2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
57 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 tls1_export_keying_material,
61 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
62 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
63 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
64 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
65 tls_close_construct_packet,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
86 tls_close_construct_packet,
90 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
93 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
94 * http, the cache would over fill
103 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
107 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
109 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
113 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
116 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
117 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
119 s->version = s->method->version;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
125 int nid; /* Curve NID */
126 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
127 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
131 * Table of curve information.
132 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
133 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
135 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
136 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
137 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
138 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
139 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
140 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
141 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
142 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
143 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
144 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
145 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
146 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
147 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
148 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
149 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
150 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
151 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
152 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
153 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
154 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
155 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
156 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
157 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
159 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
160 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
164 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
167 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
169 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
173 /* The default curves */
174 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
175 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
176 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
177 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
178 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
181 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
182 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
183 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
184 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
185 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
187 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
188 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
191 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
192 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
194 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
195 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
196 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
197 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
198 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
199 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
200 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
201 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
202 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
203 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
204 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
205 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
206 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
207 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
208 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
209 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
210 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
211 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
212 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
213 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
214 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
215 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
218 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
219 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
220 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
223 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
225 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
226 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
227 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
229 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
231 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
235 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
238 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
239 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
246 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
248 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
249 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
250 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
251 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
252 * lists in the first place.
253 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
254 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
255 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
257 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
258 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
260 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
262 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
263 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
265 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
266 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
269 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
282 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
283 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
286 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
287 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
291 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
292 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
302 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
303 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
305 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
308 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
310 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
311 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
312 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
318 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
319 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
321 const unsigned char *curves;
322 size_t num_curves, i;
323 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
324 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
326 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
328 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
334 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
335 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
337 } else /* Should never happen */
340 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
342 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
343 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
344 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
350 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
351 * if there is no match.
352 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
353 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
354 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
356 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
358 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
359 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
361 /* Can't do anything on client side */
365 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
367 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
368 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
370 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
371 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
372 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
373 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
375 /* Should never happen */
378 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
382 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
383 * but s->options is a long...
385 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
386 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
388 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
390 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
391 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
392 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
395 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
398 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
400 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
401 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
402 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
404 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
409 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
410 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
411 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
412 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
415 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
416 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
424 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
428 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
429 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
431 unsigned char *clist, *p;
434 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
437 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
438 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
441 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
442 unsigned long idmask;
444 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
446 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
455 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
459 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
463 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
466 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
468 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
474 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
480 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
481 if (nid == NID_undef)
482 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
483 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
485 if (nid == NID_undef)
487 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
488 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
490 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
494 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
495 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
499 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
503 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
506 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
507 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
514 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
515 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
518 /* Determine curve ID */
519 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
520 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
521 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
525 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
527 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
529 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
530 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
532 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
533 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
535 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
541 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
542 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
543 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
545 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
546 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
549 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
550 * supported (see RFC4492).
552 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
553 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
554 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
555 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
556 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
559 if (i == num_formats)
564 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
565 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
566 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
568 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
570 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
571 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
572 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
573 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
574 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
578 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
579 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
584 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
591 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
595 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
597 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
598 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
599 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
601 *pformats = ecformats_default;
602 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
604 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
606 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
611 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
612 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
614 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
616 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
619 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
622 /* If not EC nothing to do */
623 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
625 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
629 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
632 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
636 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
637 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
639 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
645 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
646 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
647 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
648 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
649 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
651 return 0; /* Should never happen */
652 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
653 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
655 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
657 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
658 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
659 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
661 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
667 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
669 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
671 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
673 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
674 * is compatible with the client extensions.
