+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+long bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
+ int argi, long argl, long ret)
+{
+ BIO *out;
+
+ out = (BIO *)BIO_get_callback_arg(bio);
+ if (out == NULL)
+ return (ret);
+
+ if (cmd == (BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
+ BIO_printf(out, "read from %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
+ (void *)bio, argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret);
+ BIO_dump(out, argp, (int)ret);
+ return (ret);
+ } else if (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
+ BIO_printf(out, "write to %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
+ (void *)bio, argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret);
+ BIO_dump(out, argp, (int)ret);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void apps_ssl_info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
+{
+ const char *str;
+ int w;
+
+ w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK;
+
+ if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ str = "SSL_connect";
+ else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+ str = "SSL_accept";
+ else
+ str = "undefined";
+
+ if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:%s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ } else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
+ str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n",
+ str,
+ SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret),
+ SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
+ } else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
+ if (ret == 0)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:failed in %s\n",
+ str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ else if (ret < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:error in %s\n",
+ str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static STRINT_PAIR ssl_versions[] = {
+ {"SSL 3.0", SSL3_VERSION},
+ {"TLS 1.0", TLS1_VERSION},
+ {"TLS 1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION},
+ {"TLS 1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION},
+ {"DTLS 1.0", DTLS1_VERSION},
+ {"DTLS 1.0 (bad)", DTLS1_BAD_VER},
+ {NULL}
+};
+static STRINT_PAIR alert_types[] = {
+ {" close_notify", 0},
+ {" unexpected_message", 10},
+ {" bad_record_mac", 20},
+ {" decryption_failed", 21},
+ {" record_overflow", 22},
+ {" decompression_failure", 30},
+ {" handshake_failure", 40},
+ {" bad_certificate", 42},
+ {" unsupported_certificate", 43},
+ {" certificate_revoked", 44},
+ {" certificate_expired", 45},
+ {" certificate_unknown", 46},
+ {" illegal_parameter", 47},
+ {" unknown_ca", 48},
+ {" access_denied", 49},
+ {" decode_error", 50},
+ {" decrypt_error", 51},
+ {" export_restriction", 60},
+ {" protocol_version", 70},
+ {" insufficient_security", 71},
+ {" internal_error", 80},
+ {" user_canceled", 90},
+ {" no_renegotiation", 100},
+ {" unsupported_extension", 110},
+ {" certificate_unobtainable", 111},
+ {" unrecognized_name", 112},
+ {" bad_certificate_status_response", 113},
+ {" bad_certificate_hash_value", 114},
+ {" unknown_psk_identity", 115},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+static STRINT_PAIR handshakes[] = {
+ {", HelloRequest", 0},
+ {", ClientHello", 1},
+ {", ServerHello", 2},
+ {", HelloVerifyRequest", 3},
+ {", Certificate", 11},
+ {", ServerKeyExchange", 12},
+ {", CertificateRequest", 13},
+ {", ServerHelloDone", 14},
+ {", CertificateVerify", 15},
+ {", ClientKeyExchange", 16},
+ {", Finished", 20},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+void msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf,
+ size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+{
+ BIO *bio = arg;
+ const char *str_write_p = write_p ? ">>>" : "<<<";
+ const char *str_version = lookup(version, ssl_versions, "???");
+ const char *str_content_type = "", *str_details1 = "", *str_details2 = "";
+ const unsigned char* bp = buf;
+
+ if (version == SSL3_VERSION ||
+ version == TLS1_VERSION ||
+ version == TLS1_1_VERSION ||
+ version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
+ version == DTLS1_VERSION || version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ switch (content_type) {
+ case 20:
+ str_content_type = "ChangeCipherSpec";
+ break;
+ case 21:
+ str_content_type = "Alert";
+ str_details1 = ", ???";
+ if (len == 2) {
+ switch (bp[0]) {
+ case 1:
+ str_details1 = ", warning";
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ str_details1 = ", fatal";
+ break;
+ }
+ str_details2 = lookup((int)bp[1], alert_types, " ???");
+ }
+ break;
+ case 22:
+ str_content_type = "Handshake";
+ str_details1 = "???";
+ if (len > 0)
+ str_details1 = lookup((int)bp[0], handshakes, "???");
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ case 24:
+ str_details1 = ", Heartbeat";
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ switch (bp[0]) {
+ case 1:
+ str_details1 = ", HeartbeatRequest";
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ str_details1 = ", HeartbeatResponse";
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%s %s%s [length %04lx]%s%s\n", str_write_p, str_version,
+ str_content_type, (unsigned long)len, str_details1,
+ str_details2);
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ size_t num, i;
+
+ BIO_printf(bio, " ");
+ num = len;
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ if (i % 16 == 0 && i > 0)
+ BIO_printf(bio, "\n ");
+ BIO_printf(bio, " %02x", ((const unsigned char *)buf)[i]);
+ }
+ if (i < len)
+ BIO_printf(bio, " ...");
+ BIO_printf(bio, "\n");
+ }
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio);
+}
+
+static STRINT_PAIR tlsext_types[] = {
+ {"server name", TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name},
+ {"max fragment length", TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length},
+ {"client certificate URL", TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url},
+ {"trusted CA keys", TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys},
+ {"truncated HMAC", TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac},
+ {"status request", TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request},
+ {"user mapping", TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping},
+ {"client authz", TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz},
