1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
271 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
273 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
274 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
278 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
286 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
292 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
293 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
295 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
297 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
299 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
301 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
302 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
304 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
312 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
316 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
317 * support secure renegotiation.
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
320 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
326 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
341 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
342 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
345 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
349 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
357 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
361 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
362 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
365 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
367 * callback indicates firther work to be done
369 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
372 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
373 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
375 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
376 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
378 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
380 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
388 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
392 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
393 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
394 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
399 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
400 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
402 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
415 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
416 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
419 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
421 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
422 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
427 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
429 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
432 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
444 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
445 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
448 * clear this, it may get reset by
449 * send_server_key_exchange
451 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
454 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
455 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
456 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
457 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
458 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
463 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
467 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
470 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
471 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
473 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
474 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
476 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
477 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
478 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
479 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
480 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
491 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
495 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
496 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
497 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
498 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
500 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
501 * during re-negotiation:
503 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
504 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
506 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
507 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
510 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
512 * ... except when the application insists on
513 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
518 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
520 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
521 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
522 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
524 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
527 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
528 /* no cert request */
530 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
531 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
532 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
533 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
537 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
540 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
541 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
543 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
544 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
552 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
556 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
563 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
564 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
565 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
566 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
567 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
571 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
572 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
576 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
578 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
581 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
582 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
583 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
584 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
589 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
594 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
599 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
600 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
601 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
602 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
604 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
605 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
607 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
608 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
610 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
613 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
614 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
616 if (!s->session->peer)
619 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
620 * digest cached records.
622 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
626 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
627 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
633 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
637 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
638 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
639 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
642 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
643 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
645 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
646 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
649 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
658 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
668 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
669 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
671 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
672 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
673 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
674 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
676 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
677 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
678 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
679 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
683 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
684 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
686 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
687 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
689 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
694 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
698 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
699 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
700 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
701 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
702 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
703 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
704 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
705 * the client's Finished message is read.
707 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
708 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
710 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
714 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
718 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
719 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
721 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
722 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
723 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
724 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
725 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
726 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
727 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
728 * the client's Finished message is read.
730 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
731 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
732 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
733 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
737 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
740 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
743 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
750 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
759 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
762 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
768 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
771 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
772 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
777 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
779 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
783 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
786 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
787 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
795 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
796 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
797 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
798 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
799 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
801 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
803 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
806 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
808 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
809 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
811 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
812 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
814 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
817 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
822 /* clean a few things up */
823 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
825 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
828 /* remove buffering on output */
829 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
833 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
838 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
840 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
842 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
845 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
859 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
861 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
865 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
866 new_state = s->state;
868 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
869 s->state = new_state;
875 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
879 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
883 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
886 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
887 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
888 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
891 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
892 return ssl_do_write(s);
895 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
897 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
898 unsigned int cookie_len;
901 unsigned char *p, *d;
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
905 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
907 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
909 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
913 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
914 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
915 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
916 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
918 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
919 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
922 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
923 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
924 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
925 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
926 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
931 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
934 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
935 * for session id length
937 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
938 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
944 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
945 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
947 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
950 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
951 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
952 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
954 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
955 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
957 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
960 s->version = s->client_version;
962 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
967 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
968 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
971 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
972 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
974 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
976 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
977 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
981 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
983 if (cookie_length == 0)
987 /* load the client random */
988 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
989 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
991 /* get the session-id */
995 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1002 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1003 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1004 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1005 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1006 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1007 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1008 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1009 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1010 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1011 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1014 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1015 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1018 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1020 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1022 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1023 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1024 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1025 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1026 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1028 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1035 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1042 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1044 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1045 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1049 cookie_len = *(p++);
1051 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1052 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1058 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1059 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1060 * does not cause an overflow.
