2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
27 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
29 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
33 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
36 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
38 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
39 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
40 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
41 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
43 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
45 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
48 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
49 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
50 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
51 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
53 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
54 * (transition not allowed)
56 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
58 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
61 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
62 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
63 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
65 switch (st->hand_state) {
69 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
70 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
71 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
72 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
76 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
85 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
86 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
87 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
88 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
89 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
93 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
94 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
101 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
108 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
114 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
115 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
123 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
124 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
126 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
129 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
130 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
135 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
136 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
142 /* No valid transition found */
147 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
148 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
149 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
150 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
152 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
153 * (transition not allowed)
155 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
157 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
159 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
160 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
165 switch (st->hand_state) {
171 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
172 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
173 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
178 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
180 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
181 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
183 * 2) If we did request one then
184 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
186 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
187 * list if we requested a certificate)
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
190 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
191 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
192 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
193 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
195 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
196 * not going to accept it because we require a client
199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
200 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
203 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
207 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
210 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
211 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
212 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
219 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
220 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
225 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
227 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
228 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
229 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
230 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
231 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
234 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
237 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
238 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
239 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
240 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
242 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
246 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
253 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
260 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
262 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
269 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
279 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
280 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
281 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
287 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
288 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
289 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
296 /* No valid transition found */
297 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
301 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
302 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
305 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
306 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
307 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
308 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
311 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
316 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
318 * Valid return values are:
322 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
324 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
327 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
328 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
329 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
330 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
331 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
334 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
336 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
340 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
341 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
342 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
343 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
344 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
347 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
348 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
358 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
360 * Valid return values are:
364 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
367 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
368 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
370 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
371 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
373 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
374 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
376 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
379 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
380 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
382 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
383 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
386 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
388 * ... except when the application insists on
389 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
392 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
393 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
394 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
396 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
399 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
407 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
408 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
411 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
413 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
416 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
417 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
420 switch (st->hand_state) {
422 /* Shouldn't happen */
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
424 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
427 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
433 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
435 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 /* Try to read from the client instead */
440 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
442 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
446 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
447 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
448 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
450 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
457 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
458 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
465 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
466 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
467 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
474 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
475 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
490 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
495 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
497 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
499 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
500 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
503 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
504 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
505 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
507 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
508 * handshake at this point.
510 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
513 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
519 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
520 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
521 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
522 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
524 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
525 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
526 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
527 * been configured for.
529 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
530 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
531 } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
532 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
540 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
541 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
543 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
545 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
548 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
549 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
553 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
555 switch (st->hand_state) {
557 /* Shouldn't happen */
558 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
559 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
562 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
563 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
565 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
568 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
569 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
570 /* SSLfatal() already called */
571 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
576 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
577 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
579 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
584 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
585 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
586 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
587 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
588 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
590 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
597 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
599 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
601 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
606 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
607 /* normal PSK or SRP */
608 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
609 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
611 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
613 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
619 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
622 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
624 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
628 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
629 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
630 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
635 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
636 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
638 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
642 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
643 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
647 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
649 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
651 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
652 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
653 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
654 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
658 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
660 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
661 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
662 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
664 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
665 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
666 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
668 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
670 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
672 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
673 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
678 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
679 * the server to the client.
681 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
683 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
685 switch (st->hand_state) {
687 /* No pre work to be done */
690 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
693 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
696 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
698 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
699 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
700 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
705 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
706 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
708 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
709 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
715 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
717 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
718 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
719 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
722 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
724 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
725 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
726 && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
728 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
729 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
730 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
732 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
734 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
736 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
738 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
739 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
745 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
748 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
749 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
750 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
751 } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
755 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
756 /* SSLfatal() already called */
759 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
761 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
762 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
763 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
764 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
768 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
770 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
771 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
772 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
773 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
777 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
778 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
781 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
784 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
786 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
791 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
795 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
805 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
806 * server to the client.
