1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
280 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
282 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
287 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
296 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
303 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
304 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
305 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
306 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
308 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
310 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
311 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
313 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
315 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
316 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
317 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
319 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
320 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
322 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
323 * client that doesn't support secure
326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
327 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
333 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
334 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
345 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
346 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
347 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
350 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
353 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
357 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
362 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
364 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
365 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
370 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
372 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
373 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
376 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
378 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
379 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
380 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
381 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
391 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
397 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
398 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
402 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
418 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
419 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
420 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
421 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
423 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
424 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
429 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
441 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
450 /* clear this, it may get reset by
451 * send_server_key_exchange */
452 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
454 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
455 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
457 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
458 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
459 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
460 * be able to handle this) */
461 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
463 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
466 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
467 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
469 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
471 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
472 * message only if the cipher suite is either
473 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
474 * server certificate contains the server's
475 * public key for key exchange.
477 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
478 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
479 * hint if provided */
480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
484 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
485 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
487 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
488 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
489 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
490 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
491 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
492 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
498 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
499 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
504 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
508 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
509 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
510 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
511 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
512 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
513 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
514 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
515 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
516 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
517 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
518 * and in RFC 2246): */
519 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
520 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
521 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
523 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
524 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
525 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
527 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
528 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
529 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
531 /* no cert request */
533 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
535 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
536 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
541 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
542 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
543 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
544 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
545 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
554 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
556 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
557 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
558 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
563 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
565 /* This code originally checked to see if
566 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
567 * and then flushed. This caused problems
568 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
569 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
570 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
571 * still exist. So instead we just flush
575 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
576 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
581 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
583 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
587 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
588 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
589 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
593 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
595 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
597 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
598 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
601 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
605 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
606 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
607 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
612 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
613 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
614 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
615 * message is not sent.
616 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
617 * the client uses its key from the certificate
620 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
623 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
626 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
630 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
632 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
634 if (!s->session->peer)
636 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
637 * at this point and digest cached records.
639 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
644 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
653 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
656 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
657 * a client cert, it can be verified
658 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
659 * should be generalized. But it is next step
661 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
662 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
664 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
665 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
669 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
670 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
681 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
682 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
684 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
685 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
686 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
687 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
689 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
690 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
691 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
692 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
693 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
695 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
696 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
698 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
699 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
701 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
706 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
707 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
708 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
710 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
711 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
712 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
713 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
714 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
715 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
716 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
717 * the client's Finished message is read.
719 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
720 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
722 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
723 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
725 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
730 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
732 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
733 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
734 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
735 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
736 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
737 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
738 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
739 * the client's Finished message is read.
741 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
742 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
743 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
744 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
745 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
749 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
750 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
753 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
760 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
761 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
762 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
767 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
768 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
769 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
770 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
776 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
777 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
779 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
780 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
781 { ret= -1; goto end; }
783 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
784 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
786 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
790 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
791 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
799 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
800 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
801 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
802 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
803 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
804 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
805 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
806 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
809 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
810 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
812 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
814 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
817 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
821 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
826 /* clean a few things up */
827 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
829 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
832 /* remove buffering on output */
833 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
837 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
842 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
844 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
846 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
848 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
862 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
866 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
871 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
875 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
882 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
886 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
890 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
894 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
896 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
897 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
902 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
903 /* number of bytes to write */
908 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
909 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
912 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
917 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
918 * so permit appropriate message length */
919 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
925 if (!ok) return((int)n);
926 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
927 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
929 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
931 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
936 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
937 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
939 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
941 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
942 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
946 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
948 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
949 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
952 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
958 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
960 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
961 unsigned int cookie_len;
964 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
969 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
971 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
972 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
973 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
974 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
977 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
980 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
983 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
984 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
985 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
986 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
987 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
990 if (!ok) return((int)n);
992 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
994 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
995 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
996 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
999 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
1000 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1003 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1004 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
1006 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1007 s->version = s->client_version;
1009 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1013 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1014 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1015 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1017 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1019 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1021 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1022 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1024 if (cookie_length == 0)
1028 /* load the client random */
1029 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1030 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1032 /* get the session-id */
1036 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1037 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1038 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1039 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1040 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1042 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1043 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1044 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1045 * setting will be ignored.