1062 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1064 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1069 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1070 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1071 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1073 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1074 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1076 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1078 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1081 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1083 /* default verification */
1084 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1085 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1086 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1090 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1095 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1096 /* Select version to use */
1097 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1098 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1099 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1100 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1101 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1103 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1104 s->version = s->client_version;
1105 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1107 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1108 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1109 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1110 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1113 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1114 s->version = s->client_version;
1115 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1118 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1122 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1123 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1130 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1135 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1136 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1137 /* not enough data */
1138 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1142 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1147 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1150 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1153 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1154 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1156 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1157 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1159 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1160 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1168 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1172 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1173 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1175 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1176 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1177 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1178 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1179 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1181 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1182 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1183 s->session->cipher = c;
1190 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1193 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1195 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1202 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1203 /* not enough data */
1204 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1211 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1219 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1224 /* TLS extensions */
1225 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1226 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1233 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1234 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1235 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1236 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1240 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1241 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1246 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1247 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1249 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1250 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1251 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1253 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1255 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1256 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1260 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1262 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1267 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1268 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1273 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1276 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1278 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1279 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1281 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1282 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1288 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1289 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1290 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1292 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1294 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1295 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1296 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1297 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1298 /* Can't disable compression */
1299 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1301 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1304 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1305 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1306 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1307 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1308 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1312 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1314 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1317 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1318 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1319 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1323 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1325 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1330 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1331 /* See if we have a match */
1332 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1334 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1335 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1336 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1338 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1348 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1354 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1355 * using compression.
1357 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1364 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1368 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1369 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1371 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1373 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1374 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1375 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1376 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1377 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1386 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1388 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1389 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1391 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1396 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1399 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1401 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1404 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1408 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1410 /* Session-id reuse */
1411 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1412 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1413 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1414 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1416 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1417 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1418 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1419 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1420 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1422 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1426 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1427 else if (ec != NULL)
1428 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1430 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1433 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1436 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1437 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1442 * we now have the following setup.
1444 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1445 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1446 * compression - basically ignored right now
1447 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1448 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1449 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1450 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1453 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1454 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1455 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1465 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1468 if (ciphers != NULL)
1469 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1470 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1473 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1476 unsigned char *p, *d;
1481 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1482 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1483 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1484 p = s->s3->server_random;
1485 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1488 /* Do the message type and length last */
1489 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1491 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1492 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1495 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1496 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1499 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1500 * back in the server hello:
1501 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1502 * we send back the old session ID.
1503 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1504 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1505 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1506 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1508 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1509 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1510 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1511 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1514 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1516 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1518 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1519 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1527 /* put the cipher */
1528 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1531 /* put the compression method */
1532 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1535 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1538 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1541 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1546 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1548 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1556 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1559 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1560 return ssl_do_write(s);
1563 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1566 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1567 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1568 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1571 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1572 return ssl_do_write(s);
1575 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1581 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1585 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1588 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1589 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1592 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1595 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1596 unsigned char *p, *d;
1606 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1607 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1608 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1613 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1616 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1617 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1618 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1619 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1620 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1622 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1625 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1627 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1631 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1634 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1636 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1641 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1645 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1647 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1648 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1649 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1651 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1654 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1656 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1660 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1666 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1672 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1673 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1674 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1675 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1680 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1681 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1682 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1693 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1694 const EC_GROUP *group;
1696 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1697 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1698 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1699 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1700 if (nid != NID_undef)
1701 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1702 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1703 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1704 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1706 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1707 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1709 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1710 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1712 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1716 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1718 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1722 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1723 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1727 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1729 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1734 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1735 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1736 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1737 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1738 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1745 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1746 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1747 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1752 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1753 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1755 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1760 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1761 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1765 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1768 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1773 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1774 * allocate memory accordingly.
1776 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1777 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1778 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1781 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1782 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1783 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1784 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1786 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1790 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1791 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1792 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1793 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1795 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1800 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1804 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1805 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1806 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1812 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1813 * can set these to NULLs
1820 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1822 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1824 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1826 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1828 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1830 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1831 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1832 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1833 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1835 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1838 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1839 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1840 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1841 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1845 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1847 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1850 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1851 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1853 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1860 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1861 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1862 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1864 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1867 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1873 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1877 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1879 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1881 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1892 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1894 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1895 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1896 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1897 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1899 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1907 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1908 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1909 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1910 encodedPoint = NULL;
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1916 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1917 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1918 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1919 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1920 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1921 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1928 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1929 * points to the space at the end.
