2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
141 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
142 * packet by another n bytes.
143 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
144 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
145 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
146 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
153 if (n <= 0) return n;
157 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
161 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
162 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
163 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
168 /* start with empty packet ... */
171 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
173 /* check if next packet length is large
174 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
175 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
177 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
179 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
180 * and its length field is insane, we can
181 * only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not.
183 * Header values has no effect on memmove
184 * arguments and therefore no buffer
185 * overrun can be triggered. */
186 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
190 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191 s->packet_length = 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
195 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
196 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
197 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
200 if (left > 0 && n > left)
204 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
213 /* else we need to read more data */
215 len = s->packet_length;
217 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
218 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
219 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
220 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
222 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
224 rb->offset = len + align;
227 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
234 /* ignore max parameter */
240 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
241 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
246 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
247 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
248 * len+max if possible) */
253 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
254 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
265 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
268 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
272 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
273 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
274 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
278 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
282 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
285 s->packet_length += n;
286 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
290 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
291 * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
292 * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
293 * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
294 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
297 * Call this to get a new input record.
298 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
299 * or non-blocking IO.
300 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
301 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
302 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
303 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
305 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
306 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
308 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
309 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
313 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
317 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
322 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
323 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
326 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
328 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
329 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
335 /* check if we have the header */
336 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
337 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
339 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
340 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
341 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
345 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
347 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
351 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
354 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
357 /* Lets check version */
358 if (!s->first_packet)
360 if (version != s->version)
362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
363 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
364 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
365 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
366 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
371 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
377 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
379 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
384 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
387 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
389 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
391 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
393 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
394 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
395 /* now n == rr->length,
396 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
399 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
401 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
402 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
404 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
406 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
407 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
408 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
409 * the decryption or by the decompression
410 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
411 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
413 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
414 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
416 /* check is not needed I believe */
417 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
419 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
424 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
426 rr->orig_len=rr->length;
427 /* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record.
428 * All the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
430 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash)
433 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
434 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
435 if (rr->length < mac_size)
437 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
441 rr->length -= mac_size;
442 mac = rr->data + rr->length;
443 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
444 if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
446 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
452 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
455 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
456 * 1: if the padding is valid
457 * -1: if the padding is invalid
461 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
467 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
468 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
472 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
473 if ((sess != NULL) &&
474 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
475 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s))
477 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
478 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
479 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
480 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
481 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
483 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
484 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
485 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
486 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
488 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
489 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
490 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
491 rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
493 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
498 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
500 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
501 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
502 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
503 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
506 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
507 rr->length -= mac_size;
511 /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
512 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
513 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
514 rr->length -= mac_size;
515 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
518 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
519 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
521 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
527 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
528 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
529 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
530 * we should not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this
531 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
532 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
537 /* r->length is now just compressed */
538 if (s->expand != NULL)
540 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
542 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
546 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
548 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
554 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
556 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
563 * So at this point the following is true
564 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
565 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
566 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
567 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
571 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
574 /* just read a 0 length packet */
577 empty_record_count++;
578 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
580 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
588 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
594 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
599 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
605 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
606 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
607 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
617 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
623 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
624 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
625 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
626 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
637 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
638 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
640 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
642 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
645 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
646 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
648 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
650 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
658 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
659 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
663 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
665 i=s->handshake_func(s);
666 if (i < 0) return(i);
669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
674 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
675 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
676 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
677 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
678 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
679 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
680 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
689 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
690 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
693 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],s->s3->wpend_tot);
696 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
700 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
703 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
705 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
706 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
707 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
708 * compromise is considered worthy.
710 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
711 u_len >= 4*(max_send_fragment=s->max_send_fragment) &&
712 s->compress==NULL && s->msg_callback==NULL &&
713 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
714 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
716 unsigned char aad[13];
717 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
720 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
721 if ((max_send_fragment&0xfff) == 0)
722 max_send_fragment -= 512;
724 if (tot==0 || wb->buf==NULL) /* allocate jumbo buffer */
726 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
728 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
729 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
730 max_send_fragment,NULL);
732 if (u_len >= 8*max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8;
735 wb->buf=OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
738 else if (tot==len) /* done? */
740 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
748 if (n < 4*max_send_fragment)
750 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
755 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
757 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
765 if (n >= 8*max_send_fragment)
766 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=8);
768 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=4);
770 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
772 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
773 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
780 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
781 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
782 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
784 if (packlen<=0 || packlen>(int)wb->len) /* never happens */
786 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
791 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
792 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
795 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
796 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
797 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param)<=0)
800 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
801 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
804 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
810 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
811 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
812 s->s3->wpend_type= type;
813 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
815 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],nw);
820 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
828 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
838 if (tot==len) /* done? */
840 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
842 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
851 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
852 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
856 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
859 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
865 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
866 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
868 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
869 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
870 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
872 if ((i==(int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
874 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
884 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
885 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
887 unsigned char *p,*plen;
888 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
893 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
897 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
898 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
900 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
902 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
903 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
905 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
908 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
912 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
915 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
921 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
922 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
923 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
926 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
934 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
939 #if 0 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
940 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && s->compress==NULL &&
941 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && /*!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&*/
942 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
944 unsigned char aad[13];
945 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param = {NULL,aad,sizeof(aad),0};
948 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
950 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
951 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
952 aad[11]=(unsigned char)(len>>8);
953 aad[12]=(unsigned char)len;
954 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
955 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
956 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
958 if (packlen==0 || packlen > wb->len) break;
960 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
963 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
964 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
965 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
967 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
968 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
971 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
977 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
978 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
979 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
980 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
981 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
983 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
984 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
988 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
989 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
991 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
992 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
994 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
996 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
997 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
998 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
999 * together with the actual payload) */
1000 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1001 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1005 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
1007 /* insufficient space */
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1013 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1016 if (create_empty_fragment)
1018 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1019 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
1020 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
1021 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
1022 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
1023 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1024 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
1026 p = wb->buf + align;
1029 else if (prefix_len)
1031 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
1035 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1036 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1037 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
1039 p = wb->buf + align;
1043 /* write the header */
1048 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1049 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
1050 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
1052 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
1054 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
1057 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1059 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
1062 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1063 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
1065 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1066 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
1068 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1072 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1073 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1074 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1081 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1082 wr->data=p + eivlen;
1083 wr->length=(int)len;
1084 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1086 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1089 /* first we compress */
1090 if (s->compress != NULL)
1092 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1100 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1104 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1105 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1106 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1108 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1110 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1112 wr->length+=mac_size;
1120 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
1122 wr->length += eivlen;
1125 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1)<1) goto err;
1127 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1129 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,p + wr->length,1) < 0)
1131 wr->length+=mac_size;
1134 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1135 s2n(wr->length,plen);
1137 if (s->msg_callback)
1138 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1140 /* we should now have
1141 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1142 * wr->length long */
1143 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1144 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1146 if (create_empty_fragment)
1148 /* we are in a recursive call;
1149 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1154 /* now let's set up wb */
1155 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1157 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1158 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1159 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1160 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1161 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1163 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1164 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1169 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1170 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1174 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
1177 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1178 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1179 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1180 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1189 if (s->wbio != NULL)
1191 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
1192 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
1193 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1194 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1205 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1206 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
1209 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
1210 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1211 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1212 point in using a datagram service */
1223 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1224 * 'type' is one of the following:
1226 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1227 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1228 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1230 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1231 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1233 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1234 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1235 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1236 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1237 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1238 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1239 * Change cipher spec protocol
1240 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1242 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1243 * Handshake protocol
1244 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1245 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1246 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1247 * Application data protocol
1248 * none of our business
1250 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1255 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
1257 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1258 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1261 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
1262 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1269 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1271 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1272 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1277 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1280 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1283 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1284 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1285 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1289 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1291 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1293 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1294 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1295 if (i < 0) return(i);
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1303 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1306 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1307 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1308 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1309 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1311 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1313 /* get new packet if necessary */
1314 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1316 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1317 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1320 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1322 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1323 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1324 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1326 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1331 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1332 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1333 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1336 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1341 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1343 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1344 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1345 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1346 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1348 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1353 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1355 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1358 n = (unsigned int)len;
1360 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1365 if (rr->length == 0)
1367 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1369 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1370 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1377 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1378 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1380 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1381 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1384 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1385 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1386 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1388 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1390 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1391 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1392 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1394 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1396 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1397 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1398 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1401 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1403 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1405 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1407 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1408 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1409 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1414 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1416 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1418 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1420 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1423 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1427 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1428 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1433 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1434 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1435 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1438 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1440 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1441 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1442 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1444 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1446 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1447 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1448 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1450 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1455 if (s->msg_callback)
1456 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1458 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1459 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1460 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1462 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1463 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1465 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1466 if (i < 0) return(i);
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1473 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1475 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1478 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1479 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1480 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1481 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1482 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1483 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1484 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1485 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1491 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1492 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1495 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1496 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1497 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1500 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1501 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1502 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1503 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1504 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1505 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1506 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1509 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1511 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1514 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1516 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1517 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1519 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1521 if (s->msg_callback)
1522 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1524 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1525 cb=s->info_callback;
1526 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1527 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1531 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1532 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1535 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1537 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1538 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1540 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1543 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1544 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1545 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1546 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1547 * expects it to succeed.
1549 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1550 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1552 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1554 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1558 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1559 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1563 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1567 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1568 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1570 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1571 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1572 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1573 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1578 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1586 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1588 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1593 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1595 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1596 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1597 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1598 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1600 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1605 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1606 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1608 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1613 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1615 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1620 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1624 if (s->msg_callback)
1625 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1627 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1628 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1634 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1635 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1637 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1638 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1640 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1641 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1642 * protocol violations): */
1643 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1647 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1652 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1653 if (i < 0) return(i);
1656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1660 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1662 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1665 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1666 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1667 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1668 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1669 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1670 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1671 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1672 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1683 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1684 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1686 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1692 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1695 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1697 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1698 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1699 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1700 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1701 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1704 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1705 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1706 * but have application data. If the library was
1707 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1708 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1709 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1710 * we will indulge it.
1712 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1713 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1715 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1716 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1717 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1719 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1720 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1721 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1725 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1730 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1738 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1743 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1749 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1750 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1752 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1754 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1756 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1758 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1763 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1764 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1767 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1770 /* we have to record the message digest at
1771 * this point so we can get it before we read
1772 * the finished message */
1773 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1775 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1776 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1780 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1781 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1784 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1785 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1791 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1796 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1798 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1799 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1800 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1801 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1802 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1803 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1804 if ((level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) && (s->session != NULL))
1805 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1807 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1808 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1809 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1810 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1811 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1812 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1813 * some time in the future */
1817 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1820 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1822 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1823 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1826 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1830 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1831 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1832 * we will not worry too much. */
1833 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1834 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1836 if (s->msg_callback)
1837 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1839 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1840 cb=s->info_callback;
1841 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1842 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1846 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1847 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);