/*
- * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
-#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
#include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
-
-static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
+#include "x509_local.h"
static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
+ int require_ca);
static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
+ int require_ca);
static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
-static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
+ int require_ca);
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int require_ca);
static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
+ int require_ca);
static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
+ int require_ca);
static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
+ int require_ca);
static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
-static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+ int require_ca);
+static int no_check_purpose(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+ int require_ca);
+static int check_purpose_ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+ int require_ca);
static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b);
static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign,
"CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any",
+ {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check_purpose,
+ "Any Purpose", "any",
NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper,
+ {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_ocsp_helper,
"OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0,
check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign",
}
/*
- * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
- * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
- * things.
+ * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I really
+ * can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const things.
+ * If id == -1 it just calls x509v3_cache_extensions() for its side-effect.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 if x does not allow purpose, -1 on (internal) error.
*/
-int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
+int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int require_ca)
{
int idx;
const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
- x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
-
- /* Return if side-effect only call */
+ if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(x))
+ return -1;
if (id == -1)
return 1;
+
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
if (idx == -1)
return -1;
pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
- return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
+ return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, require_ca);
}
int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
{
if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
return 0;
}
*p = purpose;
return -1;
}
+/* Returns -1 on error, else an index => 0 in standard/extended purpose table */
int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
{
X509_PURPOSE tmp;
int idx;
- if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
+ if (purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN && purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)
return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
if (xptable == NULL)
return -1;
{
int idx;
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
- /*
- * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
- */
+
+ /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
/* Need a new entry */
if (idx == -1) {
if ((ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ptmp))) == NULL) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
}
- /* dup supplied name */
+ /* Dup supplied name */
ptmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
ptmp->sname = OPENSSL_strdup(sname);
- if (!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ptmp->name == NULL|| ptmp->sname == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
if (idx == -1) {
if (xptable == NULL
&& (xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp)) == NULL) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
{
- if (!p)
+ if (p == NULL)
return;
if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
* normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
* order because it will be searched using bsearch.
*/
-
static const int supported_nids[] = {
NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */
NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */
#endif
+ NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, /* 369 */
NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */
NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */
return 0;
}
-static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
+/* Returns 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error. */
+static int setup_dp(const X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
{
- X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
+ const X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
int i;
- if (dp->reasons) {
+
+ if (dp->distpoint == NULL && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer) <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_INVALID_DISTPOINT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (dp->reasons != NULL) {
if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
- } else
+ } else {
dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
- if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
- return;
+ }
+ if (dp->distpoint == NULL || dp->distpoint->type != 1)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Handle name fragment given by nameRelativeToCRLIssuer */
+ /*
+ * Note that the below way of determining iname is not really compliant
+ * with https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.13
+ * According to it, sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer) MUST be <= 1
+ * and any CRLissuer could be of type different to GEN_DIRNAME.
+ */
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+
if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
iname = gen->d.directoryName;
break;
}
}
- if (!iname)
+ if (iname == NULL)
iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname) ? 1 : -1;
+}
+
+/* Return 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error. */
+static int setup_crldp(X509 *x)
+{
+ int i;
- DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
+ x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->crldp == NULL && i != -1)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+ int res = setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
+ if (res < 1)
+ return res;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
-static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
+/* Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm */
+static int check_sig_alg_match(const EVP_PKEY *issuer_key, const X509 *subject)
{
- int i;
- x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
- setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
+ int subj_sig_nid;
+
+ if (issuer_key == NULL)
+ return X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(subject->cert_info.signature.algorithm),
+ NULL, &subj_sig_nid) == 0)
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(issuer_key, OBJ_nid2sn(subj_sig_nid))
+ || (EVP_PKEY_is_a(issuer_key, "RSA") && subj_sig_nid == NID_rsassaPss))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH;
}
#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 && ((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)) == 0)
#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) != 0 && ((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)) == 0)
#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) != 0 && ((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)) == 0)
-static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
+/*
+ * Cache info on various X.509v3 extensions and further derived information,
+ * e.g., if cert 'x' is self-issued, in x->ex_flags and other internal fields.
+ * x->sha1_hash is filled in, or else EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT is set in x->flags.
+ * X509_SIG_INFO_VALID is set in x->flags if x->siginf was filled successfully.
+ * Set EXFLAG_INVALID and return 0 in case the certificate is invalid.
+ */
+int ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
{
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
- X509_EXTENSION *ex;
int i;
+ int res;
#ifdef tsan_ld_acq
- /* fast lock-free check, see end of the function for details. */
+ /* Fast lock-free check, see end of the function for details. */
if (tsan_ld_acq((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached))
- return;
+ return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
#endif
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock);
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock))
+ return 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) { /* Cert has already been processed */
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
- return;
+ return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
}
- X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
+ /* Cache the SHA1 digest of the cert */
+ if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL))
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT;
+
+ ERR_set_mark();
+
/* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
- if (!X509_get_version(x))
+ if (X509_get_version(x) == X509_VERSION_1)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
+
/* Handle basic constraints */
- if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
+ x->ex_pathlen = -1;
+ if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &i, NULL)) != NULL) {
if (bs->ca)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
- if (bs->pathlen) {
- if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
- || !bs->ca) {
+ if (bs->pathlen != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * The error case !bs->ca is checked by check_chain()
+ * in case ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
+ */
+ if (bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509V3_R_NEGATIVE_PATHLEN);
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
- x->ex_pathlen = 0;
- } else
+ } else {
x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
- } else
- x->ex_pathlen = -1;
+ }
+ }
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
+ } else if (i != -1) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
+
/* Handle proxy certificates */
- if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
+ if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, &i, NULL)) != NULL) {
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
- if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
+ if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint != NULL)
x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
- } else
+ else
x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
+ } else if (i != -1) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
- /* Handle key usage */
- if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+
+ /* Handle (basic) key usage */
+ if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &i, NULL)) != NULL) {
+ x->ex_kusage = 0;
if (usage->length > 0) {
x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
if (usage->length > 1)
x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
- } else
- x->ex_kusage = 0;
+ }
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
+ /* Check for empty key usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */
+ if (x->ex_kusage == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509V3_R_EMPTY_KEY_USAGE);
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ }
+ } else if (i != -1) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
+
+ /* Handle extended key usage */
x->ex_xkusage = 0;
- if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+ if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &i, NULL)) != NULL) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
case NID_server_auth:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
break;
-
case NID_client_auth:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
break;
-
case NID_email_protect:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
break;
-
case NID_code_sign:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
break;
-
case NID_ms_sgc:
case NID_ns_sgc:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
break;
-
case NID_OCSP_sign:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
break;
-
case NID_time_stamp:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
break;
-
case NID_dvcs:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
break;
-
case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
break;
+ default:
+ /* Ignore unknown extended key usage */
+ break;
}
}
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+ } else if (i != -1) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
- if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
+ /* Handle legacy Netscape extension */
+ if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, &i, NULL)) != NULL) {
if (ns->length > 0)
x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
else
x->ex_nscert = 0;
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
+ } else if (i != -1) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
- x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
- x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
- /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
- /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
- if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
- !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
+
+ /* Handle subject key identifier and issuer/authority key identifier */
+ x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->skid == NULL && i != -1)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+
+ x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->akid == NULL && i != -1)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+
+ /* Check if subject name matches issuer */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* Cert is self-issued */
+ if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK /* SKID matches AKID */
+ /* .. and the signature alg matches the PUBKEY alg: */
+ && check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(x), x) == X509_V_OK)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; /* indicate self-signed */
+ /* This is very related to ossl_x509_likely_issued(x, x) == X509_V_OK */
}
- x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+
+ /* Handle subject alternative names and various other extensions */
+ x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->altname == NULL && i != -1)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL);
- if (!x->nc && (i != -1))
+ if (x->nc == NULL && i != -1)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+
+ /* Handle CRL distribution point entries */
+ res = setup_crldp(x);
+ if (res == 0)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
- setup_crldp(x);
+ else if (res < 0)
+ goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
- x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL);
- x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum,
- NULL, NULL);
+ x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->rfc3779_addr == NULL && i != -1)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL && i != -1)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
#endif
for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) {
- ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
- == NID_freshest_crl)
+ X509_EXTENSION *ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
+
+ if (nid == NID_freshest_crl)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
continue;
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
break;
}
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_basic_constraints:
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ case NID_authority_key_identifier:
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ case NID_subject_key_identifier:
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ case NID_subject_alt_name:
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
}
- x509_init_sig_info(x);
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+
+ /* Set x->siginf, ignoring errors due to unsupported algos */
+ (void)ossl_x509_init_sig_info(x);
+
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* Indicate that cert has been processed */
#ifdef tsan_st_rel
tsan_st_rel((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached, 1);
/*
* all stores are visible on all processors. Hence the release fence.
*/
#endif
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ if ((x->ex_flags & (EXFLAG_INVALID | EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT)) == 0) {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) != 0)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509V3_R_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
+ /* If computing sha1_hash failed the error queue already reflects this. */
+
+ err:
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* indicate that cert has been processed */
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
+ return 0;
}
/*-
* return codes:
* 0 not a CA
* 1 is a CA
- * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
- * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
+ * 2 Only possible in older versions of openSSL when basicConstraints are absent
+ * new versions will not return this value. May be a CA
+ * 3 basicConstraints absent but self-signed V1.
* 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
+ * 5 Netscape specific CA Flags present
*/
static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
return 0;
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
- return 1;
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0) {
/* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
- else
- return 0;
+ return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0;
} else {
- /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
+ /* We support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT)
return 3;
/*
/* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA)
return 5;
- /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
+ /* Can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it. */
return 0;
}
}
void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509 *x)
{
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock)) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
+ }
}
void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x, long l)
int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
{
- x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+ /* Note 0 normally means "not a CA" - but in this case means error. */
+ if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(x))
+ return 0;
return check_ca(x);
}
-/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
+/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server. */
static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
{
- int ca_ret;
- ca_ret = check_ca(x);
- if (!ca_ret)
- return 0;
- /* check nsCertType if present */
- if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA)
- return ca_ret;
- else
+ int ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+
+ if (ca_ret == 0)
return 0;
+ /* Check nsCertType if present */
+ return ca_ret != 5 || (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) != 0;
}
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int require_ca)
{
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
return 0;
- if (ca)
+ if (require_ca)
return check_ssl_ca(x);
/* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT
static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int require_ca)
{
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC))
return 0;
- if (ca)
+ if (require_ca)
return check_ssl_ca(x);
if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
}
static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int require_ca)
{
int ret;
- ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
- if (!ret || ca)
+ ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, require_ca);
+ if (!ret || require_ca)
return ret;
/* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
}
/* common S/MIME checks */
-static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int require_ca)
{
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
return 0;
- if (ca) {
+ if (require_ca) {
int ca_ret;
ca_ret = check_ca(x);
- if (!ca_ret)
+ if (ca_ret == 0)
return 0;
- /* check nsCertType if present */
+ /* Check nsCertType if present */
if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA)
return ca_ret;
else
}
static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int require_ca)
{
int ret;
- ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
- if (!ret || ca)
+ ret = purpose_smime(x, require_ca);
+ if (!ret || require_ca)
return ret;
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
return 0;
}
static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int require_ca)
{
int ret;
- ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
- if (!ret || ca)
+ ret = purpose_smime(x, require_ca);
+ if (!ret || require_ca)
return ret;
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
return 0;
}
static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int require_ca)
{
- if (ca) {
+ if (require_ca) {
int ca_ret;
if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2)
return ca_ret;
* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
* is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
*/
-
-static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+static int check_purpose_ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+ int require_ca)
{
/*
* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value
* (2)?
*/
- if (ca)
+ if (require_ca)
return check_ca(x);
- /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
+ /* Leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
return 1;
}
static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int require_ca)
{
int i_ext;
/* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
- if (ca)
+ if (require_ca)
return check_ca(x);
/*
return 1;
}
-static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+static int no_check_purpose(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+ int require_ca)
{
return 1;
}
/*-
- * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
- * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
- * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
- * subject name.
+ * Various checks to see if one certificate potentially issued the second.
+ * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which
+ * have been looked up using some simple method such as by subject name.
* These are:
- * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
- * 2. If akid(subject) exists, check that it matches issuer
- * 3. Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm
- * 4. If key_usage(issuer) exists, check that it supports certificate signing
- * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
- * codes for X509_verify_cert()
+ * 1. issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
+ * 2. If akid(subject) exists, it matches the respective issuer fields.
+ * 3. subject signature algorithm == issuer public key algorithm
+ * 4. If key_usage(issuer) exists, it allows for signing subject.
+ * Note that this does not include actually checking the signature.
+ * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for mismatch
+ * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert().
*/
-
int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
{
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
- X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
- return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
+ int ret;
- x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
- x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
+ if ((ret = ossl_x509_likely_issued(issuer, subject)) != X509_V_OK)
+ return ret;
+ return ossl_x509_signing_allowed(issuer, subject);
+}
- if (subject->akid) {
- int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
- if (ret != X509_V_OK)
- return ret;
- }
+/* do the checks 1., 2., and 3. as described above for X509_check_issued() */
+int ossl_x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
+{
+ int ret;
- {
- /*
- * Check if the subject signature algorithm matches the issuer's PUBKEY
- * algorithm
- */
- EVP_PKEY *i_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
- X509_ALGOR *s_algor = &subject->cert_info.signature;
- int s_pknid = NID_undef, s_mdnid = NID_undef;
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
+ X509_get_issuer_name(subject)) != 0)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
- if (i_pkey == NULL)
- return X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ /* set issuer->skid and subject->akid */
+ if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer)
+ || !ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(subject))
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(s_algor->algorithm),
- &s_mdnid, &s_pknid)
- || EVP_PKEY_type(s_pknid) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(i_pkey))
- return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH;
- }
+ ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
+ if (ret != X509_V_OK)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Check if the subject signature alg matches the issuer's PUBKEY alg */
+ return check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(issuer), subject);
+}
+/*-
+ * Check if certificate I<issuer> is allowed to issue certificate I<subject>
+ * according to the B<keyUsage> field of I<issuer> if present
+ * depending on any proxyCertInfo extension of I<subject>.
+ * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for rejection
+ * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert().
+ */
+int ossl_x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject)
+{
if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
return X509_V_OK;
}
-int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+int X509_check_akid(const X509 *issuer, const AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
{
-
- if (!akid)
+ if (akid == NULL)
return X509_V_OK;
/* Check key ids (if present) */
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
/* Check serial number */
if (akid->serial &&
- ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
+ ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
/* Check issuer name */
if (akid->issuer) {
break;
}
}
- if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
+ if (nm != NULL && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)) != 0)
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
}
return X509_V_OK;
uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
return x->ex_flags;
}
uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
+ return 0;
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
return x->ex_kusage;
return UINT32_MAX;
uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
+ return 0;
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
return x->ex_xkusage;
return UINT32_MAX;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
+ return NULL;
return x->skid;
}
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
+ return NULL;
return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->keyid : NULL);
}
const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
+ return NULL;
return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->issuer : NULL);
}
const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
+ return NULL;
return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->serial : NULL);
}
long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x)
{
/* Called for side effect of caching extensions */
- if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1
|| (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0)
return -1;
return x->ex_pathlen;
long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x)
{
/* Called for side effect of caching extensions */
- if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1
|| (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) == 0)
return -1;
return x->ex_pcpathlen;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff