2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
35 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
36 s->init_num, &written);
39 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
45 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
49 if (written == s->init_num) {
51 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
52 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
56 s->init_off += written;
57 s->init_num -= written;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
65 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
69 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
76 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
77 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
79 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
80 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
82 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
83 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
85 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
86 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
88 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
91 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
92 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
93 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
94 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
95 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
96 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
98 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
101 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
102 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
103 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
105 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
106 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
107 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
108 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
109 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
110 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
111 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
116 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
120 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
129 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
133 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
134 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
135 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
137 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
138 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
142 /* Only happens in TLSv1.3 */
144 * TODO(TLS1.3): This needs to change. We should not get this from the
145 * cipher. However, for now, we have not done the work to separate the
146 * certificate type from the ciphersuite
148 pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md);
152 md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
153 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
155 pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
157 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
163 /* Get the data to be signed */
164 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
169 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
174 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
176 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
177 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
183 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
184 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
189 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && pktype == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
190 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
191 /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
192 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
196 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
197 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
198 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
199 s->session->master_key)) {
200 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
205 if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
210 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
212 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
213 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
214 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
215 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
219 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
224 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
225 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
229 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
233 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
234 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
240 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
241 const unsigned char *data;
242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
243 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
245 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
246 int type = 0, j, pktype;
249 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
252 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
253 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
254 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
261 peer = s->session->peer;
262 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
263 pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
264 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
266 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
268 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
269 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
273 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
275 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
276 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
279 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
280 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
285 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
289 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
290 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
293 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalg, pkey);
296 } else if (rv == 0) {
297 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
301 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
304 /* Use default digest for this key type */
305 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
307 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
309 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
314 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
316 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
320 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
321 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
322 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
324 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
327 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
329 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
333 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
339 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
341 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
342 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
348 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
349 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
350 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
351 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
355 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
361 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && pktype == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
362 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
363 /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
364 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
368 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
369 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
370 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
371 s->session->master_key)) {
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
376 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
377 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
383 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
385 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
388 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
389 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
391 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
392 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
393 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
395 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
400 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
402 size_t finish_md_len;
407 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
408 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
410 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
411 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
414 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
416 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
417 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
422 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
424 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
430 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
433 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
434 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
436 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
438 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
439 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
441 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
446 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
452 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
455 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
460 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
461 * the appropriate error.
463 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
466 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
467 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
469 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
470 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
473 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
476 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
480 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
485 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
487 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
488 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
489 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
491 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
492 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
493 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
494 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
495 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
496 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
497 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
498 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
503 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
505 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
510 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
511 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
512 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
517 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
518 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
519 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
524 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
525 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
527 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
528 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
532 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
533 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
536 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
540 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
542 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
543 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
544 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
547 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
549 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
552 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
553 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
554 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
558 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
560 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
562 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
563 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
564 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
568 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
570 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
576 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
579 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
580 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
582 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
584 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
585 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
587 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
591 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
592 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
594 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
596 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
597 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
602 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
603 s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
604 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
608 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
609 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
610 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
613 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
618 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
620 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
621 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
622 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
625 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
627 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
629 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
636 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
637 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
641 unsigned char *outbytes;
643 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
646 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
649 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
650 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
652 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
657 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
664 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
665 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
669 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
670 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
671 X509_STORE *chain_store;
672 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
674 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
680 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
682 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
683 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
685 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
687 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
689 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
690 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
692 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
694 if (chain_store != NULL) {
695 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
697 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
701 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
702 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
707 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
708 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
709 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
710 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
712 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
713 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
715 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
716 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
719 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
724 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
728 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
729 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
730 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
732 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
733 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
737 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
739 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
744 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
746 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
747 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
748 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
759 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
762 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
764 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
765 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
766 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
774 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
776 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
779 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
781 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
782 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
787 /* clean a few things up */
788 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
790 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
792 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
793 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
795 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
799 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
803 if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
804 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
809 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
811 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
812 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
814 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
816 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
818 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
819 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
822 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
823 cb = s->info_callback;
824 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
825 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
828 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
830 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
831 /* done with handshaking */
832 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
833 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
834 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
835 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
839 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
842 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
844 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
845 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
849 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
852 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
853 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
855 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
858 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
861 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
863 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
864 * in the middle of a handshake message.
866 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
867 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
869 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
872 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
873 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
874 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
875 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
877 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
878 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
879 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
882 s->init_num += readbytes;
887 if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
889 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
890 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
891 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
894 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
899 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
900 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
901 s->msg_callback_arg);
903 } while (skip_message);
904 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
907 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
909 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
911 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
914 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
915 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
917 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
918 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
919 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
921 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
922 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
925 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
926 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
927 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
931 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
933 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
939 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
943 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
949 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
950 /* We've already read everything in */
951 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
956 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
958 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
959 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
961 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
965 s->init_num += readbytes;
969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
971 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
972 * Finished verification.
