2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
431 tls_curve_info *cinfo;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
444 const unsigned char *curves;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
465 else /* Should never happen */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
674 const unsigned char *p;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1094 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1097 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1099 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1102 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1104 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1106 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1109 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1112 unsigned char *ret = p;
1113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1114 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1116 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1122 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1124 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1126 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1127 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1128 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1129 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1138 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1139 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1140 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1145 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1147 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1149 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1150 unsigned long size_str;
1153 /* check for enough space.
1154 4 for the servername type and entension length
1155 2 for servernamelist length
1156 1 for the hostname type
1157 2 for hostname length
1161 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1162 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1165 /* extension type and length */
1166 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1167 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1169 /* length of servername list */
1170 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1172 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1173 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1175 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1179 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1184 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1190 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1192 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1195 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1205 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1206 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1207 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1209 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1210 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 /* check for enough space.
1217 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1218 1 for the srp user identity
1219 + srp user identity length
1221 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1223 /* fill in the extension */
1224 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1225 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1226 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1227 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1235 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1237 const unsigned char *plist;
1240 unsigned char *etmp;
1242 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1244 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1252 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1253 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1254 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1255 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1258 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1259 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1260 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1262 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1263 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1264 if (plistlen > 65532)
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1271 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1273 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1274 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1276 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1283 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1285 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1286 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1287 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1288 * resolves this to two bytes.
1290 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1294 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1296 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1299 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1300 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1301 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1302 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1304 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1305 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1306 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1309 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1311 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1315 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1316 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1318 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1321 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1326 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1332 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1335 const unsigned char *salg;
1336 unsigned char *etmp;
1337 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1338 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1342 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1344 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, etmp, salg, salglen);
1345 /* Fill in lengths */
1346 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1351 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1352 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1354 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1356 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1358 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1364 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1369 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1372 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1376 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1378 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1379 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1385 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1387 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1394 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1395 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1396 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1398 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1399 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1401 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1403 /* save position of id len */
1404 unsigned char *q = ret;
1405 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1406 /* skip over id len */
1408 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1414 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1418 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1422 * 1: peer may send requests
1423 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1425 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1426 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1428 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1432 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1434 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1435 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1436 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1438 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1443 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1445 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1448 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1449 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1450 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1451 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1452 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1455 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1459 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1461 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1463 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1466 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1474 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1475 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1478 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1480 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1482 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1483 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1485 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1486 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1487 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1491 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1495 return NULL; /* error */
1496 if (cb_retval == -1)
1497 continue; /* skip this extension */
1499 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1501 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1503 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1507 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1508 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1511 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1512 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1513 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
1515 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1516 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1519 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1520 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1521 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1523 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1525 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1527 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1533 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1535 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1541 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1548 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1551 unsigned char *ret = p;
1553 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1555 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1558 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1559 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1560 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1561 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1563 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1564 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1568 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1570 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1572 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1574 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1578 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1582 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1588 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1593 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1605 const unsigned char *plist;
1607 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1610 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1612 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1613 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1621 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1622 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1623 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1627 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1628 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1630 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1632 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1637 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1639 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1640 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1644 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1645 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1647 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1649 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1651 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1654 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1657 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1666 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1668 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1670 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1673 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1681 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1682 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1683 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1684 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1685 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1686 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1687 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1688 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1689 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1690 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1691 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1697 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1698 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1700 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1703 * 1: peer may send requests
1704 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1706 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1707 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1709 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1715 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1716 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1717 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1719 const unsigned char *npa;
1720 unsigned int npalen;
1723 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1724 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1726 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1727 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1729 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1731 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1736 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1738 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1739 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1742 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1744 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1747 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1751 return NULL; /* error */
1752 if (cb_retval == -1)
1753 continue; /* skip this extension */
1754 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1756 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1758 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1761 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1762 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1764 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1765 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1767 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1768 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1771 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1777 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1779 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1780 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1782 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1784 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1788 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1792 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1799 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1801 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1802 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1803 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1806 * returns: 0 on success. */
1807 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1808 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1812 const unsigned char *selected;
1813 unsigned char selected_len;
1816 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1822 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1823 * length-prefixed strings. */
1824 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1825 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1834 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1836 proto_len = data[i];
1842 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1848 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1849 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1850 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1851 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1852 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1853 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1854 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1856 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1859 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1860 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1865 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1870 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1871 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1872 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1877 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1878 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1879 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1880 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1882 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1883 unsigned short type, size;
1884 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1885 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1886 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1887 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1888 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1889 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1890 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1892 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1893 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1894 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1895 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1898 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1899 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1900 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1901 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1902 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1903 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1904 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1905 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1906 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1907 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1910 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1919 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1922 if (data+size > d+n)
1926 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1928 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1929 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1931 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1933 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1935 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1940 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1942 if (data + len != d+n)
1944 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1948 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1950 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1952 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1954 unsigned short type;
1955 unsigned short size;
1957 unsigned char *data = *p;
1958 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1961 s->servername_done = 0;
1962 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1964 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1967 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1969 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1970 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1973 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1974 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1975 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1977 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1978 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1982 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1983 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1987 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1988 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1989 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1991 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1992 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1994 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1995 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1997 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1998 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2000 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2001 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2003 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2004 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2006 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2007 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2010 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2011 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2014 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2018 if (data > (d+n-len))
2021 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2026 if (data+size > (d+n))
2029 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2031 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2032 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2033 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2034 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2036 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2037 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2038 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2039 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2040 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2041 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2042 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2043 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2044 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2045 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2046 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2047 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2048 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2049 the value of the Host: field.
