2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
29 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
30 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
31 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
32 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
34 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
35 * (transition not allowed)
37 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
39 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
42 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
43 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
44 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
46 switch (st->hand_state) {
50 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
51 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
52 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
53 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
57 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
58 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
59 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
66 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
67 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
68 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
69 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
70 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
74 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
75 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
82 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
83 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
84 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
88 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
89 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
95 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
96 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
97 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
104 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
105 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
107 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
116 /* No valid transition found */
121 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
122 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
123 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
124 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
126 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
127 * (transition not allowed)
129 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
131 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
133 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
134 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
139 switch (st->hand_state) {
145 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
152 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
154 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
155 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
157 * 2) If we did request one then
158 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
160 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
161 * list if we requested a certificate)
163 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
164 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
165 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
166 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
167 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
169 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
170 * not going to accept it because we require a client
173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
174 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
175 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
178 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
182 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
185 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
194 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
195 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
200 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
202 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
203 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
204 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
205 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
206 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
209 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
210 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
212 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
213 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
214 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
215 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
217 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
222 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
228 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
229 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
235 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
237 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
238 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
244 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
245 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
254 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
262 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
271 /* No valid transition found */
272 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
273 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
274 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
279 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
281 * Valid return values are:
285 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
287 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
290 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
291 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
292 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
293 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
294 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
297 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
299 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
303 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
304 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
305 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
306 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
307 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
310 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
311 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
321 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
323 * Valid return values are:
327 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
330 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
331 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
333 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
334 * during re-negotiation:
336 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
337 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
339 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
340 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
343 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
345 * ... except when the application insists on
346 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
349 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
350 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
353 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
356 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
364 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
365 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
368 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
370 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
373 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
374 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
377 switch (st->hand_state) {
379 /* Shouldn't happen */
380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
381 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
386 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
387 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
388 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
390 /* Try to read from the client instead */
391 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
393 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
394 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
397 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
398 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
399 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
401 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
404 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
407 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
408 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
416 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
417 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
425 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
426 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
433 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
440 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
441 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
443 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
445 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
446 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
448 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
449 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
456 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
463 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
464 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
471 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
473 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
475 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
478 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
479 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
483 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
485 switch (st->hand_state) {
487 /* Shouldn't happen */
488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
489 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
490 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
491 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
494 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
495 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
497 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
498 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
500 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
501 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
502 /* SSLfatal() already called */
503 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
508 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
509 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
511 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
515 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
516 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
517 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
518 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
520 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
523 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
524 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
526 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
528 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
529 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
531 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
533 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
534 /* normal PSK or SRP */
535 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
536 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
538 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
540 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
549 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
555 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
556 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
557 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
558 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
562 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
563 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
565 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
574 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
576 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
580 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
587 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
588 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
589 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
591 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
593 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
595 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
597 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
606 * the server to the client.
608 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
610 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
612 switch (st->hand_state) {
614 /* No pre work to be done */
617 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
620 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
623 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
625 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
626 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
627 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
632 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
633 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
635 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
636 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
642 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
644 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
645 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
646 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
649 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
651 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
652 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
654 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
655 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
656 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
658 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
660 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
661 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
663 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
664 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
670 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
673 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
674 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
675 /* SSLfatal() already called */
678 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
680 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
681 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
682 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
683 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
687 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
689 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
690 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
691 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
695 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
696 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
699 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
703 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
704 * server to the client.
706 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
708 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
712 switch (st->hand_state) {
714 /* No post work to be done */
717 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
718 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
720 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
721 /* SSLfatal() already called */
726 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
727 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
729 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
730 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
731 /* SSLfatal() already called */
735 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
736 * treat like it was the first packet
741 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
742 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
743 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
748 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
749 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
750 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
753 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
756 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
757 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
759 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
760 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
761 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
764 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
765 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
769 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
770 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
774 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
775 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
779 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
780 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
783 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
784 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
785 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
786 * something clever in the record layer for this.
