2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
64 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
65 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
70 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
76 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
78 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
79 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
80 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
81 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
88 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
95 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
97 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
100 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
101 * ciphersuite or for SRP
103 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
112 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
113 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
114 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
115 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
118 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
119 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
121 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
123 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
126 switch(st->hand_state) {
127 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
133 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
134 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
135 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
141 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
143 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
145 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
148 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
153 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
154 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
156 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
157 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
158 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
159 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
161 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
162 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
163 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
164 * the server is resuming.
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
169 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
170 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
172 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
176 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
177 if (ske_expected < 0)
179 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
181 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
182 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
187 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
188 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
189 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
191 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
192 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
201 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
202 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
204 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
210 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
211 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
212 if (ske_expected < 0)
214 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
216 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
217 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
226 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
228 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
229 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
236 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
237 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
238 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
243 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
244 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
245 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
249 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
255 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
256 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
257 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
262 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
273 /* No valid transition found */
278 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
279 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
281 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
283 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
285 switch(st->hand_state) {
287 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
289 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
290 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
292 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
294 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
297 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
299 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
300 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
301 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
303 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
304 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
308 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
311 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
312 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
314 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
316 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
317 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
320 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
321 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
322 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
323 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
325 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
326 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
330 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
331 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
333 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
335 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
336 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
337 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
339 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
340 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
341 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
343 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
348 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
350 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
351 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
352 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
353 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
356 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
359 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
360 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
362 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
365 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
367 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
368 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
370 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
371 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
372 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
376 /* Shouldn't happen */
377 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
382 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
383 * the client to the server.
385 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
387 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
389 switch(st->hand_state) {
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
392 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
393 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
394 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
395 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
402 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
404 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
405 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
408 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
409 * messages unless we need to.
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
414 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
415 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
418 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
421 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
424 /* No pre work to be done */
428 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
432 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
433 * client to the server.
435 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
437 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
441 switch(st->hand_state) {
442 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
443 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
446 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
447 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
452 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
453 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
457 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
458 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
459 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
460 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
462 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
463 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
465 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
467 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
470 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
471 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
474 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
478 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
481 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
486 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
490 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
492 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
494 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
497 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
501 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
506 /* No post work to be done */
510 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
514 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
516 * Valid return values are:
520 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
522 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
524 switch(st->hand_state) {
525 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
526 return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
529 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
531 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
532 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
534 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
535 return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
537 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
539 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
541 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
543 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
544 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
545 return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
547 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
548 return tls_construct_finished(s,
550 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
552 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
555 /* Shouldn't happen */
563 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
564 * reading. Excludes the message header.
566 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
568 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
570 switch(st->hand_state) {
571 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
572 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
574 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
575 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
578 return s->max_cert_list;
580 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
581 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
583 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
584 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
586 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
587 /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
588 * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
589 * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
591 return s->max_cert_list;
593 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
594 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
596 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
597 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
599 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
600 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
602 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
603 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
606 /* Shouldn't happen */
614 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
616 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
618 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
620 switch(st->hand_state) {
621 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
622 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
624 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
625 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
628 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
630 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
631 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
633 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
634 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
636 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
637 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
639 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
640 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
642 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
643 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
645 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
646 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
648 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
649 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
652 /* Shouldn't happen */
656 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
660 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
663 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
665 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
667 switch(st->hand_state) {
668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
669 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
670 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
671 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
672 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
673 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
674 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
675 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
676 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
679 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
680 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
687 /* Shouldn't happen */
691 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
694 unsigned char *p, *d;
699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
703 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
705 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
707 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
708 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
714 if ((sess == NULL) ||
715 !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
717 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
718 * "ticket" without a session ID.
720 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
721 (sess->not_resumable)) {
722 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
725 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
727 p = s->s3->client_random;
730 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
731 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
733 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
736 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
745 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
746 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
749 /* Do the message type and length last */
750 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
753 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
754 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
755 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
756 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
757 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
758 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
759 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
760 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
763 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
764 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
765 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
766 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
767 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
768 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
769 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
770 * know that is maximum server supports.
771 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
772 * containing version 1.0.
774 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
775 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
776 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
777 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
778 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
779 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
780 * the negotiated version.
782 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
783 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
786 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
787 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
793 i = s->session->session_id_length;
796 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
800 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
804 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
805 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
806 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
810 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
811 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
812 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
815 /* Ciphers supported */
816 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
821 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
823 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
824 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
827 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
828 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
829 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
835 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
839 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
842 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
844 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
845 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
849 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
852 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
857 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
859 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
865 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
866 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
873 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
877 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
880 unsigned int cookie_len;
883 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
884 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
885 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
890 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
891 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
892 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
893 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
897 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
898 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
899 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
902 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
904 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
906 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
907 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
908 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
911 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
913 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
916 size_t session_id_len;
917 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
918 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
919 unsigned int compression;
920 unsigned int sversion;
922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
926 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
927 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
932 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
934 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
939 /* load the server hello data */
940 /* load the server random */
941 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
942 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
949 /* Get the session-id. */
950 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
951 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
955 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
956 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
957 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
958 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
963 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
965 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
970 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
971 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
972 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
973 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
974 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
975 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
976 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
977 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
978 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
979 * server wants to resume.