2050 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2051 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2052 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2053 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2057 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2059 unsigned char *sdata;
2065 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2072 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2079 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2085 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2088 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2089 switch (servname_type)
2091 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2094 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2096 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2099 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2101 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2104 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2106 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2109 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2110 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2111 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2112 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2113 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2114 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2117 s->servername_done = 1;
2121 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2122 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2123 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2135 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2141 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2143 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2145 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2148 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2150 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2153 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2155 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2156 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2158 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2160 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2167 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2169 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2170 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2172 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2173 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2175 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2182 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2183 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2185 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2186 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2188 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2191 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2192 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2195 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2196 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2197 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2198 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2199 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2202 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2204 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2205 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2206 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2208 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2209 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2211 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2216 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2218 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2221 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2222 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2224 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2227 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2228 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2231 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2232 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2233 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2234 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2235 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2238 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2239 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2240 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2242 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2246 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2249 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2250 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2257 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2258 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2259 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2261 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2262 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2264 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2269 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2271 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2272 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2274 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2278 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2280 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2282 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2284 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2287 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2294 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2296 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2307 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2310 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2311 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2315 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2320 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2324 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2326 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2328 const unsigned char *sdata;
2330 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2335 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2344 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2348 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2357 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2361 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2367 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2370 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2371 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2372 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2374 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2375 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2378 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2379 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2381 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2382 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2387 /* Read in request_extensions */
2390 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2403 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2405 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2406 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2409 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2410 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2412 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2413 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2415 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2424 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2427 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2431 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2432 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2434 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2435 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2436 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2438 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2445 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2446 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2448 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2451 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2452 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2453 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2454 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2455 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2456 * anything like that, but this might change).
2458 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2459 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2460 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2461 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2462 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2463 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2467 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2468 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2469 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2471 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2474 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2475 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2479 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2480 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2482 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2486 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2487 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2488 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2489 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2490 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2492 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2494 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2496 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2498 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2499 if (type == record->ext_type)
2501 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2506 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2507 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2508 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2518 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2520 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2521 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2523 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2525 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2528 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2529 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2530 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2535 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2538 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2540 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2544 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2553 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2554 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2555 * the length of the block. */
2556 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2558 unsigned int off = 0;
2572 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2574 unsigned short length;
2575 unsigned short type;
2576 unsigned short size;
2577 unsigned char *data = *p;
2578 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2579 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2582 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2585 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2587 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2588 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2592 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2593 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2596 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2597 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2600 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2604 if (data+length != d+n)
2606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2610 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2615 if (data+size > (d+n))
2618 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2619 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2620 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2622 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2624 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2626 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2629 tlsext_servername = 1;
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2633 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2635 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2636 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2638 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2640 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2643 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2644 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2645 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2647 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2650 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2651 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2653 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2654 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2655 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2656 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2657 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2660 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2662 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2664 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2665 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2667 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2670 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2672 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2675 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2677 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2678 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2680 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2684 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2687 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2688 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2690 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2694 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2695 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2696 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2697 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2699 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2701 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2703 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2708 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2710 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2711 * a status request message.
2713 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2715 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2718 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2719 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2722 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2723 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2725 unsigned char *selected;
2726 unsigned char selected_len;
2728 /* We must have requested it. */
2729 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2731 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2734 /* The data must be valid */
2735 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2737 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2740 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2742 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2745 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2746 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2748 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2751 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2752 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2753 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2757 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2761 /* We must have requested it. */
2762 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2764 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2769 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2772 /* The extension data consists of:
2773 * uint16 list_length
2774 * uint8 proto_length;
2775 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2779 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2781 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2785 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2787 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2790 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2791 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2792 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2793 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2795 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2798 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2799 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2802 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2804 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2806 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2809 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2813 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2814 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2816 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2817 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2818 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2820 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2825 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2827 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2831 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2832 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2834 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2837 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2839 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2841 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2842 if (record->ext_type == type)
2844 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2850 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2851 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2853 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2854 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2855 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2864 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2868 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2870 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2872 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2874 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2875 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2877 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2883 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2893 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2894 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2895 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2896 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2897 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2898 * absence on initial connect only.
2900 if (!renegotiate_seen
2901 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2902 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2904 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2906 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2914 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2917 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2921 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2923 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2928 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2930 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2931 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2933 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2934 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2936 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2937 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2942 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2946 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2947 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2954 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2959 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2961 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2962 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2965 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2966 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2968 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2969 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2973 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2974 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2975 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2976 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2978 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2980 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2981 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2982 * so this has to happen here in
2983 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2987 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2989 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2992 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2993 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2998 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2999 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3000 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3002 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3004 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3005 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3007 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3008 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3010 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3011 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3013 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3014 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3016 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3017 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3020 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3024 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3026 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3027 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3028 * abort the handshake.
3030 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3031 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3039 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3040 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3043 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3044 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3047 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3048 s->servername_done=0;
3054 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3056 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3059 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3060 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3061 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3062 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3064 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3067 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3068 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3069 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3070 if (certpkey == NULL)
3072 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3075 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3076 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3078 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3079 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3082 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3083 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3084 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3086 /* status request response should be sent */
3087 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3088 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3089 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3091 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3093 /* something bad happened */
3094 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3095 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3096 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3101 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3106 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3107 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3110 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3111 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3119 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3121 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3122 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3125 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3126 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3127 * it must contain uncompressed.
3129 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3130 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3131 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3132 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3133 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3135 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3137 unsigned char *list;
3138 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3139 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3140 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3142 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3144 found_uncompressed = 1;
3148 if (!found_uncompressed)
3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3154 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3155 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3157 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3158 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3159 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3160 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3162 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3163 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3165 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3166 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3168 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3170 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3171 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3174 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3175 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3176 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3177 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3179 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3180 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3185 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3188 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3189 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3192 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3193 * there is no response.
3195 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3197 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3198 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3200 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3201 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3204 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3205 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3209 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3210 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3216 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3217 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3220 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3221 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3224 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3225 s->servername_done=0;
3231 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3234 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3236 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3238 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3242 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3250 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3251 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3252 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3254 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3255 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3256 * extension, if any.
3257 * len: the length of the session ID.
3258 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3259 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3260 * point to the resulting session.
3262 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3263 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3264 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3267 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3268 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3269 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3270 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3271 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3272 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3273 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3276 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3277 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3278 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3279 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3280 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3281 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3283 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3284 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3286 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3287 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3291 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3293 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3294 * to permit stateful resumption.
3296 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3298 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3302 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3310 /* Skip past cipher list */
3315 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3320 /* Now at start of extensions */
3321 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3324 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3326 unsigned short type, size;
3329 if (p + size > limit)
3331 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3336 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3337 * currently have one. */
3338 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3341 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3343 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3344 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3345 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3346 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3347 * calculate the master secret later. */
3350 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3353 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3354 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3356 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3358 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3359 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3361 default: /* fatal error */
3370 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3372 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3373 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3374 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3375 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3376 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3377 * point to the resulting session.
3380 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3381 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3382 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3383 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3385 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3386 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3387 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3390 unsigned char *sdec;
3391 const unsigned char *p;
3392 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3393 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3396 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3397 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3400 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3401 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3402 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3403 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3405 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3406 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3417 /* Check key name matches */
3418 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3420 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3421 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3422 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3423 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3425 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3426 * integrity checks on ticket.
3428 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3431 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3435 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3436 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3437 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3438 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3439 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3441 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3442 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3443 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3444 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3445 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3448 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3451 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3452 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3458 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3462 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3463 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3464 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3465 * as required by standard.
3468 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3469 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3477 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3482 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3490 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3491 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3492 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3493 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3494 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3495 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3496 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3499 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3500 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3501 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3502 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3505 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3508 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3510 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3516 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3519 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3521 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3522 return table[i].nid;
3527 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3532 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3533 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3536 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3539 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3540 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3544 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3546 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3547 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3554 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3557 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3558 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3561 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3563 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3566 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3568 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3569 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3570 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3572 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3573 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3575 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3576 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3577 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3579 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3580 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3584 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3588 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3590 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3593 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3595 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3596 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3597 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3600 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3601 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3603 return inf->mfunc();
3606 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3611 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3612 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3615 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3616 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3619 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3620 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3626 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3627 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3628 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3630 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3631 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3633 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3635 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3636 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3638 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3640 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3642 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3643 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3645 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3649 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3650 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3651 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3653 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3656 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3657 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3659 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3660 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);