788 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
789 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
790 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
791 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
792 /* SSLfatal() already called */
796 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
797 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
798 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
799 /* SSLfatal() already called */
805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
806 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
808 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
811 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
815 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
816 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
818 /* SSLfatal() already called */
823 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
826 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
827 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
831 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
832 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
835 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
837 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
840 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
844 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
845 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
846 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
847 &s->session->master_key_length)
848 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
849 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
850 /* SSLfatal() already called */
855 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
856 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
858 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
859 /* SSLfatal() already called */
864 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
865 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
870 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
874 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
877 * Valid return values are:
881 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
882 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
884 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
886 switch (st->hand_state) {
888 /* Shouldn't happen */
889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
890 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
891 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
894 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
896 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
898 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
899 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
902 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
903 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
904 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
907 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
908 /* No construction function needed */
910 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
913 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
914 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
915 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
919 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
920 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
923 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
924 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
925 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
929 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
934 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
939 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
944 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
945 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
946 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
949 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
950 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
951 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
954 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
955 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
959 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
964 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
965 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
966 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
969 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
970 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
971 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
979 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
980 * calculated as follows:
982 * 2 + # client_version
983 * 32 + # only valid length for random
984 * 1 + # length of session_id
985 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
986 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
987 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
988 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
989 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
990 * 2 + # length of extensions
991 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
993 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
995 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
996 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
999 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1000 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1002 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1004 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1006 switch (st->hand_state) {
1008 /* Shouldn't happen */
1011 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1012 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1014 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1015 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1017 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1018 return s->max_cert_list;
1020 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1021 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1023 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1024 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1027 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1028 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1031 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1032 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1034 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1035 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1037 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1038 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1043 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1045 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1047 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1049 switch (st->hand_state) {
1051 /* Shouldn't happen */
1052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1053 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1054 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1055 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1057 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1058 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1060 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1061 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1063 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1064 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1066 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1067 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1069 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1070 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1073 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1074 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1077 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1078 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1080 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1081 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1083 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1084 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1090 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1093 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1095 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1097 switch (st->hand_state) {
1099 /* Shouldn't happen */
1100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1101 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1102 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1105 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1106 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1108 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1109 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1111 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1115 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1116 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1119 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1121 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1122 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1123 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1125 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1129 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1130 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1133 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1136 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1137 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1138 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1139 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1140 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1149 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1152 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1153 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1154 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1160 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1162 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1163 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1164 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1165 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1166 cookie_leni > 255) {
1167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1168 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1171 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1173 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1174 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1176 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1185 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1186 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1187 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1191 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1193 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1194 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1195 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1196 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1198 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1200 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1201 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1202 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1203 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1204 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1205 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1206 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1208 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1209 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1210 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1211 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1212 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1213 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1214 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1215 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1216 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1217 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1218 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1219 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1220 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1222 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1223 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1228 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1230 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1231 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1232 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1236 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1239 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1240 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1242 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1245 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1247 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1249 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1250 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1251 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1252 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1254 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1255 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1257 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1261 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1262 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1263 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1271 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1273 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1274 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1276 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1279 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1280 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1282 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1287 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1288 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1289 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1290 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1292 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1293 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1295 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1296 * 7-8 session_id_length
1297 * 9-10 challenge_length
1301 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1302 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1304 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1305 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1306 * in the first place
1308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1309 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1314 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1316 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1320 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1321 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1323 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1324 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1325 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1327 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1330 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1331 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1332 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1334 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1338 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1340 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1344 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1346 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1347 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1348 /* No extensions. */
1349 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1351 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1354 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1356 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1357 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1358 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1359 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1361 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1362 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1363 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1364 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1365 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1366 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1367 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1368 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1370 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1374 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1376 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1377 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1378 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1379 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1380 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1381 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1383 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1387 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1388 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1390 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1393 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1394 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1395 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1397 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1401 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1402 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1403 * So check cookie length...
1405 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1406 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1407 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1411 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1413 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1417 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1419 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1423 /* Could be empty. */
1424 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1425 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1427 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1428 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1430 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1436 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1437 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1438 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1440 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1444 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1445 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1446 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1447 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1448 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1449 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1452 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1454 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1457 if (clienthello != NULL)
1458 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1459 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1461 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1464 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1467 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1472 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1474 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1475 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1476 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1477 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1478 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1480 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1481 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1482 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1483 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1484 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1485 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1487 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1488 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1490 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1493 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1494 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1499 /* Set up the client_random */
1500 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1502 /* Choose the version */
1504 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1505 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1506 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1507 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1509 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1513 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1514 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1518 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1521 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1522 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1524 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1525 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1526 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1527 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1528 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1534 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1535 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1536 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1539 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1543 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1544 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1546 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1547 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1551 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1552 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1553 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1554 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1555 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1556 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1558 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1559 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1561 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1563 /* default verification */
1564 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1565 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1566 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1568 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1569 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1572 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1574 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1575 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1576 if (protverr != 0) {
1577 s->version = s->client_version;
1578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1579 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1587 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1588 clienthello->isv2) ||
1589 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1590 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1591 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1595 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1596 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1597 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1598 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1599 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1600 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1601 if (s->renegotiate) {
1602 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1604 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1605 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1608 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1609 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1610 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1612 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1613 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1614 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1615 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1616 * an insecure downgrade.