981 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
982 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
983 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
984 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
985 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
986 &s->session->master_key_length,
988 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
989 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
990 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
993 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
998 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
999 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1000 session_id_len) == 0) {
1001 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1002 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1003 /* actually a client application bug */
1004 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1006 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1012 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1013 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1014 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1015 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1016 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1018 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1019 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1024 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1025 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1026 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1027 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1031 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1032 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1033 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1036 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1040 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1042 /* unknown cipher */
1043 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1048 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1051 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1052 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1054 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1055 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1057 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1058 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1063 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1064 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1066 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1067 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1073 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1074 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1075 * set and use it for comparison.
1077 if (s->session->cipher)
1078 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1079 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1080 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1082 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1085 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1086 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1088 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1090 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1093 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1094 if (compression != 0) {
1095 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1097 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1101 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1102 * using compression.
1104 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1109 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1110 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1112 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1115 if (compression == 0)
1117 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1118 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1122 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1125 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1126 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1128 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1131 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1135 /* TLS extensions */
1136 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1141 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1142 /* wrong packet length */
1143 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1149 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1150 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1151 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1154 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1157 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1158 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1160 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1161 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1163 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
1167 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1168 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1169 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1173 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1175 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1177 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1178 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1181 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1183 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1184 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1186 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1187 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1188 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1190 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1195 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1196 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1197 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1201 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1202 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1203 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1204 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1206 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1210 certstart = certbytes;
1211 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1213 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1217 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1218 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1220 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1223 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1230 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1231 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && i <= 0) {
1232 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1234 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1237 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1240 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1244 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1246 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1247 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1249 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1252 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1255 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1257 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1261 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1265 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1270 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1274 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1275 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1276 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1277 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1278 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1280 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1282 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1285 s->session->peer_type = i;
1287 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1289 s->session->peer = x;
1290 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1293 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1297 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1299 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1302 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1306 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1311 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1312 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1317 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1319 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1321 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1322 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1323 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1328 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1330 save_param_start = *pkt;
1332 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1333 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1334 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1337 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1339 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1342 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1343 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1344 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1345 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1351 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1352 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1353 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1356 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1357 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1362 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1363 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1364 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1365 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1366 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1367 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1372 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1373 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1375 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1377 * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1383 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1384 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1385 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1386 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1387 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1388 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1394 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1395 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1397 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1398 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1400 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1401 PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1403 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1404 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1409 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1414 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1415 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1416 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1418 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1420 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1421 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1422 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1425 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1427 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1428 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1429 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1434 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1437 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1438 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1443 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1444 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1446 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key),
1448 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1453 if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1458 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1459 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1464 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1465 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1470 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1471 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1476 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1477 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1482 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1490 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1494 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1495 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1497 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1498 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1499 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1501 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1504 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1506 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1510 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1511 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1512 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1514 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1519 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1520 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1522 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1527 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2));
1528 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1529 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1531 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1535 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1536 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1538 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1539 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1540 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1541 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1545 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1548 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1553 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp),
1554 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1555 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1561 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1562 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1566 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1567 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1568 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1570 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1571 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1572 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1574 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1576 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1580 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1582 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1586 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1587 * equals the length of the parameters.
1589 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1590 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1591 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1592 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1597 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1598 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1600 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1604 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1611 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1613 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1614 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1619 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1620 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1624 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1631 * Check signature length
1633 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) {
1634 /* wrong packet length */
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1638 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1639 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1640 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1641 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1642 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1643 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1644 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1645 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1649 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1650 PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
1652 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1657 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1658 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1659 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1660 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1661 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1665 /* still data left over */
1666 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1671 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1672 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1674 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1680 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1682 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1683 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1684 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1687 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1689 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1690 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1691 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1692 const unsigned char *data;
1693 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1694 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1696 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1701 /* get the certificate types */
1702 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1703 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1704 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1708 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1709 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1710 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1711 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1712 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1713 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1717 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1718 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
1719 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
1721 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
1722 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
1724 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1725 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1726 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
1727 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1729 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1733 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1734 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1735 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1736 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1738 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
1739 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1741 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
1744 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1745 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1750 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1753 /* get the CA RDNs */
1754 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1755 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
1756 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1761 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1762 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
1763 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
1764 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1766 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1770 namestart = namebytes;
1772 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
1773 name_len)) == NULL) {
1774 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1779 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
1780 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1782 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1785 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1792 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
1793 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
1794 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
1795 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
1796 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
1799 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1802 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1805 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
1809 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
1811 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
1814 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1817 unsigned int ticklen;
1818 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
1820 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
1821 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
1822 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
1823 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1828 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
1830 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1832 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1833 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
1834 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
1836 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
1839 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
1841 * Remove the old session from the cache
1843 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
1844 if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
1845 s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
1848 /* We carry on if this fails */
1849 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1853 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
1854 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1859 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1860 s->session = new_sess;
1863 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
1864 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
1866 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1867 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1871 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
1872 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1877 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
1878 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1880 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
1881 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
1882 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
1883 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
1884 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
1885 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
1886 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
1887 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
1888 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
1890 EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
1891 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