676 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
678 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
681 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
684 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
685 unsigned char curve_id[2];
686 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
687 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
688 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
689 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
690 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
694 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
695 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
699 /* Need a shared curve */
700 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
704 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
708 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
713 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
716 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
717 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
720 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
721 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
726 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
727 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
738 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
739 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
740 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
743 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
750 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
751 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
757 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
758 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
759 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
762 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
765 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
769 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
770 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
771 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
772 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
774 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
775 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
778 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
779 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
783 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
784 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
785 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
786 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
787 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
788 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
789 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
791 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
792 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
797 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
798 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
800 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
801 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
803 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
804 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
805 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
806 /* Should never happen */
809 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
810 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
815 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
816 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
817 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
818 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
820 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
824 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
825 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
828 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
829 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
831 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
834 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
835 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
837 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
847 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
848 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
849 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
850 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
853 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
854 if (i == sent_sigslen
855 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
856 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
860 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
865 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
866 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
867 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
872 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
874 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
879 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
880 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
881 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
883 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
886 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
888 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
890 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
891 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
892 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
893 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
895 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
896 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
900 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
902 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
903 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
904 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
910 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
911 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
912 * @c: cipher to check
913 * @op: Security check that you want to do
915 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
917 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
919 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
920 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
922 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
924 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
925 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
927 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
928 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
931 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
934 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
936 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
938 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
941 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
943 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
944 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
954 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
955 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
956 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
957 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
958 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
961 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
963 PACKET extensions = *packet;
964 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
965 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
968 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
969 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
973 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
979 if (num_extensions <= 1)
982 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
983 if (extension_types == NULL) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
989 extensions = *packet;
990 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
993 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
994 /* This should not happen. */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1005 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1006 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1007 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1012 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1016 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1019 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1021 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1023 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1024 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1027 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1029 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1030 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1031 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1032 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1040 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1041 if (s->renegotiate) {
1042 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1043 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1044 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1045 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1046 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1051 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1052 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1055 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1056 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1057 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1058 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1059 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1060 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1061 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1062 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1063 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1064 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1065 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1066 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1072 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1073 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1074 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1075 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1076 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1077 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1078 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1079 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1080 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1081 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1082 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1083 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1093 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1095 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1096 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1099 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1101 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1102 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1104 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1113 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1114 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1119 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1120 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1121 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1122 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1127 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1128 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1129 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0])
1130 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) {
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1144 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1146 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1147 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1148 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1149 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1150 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1151 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1152 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1157 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1158 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1161 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1162 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1165 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1166 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1174 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1176 const unsigned char *salg;
1178 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1180 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1181 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1182 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1183 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1184 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1185 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1186 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1187 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1193 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1196 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1197 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1198 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1199 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1200 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1201 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1205 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1206 unsigned char *idbytes;
1210 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1211 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1213 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1214 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1215 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1221 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1226 unsigned char *extbytes;
1227 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1234 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1247 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1252 * 1: peer may send requests
1253 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1255 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1256 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1258 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1260 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1261 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1262 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1263 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1264 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1272 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1274 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1275 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1277 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1278 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1286 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1287 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1288 * (see longer comment below)
1290 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1291 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1292 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1293 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1294 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1295 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1296 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1297 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1305 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = 0;
1306 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1309 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1310 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1311 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1312 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1313 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1318 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1319 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1320 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1325 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1331 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1332 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1333 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1339 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1345 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1354 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1355 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1361 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1362 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1363 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1366 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1367 unsigned char *padbytes;
1370 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1375 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1376 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1382 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1383 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1387 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1395 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1398 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1401 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1402 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1403 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1404 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1407 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1408 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1413 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1414 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1419 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1420 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1423 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1424 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1425 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1426 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1433 const unsigned char *plist;
1436 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1438 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1440 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1441 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1442 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1443 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1449 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1452 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1454 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1455 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1456 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1465 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1468 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1469 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1470 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1476 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1477 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1478 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1479 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1480 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1481 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1482 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1489 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1490 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1491 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1492 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1493 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1494 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1495 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1496 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1497 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1498 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1500 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1506 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1507 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1510 * 1: peer may send requests
1511 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1513 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1514 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1516 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1518 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1519 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1520 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1521 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1530 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1531 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1532 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1533 const unsigned char *npa;
1534 unsigned int npalen;
1537 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1539 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1540 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1541 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1542 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1546 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1550 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1557 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1558 * for other cases too.
1560 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1561 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1562 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1563 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1564 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1566 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1567 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1574 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1575 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1581 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1582 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1583 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1584 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1585 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1586 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1587 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1588 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1589 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1604 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1605 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1606 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1607 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1609 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1611 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1613 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1615 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1616 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1620 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1622 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1623 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1624 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1627 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1629 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1630 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1631 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1639 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1640 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1641 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1643 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1645 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1646 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1648 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1649 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1650 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1651 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1652 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1654 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1655 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1656 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1657 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1658 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1661 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1663 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1664 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1667 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1677 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1678 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1679 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1684 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1685 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1686 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1687 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1689 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1695 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1696 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1697 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1698 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1699 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1700 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1701 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1703 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1704 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1705 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1706 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1707 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1708 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1709 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1710 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1711 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1712 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1713 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1714 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1715 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1718 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1719 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1723 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1724 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1725 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1729 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1732 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1733 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1735 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1738 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1741 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1742 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1744 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1745 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1748 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1749 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1751 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1754 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1757 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1758 s->servername_done = 0;
1759 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1761 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1764 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1765 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1766 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1767 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1768 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1769 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1771 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1772 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1776 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1777 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1778 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1780 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1781 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1782 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1783 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1786 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1787 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1790 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1792 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1795 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1798 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1802 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1803 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1806 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1808 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1811 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1812 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1813 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1814 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1816 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1817 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1819 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1820 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1823 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1825 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1826 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1827 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1828 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1829 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1830 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1831 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1832 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1833 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1834 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1835 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1836 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1837 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1838 * the value of the Host: field.
1839 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1840 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1841 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1843 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1847 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1848 unsigned int servname_type;
1849 PACKET sni, hostname;
1851 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1852 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1853 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1858 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1859 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1860 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1862 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1863 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1864 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1866 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1867 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1869 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1870 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1871 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1876 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1877 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1881 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1882 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1886 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1887 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1891 s->servername_done = 1;
1894 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1895 * fall back to a full handshake.
1897 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1898 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1899 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1903 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1906 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1909 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1913 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1914 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1916 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1917 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1924 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1925 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1927 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1928 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1933 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1934 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1936 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1937 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1941 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1942 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1944 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1945 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1946 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1947 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1952 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1953 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1955 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1956 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1961 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1962 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1963 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1964 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
1965 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1966 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1968 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1971 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1972 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
1974 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
1975 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
1976 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
1981 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
1982 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
1986 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
1987 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
1988 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
1991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1992 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1993 const unsigned char *ext_data;
1994 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
1995 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
1996 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2000 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2001 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2003 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2005 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2006 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2007 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2008 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2012 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2015 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2017 PACKET responder_id;
2018 const unsigned char *id_data;
2020 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2022 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2026 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2027 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2028 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2032 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2033 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2037 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2038 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2039 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2044 /* Read in request_extensions */
2045 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2048 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2049 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2050 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2051 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2052 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2053 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2054 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2055 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2056 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2064 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2066 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2070 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2071 unsigned int hbtype;
2073 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2074 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2079 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2080 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2082 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2083 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2084 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2087 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2093 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2094 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2096 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2099 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2100 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2101 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2102 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2103 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2104 * anything like that, but this might change).
2106 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2107 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2108 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2109 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2110 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2112 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2116 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2117 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2118 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2122 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2124 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2125 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2126 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2130 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2131 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2133 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2134 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2138 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2139 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2140 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2141 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2142 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2145 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2146 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2151 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2153 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2155 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2161 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2163 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2164 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2165 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2167 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2172 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2173 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2174 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2175 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2180 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2183 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2184 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2185 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2188 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2197 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2198 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2199 * fill the length of the block.
2201 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2203 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2205 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2206 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2207 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2215 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2217 unsigned int length, type, size;
2218 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2219 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2222 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2224 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2226 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2227 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2229 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2230 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2233 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2235 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2237 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2240 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2241 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2246 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2251 const unsigned char *data;
2254 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2255 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2258 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2259 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2261 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2262 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2264 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2265 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2266 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2267 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2268 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2271 tlsext_servername = 1;
2273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2274 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2275 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2276 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2277 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2278 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2282 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2283 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2284 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2285 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2286 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2289 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2290 ecpointformatlist_length;
2291 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2292 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2293 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2294 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2300 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2302 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2303 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2304 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2305 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2307 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2310 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2311 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2314 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2315 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2317 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2320 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2321 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2324 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2325 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2329 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2330 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2331 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2333 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2334 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2335 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2336 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2337 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2338 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2340 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2342 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2343 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2344 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2347 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2352 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2353 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2354 unsigned char *selected;
2355 unsigned char selected_len;
2356 /* We must have requested it. */
2357 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2358 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2361 /* The data must be valid */
2362 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2363 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2369 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2370 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2371 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2375 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2376 * a single Serverhello
2378 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2379 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2380 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2381 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2384 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2385 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2386 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2390 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2392 /* We must have requested it. */
2393 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2394 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2398 * The extension data consists of:
2399 * uint16 list_length
2400 * uint8 proto_length;
2401 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2403 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2404 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2405 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2406 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2409 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2410 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2411 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2412 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2415 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2416 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2419 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2422 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2423 unsigned int hbtype;
2424 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2425 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2429 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2430 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2432 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2433 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2434 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2437 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2443 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2444 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2448 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2449 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2450 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2451 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2452 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2453 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2454 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2456 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2459 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2460 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2462 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2466 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2467 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2471 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2472 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2473 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2474 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2475 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2476 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2477 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2481 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2490 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2491 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2492 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2493 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2494 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2496 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2497 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2498 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2500 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2506 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2509 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2510 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2511 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2520 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2522 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2526 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2531 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2533 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2534 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2538 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2539 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2542 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2543 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2547 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2549 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2550 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2551 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2552 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2554 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2556 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2559 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2560 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2563 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2564 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2567 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2568 s->servername_done = 0;
2574 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2575 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2577 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2579 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2582 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2583 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2585 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2586 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2589 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2592 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2593 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2594 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2598 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2603 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2604 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2605 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2606 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2607 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2608 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2609 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2610 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2613 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2614 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2615 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2617 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2620 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2621 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2623 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2624 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2628 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2632 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2637 * Upon success, returns 1.