1618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1619 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1620 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1626 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1627 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1628 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1629 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1631 if (cipher == NULL) {
1632 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1633 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1634 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1637 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1638 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1639 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1641 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1642 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1645 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1649 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1652 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1653 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1654 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1655 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1656 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1661 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1662 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1664 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1665 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1666 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1667 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1668 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1669 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1670 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1671 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1672 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1673 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1676 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1678 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1679 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1680 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1684 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1686 /* previous session */
1688 } else if (i == -1) {
1689 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1693 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1694 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1700 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1701 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1702 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1703 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1707 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1708 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1710 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1712 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1715 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1717 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1718 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1720 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1721 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1730 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1734 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1735 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1740 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1741 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1745 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1748 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1749 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1754 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1755 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1756 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1758 /* TLS extensions */
1759 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1760 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1761 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1766 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1767 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1768 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1769 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1773 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1774 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1776 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1777 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1783 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1786 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1787 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1789 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1790 * backwards compat reasons
1792 int master_key_length;
1794 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1795 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1796 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1798 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1799 && master_key_length > 0) {
1800 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1802 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1803 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1807 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1808 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1809 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1810 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1811 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1813 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1814 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1818 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1819 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1820 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1821 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1822 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1827 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1828 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1829 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1831 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1832 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1834 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1835 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1836 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1838 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1840 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1841 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1846 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1847 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1848 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1850 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1851 /* Can't disable compression */
1852 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1854 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1855 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1858 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1859 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1860 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1861 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1862 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1866 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1868 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1869 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1872 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1873 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1874 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1877 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1879 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1880 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1883 } else if (s->hit) {
1885 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1886 /* See if we have a match */
1887 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1890 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1891 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1892 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1894 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1895 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1904 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1910 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1911 * using compression.
1913 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1915 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1916 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1922 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1925 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1926 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1927 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1928 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1930 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1931 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1938 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1939 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1941 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1943 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1944 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1949 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1950 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1951 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1952 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1953 s->clienthello = NULL;
1956 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1957 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1958 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1960 s->clienthello = NULL;
1966 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1967 * Upon failure, returns 0.
1969 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
1971 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1974 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1975 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1976 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1977 * influence which certificate is sent
1979 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1980 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1983 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1984 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1986 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1987 * et al can pick it up.
1989 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1990 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1992 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1993 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1994 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1996 /* status request response should be sent */
1997 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1998 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1999 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2001 /* something bad happened */
2002 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2005 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2006 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2016 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2017 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2019 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2021 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2022 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2024 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2025 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2026 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2027 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2028 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2030 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2031 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2032 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2033 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2038 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2040 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2041 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2044 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2045 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2046 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2047 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2048 selected_len) != 0) {
2049 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2050 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2053 /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */
2054 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2056 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2058 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2059 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2062 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2067 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2068 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2069 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2073 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2078 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2079 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2080 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2081 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2087 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2089 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2091 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2092 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2094 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2101 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2102 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2103 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2104 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2105 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2108 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2109 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2113 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2116 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2119 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2120 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2122 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2124 if (cipher == NULL) {
2125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2126 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2127 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2130 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2133 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2134 /* SSLfatal already called */
2137 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2138 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2139 s->session->not_resumable =
2140 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2141 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2142 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2143 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2144 /* do not send a session ticket */
2145 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2148 /* Session-id reuse */
2149 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2153 * we now have the following setup.
2155 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2156 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2157 * compression - basically ignored right now
2158 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2159 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2160 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2161 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2165 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2166 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2168 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2169 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2173 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2174 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2175 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2176 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2178 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2179 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2186 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2188 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2190 * callback indicates further work to be done
2192 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2196 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2202 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2207 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2212 unsigned char *session_id;
2213 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2215 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2216 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2218 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2219 * tls_process_client_hello()
2221 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2222 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2223 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2224 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2226 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2231 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2232 * back in the server hello:
2233 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2234 * we send back the old session ID.
