2 * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
15 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
20 #include "internal/refcount.h"
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
22 #include <openssl/engine.h>
23 #include <openssl/self_test.h>
24 #include "crypto/bn.h"
26 static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
30 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
32 return ec_key_new_method_int(NULL, NULL, NULL);
36 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_with_libctx(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, const char *propq)
38 return ec_key_new_method_int(ctx, propq, NULL);
41 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_with_libctx(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
42 const char *propq, int nid)
44 EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new_with_libctx(ctx, propq);
47 ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name_with_libctx(ctx, propq, nid);
48 if (ret->group == NULL) {
52 if (ret->meth->set_group != NULL
53 && ret->meth->set_group(ret, ret->group) == 0) {
61 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
63 return EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_with_libctx(NULL, NULL, nid);
67 void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
74 CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
75 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
78 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
80 if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
83 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
84 ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
87 if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish)
88 r->group->meth->keyfinish(r);
91 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data);
93 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
94 EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
95 EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
96 BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
97 OPENSSL_free(r->propq);
99 OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
102 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
104 if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
105 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
108 if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
109 if (dest->meth->finish != NULL)
110 dest->meth->finish(dest);
111 if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish)
112 dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest);
113 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
114 if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0)
119 dest->libctx = src->libctx;
120 /* copy the parameters */
121 if (src->group != NULL) {
122 /* clear the old group */
123 EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
124 dest->group = ec_group_new_with_libctx(src->libctx, src->propq,
126 if (dest->group == NULL)
128 if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
131 /* copy the public key */
132 if (src->pub_key != NULL) {
133 EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
134 dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
135 if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
137 if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
140 /* copy the private key */
141 if (src->priv_key != NULL) {
142 if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
143 dest->priv_key = BN_new();
144 if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
147 if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
149 if (src->group->meth->keycopy
150 && src->group->meth->keycopy(dest, src) == 0)
157 dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
158 dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
159 dest->version = src->version;
160 dest->flags = src->flags;
162 if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY,
163 &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
167 if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
168 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
169 if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0)
171 dest->engine = src->engine;
173 dest->meth = src->meth;
176 if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0)
184 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key)
186 EC_KEY *ret = ec_key_new_method_int(ec_key->libctx, ec_key->propq,
192 if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
199 int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r)
203 if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
206 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
207 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
208 return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
211 ENGINE *EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY *eckey)
213 return eckey->engine;
216 int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
218 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) {
219 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
222 if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL) {
225 ret = eckey->meth->keygen(eckey);
231 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
235 int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
239 ret = eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
247 * ECC Key generation.
248 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
251 * libctx A context containing an optional self test callback.
252 * eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
253 * is stored in this object.
254 * pairwise_test Set to non zero to perform a pairwise test. If the test
255 * fails then the keypair is not generated,
256 * Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
258 int ec_generate_key(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, EC_KEY *eckey, int pairwise_test)
261 BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
262 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
263 EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
264 const EC_GROUP *group = eckey->group;
265 BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new_ex(eckey->libctx);
270 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
271 priv_key = BN_secure_new();
272 if (priv_key == NULL)
275 priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
278 * Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength.
279 * These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be
280 * stated in the security policy.
283 order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
288 * Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]).
289 * Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively
290 * equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also
291 * faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing
292 * 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into
293 * rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here.
296 if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(priv_key, order, ctx))
298 while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
300 if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
301 pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group);
305 pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
307 /* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
308 if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
311 eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
312 eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
320 #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
324 OSSL_CALLBACK *cb = NULL;
327 OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(libctx, &cb, &cbarg);
328 ok = ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(eckey, cb, cbarg);
331 /* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
333 BN_clear(eckey->priv_key);
334 if (eckey->pub_key != NULL)
335 EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, eckey->pub_key);
338 EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
339 BN_clear_free(priv_key);
344 int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
346 return ec_generate_key(NULL, eckey, 0);
349 int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
352 BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx);
358 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
359 * pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
361 ret = EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
371 int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
373 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
374 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
378 if (eckey->group->meth->keycheck == NULL) {
379 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
383 return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey);
387 * Check the range of the EC public key.
388 * See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
390 * - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
391 * interval[0, p - 1], OR
392 * - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
393 * Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
395 static int ec_key_public_range_check(BN_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *key)
406 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, key->pub_key, x, y, ctx))
409 if (EC_GROUP_get_field_type(key->group) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
410 if (BN_is_negative(x)
411 || BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0
413 || BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0) {
417 int m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(key->group);
418 if (BN_num_bits(x) > m || BN_num_bits(y) > m) {
429 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
430 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation.
432 int ec_key_public_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
435 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
436 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
438 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
439 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
443 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
444 if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
445 ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
449 point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
453 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
454 if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx, eckey)) {
455 ECerr(0, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
459 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
460 if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
461 ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
465 order = eckey->group->order;
466 if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
467 ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
470 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
471 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
472 ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
475 if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
476 ECerr(0, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
481 EC_POINT_free(point);
486 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
487 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
488 * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
490 int ec_key_private_check(const EC_KEY *eckey)
492 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
493 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
496 if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
497 || BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, eckey->group->order) >= 0) {
498 ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
505 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
506 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
507 * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
509 int ec_key_pairwise_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
512 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
515 || eckey->group == NULL
516 || eckey->pub_key == NULL
517 || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
518 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
522 point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
527 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
528 ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
531 if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
532 ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
537 EC_POINT_free(point);
543 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
544 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
545 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
546 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
548 * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
549 * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
550 * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
552 int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
558 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
561 if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx)) == NULL)
564 if (!ec_key_public_check(eckey, ctx))
567 if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
568 if (!ec_key_private_check(eckey)
569 || !ec_key_pairwise_check(eckey, ctx))
578 int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
583 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
586 if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) {
587 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
588 ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
591 ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(key->libctx);
596 point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
601 tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
602 ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
606 if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, x, y, ctx))
608 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx))
612 * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals. The range check is done
613 * inside EC_KEY_check_key().
615 if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
616 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
617 EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
621 /* EC_KEY_set_public_key updates dirty_cnt */
622 if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
625 if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0)
633 EC_POINT_free(point);
638 OPENSSL_CTX *ec_key_get_libctx(const EC_KEY *key)
643 const char *ec_key_get0_propq(const EC_KEY *key)
648 const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
653 int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
655 if (key->meth->set_group != NULL && key->meth->set_group(key, group) == 0)
657 EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
658 key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
660 return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
663 const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key)
665 return key->priv_key;
668 int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
671 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
672 BIGNUM *tmp_key = NULL;
674 if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL)
678 * Not only should key->group be set, but it should also be in a valid
679 * fully initialized state.
681 * Specifically, to operate in constant time, we need that the group order
682 * is set, as we use its length as the fixed public size of any scalar used
683 * as an EC private key.
685 order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group);
686 if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order))
687 return 0; /* This should never happen */
689 if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL
690 && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
692 if (key->meth->set_private != NULL
693 && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
697 * We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
698 * so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
699 * holding the secret scalar.
701 * This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
702 * propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
703 * this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
704 * the caller specifically set it.
706 * The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
707 * years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
708 * some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
710 * In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
711 * manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
712 * inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
713 * correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
715 * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
716 * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
717 * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
718 * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
724 * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
725 * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
726 * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
729 * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
730 * required for the internal representation of the order, and we
731 * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
732 * might temporarily overflow the order length.
734 tmp_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
738 BN_set_flags(tmp_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
740 fixed_top = bn_get_top(order) + 2;
741 if (bn_wexpand(tmp_key, fixed_top) == NULL) {
742 BN_clear_free(tmp_key);
746 BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
747 key->priv_key = tmp_key;
753 const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
758 int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
760 if (key->meth->set_public != NULL
761 && key->meth->set_public(key, pub_key) == 0)
763 EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
764 key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
766 return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
769 unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
771 return key->enc_flag;
774 void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags)
776 key->enc_flag = flags;
779 point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key)
781 return key->conv_form;
784 void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
786 key->conv_form = cform;
787 if (key->group != NULL)
788 EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform);
791 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
793 if (key->group != NULL)
794 EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
798 int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
800 if (key->group == NULL)
802 return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
806 int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
811 void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
817 void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
819 key->flags &= ~flags;
823 size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
824 unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx)
826 if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
828 return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, pbuf, ctx);
831 int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
834 if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
836 if (key->pub_key == NULL)
837 key->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
838 if (key->pub_key == NULL)
840 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0)
844 * Save the point conversion form.
845 * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
846 * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
847 * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
848 * the buffer so we know it is valid.
850 if ((key->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0)
851 key->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(buf[0] & ~0x01);
855 size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
856 unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
858 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
860 if (eckey->group->meth->priv2oct == NULL) {
861 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
865 return eckey->group->meth->priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
868 size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
869 unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
873 buf_len = (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey->group) + 7) / 8;
874 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
878 else if (len < buf_len)
881 /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
883 if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey->priv_key, buf, buf_len) == -1) {
884 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
891 int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
895 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
897 if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) {
898 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
901 ret = eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len);
907 int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
909 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
910 eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new();
911 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
912 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
915 eckey->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(buf, len, eckey->priv_key);
916 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
917 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
924 size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf)
929 len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0);
932 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
933 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
936 len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
945 int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey)
947 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL
948 || (eckey->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN))
954 * FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9 AS09.33
955 * Perform a sign/verify operation.
957 * NOTE: When generating keys for key-agreement schemes - FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9
958 * states that no additional pairwise tests are required (apart from the tests
959 * specified in SP800-56A) when generating keys. Hence pairwise ECDH tests are
962 static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
966 unsigned char dgst[16] = {0};
967 int dgst_len = (int)sizeof(dgst);
968 ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
969 OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL;
971 st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg);
975 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT,
976 OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_ECDSA);
978 sig = ECDSA_do_sign(dgst, dgst_len, eckey);
982 OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, dgst);
984 if (ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey) != 1)
989 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret);
990 OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st);