1892 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
1893 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1895 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1897 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1898 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1901 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1904 unsigned long resplen;
1907 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
1908 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1909 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
1913 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
1914 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
1915 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1919 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
1920 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
1921 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1925 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
1926 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1930 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
1931 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1933 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1934 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1935 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1938 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1940 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1941 /* should contain no data */
1942 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1944 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1945 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1949 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
1950 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
1951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
1952 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1953 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1954 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1960 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
1963 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
1964 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1965 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1966 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1970 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
1971 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
1972 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
1974 if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
1976 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1978 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
1979 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
1981 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
1982 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1985 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1987 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1992 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1993 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
1994 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1995 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1996 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2002 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2003 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2004 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2005 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2008 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2011 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2016 size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
2018 unsigned long alg_k;
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2021 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2022 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2024 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2025 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2028 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2029 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2031 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2033 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2035 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2039 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2042 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2043 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2046 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2048 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2051 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2053 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2057 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2059 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2060 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2063 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2065 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2067 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2069 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2072 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2073 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2074 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2076 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2077 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2081 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2082 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2083 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2088 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2089 s->session->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2090 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2091 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2095 s2n(identitylen, p);
2096 memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
2097 pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
2101 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2103 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2107 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2112 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2116 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2118 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2119 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2123 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2125 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2128 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2132 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2133 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2135 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2139 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2140 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2141 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2145 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2146 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2148 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2149 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2150 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2155 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2157 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2161 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2164 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2166 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2170 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2171 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2178 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2181 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2184 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2187 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2188 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2190 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2192 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2197 /* send off the data */
2198 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2199 n = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
2201 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, p);
2203 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2209 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2211 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2212 if ((skey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey) == NULL) {
2213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2214 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2218 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2220 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2225 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2226 encoded_pt_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey),
2227 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2228 &encodedPoint, NULL);
2230 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2235 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2240 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2241 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2243 /* copy the point */
2244 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
2245 /* increment n to account for length field */
2248 /* Free allocated memory */
2249 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2251 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2253 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2254 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2255 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2258 unsigned int md_len;
2259 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2260 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2261 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2262 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2263 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2267 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2272 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2274 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2277 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2281 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2282 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2284 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2288 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2289 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2290 * certificate key for key exchange
2293 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2295 if (pkey_ctx == NULL
2296 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2297 /* Generate session key */
2298 || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2299 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2301 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2305 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2307 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2308 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2309 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2311 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2318 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2321 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2322 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2323 EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2324 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2325 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2326 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2327 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2328 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2329 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2331 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2334 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2335 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2336 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2342 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2344 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2346 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2348 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2353 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2355 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2358 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2361 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2362 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2363 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2364 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2365 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2366 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2368 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2373 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2374 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2375 /* send off the data */
2376 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2378 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2385 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2386 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2387 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2389 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2395 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2404 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2405 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2411 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2412 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2417 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2420 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2421 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2423 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2426 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2428 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2429 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2432 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2433 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2435 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2439 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2441 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2444 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2445 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2449 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2450 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2452 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2459 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2460 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2464 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2465 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2467 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2476 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2477 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2478 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2481 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2484 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2485 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2487 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2488 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2489 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2492 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2493 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2499 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2500 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2504 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
2508 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2511 unsigned long n = 0;
2515 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2521 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2522 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2524 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2525 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2529 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2530 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2538 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2540 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2541 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2542 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2543 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2544 s->session->master_key_length,
2545 s->session->master_key))
2546 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2552 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2553 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2554 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2555 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
2556 BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
2562 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2563 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2565 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2570 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2573 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2578 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2579 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2580 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2582 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2584 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2586 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2587 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2590 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2591 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2593 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2594 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2599 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2602 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2605 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2606 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2607 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2608 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2610 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2614 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2615 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2618 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2620 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2621 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2623 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2627 /* We need to get a client cert */
2628 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2630 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2631 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2633 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2635 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2638 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2639 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2640 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2642 } else if (i == 1) {
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2645 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2649 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2650 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2653 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2654 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2655 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2656 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2658 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2659 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2660 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2661 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2667 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2670 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2674 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2676 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
2677 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
2678 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2680 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2681 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2688 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2690 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2697 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2698 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2700 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2701 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2703 /* we don't have a certificate */
2704 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
2707 /* This is the passed certificate */
2709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2710 idx = s->session->peer_type;
2711 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
2712 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
2719 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2721 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2725 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2726 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
2728 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
2729 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2731 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2735 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2737 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2742 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
2743 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2745 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
2749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2750 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
2751 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2759 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2764 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
2766 unsigned int len, padding_len;
2769 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
2770 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
2771 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2773 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
2774 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
2775 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
2776 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
2777 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
2778 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
2785 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
2788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
2789 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
2790 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
2791 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
2792 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
2797 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
2798 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
2802 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
2806 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2808 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
2809 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
2810 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
2816 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
2817 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2818 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2819 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
2821 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
2825 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
2829 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
2830 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
2831 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2833 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
2836 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
2837 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
2838 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2840 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);