1047 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1049 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1054 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1056 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1058 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1059 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1060 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1061 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1062 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1064 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
1065 { /* previous session */
1072 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1079 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1082 cookie_len = *(p++);
1085 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1086 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1087 * does not cause an overflow.
1089 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1092 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1097 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1098 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1101 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1103 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1105 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1108 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1110 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1113 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1115 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1116 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1118 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1120 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1131 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1133 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1134 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1140 /* not enough data */
1141 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1145 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1152 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1153 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1156 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1159 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1161 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1163 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1165 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1166 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1174 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1175 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1178 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1180 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1181 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1182 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1183 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1184 * enabled, though. */
1185 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1186 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1188 s->session->cipher = c;
1195 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1196 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1197 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1207 /* not enough data */
1208 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1215 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1222 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1229 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1231 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1233 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1238 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1243 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1244 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1245 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1246 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1249 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1250 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1252 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1257 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1259 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1261 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1262 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1263 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1266 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1267 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1271 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1272 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1273 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1275 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1280 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1283 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1285 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1286 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1288 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1289 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1294 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1295 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1296 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1297 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1299 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1300 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1302 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1303 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1304 /* Can't disable compression */
1305 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1307 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1311 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1312 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1314 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1315 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1317 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1321 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1323 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1327 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1328 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1330 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1335 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1342 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1343 { /* See if we have a match */
1344 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1346 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1347 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1349 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1362 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1367 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1368 * using compression.
1370 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1372 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1378 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1383 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1384 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1386 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1388 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1389 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1390 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1391 if (ciphers == NULL)
1393 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1398 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1399 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1403 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1407 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1411 /* Session-id reuse */
1412 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1413 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1414 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1415 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1417 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1419 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1420 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1422 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1423 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1425 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1429 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1430 else if (ec != NULL)
1431 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1433 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1437 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1440 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1442 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1444 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1449 /* we now have the following setup.
1451 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1452 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1453 * compression - basically ignored right now
1454 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1455 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1456 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1457 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1460 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1461 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1463 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1474 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1477 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1481 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1484 unsigned char *p,*d;
1488 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1490 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1491 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1492 p=s->s3->server_random;
1493 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1496 /* Do the message type and length last */
1499 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1500 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1503 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1504 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1506 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1507 * back in the server hello:
1508 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1509 * we send back the old session ID.
1510 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1511 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1512 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1513 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1515 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1516 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1517 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1518 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1521 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1523 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1525 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1526 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1532 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1535 /* put the cipher */
1536 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1539 /* put the compression method */
1540 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1543 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1546 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1549 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1554 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1563 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1566 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1567 /* number of bytes to write */
1572 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1573 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1576 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1580 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1582 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1585 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1590 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1591 /* number of bytes to write */
1596 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1597 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1600 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1606 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1613 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1614 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1617 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1620 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1621 unsigned char *p,*d;
1631 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1632 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1634 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1639 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1642 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1645 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1647 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1648 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1649 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1652 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1661 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1667 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1672 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1675 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1676 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1677 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1678 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1681 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1686 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1692 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1699 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1700 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1701 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1703 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1712 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1713 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1714 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1715 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1728 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1730 const EC_GROUP *group;
1732 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1733 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1735 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1736 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1737 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1741 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1746 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1752 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1758 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1764 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1765 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1766 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1767 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1769 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1776 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1777 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1778 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1784 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1785 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1791 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1792 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1793 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1796 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1803 /* Encode the public key.
1804 * First check the size of encoding and
1805 * allocate memory accordingly.