2235 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2236 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2237 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2238 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2240 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2241 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2242 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2244 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2245 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2248 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2249 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2251 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2254 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2255 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2257 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2258 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2261 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2263 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2267 /* set up the compression method */
2268 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2271 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2274 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2277 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2278 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2279 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
2280 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2281 s->hello_retry_request
2283 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2285 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2286 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2288 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2292 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2293 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2294 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2299 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2300 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2302 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
2303 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2306 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2307 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2308 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2315 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2317 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2318 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2319 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2326 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2329 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2332 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2333 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2336 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2340 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2341 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2342 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2344 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2346 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2350 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2352 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2356 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2358 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2360 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2361 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2363 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2365 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2366 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2368 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2371 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2372 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2373 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2374 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2377 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2378 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2381 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2384 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2386 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2387 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2388 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2391 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2392 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2397 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2399 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2400 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2403 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2404 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2406 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2407 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2410 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2412 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2413 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2417 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2418 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2419 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2423 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2425 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2428 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2429 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2433 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2435 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2437 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2442 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2443 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2444 if (curve_id == 0) {
2445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2446 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2447 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2450 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2451 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2452 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2453 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2457 /* Encode the public key. */
2458 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2460 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2462 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2467 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2468 * can set these to NULLs
2475 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2477 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2478 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2479 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2480 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2482 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2483 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2486 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2487 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2488 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2489 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2494 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2495 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2499 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2500 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2502 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2504 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2509 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2510 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2511 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2514 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2515 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2517 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2518 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2521 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2522 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2528 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2529 unsigned char *binval;
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2533 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2534 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2537 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2541 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2542 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2548 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2549 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2552 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2553 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2556 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2558 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2559 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2562 memset(binval, 0, len);
2566 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2567 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2569 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2570 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2574 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2578 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2580 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2581 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2582 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2585 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2586 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2587 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2588 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2590 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2591 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2594 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2595 encodedPoint = NULL;
2601 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2603 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2604 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2607 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2608 /* Should never happen */
2609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2610 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2611 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2615 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2616 * points to the space at the end.
2619 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2620 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2622 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2623 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2626 /* send signature algorithm */
2627 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2629 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2630 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2634 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2635 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2636 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2639 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2640 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2641 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2643 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2644 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2647 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2648 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2649 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2651 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2656 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2657 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2660 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2663 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2665 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2666 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2668 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2674 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2678 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2681 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2683 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2687 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2689 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2690 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2691 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2693 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2694 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2698 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2699 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2707 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2708 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2709 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2711 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2715 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2716 const uint16_t *psigs;
2717 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2719 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2720 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2721 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2722 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2723 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2724 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2725 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2730 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2731 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2736 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2740 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2743 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2745 PACKET psk_identity;
2747 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2749 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2752 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2754 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2757 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2758 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2759 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2763 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2765 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2769 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2772 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2774 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2776 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2778 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2781 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2782 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2786 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2787 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2788 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2790 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2792 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2796 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2800 /* Should never happen */
2801 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2802 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2807 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2810 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2812 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2813 size_t j, padding_len;
2814 PACKET enc_premaster;
2816 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2819 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2822 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2826 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2827 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2828 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2830 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2831 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2833 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2839 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2840 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2841 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2842 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2844 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2846 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2850 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2851 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2853 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2858 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2859 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2860 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2861 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2862 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2865 if (ssl_randbytes(s, rand_premaster_secret,
2866 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2868 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2873 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2874 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2876 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2877 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2878 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2879 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2880 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
2881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2882 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2886 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2889 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2890 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2891 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2893 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2895 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2899 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2900 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2901 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2902 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2903 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2905 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2908 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2909 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2910 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2911 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2912 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2913 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2916 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2917 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2919 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2920 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2923 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2924 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2925 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2926 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2927 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2928 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2931 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2932 unsigned char workaround_good;
2933 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2934 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2936 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2937 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2938 version_good |= workaround_good;
2942 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2943 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2945 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2948 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2949 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2950 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2951 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2953 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2954 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2955 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2956 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2957 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2960 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2961 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2962 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2968 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2971 /* Should never happen */
2972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2973 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2978 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2981 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2985 const unsigned char *data;
2986 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2989 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2990 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2991 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2994 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2997 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3001 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3003 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3006 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3007 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3009 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3012 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3013 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3014 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3018 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3019 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3021 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3023 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3024 if (pub_key != NULL)
3029 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3030 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3035 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3036 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3038 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3041 /* Should never happen */
3042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3043 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3048 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3050 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3051 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3052 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3055 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3056 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3058 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3062 const unsigned char *data;
3065 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3066 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3069 /* Get encoded point length */
3070 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3071 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3073 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3076 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3077 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3082 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3089 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3090 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3095 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3096 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3098 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3102 /* Should never happen */
3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3104 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3109 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3113 const unsigned char *data;
3115 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3116 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3118 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3121 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3126 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3128 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3131 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3132 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3133 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3134 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3135 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3139 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3140 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3146 /* Should never happen */
3147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3148 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3153 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3156 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3157 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3158 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3159 const unsigned char *start;
3160 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3161 unsigned long alg_a;
3164 size_t sess_key_len;
3165 const unsigned char *data;
3168 /* Get our certificate private key */
3169 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3170 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3172 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3174 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3176 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3179 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3181 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3182 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3185 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3186 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3187 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3188 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3191 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3197 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3198 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3199 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3200 * client certificate for authorization only.
