1082 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1083 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1093 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1095 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1096 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1099 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1101 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1102 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1104 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1113 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1114 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1119 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1120 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1121 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1122 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1127 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1128 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1129 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0])
1130 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) {
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1144 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1146 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1147 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1148 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1149 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1150 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1151 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1152 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1157 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1158 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1161 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1162 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1165 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1166 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1174 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1176 const unsigned char *salg;
1178 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1180 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1181 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1182 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1183 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1184 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1185 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1186 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1187 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1193 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1196 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1197 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1198 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1199 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1200 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1201 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1205 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1206 unsigned char *idbytes;
1210 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1211 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1213 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1214 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1215 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1221 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1226 unsigned char *extbytes;
1227 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1234 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1247 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1252 * 1: peer may send requests
1253 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1255 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1256 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1258 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1260 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1261 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1262 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1263 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1264 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1272 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1274 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1275 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1277 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1278 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1286 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1287 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1288 * (see longer comment below)
1290 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1291 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1292 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1293 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1294 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1295 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1296 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1297 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1305 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = 0;
1306 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1309 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1310 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1311 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1312 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1313 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1318 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1319 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1320 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1325 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1331 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1332 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1333 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1339 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1345 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1354 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1355 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1361 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1362 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1363 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1366 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1367 unsigned char *padbytes;
1370 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1375 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1376 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1382 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1383 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1387 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1395 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1398 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1401 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1402 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1403 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1404 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1407 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1408 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1413 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1414 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1419 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1420 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1423 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1424 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1425 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1426 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1433 const unsigned char *plist;
1436 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1438 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1440 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1441 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1442 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1443 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1449 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1452 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1454 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1455 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1456 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1465 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1468 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1469 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1470 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1476 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1477 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1478 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1479 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1480 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1481 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1482 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1489 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1490 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1491 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1492 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1493 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1494 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1495 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1496 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1497 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1498 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1500 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1506 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1507 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1511 * 1: peer may send requests
1512 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1514 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1515 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1517 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1519 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1520 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1521 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1522 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1531 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1532 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1533 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1534 const unsigned char *npa;
1535 unsigned int npalen;
1538 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1540 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1541 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1542 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1543 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1547 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1551 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1558 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1559 * for other cases too.
1561 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1562 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1563 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1564 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1565 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1567 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1568 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1574 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1575 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1576 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1583 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1584 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1585 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1586 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1587 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1588 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1589 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1590 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1597 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1605 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1606 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1607 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1608 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1610 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1612 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1614 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1616 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1617 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1621 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1623 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1624 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1625 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1628 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1630 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1631 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1632 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1640 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1641 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1642 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1644 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1646 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1647 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1649 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1650 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1651 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1652 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1653 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1655 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1656 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1657 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1658 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1659 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1662 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1664 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1665 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1668 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1678 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1679 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1680 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1685 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1686 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1687 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1688 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1690 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1696 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1697 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1698 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1699 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1700 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1701 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1702 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1704 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1705 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1706 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1707 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1708 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1709 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1710 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1711 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1712 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1713 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1714 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1715 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1716 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1719 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1720 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1724 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1725 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1726 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1730 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1733 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1734 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1736 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1739 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1742 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1743 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1745 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1746 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1749 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1750 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1752 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1755 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1758 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1759 s->servername_done = 0;
1760 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1762 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1765 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1766 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1767 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1768 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1769 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1770 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1772 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1773 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1777 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1778 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1779 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1781 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1782 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1783 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1784 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1787 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1788 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1791 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1793 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1796 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1799 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1803 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1804 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1807 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1809 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1812 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1813 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1814 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1815 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1817 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1818 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1820 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1821 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1824 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1826 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1827 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1828 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1829 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1830 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1831 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1832 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1833 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1834 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1835 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1836 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1837 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1838 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1839 * the value of the Host: field.
1840 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1841 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1842 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1844 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1848 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1849 unsigned int servname_type;
1850 PACKET sni, hostname;
1852 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1853 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1854 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1859 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1860 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1861 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1863 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1864 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1865 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1867 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1868 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1870 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1871 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1872 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1877 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1878 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1882 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1883 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1887 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1888 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1892 s->servername_done = 1;
1895 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1896 * fall back to a full handshake.