808 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
810 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
814 switch (st->hand_state) {
816 /* No post work to be done */
819 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
820 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
822 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
823 /* SSLfatal() already called */
828 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
829 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
831 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
832 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
833 /* SSLfatal() already called */
837 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
838 * treat like it was the first packet
843 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
844 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
845 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
846 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
851 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
852 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
853 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
857 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
860 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
861 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
863 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
864 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
865 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
868 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
869 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
876 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
877 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
881 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
882 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
886 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
887 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
888 if (!statem_flush(s))
893 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
894 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
895 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
896 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
897 /* SSLfatal() already called */
901 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
902 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
903 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
904 /* SSLfatal() already called */
908 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
909 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
910 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
912 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
917 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
919 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
922 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
926 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
927 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
929 /* SSLfatal() already called */
934 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
937 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
938 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
942 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
943 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
946 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
948 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
951 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
955 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
956 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
958 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
959 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
961 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
962 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
963 /* SSLfatal() already called */
968 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
969 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
970 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
975 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
976 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
978 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
979 /* SSLfatal() already called */
984 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
986 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
987 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
988 && conn_is_closed()) {
990 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
991 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
992 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
993 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
994 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
996 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1005 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1009 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1012 * Valid return values are:
1016 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1017 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1019 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1021 switch (st->hand_state) {
1023 /* Shouldn't happen */
1024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1027 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1029 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1031 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1032 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1035 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1036 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1037 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1040 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1041 /* No construction function needed */
1043 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1046 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1047 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1048 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1051 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1052 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1053 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1056 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1057 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1058 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1062 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1063 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1064 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1067 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1068 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1069 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1072 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1073 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1074 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1077 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1078 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1079 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1082 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1083 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1084 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1087 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1088 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1089 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1092 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1094 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1097 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1098 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1099 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1102 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1103 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1104 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1112 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1113 * calculated as follows:
1115 * 2 + # client_version
1116 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1117 * 1 + # length of session_id
1118 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1119 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1120 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1121 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1122 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1123 * 2 + # length of extensions
1124 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1126 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1128 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1129 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1132 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1133 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1135 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1137 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1139 switch (st->hand_state) {
1141 /* Shouldn't happen */
1144 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1145 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1147 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1148 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1150 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1151 return s->max_cert_list;
1153 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1154 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1156 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1157 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1160 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1161 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1164 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1165 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1167 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1168 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1170 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1171 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1176 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1178 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1180 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1182 switch (st->hand_state) {
1184 /* Shouldn't happen */
1185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1186 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1188 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1189 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1191 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1192 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1194 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1195 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1197 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1198 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1200 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1201 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1204 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1205 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1208 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1209 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1211 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1212 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1214 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1215 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1221 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1224 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1226 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1228 switch (st->hand_state) {
1230 /* Shouldn't happen */
1231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1235 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1237 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1238 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1243 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1244 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1247 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1249 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1250 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1251 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1253 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1257 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1260 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1263 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1265 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1266 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1267 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1276 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1279 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1280 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1281 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1287 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1289 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1290 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1291 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1292 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1293 cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1297 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1299 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1300 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1310 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1311 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1312 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1316 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1318 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1319 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1320 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1321 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1323 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1325 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1326 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1327 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1328 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1329 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1330 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1331 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1333 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1334 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1335 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1336 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1337 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1338 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1339 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1340 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1341 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1342 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1343 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1344 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1345 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1347 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1348 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1353 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1355 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1356 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1357 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1361 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1364 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1365 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1367 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1370 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1372 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1374 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1375 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1376 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1377 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1379 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1380 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1381 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1386 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1388 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1389 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1390 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1396 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1397 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1403 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1405 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1406 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1408 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1411 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1412 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1418 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1419 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1420 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1421 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1423 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1424 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1426 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1427 * 7-8 session_id_length
1428 * 9-10 challenge_length
1432 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1433 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1435 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1436 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1437 * in the first place
1439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1444 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1449 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1450 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1452 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1453 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1454 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1456 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1459 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1460 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1461 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1466 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1471 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1473 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1474 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1475 /* No extensions. */
1476 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1480 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1482 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1483 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1484 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1485 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1487 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1488 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1489 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1490 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1491 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1492 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1493 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1494 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1501 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1502 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1503 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1504 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1505 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1506 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1511 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1512 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1516 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1517 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1518 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1523 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1524 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1525 * So check cookie length...