2638 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2640 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2642 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2645 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2646 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2647 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2648 * influence which certificate is sent
2650 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2652 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2653 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2654 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2655 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2657 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2658 * et al can pick it up.
2660 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2661 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2663 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2664 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2665 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2667 /* status request response should be sent */
2668 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2669 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2670 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2672 /* something bad happened */
2673 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2675 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2681 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2688 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2690 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2691 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2695 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2696 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2697 * must contain uncompressed.
2699 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2700 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2701 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2702 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2703 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2704 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2705 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2706 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2708 unsigned char *list;
2709 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2710 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2711 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2712 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2713 found_uncompressed = 1;
2717 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2719 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2723 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2724 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2726 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2728 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2729 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2730 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2731 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2733 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2735 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2738 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2739 * that we don't receive a status message
2741 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2742 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2743 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2746 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2747 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2750 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2751 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2754 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2755 s->servername_done = 0;
2761 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2764 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2766 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2767 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2771 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2779 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2780 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2781 * need to be handled at the same time.
2783 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2786 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2787 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2788 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2789 * point to the resulting session.
2791 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2792 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2793 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2796 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2797 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2798 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2799 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2800 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2801 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2802 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2805 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2806 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2807 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2808 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2809 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2810 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2812 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2815 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2816 const PACKET *session_id,
2820 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2823 int have_ticket = 0;
2824 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2827 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2828 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2831 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2834 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2837 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2841 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2842 unsigned int type, size;
2844 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2845 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2846 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2850 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2854 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2856 const unsigned char *etick;
2858 /* Duplicate extension */
2859 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2867 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2870 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2874 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2876 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2877 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2878 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2879 * calculate the master secret later.
2884 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2885 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2889 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2890 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2892 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2893 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2896 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2899 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2900 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2903 default: /* fatal error */
2909 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2910 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2911 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2917 if (have_ticket == 0)
2924 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2926 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2927 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2928 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2929 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2930 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2931 * point to the resulting session.
2934 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2935 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2936 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2937 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2938 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2940 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2941 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2942 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2945 unsigned char *sdec;
2946 const unsigned char *p;
2947 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2948 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2949 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2950 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2951 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2953 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2954 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2957 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2962 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2963 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2964 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2975 /* Check key name matches */
2976 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2977 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2981 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2982 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2983 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
2984 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
2985 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
2986 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
2992 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2995 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
2999 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3001 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3006 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3007 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3008 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3011 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3012 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3013 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3016 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3017 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3018 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3019 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3020 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3021 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3022 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3026 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3027 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3032 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3036 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3040 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3041 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3042 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3046 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3047 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3056 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3060 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3061 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3065 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3072 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3073 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3074 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3075 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3076 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3077 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3078 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3079 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3080 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3081 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3084 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3085 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3086 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3087 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3088 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3089 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3090 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3093 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3096 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3097 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3103 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3106 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3107 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3108 return table[i].nid;
3113 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3119 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3122 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3125 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3132 * Old version of the tls12_get_sigandhash function used by code that has not
3133 * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
3137 int tls12_get_sigandhash_old(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3143 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3146 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3149 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3150 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3154 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3156 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3163 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3166 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3167 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3168 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3169 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3170 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3171 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3172 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3173 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3174 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3175 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3176 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3177 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3180 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3186 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3187 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3188 return tls12_md_info + i;
3194 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3196 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3197 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3199 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3202 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3205 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3209 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3210 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3213 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3214 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3217 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3218 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3221 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3222 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3224 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3225 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3227 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3228 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3234 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3235 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3236 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3238 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3239 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3241 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3242 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3244 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3246 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3247 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3249 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3251 if (psignhash_nid) {
3252 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3253 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3254 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3258 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3259 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3261 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3262 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3263 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3265 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3266 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3268 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3269 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3273 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3274 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3278 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3280 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3281 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3282 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3284 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3285 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3286 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3288 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3289 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3290 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3292 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3293 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3298 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3299 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3304 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3305 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3312 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3314 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3316 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3320 * Old version of the tls12_copy_sigalgs function used by code that has not
3321 * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
3325 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3326 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3328 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3330 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3331 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3332 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3333 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3336 return tmpout - out;
3339 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3340 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3344 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3345 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3354 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3355 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3356 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3357 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3359 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3360 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3361 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3362 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3363 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3365 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3366 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3369 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3370 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3371 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3373 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3383 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3384 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3386 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3387 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3389 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3391 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3393 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3394 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3395 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3396 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3397 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3398 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3399 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3400 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3401 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3402 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3404 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3405 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3408 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3409 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3413 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3414 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3416 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3418 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3421 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3425 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3426 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3430 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3432 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3435 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3436 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3438 /* Should never happen */
3442 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3443 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3444 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3446 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3447 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3451 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3456 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3457 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3459 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3460 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3463 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3464 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3465 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3466 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3467 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3469 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3470 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3471 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3472 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3478 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3479 * the certificate for signing.