+ {"server authz", TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz},
+ {"cert type", TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type},
+ {"elliptic curves", TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves},
+ {"EC point formats", TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats},
+ {"SRP", TLSEXT_TYPE_srp},
+ {"signature algorithms", TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms},
+ {"use SRTP", TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp},
+ {"heartbeat", TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat},
+ {"session ticket", TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket},
+ {"renegotiation info", TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate},
+ {"TLS padding", TLSEXT_TYPE_padding},
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
+ {"next protocol", TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+ {"encrypt-then-mac", TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
+ {"application layer protocol negotiation",
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation},
+#endif
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+void tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
+ unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg)
+{
+ BIO *bio = arg;
+ const char *extname = lookup(type, tlsext_types, "unknown");
+
+ BIO_printf(bio, "TLS %s extension \"%s\" (id=%d), len=%d\n",
+ client_server ? "server" : "client", extname, type, len);
+ BIO_dump(bio, (char *)data, len);
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio);
+}
+
+int generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int *cookie_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int length, resultlength;
+ union {
+ struct sockaddr sa;
+ struct sockaddr_in s4;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
+#endif
+ } peer;
+
+ /* Initialize a random secret */
+ if (!cookie_initialized) {
+ if (RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH) <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting random cookie secret\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cookie_initialized = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Read peer information */
+ (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
+
+ /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
+ length = 0;
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer = app_malloc(length, "cookie generate buffer");
+
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ memcpy(buffer, &peer.s4.sin_port, sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
+ &peer.s4.sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ memcpy(buffer, &peer.s6.sin6_port, sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
+ &peer.s6.sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
+ HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
+ buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+ memcpy(cookie, result, resultlength);
+ *cookie_len = resultlength;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int cookie_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int length, resultlength;
+ union {
+ struct sockaddr sa;
+ struct sockaddr_in s4;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
+#endif
+ } peer;
+
+ /* If secret isn't initialized yet, the cookie can't be valid */
+ if (!cookie_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Read peer information */
+ (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
+
+ /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
+ length = 0;
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer = app_malloc(length, "cookie verify buffer");
+
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ memcpy(buffer, &peer.s4.sin_port, sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
+ &peer.s4.sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ memcpy(buffer, &peer.s6.sin6_port, sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
+ &peer.s6.sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
+ HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
+ buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+ if (cookie_len == resultlength
+ && memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Example of extended certificate handling. Where the standard support of
+ * one certificate per algorithm is not sufficient an application can decide
+ * which certificate(s) to use at runtime based on whatever criteria it deems
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+
+/* Linked list of certificates, keys and chains */
+struct ssl_excert_st {
+ int certform;
+ const char *certfile;
+ int keyform;
+ const char *keyfile;
+ const char *chainfile;
+ X509 *cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *key;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+ int build_chain;
+ struct ssl_excert_st *next, *prev;
+};
+
+static STRINT_PAIR chain_flags[] = {
+ {"Overall Validity", CERT_PKEY_VALID},
+ {"Sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_SIGN},
+ {"EE signature", CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE},
+ {"CA signature", CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE},
+ {"EE key parameters", CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM},
+ {"CA key parameters", CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM},
+ {"Explicity sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN},
+ {"Issuer Name", CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME},
+ {"Certificate Type", CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+static void print_chain_flags(SSL *s, int flags)
+{
+ STRINT_PAIR *pp;
+
+ for (pp = chain_flags; pp->name; ++pp)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%s: %s\n",
+ pp->name,
+ (flags & pp->retval) ? "OK" : "NOT OK");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tSuite B: ");
+ if (SSL_set_cert_flags(s, 0) & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, flags & CERT_PKEY_SUITEB ? "OK\n" : "NOT OK\n");
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "not tested\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Very basic selection callback: just use any certificate chain reported as
+ * valid. More sophisticated could prioritise according to local policy.