1898 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1899 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1900 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1904 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1907 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1910 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1914 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1915 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1917 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1918 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1925 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1926 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1928 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1929 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1934 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1935 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1937 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1938 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1942 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1943 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1945 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1946 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1947 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1948 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1953 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1954 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1956 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1957 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1962 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1963 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1964 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1965 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
1966 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1967 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1969 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1972 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1973 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
1975 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
1976 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
1977 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
1982 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
1983 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
1987 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
1988 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
1989 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1993 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1994 const unsigned char *ext_data;
1995 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
1996 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
1997 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2001 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2002 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2004 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2006 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2007 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2008 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2009 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2013 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2016 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2018 PACKET responder_id;
2019 const unsigned char *id_data;
2021 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2023 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2027 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2028 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2029 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2033 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2034 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2038 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2039 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2040 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2045 /* Read in request_extensions */
2046 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2049 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2050 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2051 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2052 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2053 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2054 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2055 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2056 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2057 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2065 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2067 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2071 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2072 unsigned int hbtype;
2074 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2075 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2076 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2081 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2083 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2084 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2085 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2088 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2094 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2095 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2097 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2100 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2101 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2102 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2103 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2104 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2105 * anything like that, but this might change).
2107 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2108 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2109 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2110 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2111 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2113 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2117 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2118 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2119 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2123 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2125 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2126 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2127 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2131 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2132 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2134 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2135 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2139 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2140 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2141 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2142 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2143 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2146 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2147 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2152 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2154 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2156 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2162 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2164 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2165 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2166 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2168 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2173 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2174 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2175 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2176 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2181 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2184 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2185 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2186 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2189 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2198 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2199 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2200 * fill the length of the block.
2202 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2204 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2206 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2207 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2208 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2216 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2218 unsigned int length, type, size;
2219 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2220 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2223 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2225 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2227 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2228 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2230 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2231 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2234 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2236 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2238 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2241 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2242 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2246 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2247 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2251 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2252 const unsigned char *data;
2255 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2256 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2259 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2260 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2262 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2263 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2265 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2266 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2267 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2268 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2269 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2272 tlsext_servername = 1;
2274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2275 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2276 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2277 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2278 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2279 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2284 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2285 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2286 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2287 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2290 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2291 ecpointformatlist_length;
2292 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2293 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2294 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2295 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2301 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2303 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2304 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2305 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2306 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2308 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2311 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2312 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2315 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2316 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2318 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2321 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2322 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2325 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2326 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2330 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2331 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2332 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2334 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2335 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2336 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2337 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2338 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2339 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2341 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2343 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2344 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2345 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2348 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2353 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2354 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2355 unsigned char *selected;
2356 unsigned char selected_len;
2357 /* We must have requested it. */
2358 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2359 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2362 /* The data must be valid */
2363 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2364 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2367 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2370 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2371 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2372 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2376 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2377 * a single Serverhello
2379 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2380 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2381 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2382 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2385 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2386 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2387 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2391 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2393 /* We must have requested it. */
2394 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2395 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2399 * The extension data consists of:
2400 * uint16 list_length
2401 * uint8 proto_length;
2402 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2404 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2405 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2406 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2407 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2410 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2411 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2412 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2413 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2416 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2417 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2423 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2424 unsigned int hbtype;
2425 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2426 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2430 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2431 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2433 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2434 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2435 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2438 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2444 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2445 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2449 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2450 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2451 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2452 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2453 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2454 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2455 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2457 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2460 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2461 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2463 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2467 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2468 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2472 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2473 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2474 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2475 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2476 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2477 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2478 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2482 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2491 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2492 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2493 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2494 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2495 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2497 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2498 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2499 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2501 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2507 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2510 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2511 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2512 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2521 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2523 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2527 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2532 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2534 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2535 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2539 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2540 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2543 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2544 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2548 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2550 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2551 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2552 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2553 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2555 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2557 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2560 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2561 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2564 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2565 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2568 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2569 s->servername_done = 0;
2575 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2576 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2578 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2580 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2583 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2584 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2586 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2587 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2590 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2593 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2594 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2595 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2599 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2604 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2605 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2606 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2607 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2608 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2609 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2610 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2611 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2614 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2615 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2616 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2618 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2621 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2622 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2624 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2625 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2629 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2633 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2638 * Upon success, returns 1.