3481 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3483 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3484 * supported it stays as NULL.
3486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3487 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3488 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3491 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3492 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3493 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3497 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3498 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3501 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3502 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3503 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3504 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3505 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3506 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3507 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3508 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3514 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3515 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3516 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3518 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3523 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3530 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3532 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3535 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3536 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3537 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3539 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3540 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3544 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3546 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3548 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3550 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3552 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3553 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3556 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3560 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3563 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3565 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3566 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3567 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3568 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3569 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3570 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3572 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3573 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3574 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3578 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3580 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3583 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3586 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3592 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3600 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3601 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3603 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3606 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3607 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3610 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3611 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3616 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3617 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3619 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3623 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3627 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3630 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3632 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3637 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3638 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3640 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3641 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3642 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3644 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3651 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3652 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3653 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3655 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3656 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3657 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3663 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3667 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3671 if (default_nid == -1)
3673 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3675 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3676 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3677 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3682 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3683 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3687 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3688 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3689 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3696 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3697 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3698 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3699 * attempting to use them.
3702 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3704 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3705 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3706 /* Strict mode flags */
3707 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3708 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3709 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3711 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3716 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3717 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3720 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3721 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3723 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3726 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3728 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3729 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3731 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3733 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3734 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3740 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3743 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3745 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3746 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3748 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3755 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3756 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3757 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3758 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3759 else if (!check_flags)
3764 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3765 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3767 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3769 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3770 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3772 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3775 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3776 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3777 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3778 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3781 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3782 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3783 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3787 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3788 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3791 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3792 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3793 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3796 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3797 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3798 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3801 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3802 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3803 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3812 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3813 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3815 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3817 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3818 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3819 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3822 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3829 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3830 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3834 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3835 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3836 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3837 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3839 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3846 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3847 else if (check_flags)
3848 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3850 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3851 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3852 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3853 else if (!check_flags)
3856 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3857 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3858 else if (strict_mode) {
3859 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3860 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3861 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3862 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3864 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3871 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3872 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3874 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3876 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3879 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3882 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3886 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3890 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3892 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3893 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3895 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3896 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3897 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3901 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3904 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3906 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3908 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3909 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3911 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3912 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3913 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3915 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3916 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3917 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3918 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3919 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3924 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3927 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3929 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3930 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3934 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3935 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3936 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3937 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3938 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3940 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3943 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3947 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3950 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3951 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3958 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3959 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3961 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3962 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3963 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3964 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3965 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3966 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3967 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3970 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3971 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3973 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3977 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3979 int dh_secbits = 80;
3980 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3981 return DH_get_1024_160();
3982 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3983 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3988 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3989 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3992 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4000 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4001 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4003 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4004 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4012 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4013 return DH_get_2048_224();
4014 return DH_get_1024_160();
4018 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4021 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4024 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4025 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4026 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4027 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4029 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4032 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4034 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4037 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4039 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4040 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4041 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4042 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4044 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4045 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4047 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4048 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4051 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4053 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4056 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4059 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4061 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4062 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4064 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4065 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4067 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4068 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4073 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4074 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4075 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4078 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4080 int rv, start_idx, i;
4082 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4087 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4091 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4092 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4093 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);