1527 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1528 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1529 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1530 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1535 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1540 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1545 /* Could be empty. */
1546 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1547 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1549 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1550 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1557 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1558 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1559 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1565 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1566 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1567 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1568 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1569 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1572 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1574 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1577 if (clienthello != NULL)
1578 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1579 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1581 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1584 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1587 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1592 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1594 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1595 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1596 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1597 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1598 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1600 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1601 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1602 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1603 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1604 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1605 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1607 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1608 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1610 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1612 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1617 /* Set up the client_random */
1618 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1620 /* Choose the version */
1622 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1623 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1624 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1625 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1627 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1634 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1637 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1638 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1640 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1641 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1642 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1643 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1644 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1650 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1651 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1652 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
1658 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1659 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1664 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1665 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1666 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1667 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1668 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1669 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1671 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1673 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1675 /* default verification */
1676 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1677 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1678 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1679 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1682 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1684 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1685 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1686 if (protverr != 0) {
1687 s->version = s->client_version;
1688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
1696 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1697 clienthello->isv2) ||
1698 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1699 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1700 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1704 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1705 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1706 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1707 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1708 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1709 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1710 if (s->renegotiate) {
1711 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1713 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1716 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1717 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1718 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1720 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1721 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1722 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1723 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1724 * an insecure downgrade.
1726 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1727 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1733 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1734 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1735 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1736 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1738 if (cipher == NULL) {
1739 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1742 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1743 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1744 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1746 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1747 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1749 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1752 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1755 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1756 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1757 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1758 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1759 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1764 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1765 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1767 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1768 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1769 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1770 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1771 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1772 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1773 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1774 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1775 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1776 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1779 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1781 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1782 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1783 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1787 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1789 /* previous session */
1791 } else if (i == -1) {
1792 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1796 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1797 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1803 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1804 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1805 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1806 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1810 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1811 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1813 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1815 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1817 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1818 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1819 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1821 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1822 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1823 if (trc_out != NULL)
1824 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1825 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1833 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1837 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1838 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1841 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1844 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1845 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1849 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1856 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1857 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1858 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1860 /* TLS extensions */
1861 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1862 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1863 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1868 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1869 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1870 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1871 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1875 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1876 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1883 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1886 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1887 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1889 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1890 * backwards compat reasons
1892 int master_key_length;
1894 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1895 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1896 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1898 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1899 && master_key_length > 0) {
1900 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1902 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1903 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1907 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1908 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1909 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1910 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1911 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1916 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1917 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1918 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1919 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1920 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1925 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1926 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1927 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1929 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1930 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1932 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1933 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1934 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1936 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1938 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1943 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1944 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1945 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1947 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1948 /* Can't disable compression */
1949 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1951 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1954 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1955 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1956 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1957 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1958 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1962 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1964 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1967 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1968 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1969 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1972 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1974 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1977 } else if (s->hit) {
1979 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1980 /* See if we have a match */
1981 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1984 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1985 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1986 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1988 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1989 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1998 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2004 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2005 * using compression.
2007 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2014 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2017 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2018 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2019 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2020 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2021 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2028 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2029 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2031 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2033 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2034 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2039 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2040 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2041 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2042 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2043 s->clienthello = NULL;
2046 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2047 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2048 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2049 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2050 s->clienthello = NULL;
2056 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2057 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2059 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2061 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2064 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2065 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2066 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2067 * influence which certificate is sent
2069 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2070 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2073 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2074 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2076 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2077 * et al can pick it up.