2639 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2641 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2643 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2646 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2647 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2648 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2649 * influence which certificate is sent
2651 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2653 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2654 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2655 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2656 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2658 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2659 * et al can pick it up.
2661 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2662 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2664 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2665 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2666 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2668 /* status request response should be sent */
2669 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2670 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2671 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2673 /* something bad happened */
2674 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2676 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2682 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2689 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2691 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2692 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2696 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2697 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2698 * must contain uncompressed.
2700 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2701 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2702 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2703 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2704 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2705 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2706 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2707 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2709 unsigned char *list;
2710 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2711 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2712 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2713 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2714 found_uncompressed = 1;
2718 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2720 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2724 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2725 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2727 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2729 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2730 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2731 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2732 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2734 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2736 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2739 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2740 * that we don't receive a status message
2742 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2743 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2744 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2747 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2748 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2751 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2752 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2755 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2756 s->servername_done = 0;
2762 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2765 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2767 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2768 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2772 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2780 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2781 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2782 * need to be handled at the same time.
2784 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2787 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2788 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2789 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2790 * point to the resulting session.
2792 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2793 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2794 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2797 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2798 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2799 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2800 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2801 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2802 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2803 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2806 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2807 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2808 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2809 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2810 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2811 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2813 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2816 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2817 const PACKET *session_id,
2821 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2824 int have_ticket = 0;
2825 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2828 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2829 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2832 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2835 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2838 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2842 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2843 unsigned int type, size;
2845 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2846 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2847 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2851 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2855 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2857 const unsigned char *etick;
2859 /* Duplicate extension */
2860 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2868 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2871 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2875 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2877 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2878 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2879 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2880 * calculate the master secret later.
2885 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2886 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2890 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2891 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2893 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2894 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2897 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2900 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2901 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2904 default: /* fatal error */
2910 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2911 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2912 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2918 if (have_ticket == 0)
2925 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2927 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2928 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2929 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2930 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2931 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2932 * point to the resulting session.
2935 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2936 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2937 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2938 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2939 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2941 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2942 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2943 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2946 unsigned char *sdec;
2947 const unsigned char *p;
2948 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2949 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2950 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2951 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2952 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2954 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2955 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2958 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2963 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2964 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2965 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2976 /* Check key name matches */
2977 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2978 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2982 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2983 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2984 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
2985 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
2986 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
2987 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
2993 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2996 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3000 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3002 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3007 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3008 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3009 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3012 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3013 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3014 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3017 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3018 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3019 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3020 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3021 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3022 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3023 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3027 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3028 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3033 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3037 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3041 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3042 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3043 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3047 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3048 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3057 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3061 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3062 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3066 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3073 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3074 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3075 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3076 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3077 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3078 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3079 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3080 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3081 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3082 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3085 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3086 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3087 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3088 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3089 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3090 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3091 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3094 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3097 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3098 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3104 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3107 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3108 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3109 return table[i].nid;
3114 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3120 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3123 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3126 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3133 * Old version of the tls12_get_sigandhash function used by code that has not
3134 * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
3138 int tls12_get_sigandhash_old(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3144 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3147 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3150 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3151 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3155 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3157 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3164 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3167 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3168 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3169 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3170 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3171 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3172 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3173 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3174 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3175 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3176 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3177 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3178 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3181 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3187 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3188 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3189 return tls12_md_info + i;
3195 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3197 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3198 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3200 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3203 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3206 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3210 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3211 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3214 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3215 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3218 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3219 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3222 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3223 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3225 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3226 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3228 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3229 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3235 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3236 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3237 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3239 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3240 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3242 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3243 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3245 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3247 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3248 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3250 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3252 if (psignhash_nid) {
3253 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3254 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3255 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3259 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3260 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3262 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3263 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3264 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3266 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3267 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3269 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3270 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3274 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3275 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3279 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3281 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3282 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3283 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3285 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3286 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3287 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3289 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3290 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3291 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3293 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3294 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3299 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3300 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3305 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3306 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3313 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3315 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3317 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3321 * Old version of the tls12_copy_sigalgs function used by code that has not
3322 * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
3326 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3327 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3329 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3331 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3332 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3333 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3334 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3337 return tmpout - out;
3340 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3341 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3345 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3346 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3347 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3348 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3355 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3356 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3357 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3358 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3360 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3361 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3362 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3363 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3364 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3366 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3367 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3370 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3371 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3372 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3374 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3384 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3385 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3387 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3388 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3390 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3392 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3394 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3395 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3396 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3397 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3398 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3399 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3400 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3401 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3402 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3403 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3405 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3406 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3409 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3410 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3414 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3415 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3417 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3419 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3422 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3426 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3427 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3431 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3433 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3436 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3437 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3439 /* Should never happen */
3443 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3444 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3445 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3447 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3448 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3452 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3457 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3458 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3460 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3461 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3464 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3465 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3466 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3467 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3468 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3470 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3471 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3472 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3473 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3479 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3480 * the certificate for signing.