974 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
978 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
979 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
980 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
983 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
988 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
989 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
991 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
992 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
994 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
999 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1000 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1001 s->msg_callback_arg);
1008 int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
1010 if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
1013 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
1017 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
1019 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1022 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1025 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1026 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1027 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1028 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1029 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1030 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1035 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
1040 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1041 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
1042 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
1043 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1045 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
1046 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
1047 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
1048 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1049 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1050 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
1051 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
1052 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1053 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
1054 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
1055 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
1056 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
1057 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
1058 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
1059 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
1060 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1061 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1062 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
1063 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1065 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1066 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1067 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1069 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1070 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
1071 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
1073 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
1074 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
1076 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
1077 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
1078 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
1079 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
1080 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1082 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
1083 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
1084 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
1085 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
1086 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
1087 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
1088 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
1089 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1091 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
1092 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1094 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
1095 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1098 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
1104 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1106 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1108 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1111 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1113 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1118 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1119 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1124 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1125 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1128 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1129 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1132 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1134 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1136 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1139 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1141 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1144 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1146 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1149 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1151 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1154 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1156 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1161 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1162 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1165 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1167 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1169 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1172 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1173 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1175 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1176 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1182 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1184 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1185 * @method: the intended method.
1187 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1189 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1191 int version = method->version;
1193 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1194 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1195 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1196 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1198 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1199 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1200 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1202 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1203 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1204 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1205 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1206 else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
1207 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
1213 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1216 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1217 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1219 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1221 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
1223 const version_info *vent;
1224 const version_info *table;
1226 switch (s->method->version) {
1228 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1229 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1230 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1231 table = tls_version_table;
1233 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1234 table = dtls_version_table;
1239 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1241 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
1242 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
1243 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
1251 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1252 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1253 * supported protocol version.
1255 * @s server SSL handle.
1257 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1259 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1261 const version_info *vent;
1262 const version_info *table;
1265 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1266 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1269 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1273 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1274 * highest protocol version).
1276 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1277 table = tls_version_table;
1278 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1279 table = dtls_version_table;
1281 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1285 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1286 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1287 return s->version == vent->version;
1293 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1294 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1295 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1296 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1298 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1299 * @version: the intended limit.
1300 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1302 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1304 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1312 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1313 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1314 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1316 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1317 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1318 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1319 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1320 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1322 switch (method_version) {
1325 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1326 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1327 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1328 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1333 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1334 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1338 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1339 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1340 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1350 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1351 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1352 * the version specific method.
1354 * @s: server SSL handle.
1356 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1358 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1361 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1363 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1364 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1366 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1369 int server_version = s->method->version;
1370 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1371 const version_info *vent;
1372 const version_info *table;
1374 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1376 s->client_version = client_version;
1378 switch (server_version) {
1381 * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
1382 * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
1383 * renegotiation for TLS1.3
1385 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1386 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1388 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1389 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1390 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1391 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1392 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1395 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1396 table = tls_version_table;
1398 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1399 table = dtls_version_table;
1403 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1405 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1406 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1407 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1408 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1409 PACKET versionslist;
1411 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1413 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1414 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1415 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1418 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1419 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1420 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1421 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1423 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1424 * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1425 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1427 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1430 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1433 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1434 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1436 method = vent->smeth();
1437 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1438 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1439 best_method = method;
1443 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1444 /* Trailing data? */
1445 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1448 if (best_vers > 0) {
1449 s->version = best_vers;
1450 s->method = best_method;
1453 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1457 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1458 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1460 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1461 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1464 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1467 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1468 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1470 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1471 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1473 method = vent->smeth();
1474 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1475 s->version = vent->version;
1481 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1485 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1486 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1487 * the version specific method.
1489 * @s: client SSL handle.
1490 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1492 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1494 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
1496 const version_info *vent;
1497 const version_info *table;
1499 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1500 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1501 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1503 switch (s->method->version) {
1505 if (version != s->version)
1506 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1508 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1509 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1510 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1511 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1512 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1515 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1516 table = tls_version_table;
1518 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1519 table = dtls_version_table;
1523 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1524 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1527 if (version != vent->version)
1529 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1531 method = vent->cmeth();
1532 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1536 s->version = version;
1540 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1544 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1545 * @s: The SSL connection
1546 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1547 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1549 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1550 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1551 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1552 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1553 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1555 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1556 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1557 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1559 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1560 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1562 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
1567 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1568 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1569 const version_info *table;
1570 const version_info *vent;
1572 switch (s->method->version) {
1575 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1576 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1577 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1578 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1579 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1581 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1583 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1584 table = tls_version_table;
1586 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1587 table = dtls_version_table;
1592 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1593 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1594 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1595 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1597 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1598 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1599 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1601 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1602 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1603 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1605 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1606 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1607 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1608 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1609 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1610 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1612 *min_version = version = 0;
1614 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1616 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1617 * "version capability" vector.
1619 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1623 method = vent->cmeth();
1624 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1628 *min_version = method->version;
1630 version = (single = method)->version;
1631 *min_version = version;
1636 *max_version = version;
1638 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1640 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1646 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1647 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1649 * @s: client SSL handle.
1651 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1653 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1655 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1657 ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1662 s->version = ver_max;
1664 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1665 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
1666 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1668 s->client_version = ver_max;