2079 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2080 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2082 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2083 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2084 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2086 /* status request response should be sent */
2087 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2088 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2089 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2091 /* something bad happened */
2092 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2094 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2104 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2105 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2107 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2109 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2110 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2112 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2113 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2114 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2115 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2116 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2118 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2119 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2120 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2121 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2125 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2127 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2131 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2132 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2133 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2134 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2135 selected_len) != 0) {
2136 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2137 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2141 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2142 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2145 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2147 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2150 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2152 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2154 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2157 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2162 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
2164 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2168 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2173 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2174 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2175 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2176 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2182 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2184 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2186 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2187 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2189 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2196 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2197 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2198 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2199 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2200 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2206 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2209 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2212 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2213 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2215 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2217 if (cipher == NULL) {
2218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2219 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2222 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2225 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2226 /* SSLfatal already called */
2229 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2230 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2231 s->session->not_resumable =
2232 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2233 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2234 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2235 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2236 /* do not send a session ticket */
2237 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2240 /* Session-id reuse */
2241 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2245 * we now have the following setup.
2247 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2248 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2249 * compression - basically ignored right now
2250 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2251 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2252 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2253 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2257 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2258 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2260 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2261 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2265 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2266 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2267 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2268 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2270 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2271 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2278 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2280 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2282 * callback indicates further work to be done
2284 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2288 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2294 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2299 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2304 unsigned char *session_id;
2305 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2307 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2308 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2310 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2311 * tls_process_client_hello()
2313 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2314 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2315 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2316 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2322 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2323 * back in the server hello:
2324 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2325 * we send back the old session ID.
2326 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2327 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2328 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2329 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2331 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2332 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2333 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2335 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2336 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2339 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2340 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2342 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2345 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2346 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2348 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2349 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2352 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2357 /* set up the compression method */
2358 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2361 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2364 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2367 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2368 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2369 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2370 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2374 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2375 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2376 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2378 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2379 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2381 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2385 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2386 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2387 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2392 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2393 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2395 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2396 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2399 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2400 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2401 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2408 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2410 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2411 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2412 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2419 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2422 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2425 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2426 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2429 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2433 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2434 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2435 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2436 int freer = 0, ret = 0;
2438 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2443 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2448 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2450 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2452 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2453 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2455 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2457 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2458 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2459 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2461 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2462 pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2469 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
2472 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2473 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024));
2475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2481 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2485 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2486 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2490 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2495 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
2496 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2501 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2504 /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
2506 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P,
2508 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G,
2510 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2511 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) {
2512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2518 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2520 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2525 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2526 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2527 if (curve_id == 0) {
2528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2529 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2532 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2533 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2534 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2535 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2539 /* Encode the public key. */
2540 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2542 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2548 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2549 * can set these to NULLs
2556 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2558 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2559 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2560 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2561 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2565 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2566 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2567 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2568 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2576 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2577 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2579 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2585 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2586 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2587 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2590 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2591 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2593 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2594 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2602 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2603 unsigned char *binval;
2606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2607 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2608 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2611 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2619 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2620 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2623 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2624 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2627 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2631 memset(binval, 0, len);
2635 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2636 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2641 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2645 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2647 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2648 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2649 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2652 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2653 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2654 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2655 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2659 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2660 encodedPoint = NULL;
2666 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2668 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2669 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
2671 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
2672 /* Should never happen */
2673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2676 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2677 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2681 /* send signature algorithm */
2682 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2687 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2688 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md),
2689 s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey) <= 0) {
2690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2693 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2694 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2695 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2700 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2701 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2704 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2708 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
2709 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2710 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
2711 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2712 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2722 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2724 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2726 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2736 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2738 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2739 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2740 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2741 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2742 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2743 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2744 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context,
2745 s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2746 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2750 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2751 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2752 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2756 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2763 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2765 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2771 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2772 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2773 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2778 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2779 const uint16_t *psigs;
2780 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2782 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2783 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2784 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2785 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2791 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2792 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2798 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2802 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2805 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2807 PACKET psk_identity;
2809 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2813 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2817 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2822 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2823 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2827 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2830 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2831 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2833 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2835 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2841 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2842 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2843 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2845 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2850 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2854 /* Should never happen */
2855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2860 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2864 PACKET enc_premaster;
2865 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
2866 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2868 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2869 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
2871 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
2873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2877 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2878 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2879 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2881 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2882 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2888 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2889 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
2890 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2895 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, rsa, s->ctx->propq);
2897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2902 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2903 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2904 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
2905 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
2906 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
2907 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
2908 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
2909 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
2910 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2912 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
2913 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
2914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2918 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
2919 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
2920 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
2921 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
2922 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
2923 (unsigned int *)&s->version);
2924 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
2926 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
2927 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
2928 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2929 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
2930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2935 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
2936 * we double check anyway.