1931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1932 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1935 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1936 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1937 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1938 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1939 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1940 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1942 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1944 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1945 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1949 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1950 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1959 /* send signature algorithm */
1960 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1961 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1962 /* Should never happen */
1963 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1965 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1971 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1973 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1974 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1976 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1978 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1979 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1980 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1986 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1989 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1990 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1992 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1997 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2000 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2001 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2002 return ssl_do_write(s);
2004 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2007 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2008 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2009 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2011 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2015 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2017 unsigned char *p, *d;
2018 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2019 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2023 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2026 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2028 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2030 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2035 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2036 const unsigned char *psigs;
2037 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2039 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2048 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2051 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2052 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2053 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2054 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2055 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2060 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2061 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2063 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2068 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2077 /* else no CA names */
2078 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2081 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2083 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2084 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2085 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2089 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2091 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2099 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2102 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2103 return ssl_do_write(s);
2108 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2112 unsigned long alg_k;
2114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2116 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2120 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2124 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2127 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2128 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2129 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2130 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2133 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2134 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2135 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2136 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2140 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2142 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2145 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2146 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2148 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2151 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2152 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2153 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2154 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2156 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2159 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2161 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2166 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2167 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2168 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2169 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2171 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2174 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2177 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2178 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2181 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2182 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2184 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2193 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2194 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2195 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2196 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2197 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2199 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2200 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2202 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2207 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2208 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2209 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2210 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2211 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2215 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2217 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2218 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2221 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2225 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2226 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2229 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2232 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2233 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2234 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2235 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2236 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2237 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2240 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2242 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2245 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2246 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2247 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2248 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2249 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2250 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2253 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2254 unsigned char workaround_good;
2256 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2258 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2259 version_good |= workaround_good;
2263 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2264 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2266 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2269 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2270 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2271 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2272 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2274 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2275 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2276 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2279 s->session->master_key_length =
2280 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2282 session->master_key,
2285 (rand_premaster_secret));
2286 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2290 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2292 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2296 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2297 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2299 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2304 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2305 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2307 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2314 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2315 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2316 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2317 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2319 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2320 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2321 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2322 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2324 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2327 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2328 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2329 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2331 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2334 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2337 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2338 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2340 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2341 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2343 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2344 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2346 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2349 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2350 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2352 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2358 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2366 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2367 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2373 s->session->master_key_length =
2374 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2376 session->master_key,
2378 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2384 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2385 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2386 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2387 krb5_data authenticator;
2389 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2390 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2391 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2392 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2393 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2395 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2396 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2398 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2401 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2404 enc_ticket.length = i;
2406 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2408 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2412 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2413 p += enc_ticket.length;
2416 authenticator.length = i;
2418 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2420 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2424 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2425 p += authenticator.length;
2429 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2430 p += enc_pms.length;
2433 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2435 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2437 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2441 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2442 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2444 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2448 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2451 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2452 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2454 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2455 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2461 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2462 * return authtime == 0.
2464 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2465 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2467 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2468 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2470 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2471 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2476 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2481 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2482 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2484 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2488 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2490 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2492 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2495 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2496 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2499 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2502 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2504 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2507 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2509 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2513 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2515 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2518 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2519 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2521 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2522 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2523 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2524 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2525 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2526 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2527 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2530 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2537 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2539 s->session->master_key_length =
2540 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2542 session->master_key,
2545 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2546 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2547 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2548 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2549 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2554 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2555 * but it caused problems for apache.
2556 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2557 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2560 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2563 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2567 const EC_GROUP *group;
2568 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2570 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2571 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2576 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2577 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2578 /* use the certificate */
2579 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2582 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2583 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2585 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2588 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2589 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2591 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2592 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2597 /* Let's get client's public key */
2598 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2604 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2606 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2607 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2609 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2612 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2613 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2615 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2616 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2617 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2618 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2619 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2620 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2622 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2624 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2628 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2629 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2634 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2637 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2638 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2640 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2642 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2646 /* Get encoded point length */
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2653 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2658 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2661 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2664 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2665 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2666 if (field_size <= 0) {
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2670 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2677 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2678 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2679 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2680 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2681 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2682 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2684 /* Compute the master secret */
2685 s->session->master_key_length =
2686 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2688 session->master_key,
2691 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2696 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2697 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2698 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2699 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2701 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2703 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2710 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2712 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2715 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2717 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2722 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2724 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2725 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2726 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2728 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2729 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2731 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2734 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2736 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2739 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2740 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2744 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2745 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2747 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2749 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2753 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2754 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2755 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2756 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2761 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2762 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2763 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2764 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2765 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2770 s->session->master_key_length =
2771 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2773 session->master_key,
2778 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2784 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2789 if (param_len > n) {
2790 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2792 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2795 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2799 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2800 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2801 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2803 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2806 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2807 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2808 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2809 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2814 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2815 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2816 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2823 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2824 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2826 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2827 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2828 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2829 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2830 unsigned long alg_a;
2834 /* Get our certificate private key */
2835 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2836 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2837 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2838 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2839 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2841 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2842 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2844 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2845 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2846 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2847 * client certificate for authorization only.