+ */
+static int set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+{
+ int i, rv;
+ SSL_EXCERT *exc = arg;
+#ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY
+ static int retry_cnt;
+ if (retry_cnt < 5) {
+ retry_cnt++;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Certificate callback retry test: count %d\n",
+ retry_cnt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
+
+ if (!exc)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Go to end of list and traverse backwards since we prepend newer
+ * entries this retains the original order.
+ */
+ while (exc->next)
+ exc = exc->next;
+
+ i = 0;
+
+ while (exc) {
+ i++;
+ rv = SSL_check_chain(ssl, exc->cert, exc->key, exc->chain);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Checking cert chain %d:\nSubject: ", i);
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(exc->cert), 0,
+ XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+ print_chain_flags(ssl, rv);
+ if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
+ if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, exc->cert)
+ || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, exc->key)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * NB: we wouldn't normally do this as it is not efficient
+ * building chains on each connection better to cache the chain
+ * in advance.
+ */
+ if (exc->build_chain) {
+ if (!SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl, 0))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (exc->chain)
+ SSL_set1_chain(ssl, exc->chain);
+ }
+ exc = exc->prev;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc)
+{
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(ctx, set_cert_cb, exc);
+}
+
+static int ssl_excert_prepend(SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
+{
+ SSL_EXCERT *exc = app_malloc(sizeof(*exc), "prepend cert");
+
+ memset(exc, 0, sizeof(*exc));
+
+ exc->next = *pexc;
+ *pexc = exc;
+
+ if (exc->next) {
+ exc->certform = exc->next->certform;
+ exc->keyform = exc->next->keyform;
+ exc->next->prev = exc;
+ } else {
+ exc->certform = FORMAT_PEM;
+ exc->keyform = FORMAT_PEM;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc)
+{
+ SSL_EXCERT *curr;
+
+ if (!exc)
+ return;
+ while (exc) {
+ X509_free(exc->cert);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(exc->key);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(exc->chain, X509_free);
+ curr = exc;
+ exc = exc->next;
+ OPENSSL_free(curr);
+ }
+}
+
+int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
+{
+ SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc;
+ if (!exc)
+ return 1;
+ /* If nothing in list, free and set to NULL */
+ if (!exc->certfile && !exc->next) {
+ ssl_excert_free(exc);
+ *pexc = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ for (; exc; exc = exc->next) {
+ if (!exc->certfile) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Missing filename\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ exc->cert = load_cert(exc->certfile, exc->certform,
+ NULL, NULL, "Server Certificate");
+ if (!exc->cert)
+ return 0;
+ if (exc->keyfile) {
+ exc->key = load_key(exc->keyfile, exc->keyform,
+ 0, NULL, NULL, "Server Key");
+ } else {
+ exc->key = load_key(exc->certfile, exc->certform,
+ 0, NULL, NULL, "Server Key");
+ }
+ if (!exc->key)
+ return 0;
+ if (exc->chainfile) {
+ exc->chain = load_certs(exc->chainfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+ NULL, NULL, "Server Chain");
+ if (!exc->chain)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+enum range { OPT_X_ENUM };
+
+int args_excert(int opt, SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
+{
+ SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc;
+
+ assert(opt > OPT_X__FIRST);
+ assert(opt < OPT_X__LAST);
+
+ if (exc == NULL) {
+ if (!ssl_excert_prepend(&exc)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " %s: Error initialising xcert\n",
+ opt_getprog());
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *pexc = exc;
+ }
+
+ switch ((enum range)opt) {
+ case OPT_X__FIRST:
+ case OPT_X__LAST:
+ return 0;
+ case OPT_X_CERT:
+ if (exc->certfile && !ssl_excert_prepend(&exc)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error adding xcert\n", opt_getprog());
+ goto err;
+ }
+ exc->certfile = opt_arg();
+ break;
+ case OPT_X_KEY:
+ if (exc->keyfile) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Key already specified\n", opt_getprog());
+ goto err;
+ }
+ exc->keyfile = opt_arg();
+ break;
+ case OPT_X_CHAIN:
+ if (exc->chainfile) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Chain already specified\n",
+ opt_getprog());
+ goto err;
+ }
+ exc->chainfile = opt_arg();
+ break;
+ case OPT_X_CHAIN_BUILD:
+ exc->build_chain = 1;
+ break;
+ case OPT_X_CERTFORM:
+ if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &exc->certform))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case OPT_X_KEYFORM:
+ if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &exc->keyform))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ ssl_excert_free(exc);
+ *pexc = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void print_raw_cipherlist(SSL *s)
+{
+ const unsigned char *rlist;
+ static const unsigned char scsv_id[] = { 0, 0, 0xFF };
+ size_t i, rlistlen, num;
+ if (!SSL_is_server(s))
+ return;
+ num = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, NULL);
+ rlistlen = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, &rlist);
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "Client cipher list: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < rlistlen; i += num, rlist += num) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, rlist);
+ if (i)
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, ":");
+ if (c)
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ else if (!memcmp(rlist, scsv_id - num + 3, num))
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "SCSV");
+ else {
+ size_t j;
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "0x");
+ for (j = 0; j < num; j++)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%02X", rlist[j]);
+ }
+ }
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+}
+
+void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s)
+{
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ X509 *peer;
+ /* const char *pnam = SSL_is_server(s) ? "client" : "server"; */
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Protocol version: %s\n", SSL_get_version(s));
+ print_raw_cipherlist(s);
+ c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Ciphersuite: %s\n", SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ do_print_sigalgs(bio_err, s, 0);
+ peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
+ if (peer) {
+ int nid;
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "Peer certificate: ");
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(peer),
+ 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+ if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &nid))
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Hash used: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+ } else
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "No peer certificate\n");
+ X509_free(peer);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ ssl_print_point_formats(bio_err, s);
+ if (SSL_is_server(s))
+ ssl_print_curves(bio_err, s, 1);
+ else
+ ssl_print_tmp_key(bio_err, s);
+#else
+ if (!SSL_is_server(s))
+ ssl_print_tmp_key(bio_err, s);
+#endif
+}
+
+int config_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str,
+ SSL_CTX *ctx, int no_ecdhe, int no_jpake)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(str); i += 2) {
+ const char *flag = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i);
+ const char *arg = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i + 1);
+ /* If no_ecdhe or named curve already specified don't need a default. */
+ if (!no_ecdhe && strcmp(flag, "-named_curve") == 0)
+ no_ecdhe = 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ if (!no_jpake && (strcmp(flag, "-cipher") == 0)) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "JPAKE sets cipher to PSK\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, flag, arg) <= 0) {
+ if (arg)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error with command: \"%s %s\"\n",
+ flag, arg);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error with command: \"%s\"\n", flag);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * This is a special case to keep existing s_server functionality: if we
+ * don't have any curve specified *and* we haven't disabled ECDHE then
+ * use P-256.