2938 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2939 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2944 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
2945 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2946 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
2947 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2953 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2954 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
2957 /* Should never happen */
2958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2963 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2966 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2970 const unsigned char *data;
2971 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2974 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2978 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
2980 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2984 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2988 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2989 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2990 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2993 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2994 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
2999 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3000 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3001 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3007 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3008 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3013 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3014 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3016 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3019 /* Should never happen */
3020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3025 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3028 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3029 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3032 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3033 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3038 const unsigned char *data;
3041 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3042 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3045 /* Get encoded point length */
3046 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3047 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3056 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3057 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3062 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
3063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3068 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3069 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3074 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3075 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3077 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3081 /* Should never happen */
3082 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3087 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3091 const unsigned char *data;
3093 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3094 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3098 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3099 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3102 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3106 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3107 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3108 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3113 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3114 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3120 /* Should never happen */
3121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3126 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3129 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3130 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3131 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3132 const unsigned char *start;
3133 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3134 unsigned long alg_a;
3135 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3136 const unsigned char *ptr;
3139 /* Get our certificate private key */
3140 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3141 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3143 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3145 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3147 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3150 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3152 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3153 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3156 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
3157 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3161 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3166 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3167 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3168 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3169 * client certificate for authorization only.
3171 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3172 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3173 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3177 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3178 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3179 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3180 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3182 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3183 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3188 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3193 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3198 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3199 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3201 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3206 /* Generate master secret */
3207 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3208 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3209 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3212 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3213 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3215 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3219 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3220 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3223 /* Should never happen */
3224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3229 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3232 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3233 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3234 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
3235 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3236 const unsigned char *start = NULL;
3237 size_t outlen = 32, inlen = 0;
3239 int cipher_nid = gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3241 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3246 if (gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3251 /* Get our certificate private key */
3252 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
3253 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
3254 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
3260 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
3261 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3265 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3270 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
3271 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3272 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) {
3273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3277 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3278 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) {
3279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3282 inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3283 start = PACKET_data(pkt);
3285 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3289 /* Generate master secret */
3290 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3291 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3298 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3301 /* Should never happen */
3302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3307 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3309 unsigned long alg_k;
3311 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3313 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3314 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3315 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3319 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3320 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3321 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3325 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3326 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3327 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3330 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3331 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3332 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3335 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3336 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3337 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3340 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3341 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3342 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3345 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3346 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3347 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3350 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3351 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3352 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3355 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3356 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
3357 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3365 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3368 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3369 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3371 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3374 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3377 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3378 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3379 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3380 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3383 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3386 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3387 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3389 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3390 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3391 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3394 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3395 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3402 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3403 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3408 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3410 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3411 * the handshake_buffer
3413 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3414 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3417 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3419 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3424 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3425 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3427 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3428 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3433 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3436 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3439 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3442 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3443 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3444 PACKET spkt, context;
3446 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3449 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3450 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3453 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3455 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3460 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3461 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3462 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3463 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3468 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3469 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3474 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3475 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3476 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3481 certstart = certbytes;
3482 x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
3484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3487 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
3488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3492 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3497 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3498 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3501 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3505 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3506 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3507 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3508 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3509 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3510 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3511 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3514 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3517 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3524 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3525 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3526 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3528 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3531 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3532 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3533 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3535 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3538 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3539 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3540 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3545 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3547 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3548 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, i);