1807 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1808 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1809 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1812 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1813 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1814 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1815 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1822 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1823 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1824 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1825 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1827 if (encodedlen == 0)
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1833 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1835 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1836 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1837 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1838 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1843 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1844 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1852 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1854 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1856 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1857 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1860 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1862 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1864 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1865 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1866 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1867 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1880 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1884 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1886 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1888 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1895 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1896 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1898 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1901 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1904 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1912 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1917 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1920 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1923 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1936 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1938 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1939 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1940 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1941 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1942 * the actual encoded point itself
1944 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1952 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1953 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1955 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1956 encodedPoint = NULL;
1961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1962 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1964 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1965 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1966 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1967 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1974 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1975 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1977 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1978 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1982 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1984 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1985 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1986 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1987 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1988 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1989 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1990 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1991 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1992 (unsigned int *)&i);
1996 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1997 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2009 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
2011 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2013 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2015 /* Should never happen */
2016 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2023 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2026 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2027 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2028 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2029 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
2030 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2031 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2038 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2043 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2044 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2050 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2053 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2059 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2060 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2061 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2063 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2066 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2067 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2069 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2073 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2075 unsigned char *p,*d;
2077 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2081 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2085 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2087 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2089 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2094 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2096 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2106 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2110 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2112 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2113 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2114 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2119 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2120 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2123 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2130 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2131 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2137 /* else no CA names */
2138 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2141 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2142 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2145 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2150 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2151 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2156 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2159 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2166 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2169 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2170 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2175 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2179 unsigned long alg_k;
2181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2183 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2191 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2194 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2195 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2196 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2197 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2200 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2201 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2202 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2203 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2207 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2208 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2210 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2213 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2215 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2217 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2220 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2221 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2223 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2224 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2225 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2226 * be sent already */
2229 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2237 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2238 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2239 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2240 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2242 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2249 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2250 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2255 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2257 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2269 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2270 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2271 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2272 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2273 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2275 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2277 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2282 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2283 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2284 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2285 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2286 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2287 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2289 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2290 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2291 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2293 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2296 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2297 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2298 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2300 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2301 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2302 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2303 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2304 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2305 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2306 * decryption error. */
2307 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2308 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2310 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2311 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2312 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2313 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2314 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2315 * support the requested protocol version. If
2316 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2317 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2319 unsigned char workaround_good;
2320 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2321 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2322 version_good |= workaround_good;
2325 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2326 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2327 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2330 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2331 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2332 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2333 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2335 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
2337 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2338 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2341 s->session->master_key_length=
2342 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2343 s->session->master_key,
2344 p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2345 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2350 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2355 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2367 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2369 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2375 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2377 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2382 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2385 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2392 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2401 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2406 s->session->master_key_length=
2407 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2408 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2409 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2414 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2416 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2417 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2418 krb5_data authenticator;
2420 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2421 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2422 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2423 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2424 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2425 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2427 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2428 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2430 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2432 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2435 enc_ticket.length = i;
2437 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2440 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2444 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2445 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2448 authenticator.length = i;
2450 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2453 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2457 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2458 p+=authenticator.length;
2462 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2465 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2468 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2471 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2475 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2476 enc_pms.length + 6))
2478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2479 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2483 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2487 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2488 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2490 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2491 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2497 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2498 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2500 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2501 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2504 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2505 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2507 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2508 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2514 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2521 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2522 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2524 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2528 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2530 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2533 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2536 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2537 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2540 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2543 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2546 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2549 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2552 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2556 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2559 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2562 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2564 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2565 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2566 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2567 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2568 * the protocol version.
2569 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2570 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2572 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2575 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2580 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2582 s->session->master_key_length=
2583 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2584 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2586 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2588 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2589 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2591 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2592 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2597 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2598 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2599 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2600 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2604 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2607 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2612 const EC_GROUP *group;
2613 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2615 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2616 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2619 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2623 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2624 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2626 /* use the certificate */
2627 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2631 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2632 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2634 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2637 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2638 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2640 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2641 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648 /* Let's get client's public key */
2649 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2652 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2658 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2660 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2662 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2666 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2668 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2670 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2671 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2672 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2673 * never executed. When that support is
2674 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2675 * received in the certificate is
2676 * authorized for key agreement.