+ */
+ if (!no_ecdhe) {
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, "-named_curve", "P-256") <= 0) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting EC curve\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ if (!no_jpake) {
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, "-cipher", "PSK") <= 0) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting cipher to PSK\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error finishing context\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int add_crls_store(X509_STORE *st, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+ X509_CRL *crl;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+ crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+ X509_STORE_add_crl(st, crl);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_ctx_add_crls(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download)
+{
+ X509_STORE *st;
+ st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
+ add_crls_store(st, crls);
+ if (crl_download)
+ store_setup_crl_download(st);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_load_stores(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *vfyCApath, const char *vfyCAfile,
+ const char *chCApath, const char *chCAfile,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download)
+{
+ X509_STORE *vfy = NULL, *ch = NULL;
+ int rv = 0;
+ if (vfyCApath || vfyCAfile) {
+ vfy = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(vfy, vfyCAfile, vfyCApath))
+ goto err;
+ add_crls_store(vfy, crls);
+ SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(ctx, vfy);
+ if (crl_download)
+ store_setup_crl_download(vfy);
+ }
+ if (chCApath || chCAfile) {
+ ch = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(ch, chCAfile, chCApath))
+ goto err;
+ SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(ctx, ch);
+ }
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ X509_STORE_free(vfy);
+ X509_STORE_free(ch);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Verbose print out of security callback */
+
+typedef struct {
+ BIO *out;
+ int verbose;
+ int (*old_cb) (SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid,
+ void *other, void *ex);
+} security_debug_ex;
+
+static STRINT_PAIR callback_types[] = {
+ {"Supported Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED},
+ {"Shared Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED},
+ {"Check Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ {"Temp DH key bits", SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH},
+#endif
+ {"Supported Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED},
+ {"Shared Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED},
+ {"Check Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK},
+ {"Supported Signature Algorithm digest", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED},
+ {"Shared Signature Algorithm digest", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED},
+ {"Check Signature Algorithm digest", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK},
+ {"Signature Algorithm mask", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK},
+ {"Certificate chain EE key", SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY},
+ {"Certificate chain CA key", SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY},
+ {"Peer Chain EE key", SSL_SECOP_PEER_EE_KEY},
+ {"Peer Chain CA key", SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_KEY},
+ {"Certificate chain CA digest", SSL_SECOP_CA_MD},
+ {"Peer chain CA digest", SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD},
+ {"SSL compression", SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION},
+ {"Session ticket", SSL_SECOP_TICKET},
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+static int security_callback_debug(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int op, int bits, int nid,
+ void *other, void *ex)
+{
+ security_debug_ex *sdb = ex;
+ int rv, show_bits = 1, cert_md = 0;
+ const char *nm;
+ rv = sdb->old_cb(s, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, ex);
+ if (rv == 1 && sdb->verbose < 2)
+ return 1;
+ BIO_puts(sdb->out, "Security callback: ");
+
+ nm = lookup(op, callback_types, NULL);
+ switch (op) {
+ case SSL_SECOP_TICKET:
+ case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION:
+ show_bits = 0;
+ nm = NULL;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SECOP_VERSION:
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, "Version=%s", lookup(nid, ssl_versions, "???"));
+ show_bits = 0;
+ nm = NULL;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SECOP_CA_MD:
+ case SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD:
+ cert_md = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (nm)
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s=", nm);
+
+ switch (op & SSL_SECOP_OTHER_TYPE) {
+
+ case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER:
+ BIO_puts(sdb->out, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(other));
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE:
+ {
+ const char *cname;
+ cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
+ if (cname == NULL)
+ cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+ BIO_puts(sdb->out, cname);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_DH:
+ {
+ DH *dh = other;
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%d", BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT:
+ {
+ if (cert_md) {
+ int sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(other);
+ BIO_puts(sdb->out, OBJ_nid2sn(sig_nid));
+ } else {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(other);
+ const char *algname = "";
+ EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ &algname, EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(pkey));
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s, bits=%d",
+ algname, EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey));
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG:
+ {
+ const unsigned char *salg = other;
+ const char *sname = NULL;
+ switch (salg[1]) {
+ case TLSEXT_signature_anonymous:
+ sname = "anonymous";
+ break;
+ case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+ sname = "RSA";
+ break;
+ case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+ sname = "DSA";
+ break;
+ case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+ sname = "ECDSA";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ BIO_puts(sdb->out, OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+ if (sname)
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", algorithm=%s", sname);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", algid=%d", salg[1]);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ if (show_bits)
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", security bits=%d", bits);
+ BIO_printf(sdb->out, ": %s\n", rv ? "yes" : "no");
+ return rv;
+}
+
+void ssl_ctx_security_debug(SSL_CTX *ctx, int verbose)
+{
+ static security_debug_ex sdb;
+
+ sdb.out = bio_err;
+ sdb.verbose = verbose;
+ sdb.old_cb = SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(ctx);
+ SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(ctx, security_callback_debug);
+ SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(ctx, &sdb);
+}