3555 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3558 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3564 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3565 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3566 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3567 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3568 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3571 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3572 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3577 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3578 s->session = new_sess;
3581 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3582 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3583 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3585 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3586 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3589 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3592 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3593 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3598 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3599 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3603 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3604 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3605 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3606 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3607 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3608 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3612 /* Resend session tickets */
3613 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3616 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3620 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3624 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3626 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3634 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3635 * for the server Certificate message
3637 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3641 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3642 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3649 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3650 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3653 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3654 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3655 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3658 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3659 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3660 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3665 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3666 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3667 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3673 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3674 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3682 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3683 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3685 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3686 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3687 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
3688 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3689 const unsigned char *const_p;
3690 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3693 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3694 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3695 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3697 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3699 /* get session encoding length */
3700 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3702 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3705 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3709 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3715 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3716 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
3717 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3723 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3729 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3732 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3738 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3739 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3740 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3742 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3746 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3748 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3751 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3754 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3755 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3758 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3760 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3765 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3766 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3767 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
3769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3770 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3771 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3772 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3773 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
3778 /* Put timeout and length */
3779 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3780 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3785 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3786 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
3790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3793 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3795 EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
3798 if (cipher == NULL) {
3799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED);
3803 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3804 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len) <= 0
3805 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3806 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3807 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3808 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3810 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
3811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3814 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
3815 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3816 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3819 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3820 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3824 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3825 /* Output key name */
3826 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3828 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3829 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3831 /* Encrypt session data */
3832 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3833 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3834 || encdata1 != encdata2
3835 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3836 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3837 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3838 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3839 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3840 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
3841 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3842 macendoffset - macoffset)
3843 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3844 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
3845 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3846 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3847 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3852 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3853 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3861 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3862 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
3866 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3867 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3869 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3870 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3874 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
3875 s->session->session_id_length)
3876 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3884 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3886 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3887 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
3889 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3893 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
3895 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3898 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
3899 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
3900 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
3902 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
3903 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
3904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3907 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
3910 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
3911 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
3912 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
3914 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
3915 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
3917 if (new_sess == NULL) {
3918 /* SSLfatal already called */
3922 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3923 s->session = new_sess;
3926 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
3927 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3930 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c,
3931 sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
3932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3935 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3937 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
3938 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
3939 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
3943 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
3945 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
3948 s->session->master_key,
3950 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3953 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
3955 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3956 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
3957 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3958 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3959 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
3960 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3964 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
3966 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3969 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
3970 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
3974 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
3975 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
3976 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
3979 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
3980 || (s->max_early_data > 0
3981 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
3982 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3983 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3986 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
3988 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3992 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3993 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3994 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3996 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4000 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4001 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4002 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
4003 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
4006 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4007 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
4008 s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
4009 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4018 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4019 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4021 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4023 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4024 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4025 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4033 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4035 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4036 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4045 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4046 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4048 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4050 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4051 size_t next_proto_len;
4054 * The payload looks like:
4056 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4057 * uint8 padding_len;
4058 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4060 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4061 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4062 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4064 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4067 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4070 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4073 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4075 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4079 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4081 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4083 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4090 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4092 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4094 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4097 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4098 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4099 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4100 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4104 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4105 * a record boundary.
4107 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4109 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4112 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4113 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4114 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4115 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4116 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4119 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;