2849 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2850 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2851 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2854 /* Decrypt session key */
2856 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2857 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2858 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2860 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2865 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2866 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2868 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2871 /* Generate master secret */
2872 s->session->master_key_length =
2873 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2875 session->master_key,
2876 premaster_secret, 32);
2877 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2878 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2879 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2884 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2885 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2891 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2898 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2899 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2903 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2904 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2905 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2906 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2907 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2912 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2914 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2916 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2920 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2922 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2924 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2925 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2926 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2927 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2932 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2933 peer = s->session->peer;
2934 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2935 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2941 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2942 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2944 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2954 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2958 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2960 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2961 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2965 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2967 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2971 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2972 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2973 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2975 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2978 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2979 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2982 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2983 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
2985 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2987 } else if (rv == 0) {
2988 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2992 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3001 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3005 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3006 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3008 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3012 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3015 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3016 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3018 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3022 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3025 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3026 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3028 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3032 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3033 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3039 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3040 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3041 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3044 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3049 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3055 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3056 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3057 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3058 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3059 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3062 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3069 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3070 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3071 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3072 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3075 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3081 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3082 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3083 unsigned char signature[64];
3085 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3086 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3088 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3090 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3091 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3093 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3095 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3097 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3103 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3110 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3113 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3114 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3115 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3116 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3118 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3119 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3123 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3125 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3127 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3128 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3130 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3132 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3135 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3140 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3141 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3142 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3144 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3145 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3149 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3151 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3153 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3154 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3157 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3161 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3162 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3166 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3168 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3174 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3175 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3179 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3181 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3182 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3184 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3189 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3195 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3197 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3200 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3208 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3209 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3210 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3211 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3213 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3216 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3217 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3218 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3220 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3221 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3224 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3225 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3226 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3230 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3232 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3234 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3239 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3240 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3241 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3242 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3245 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3248 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3249 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3250 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3255 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3256 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3257 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3259 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3260 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3268 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3274 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3278 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3282 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3283 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3285 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3286 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3287 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3289 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3294 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3298 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3301 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3302 return ssl_do_write(s);
3305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3306 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3307 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3309 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3313 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3314 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3315 const unsigned char *const_p;
3316 int len, slen_full, slen;
3319 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3320 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3321 unsigned char key_name[16];
3323 /* get session encoding length */
3324 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3326 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3329 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00)
3331 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3335 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3336 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3339 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3343 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3346 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3349 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3351 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3352 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3353 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3357 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3358 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3361 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3364 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3365 * follows handshake_header_length +
3366 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3367 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3368 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3369 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3371 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3372 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3373 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3376 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3378 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3379 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3381 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3382 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3386 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3388 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3389 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3391 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3392 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3394 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3398 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3399 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3400 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3402 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3404 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3406 /* Output key name */
3408 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3411 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3412 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3413 /* Encrypt session data */
3414 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3417 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3421 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3423 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3426 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3427 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3430 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3432 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3433 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3434 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3436 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3437 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3441 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3442 return ssl_do_write(s);
3446 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3447 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3451 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3453 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3456 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3457 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3458 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3461 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3464 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3467 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3468 /* message length */
3469 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3471 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3472 /* length of OCSP response */
3473 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3474 /* actual response */
3475 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3476 /* number of bytes to write */
3477 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3478 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3482 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3483 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3486 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3488 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3489 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3491 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3494 int proto_len, padding_len;
3496 const unsigned char *p;
3499 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3500 * extension in their ClientHello
3502 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3504 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3508 /* See the payload format below */
3509 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3510 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3511 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3512 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3518 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3519 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3520 * ssl3_get_finished).
3522 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3528 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3530 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3533 * The payload looks like:
3535 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3536 * uint8 padding_len;
3537 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3540 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3542 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3543 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3546 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3547 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3551 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3552 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;