3482 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3484 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3485 * supported it stays as NULL.
3487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3488 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3489 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3492 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3493 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3494 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3498 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3499 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3502 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3503 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3504 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3505 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3506 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3507 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3508 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3509 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3515 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3516 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3517 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3519 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3524 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3531 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3533 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3536 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3537 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3538 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3540 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3541 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3545 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3547 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3549 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3551 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3553 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3554 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3557 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3561 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3564 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3566 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3567 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3568 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3569 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3570 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3571 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3573 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3574 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3575 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3579 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3581 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3584 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3587 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3589 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3591 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3593 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3601 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3602 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3604 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3607 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3608 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3611 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3612 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3617 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3618 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3620 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3624 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3628 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3631 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3633 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3638 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3639 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3641 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3642 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3643 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3645 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3652 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3653 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3654 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3656 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3657 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3658 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3664 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3668 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3672 if (default_nid == -1)
3674 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3676 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3677 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3678 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3683 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3684 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3688 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3689 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3690 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3697 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3698 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3699 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3700 * attempting to use them.
3703 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3705 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3706 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3707 /* Strict mode flags */
3708 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3709 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3710 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3712 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3717 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3718 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3721 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3722 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3724 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3727 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3729 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3730 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3732 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3734 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3735 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3741 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3744 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3746 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3747 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3749 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3756 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3757 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3758 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3759 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3760 else if (!check_flags)
3765 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3766 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3768 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3770 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3771 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3773 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3776 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3777 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3778 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3779 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3782 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3783 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3784 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3788 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3789 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3792 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3793 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3794 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3797 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3798 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3799 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3802 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3803 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3804 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3813 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3814 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3816 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3818 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3819 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3820 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3823 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3830 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3831 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3835 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3836 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3837 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3838 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3840 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3847 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3848 else if (check_flags)
3849 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3851 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3852 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3853 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3854 else if (!check_flags)
3857 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3858 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3859 else if (strict_mode) {
3860 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3861 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3862 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3863 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3865 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3872 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3873 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3875 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3877 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3880 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3883 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3887 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3891 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3893 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3894 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3896 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3897 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3898 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3902 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3905 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3907 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3909 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3910 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3912 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3913 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3914 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3916 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3917 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3918 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3919 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3920 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3925 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3928 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3930 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3931 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3935 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3936 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3937 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3938 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3939 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3941 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3944 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3948 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3951 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3952 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3959 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3960 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3962 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3963 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3964 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3965 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3966 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3967 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3968 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3971 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3972 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3974 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3978 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3980 int dh_secbits = 80;
3981 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3982 return DH_get_1024_160();
3983 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3984 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3989 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3990 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3993 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4001 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4002 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4004 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4005 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4013 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4014 return DH_get_2048_224();
4015 return DH_get_1024_160();
4019 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4022 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4025 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4026 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4027 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4028 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4030 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4033 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4035 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4038 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4040 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4041 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4042 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4043 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4045 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4046 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4048 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4049 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4052 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4054 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4057 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4060 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4062 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4063 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4065 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4066 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4068 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4069 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4074 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4075 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4076 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4079 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4081 int rv, start_idx, i;
4083 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4088 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4092 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4093 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4094 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);