#include <openssl/md5.h>
static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
+static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
PACKET *cipher_suites,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
- * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
- */
-
/*
* Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
* not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
default:
break;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
break;
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
return 1;
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
* during re-negotiation:
*/
- && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
+ && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
/*
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
+ if (s->hello_retry_request)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
- st->hand_state = s->tlsext_status_expected ? TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
- : TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+ /*
+ * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
+ * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
+ * immediately.
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
+ * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
+ * session ticket?
+ */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
+ /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
+ st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
+ if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
/* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (s->hit) {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
+ if (s->ext.status_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
+ * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
+ * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
+ */
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
+ } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_OK:
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* No post work to be done */
break;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ break;
+
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
#endif
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
+ s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
&s->session->master_key_length)
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
break;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+ break;
+
+
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
*confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
*confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
*mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
+ break;
}
return 1;
static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
+ /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
+ if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+ s->new_session = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
+ s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
+
/*
* First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
*/
if (clienthello.isv2) {
unsigned int mt;
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/*-
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
if (protverr) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
- if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
/* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
}
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
- /*
- * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
- * version.
- * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
- * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
- * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
- * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
- * will abort the handshake with an error.
- */
- if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello, &al);
+ if (i == 1) {
/* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {
- goto err;
+ goto f_err;
} else {
/* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto f_err;
}
- /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) {
- /* No suitable share */
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
}
}
- if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+ if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
/*
* s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
int master_key_length;
master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
- s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
+ s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
&& master_key_length > 0) {
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
s->hit = 1;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
- pref_cipher =
- pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
- s->
- session->ciphers,
- SSL_get_ciphers
- (s));
+ if (pref_cipher == NULL)
+ pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
+ SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
*/
static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
{
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ s->ext.status_expected = 0;
/*
* If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
* and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
* influence which certificate is sent
*/
- if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
- && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
+ && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
int ret;
CERT_PKEY *certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
* et al can pick it up.
*/
s->cert->key = certpkey;
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
switch (ret) {
/* We don't want to send a status request response */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ s->ext.status_expected = 0;
break;
/* status request response should be sent */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
+ s->ext.status_expected = 1;
break;
/* something bad happened */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+ if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/* check whether we should disable session resumption */
if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
s->session->not_resumable =
!= 0));
if (s->session->not_resumable)
/* do not send a session ticket */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
}
#endif
- s->renegotiate = 2;
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
f_err:
unsigned long type;
const BIGNUM *r[4];
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
*/
if (md) {
unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
- unsigned int siglen;
+ size_t siglen;
+ int ispss = 0;
/* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
}
/* send signature algorithm */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
+ if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) {
/* Should never happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
* up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
* afterwards.
*/
- if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
- &sigbytes1)
- || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
- paramlen) <= 0
- || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
+ siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
+ || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (ispss) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
+ s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
+ paramlen) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
|| sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- const unsigned char *psigs;
- size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
+ const uint16_t *psigs;
+ size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
+
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
if (rsa == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return WORK_ERROR;;
+ return WORK_ERROR;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- const unsigned char *sig, *data;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
-#endif
- int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- int type = 0, j;
- unsigned int len;
- X509 *peer;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- long hdatalen = 0;
- void *hdata;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-
- if (mctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- peer = s->session->peer;
- pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
- type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
-
- if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
- /*
- * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
- * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
- && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
- len = 64;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- int rv;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
- if (rv == -1) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (rv == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- } else {
- /* Use default digest for this key type */
- int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
- if (idx >= 0)
- md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
- if (md == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
- || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
- || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- {
- int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
- if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
- || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
- || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
- if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
- data = gost_data;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
- && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
- (int)s->session->master_key_length,
- s->session->master_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- }
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
-#endif
- return ret;
-}
-
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
PACKET spkt, context;
- size_t chain;
+ size_t chainidx;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
- for (chain = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chain++) {
+ for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
&rawexts, &al)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
- rawexts, x, chain, &al))
+ rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
goto f_err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
*/
sk = NULL;
+
+ /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
+ sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
+ &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int hlen;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
- int iv_len;
+ int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
+ union {
+ unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+ uint32_t age_add;
+ } age_add_u;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
+ }
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
/* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
- int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
+ int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
hctx, 1);
if (ret == 0) {
if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
+ tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL))
goto err;
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
- sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
}
/*
* new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
/* Now the actual ticket data */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
|| hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
|| macdata1 != macdata2
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ NULL, 0, &al))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
+ * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+ */
+int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
+ s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
goto err;
}
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
+ s->ext.npn_len = 0;
goto err;
}
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
+ s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
return NULL;
}
- if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
- sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
- if (sk == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return NULL;
- }
- } else {
- sk = *skp;
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
+ sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return NULL;
}
- if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
- &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
+
+ if (sslv2format) {
+ size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
+ PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
+ unsigned int leadbyte;
+ unsigned char *raw;
+
+ /*
+ * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
+ * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
+ * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
+ * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
+ * problem.
+ */
+ raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
+ if (raw == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
+ PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
+ raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
+ || (leadbyte == 0
+ && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
+ TLS_CIPHER_LEN))
+ || (leadbyte != 0
+ && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (leadbyte == 0)
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
+ }
+ } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
+ &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
goto err;
}
- if (skp != NULL)
- *skp = sk;
- return (sk);
+ *skp = sk;
+ return sk;
err:
- if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
return NULL;
}
+
+static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int al;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
+ * (should be s->version)
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
+ || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ NULL, 0, &al)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}