2677 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2678 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2681 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2683 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2687 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2688 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2694 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2698 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2699 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2701 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2704 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2708 /* Get encoded point length */
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2717 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2718 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2724 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2725 * currently, so set it to the start
2727 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2730 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2731 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2732 if (field_size <= 0)
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2738 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2746 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2747 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2748 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2749 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2750 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2751 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2753 /* Compute the master secret */
2754 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2755 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2757 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2763 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2765 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2766 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2767 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2769 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2771 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2777 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2780 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2783 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2786 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2789 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2793 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2794 * string for the callback */
2795 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2796 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2797 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2798 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2799 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2801 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2804 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2807 else if (psk_len == 0)
2809 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2811 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2812 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2816 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2817 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2819 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2821 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2825 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2826 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2827 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2828 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2831 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2835 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2836 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2837 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2838 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2839 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2842 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2846 s->session->master_key_length=
2847 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2848 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2851 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2858 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2866 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2870 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2875 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2876 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2878 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2882 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2883 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2884 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2885 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2888 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2892 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2901 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2902 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2905 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2906 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2907 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2908 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2909 unsigned long alg_a;
2913 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2914 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2915 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2916 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2917 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2918 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2920 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2921 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2922 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2923 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2924 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2925 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2926 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2927 if (client_pub_pkey)
2929 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2932 /* Decrypt session key */
2933 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2934 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2935 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2942 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2948 /* Generate master secret */
2949 s->session->master_key_length=
2950 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2951 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2952 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2953 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2958 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2959 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2967 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2969 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2975 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2976 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2980 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2981 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2982 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2983 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2984 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2989 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2991 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2997 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2999 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3001 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3002 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3003 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3005 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3008 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3010 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3012 peer=s->session->peer;
3013 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3014 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3022 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3024 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3025 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3027 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3038 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3042 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3045 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3049 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3052 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3056 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3057 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3058 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3059 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3060 * signature without length field */
3061 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3062 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3068 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3070 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3071 /* Should never happen */
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3075 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3078 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3079 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3082 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3085 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3089 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3093 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3103 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3107 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3108 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3111 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3115 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3119 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3127 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3130 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3131 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3134 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3138 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3140 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3147 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3149 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3150 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3154 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3160 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3168 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3170 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3171 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3172 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3176 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3184 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3186 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3187 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3188 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3192 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3194 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3200 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3201 { unsigned char signature[64];
3203 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3204 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3206 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3208 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3209 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3211 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3212 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3215 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3217 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3224 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3233 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3236 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3238 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3239 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3240 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3242 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3243 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3247 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3249 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3251 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3252 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3254 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3256 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3263 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3265 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3267 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3268 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3271 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3274 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3275 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3278 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3281 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3285 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3287 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3291 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3293 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3302 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3306 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3309 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3311 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3317 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3325 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3329 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3338 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3340 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3341 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3343 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3347 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3348 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3349 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3352 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3355 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3356 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3358 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3364 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3367 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3373 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3374 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3375 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3376 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3378 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3379 * when we arrive here. */
3380 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3382 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3383 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3389 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3390 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3391 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3392 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3393 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3401 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3404 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3405 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3409 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3414 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3416 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3419 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3420 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3421 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3428 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3439 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3440 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3444 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3445 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3447 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3449 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3450 const unsigned char *const_p;
3451 int len, slen_full, slen;
3456 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3457 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3458 unsigned char key_name[16];
3460 /* get session encoding length */
3461 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3462 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3465 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3467 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3471 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3473 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3475 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3481 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3483 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3484 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3490 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3491 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3493 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3494 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3495 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3496 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3497 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3498 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3500 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3501 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3502 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3505 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3507 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3508 /* Skip message length for now */
3510 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3511 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3512 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3513 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3516 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3518 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3527 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3528 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3529 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3530 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3531 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3532 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3535 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3536 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3537 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3538 * as their sessions. */
3539 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3541 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3543 /* Output key name */
3545 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3548 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3549 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3550 /* Encrypt session data */
3551 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3553 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3555 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3557 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3558 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3559 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3562 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3564 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3565 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3566 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3568 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3570 /* number of bytes to write */
3572 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3577 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3578 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3581 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3583 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3586 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3587 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3588 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3591 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3594 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3597 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3598 /* message length */
3599 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3601 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3602 /* length of OCSP response */
3603 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3604 /* actual response */
3605 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3606 /* number of bytes to write */
3607 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3608 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3612 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3613 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3616 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3617 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3618 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3619 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3622 int proto_len, padding_len;
3624 const unsigned char *p;
3626 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3627 * extension in their ClientHello */
3628 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3634 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3635 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3636 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3638 514, /* See the payload format below */
3644 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3645 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3646 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3647 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3654 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3656 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3658 /* The payload looks like:
3660 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3661 * uint8 padding_len;
3662 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3665 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3667 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3668 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3671 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3672 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3677 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3678 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;