3202 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3203 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3204 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3207 /* Decrypt session key */
3208 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3209 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3214 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3215 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3216 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3217 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3219 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3224 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3226 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3227 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3230 /* Generate master secret */
3231 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3232 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3233 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3236 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3237 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3239 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3243 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3246 /* Should never happen */
3247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3253 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3255 unsigned long alg_k;
3257 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3259 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3260 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3261 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3265 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3266 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3267 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3269 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3270 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3273 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3274 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3275 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3278 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3279 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3280 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3283 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3284 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3285 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3288 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3289 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3293 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3294 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3295 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3298 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3299 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3300 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3305 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3306 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3310 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3313 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3314 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3316 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3319 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3322 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3323 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3324 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3325 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3327 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3330 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3331 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3333 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3334 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3335 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3338 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3339 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3343 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3344 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3349 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3351 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3352 * the handshake_buffer
3354 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3355 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3358 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3360 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3362 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3363 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3367 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3368 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3370 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3371 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3376 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3379 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3382 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3384 unsigned long l, llen;
3385 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3386 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3387 PACKET spkt, context;
3390 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3392 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3396 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3397 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3398 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3399 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3400 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3402 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3406 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3407 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3408 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3410 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3411 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3415 certstart = certbytes;
3416 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3419 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3422 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3424 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3425 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3429 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3430 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3433 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3435 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3439 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3440 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3441 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3442 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3443 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3444 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3445 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3448 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3451 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3453 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3454 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3460 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3461 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3462 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3464 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3465 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3468 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3469 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3470 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3472 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3473 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3476 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3477 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3478 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3483 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3485 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
3486 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3487 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3492 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3495 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3498 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3499 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3504 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3505 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3506 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3508 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3509 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3512 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3515 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3516 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3521 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3522 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3526 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3528 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3529 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3530 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3531 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3535 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3539 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3543 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3545 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3549 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3554 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3555 * for the server Certificate message
3557 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3558 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3559 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3562 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3563 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3570 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3572 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3573 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3574 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3575 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3576 const unsigned char *const_p;
3577 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3580 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3581 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3582 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3584 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3586 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3590 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3591 if (ssl_randbytes(s, age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
3592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3593 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3594 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3597 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3599 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3600 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3601 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3603 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce);
3604 s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3605 if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) {
3606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3607 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3608 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3611 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1;
3612 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3613 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3614 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3615 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3616 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3617 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3619 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3620 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3623 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3625 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3628 /* get session encoding length */
3629 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3631 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3634 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3636 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3639 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3642 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3646 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3647 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3648 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3650 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3655 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3657 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3662 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3665 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3668 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3671 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3673 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3674 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3675 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3677 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3678 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3682 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3684 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3685 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3688 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3691 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3692 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3694 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3695 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3696 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3701 /* Put timeout and length */
3702 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3703 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3705 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3706 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3710 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3711 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3715 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3716 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3717 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3720 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3722 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3724 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3725 if (ssl_randbytes(s, iv, iv_len) <= 0
3726 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3727 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)
3728 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3729 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3730 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3732 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3733 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3736 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3737 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3741 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3742 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3743 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3746 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3747 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3748 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3750 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
3751 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
3752 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
3753 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3754 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3755 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3756 /* Output key name */
3757 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3759 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3760 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3762 /* Encrypt session data */
3763 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3764 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3765 || encdata1 != encdata2
3766 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3767 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3768 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3769 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3770 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3771 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3772 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3773 macendoffset - macoffset)
3774 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3775 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3776 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3777 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3778 || macdata1 != macdata2
3779 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3781 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3785 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3786 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3788 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3791 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3792 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3798 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3799 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3804 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3805 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3807 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3809 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3810 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3811 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
3813 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3820 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3822 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3823 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3832 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3833 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3835 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3837 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3838 size_t next_proto_len;
3841 * The payload looks like:
3843 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3844 * uint8 padding_len;
3845 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3847 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3848 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3849 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3851 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3852 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3855 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3857 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3858 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3859 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3862 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3864 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3868 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3870 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3872 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3879 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3881 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3882 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3883 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3884 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3887 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3888 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3890 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3891 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3895 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3896 * a record boundary.
3898 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
3899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
3900 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3901 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
3902 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3905 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
3906 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3907 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
3908 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3909 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3912 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;