2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
21 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
24 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
25 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
26 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
27 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
29 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
30 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
33 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
36 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
37 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
40 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
44 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
47 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
48 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
53 rl->packet_length = 0;
55 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
56 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
57 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
58 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
64 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
65 for (pipes = 0; pipes < rl->numwpipes; pipes++)
66 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf[pipes]);
69 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
71 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
72 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
75 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
78 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
80 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
81 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
82 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
83 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
84 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
87 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
89 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
92 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
94 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
95 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
98 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf,
101 rl->packet_length = len;
103 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
104 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
105 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
109 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
110 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
115 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
117 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
120 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
122 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
125 int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
130 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
133 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
134 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
135 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
137 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
143 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
145 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
148 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
150 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
153 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
155 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
156 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
157 return "read header";
158 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
160 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
167 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
169 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
170 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
172 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
174 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
182 * Return values are as per SSL_read(), i.e.
184 * 0 Failure (not retryable)
185 * <0 Failure (may be retryable)
187 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
191 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
192 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
193 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
194 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
195 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
196 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
197 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
199 size_t len, left, align = 0;
206 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
208 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
212 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
213 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
214 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
218 /* start with empty packet ... */
221 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
223 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
226 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
227 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
228 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
230 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
231 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
232 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
233 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
234 * overrun can be triggered.
236 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
240 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
241 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
242 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
245 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
246 pkt = rb->buf + align;
248 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
249 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
251 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
252 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
253 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
254 rb->offset = len + align;
258 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
259 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
262 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
263 if (left == 0 && extend)
265 if (left > 0 && n > left)
269 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
271 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
278 /* else we need to read more data */
280 if (n > (rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
285 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
286 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
287 /* ignore max parameter */
292 if (max > (rb->len - rb->offset))
293 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
301 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
302 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
307 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
308 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
309 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
310 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
320 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
322 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
327 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
328 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
329 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
331 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
333 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
337 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
340 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
341 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
347 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
348 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
350 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
352 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
354 unsigned int n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
355 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
356 unsigned int max_send_fragment, nw;
357 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
359 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
367 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
368 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
370 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
371 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
372 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
373 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
374 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
375 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
376 * report the error in a way the user will notice
378 if ((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
385 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
386 i = s->handshake_func(s);
390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
396 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
397 * will happen with non blocking IO
400 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
402 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
403 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
406 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
408 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
410 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
411 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
412 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
413 * compromise is considered worthy.
415 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
416 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
417 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
418 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
419 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
420 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
421 unsigned char aad[13];
422 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
425 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
426 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
427 max_send_fragment -= 512;
429 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
430 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
432 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
433 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
434 max_send_fragment, NULL);
436 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
441 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
445 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
446 /* free jumbo buffer */
447 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
453 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
454 /* free jumbo buffer */
455 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
459 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
460 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
462 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
467 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
468 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
470 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
472 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
474 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
475 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
482 /* TODO: CHECK ME - CAN THIS EVER BE NEGATIVE???? */
483 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
484 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
485 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
487 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
488 /* free jumbo buffer */
489 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
493 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
494 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
497 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
498 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
499 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
502 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
503 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
505 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
511 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
512 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
513 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
514 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
516 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
518 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
519 /* free jumbo buffer */
520 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
522 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
526 /* free jumbo buffer */
527 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
535 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
536 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
537 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
544 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
546 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
547 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
548 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
551 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
552 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
554 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
561 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
562 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
563 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
564 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
566 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
567 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
569 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
570 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
577 unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
578 unsigned int numpipes, j;
583 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
584 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
587 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
589 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
592 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
593 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
596 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
597 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
598 remain = n % numpipes;
599 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
600 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
606 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0);
608 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
609 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
614 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
615 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
617 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
618 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
620 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
622 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
624 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
634 /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
635 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
636 unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes,
637 int create_empty_fragment)
639 unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
640 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
641 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
647 unsigned int totlen = 0;
650 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
651 totlen += pipelens[j];
653 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
654 * will happen with non blocking IO
656 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
657 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen));
659 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
660 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
661 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
664 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
667 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
668 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
671 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
676 if ((sess == NULL) ||
677 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
678 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
681 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
687 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
689 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
691 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
692 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
695 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
697 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
698 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
699 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
702 unsigned int tmppipelen = 0;
704 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1);
709 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
710 /* insufficient space */
711 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
716 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
719 if (create_empty_fragment) {
720 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
721 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
723 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
724 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
725 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
727 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
728 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
730 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
731 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
732 } else if (prefix_len) {
733 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
734 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
737 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
738 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
739 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
740 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
741 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
743 outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
744 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
748 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
749 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
750 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
751 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
752 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
756 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
757 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
758 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
759 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
760 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
767 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
768 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
769 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
770 /* write the header */
771 *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff;
772 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
774 *(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
776 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
777 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
779 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
780 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
781 *(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1;
783 *(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff;
785 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
789 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
790 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen);
791 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], pipelens[j]);
792 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
793 totlen += pipelens[j];
796 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
799 /* first we compress */
800 if (s->compress != NULL) {
801 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) {
802 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
806 memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length);
807 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
811 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
812 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
816 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
817 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
818 &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]),
821 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
824 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]);
825 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
829 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
831 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen);
835 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
838 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
839 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
840 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
841 outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0)
843 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
846 /* record length after mac and block padding */
847 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]);
850 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s,
851 s->msg_callback_arg);
854 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
857 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for
859 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
861 if (create_empty_fragment) {
863 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
867 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
871 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
874 /* now let's set up wb */
875 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
876 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
880 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
883 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
884 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
885 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
886 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
888 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
889 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen);
894 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
896 * Return values are as per SSL_read(), i.e.
897 * >0 The number of read bytes
898 * 0 Failure (not retryable)
899 * <0 Failure (may be retryable)
901 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
905 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
906 unsigned int currbuf = 0;
909 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len)
910 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
911 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
912 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
918 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
919 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
920 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
925 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
926 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
927 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
928 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
929 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
930 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
935 if (i == (int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
936 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
937 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
938 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
940 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
941 return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret);
943 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
945 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
946 * using a datagram service
948 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
952 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
953 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], i);
958 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
959 * 'type' is one of the following:
961 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
962 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
963 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
965 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
966 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
968 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
969 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
970 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
971 * argument is non NULL.
972 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
973 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
974 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
975 * Change cipher spec protocol
976 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
978 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
980 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
981 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
982 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
983 * Application data protocol
984 * none of our business
986 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
987 size_t len, int peek, size_t *read)
990 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, read_bytes;
993 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
995 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
997 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
998 /* Not initialized yet */
999 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1003 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1004 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1006 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1011 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1012 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1014 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1015 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1020 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1023 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1026 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1027 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1028 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1030 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1031 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1038 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1041 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1042 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1043 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1052 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1055 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1056 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1057 * rr[i].data, - data
1058 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1059 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1061 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1062 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1065 /* get new records if necessary */
1066 if (num_recs == 0) {
1067 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1070 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1071 if (num_recs == 0) {
1072 /* Shouldn't happen */
1073 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1078 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1080 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1082 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1083 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1087 } while (num_recs == 0);
1091 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1092 * record that isn't an alert.
1094 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1095 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1096 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1098 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1100 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1101 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1102 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1103 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1109 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1112 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1113 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1114 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1118 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1119 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1120 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1122 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1123 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1124 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1127 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1128 * doing a handshake for the first time
1130 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1131 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1132 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1137 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1138 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1139 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1140 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1145 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1146 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1153 if (len - read_bytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1154 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1156 n = len - read_bytes;
1158 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1161 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1162 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1163 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1165 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1166 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1167 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1168 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1169 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1170 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1173 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1174 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1179 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1180 && read_bytes < len);
1181 if (read_bytes == 0) {
1182 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1185 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1186 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1187 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1188 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1194 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1195 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1196 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1200 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1202 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1204 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1205 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1206 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1207 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1209 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1215 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1217 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1218 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1219 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1220 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1222 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1223 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1229 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1230 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1233 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1234 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1235 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1237 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1238 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1239 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1240 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1241 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1242 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1243 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1244 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1247 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1248 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1249 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1250 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1252 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1254 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1255 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1256 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1257 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1260 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
1261 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1262 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1268 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1269 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1270 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1273 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1275 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1276 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1277 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1278 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1280 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1281 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1282 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1283 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1288 if (s->msg_callback)
1289 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1290 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1291 s->msg_callback_arg);
1293 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1294 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1295 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1296 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1297 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1298 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1306 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1307 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1308 /* no read-ahead left? */
1311 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1312 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1313 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1314 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1316 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1317 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1318 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1319 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1326 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1327 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1332 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1333 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1334 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1337 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1338 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1339 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1340 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1341 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1342 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1343 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1344 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1345 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1346 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1349 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1350 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1351 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1353 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1355 if (s->msg_callback)
1356 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1357 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1358 s->msg_callback_arg);
1360 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1361 cb = s->info_callback;
1362 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1363 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1366 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1367 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1370 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1371 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1372 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1374 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1375 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1376 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1381 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1382 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1386 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1387 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1388 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1389 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1390 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1391 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1393 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1394 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1398 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1399 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1402 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1405 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1406 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1408 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1409 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1410 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1411 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1412 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1415 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1423 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1425 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1426 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1427 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1431 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1432 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1438 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1440 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1441 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1442 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1443 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1444 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1448 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1456 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1457 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1458 /* no read-ahead left? */
1461 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1462 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1463 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1464 * problems in the blocking world
1466 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1467 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1468 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1469 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1476 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1479 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1480 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1481 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1482 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1483 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1485 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1488 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1490 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1492 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1493 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1494 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1496 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1501 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1502 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1503 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1504 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1505 * started), we will indulge it.
1507 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1508 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1511 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1519 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1523 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1527 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1535 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1536 * format and false otherwise.
1538 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1540 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1544 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1546 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1548 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);