* Personalisation string tests
*/
- /* Test detection of too large personlisation string */
+ /* Test detection of too large personalisation string */
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, drbg->max_perslen + 1) > 0)
goto err;
/* fill 'randomness' buffer with some arbitrary data */
memset(rand_add_buf, 'r', sizeof(rand_add_buf));
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
/*
* Test whether all three DRBGs are reseeded by RAND_add().
* The before_reseed time has to be measured here and passed into the
if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(0, master, public, private, 0, 0, 0, 0)))
goto error;
reset_drbg_hook_ctx();
+#else /* FIPS_MODE */
+ /*
+ * In FIPS mode, random data provided by the application via RAND_add()
+ * is not considered a trusted entropy source. It is only treated as
+ * additional_data and no reseeding is forced. This test assures that
+ * no reseeding occurs.
+ */
+ before_reseed = time(NULL);
+ RAND_add(rand_add_buf, sizeof(rand_add_buf), sizeof(rand_add_buf));
+ if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 0, 0, 0,
+ before_reseed)))
+ goto error;
+ reset_drbg_hook_ctx();
+#endif
rv = 1;
return 1;
}
+static int test_rand_drbg_prediction_resistance(void)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *m = NULL, *i = NULL, *s = NULL;
+ unsigned char buf1[51], buf2[sizeof(buf1)];
+ int ret = 0, mreseed, ireseed, sreseed;
+
+ /* Initialise a three long DRBG chain */
+ if (!TEST_ptr(m = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL))
+ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(m))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(m, NULL, 0))
+ || !TEST_ptr(i = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, m))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(i, NULL, 0))
+ || !TEST_ptr(s = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, i))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(s, NULL, 0)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* During a normal reseed, only the slave DRBG should be reseed */
+ mreseed = ++m->reseed_prop_counter;
+ ireseed = ++i->reseed_prop_counter;
+ sreseed = s->reseed_prop_counter;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(s, NULL, 0, 0))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(m->reseed_prop_counter, mreseed)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(i->reseed_prop_counter, ireseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(s->reseed_prop_counter, sreseed))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * When prediction resistance is requested, the request should be
+ * propagated to the master, so that the entire DRBG chain reseeds.
+ */
+ sreseed = s->reseed_prop_counter;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(s, NULL, 0, 1))
+ || !TEST_int_gt(m->reseed_prop_counter, mreseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(i->reseed_prop_counter, ireseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(s->reseed_prop_counter, sreseed))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* During a normal generate, only the slave DRBG should be reseed */
+ mreseed = ++m->reseed_prop_counter;
+ ireseed = ++i->reseed_prop_counter;
+ sreseed = s->reseed_prop_counter;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(s, buf1, sizeof(buf1), 0, NULL, 0))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(m->reseed_prop_counter, mreseed)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(i->reseed_prop_counter, ireseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(s->reseed_prop_counter, sreseed))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * When a prediction resistant generate is requested, the request
+ * should be propagated to the master, reseeding the entire DRBG chain.
+ */
+ sreseed = s->reseed_prop_counter;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(s, buf2, sizeof(buf2), 1, NULL, 0))
+ || !TEST_int_gt(m->reseed_prop_counter, mreseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(i->reseed_prop_counter, ireseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(s->reseed_prop_counter, sreseed)
+ || !TEST_mem_ne(buf1, sizeof(buf1), buf2, sizeof(buf2)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Verify that a normal reseed still only reseeds the slave DRBG */
+ mreseed = ++m->reseed_prop_counter;
+ ireseed = ++i->reseed_prop_counter;
+ sreseed = s->reseed_prop_counter;
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(s, NULL, 0, 0))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(m->reseed_prop_counter, mreseed)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(i->reseed_prop_counter, ireseed)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(s->reseed_prop_counter, sreseed))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ RAND_DRBG_free(s);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(i);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(m);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int test_multi_set(void)
{
int rv = 0;
static size_t crngt_case, crngt_idx;
-static int crngt_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf)
+static int crngt_entropy_cb(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool,
+ unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
+ unsigned int *md_size)
{
size_t i, z;
z--;
for (i = 0; i < CRNGT_BUFSIZ; i++)
buf[i] = (unsigned char)(i + 'A' + z);
- return 1;
+ return EVP_Digest(buf, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
}
static int test_crngt(int n)
size_t ent;
int res = 0;
int expect;
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_CTX_new();
- if (!TEST_true(rand_crngt_single_init()))
- return 0;
- rand_crngt_cleanup();
-
- if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(dt->nid, dt->flags, NULL)))
+ if (!TEST_ptr(ctx))
return 0;
+ if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new_ex(ctx, dt->nid, dt->flags, NULL)))
+ goto err;
ent = (drbg->min_entropylen + CRNGT_BUFSIZ - 1) / CRNGT_BUFSIZ;
crngt_case = n % crngt_num_cases;
crngt_idx = 0;
crngt_get_entropy = &crngt_entropy_cb;
- if (!TEST_true(rand_crngt_init()))
- goto err;
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, &rand_crngt_get_entropy,
&rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy,
uninstantiate(drbg);
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
crngt_get_entropy = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
+ OPENSSL_CTX_free(ctx);
return res;
}
ADD_TEST(test_rand_drbg_reseed);
ADD_TEST(test_rand_seed);
ADD_TEST(test_rand_add);
+ ADD_TEST(test_rand_drbg_prediction_resistance);
ADD_TEST(test_multi_set);
ADD_TEST(test_set_defaults);
#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff