Revert the size_t modifications from HEAD that had led to more

[openssl.git] / crypto / rand / md_rand.c

diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 841631d3cafcbf60553ea0e58255f9d987bffce8..810b4c2d4a61a25d4635453fa9ed6ab83e2c5025 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -145,14 +145,14 @@ static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
                                            * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
                                            * (to prevent double locking) */
 /* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
-static unsigned long locking_thread = 0; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
+static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
 
 
 #ifdef PREDICT
 int rand_predictable=0;
 #endif
 
-const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
@@ -177,10 +177,10 @@ RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void)
 
 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
        {
-       memset(state,0,sizeof(state));
+       OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state));
        state_num=0;
        state_index=0;
-       memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+       OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
        md_count[0]=0;
        md_count[1]=0;
        entropy=0;
@@ -213,8 +213,10 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
        /* check if we already have the lock */
        if (crypto_lock_rand)
                {
+               CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+               CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
                CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-               do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+               do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
                }
        else
@@ -300,7 +302,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
         * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
         * the incremented counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as
         * much entropy as fits into md. */
-       for (k = 0; k < sizeof md; k++)
+       for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
                {
                md[k] ^= local_md[k];
                }
@@ -315,7 +317,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
 
 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
        {
-       ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, num);
+       ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
        }
 
 static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
@@ -372,7 +374,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 
        /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-       locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+       CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
        crypto_lock_rand = 1;
 
@@ -520,22 +522,24 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
                err = ERR_peek_error();
                if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND &&
                    ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED)
-                       (void)ERR_get_error();
+                       ERR_clear_error();
                }
        return (ret);
        }
 
 static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
        {
+       CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
        int ret;
        int do_not_lock;
 
+       CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
        /* check if we already have the lock
         * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
        if (crypto_lock_rand)
                {
                CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-               do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+               do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
                }
        else
@@ -547,7 +551,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
                
                /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-               locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+               CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
                crypto_lock_rand = 1;
                }