2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
62 tls_close_construct_packet,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
80 tls_close_construct_packet,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
87 tls13_setup_key_block,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls13_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
97 tls_close_construct_packet,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
120 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
122 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
126 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
131 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
132 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
134 s->version = s->method->version;
139 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
144 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
145 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
146 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
147 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
148 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
149 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
150 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
151 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
152 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
153 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
154 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
155 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
156 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
157 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
158 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
159 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
160 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
161 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
163 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
164 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
165 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
167 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
168 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
173 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
174 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A},
175 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B},
176 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C},
181 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
182 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
183 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
184 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
185 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
188 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
189 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
194 /* The default curves */
195 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
196 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519, /* X25519 (29) */
197 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448, /* X448 (30) */
199 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
200 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
201 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A, /* GC256A (34) */
202 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B, /* GC256B (35) */
203 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C, /* GC256C (36) */
204 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D, /* GC256D (37) */
205 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A, /* GC512A (38) */
206 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B, /* GC512B (39) */
207 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C, /* GC512C (40) */
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
215 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1,
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1,
220 struct provider_group_data_st {
222 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
225 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
226 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
227 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
229 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
230 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
231 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
233 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
234 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
236 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
239 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
240 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
242 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
243 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
244 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
246 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
247 (ctx->group_list_max_len
248 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
249 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
251 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
254 ctx->group_list = tmp;
255 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
257 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
258 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
261 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
263 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
264 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
265 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
268 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
269 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
270 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
274 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
275 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
276 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
279 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
280 if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
281 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
285 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
286 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
287 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
290 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
292 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
293 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
294 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
297 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
298 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
299 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
303 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
304 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
305 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
309 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
310 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
311 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
314 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
316 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
317 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
318 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
322 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
323 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
324 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
328 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
329 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
330 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
334 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
335 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
336 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
340 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
341 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
342 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
347 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
348 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
350 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
351 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
353 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
354 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
355 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
356 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
357 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
358 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
361 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
362 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
363 ctx->group_list_len++;
366 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
371 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
372 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
373 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
374 ginf->algorithm = ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
379 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
381 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
384 pgd.provider = provider;
385 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
386 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
389 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
391 size_t i, j, num_deflt_grps = 0;
392 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default)];
394 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
397 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default); i++) {
398 for (j = 0; j < ctx->group_list_len; j++) {
399 if (ctx->group_list[j].group_id == supported_groups_default[i]) {
400 tmp_supp_groups[num_deflt_grps++] = ctx->group_list[j].group_id;
406 if (num_deflt_grps == 0)
409 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
410 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
412 if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL) {
413 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
417 memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
419 num_deflt_grps * sizeof(tmp_supp_groups[0]));
420 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len = num_deflt_grps;
425 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
429 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
430 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
431 || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
432 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
438 uint16_t ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(uint16_t curve_id)
441 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1:
442 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13;
443 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1:
444 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13;
445 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1:
446 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13;
447 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13:
448 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13:
449 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13:
456 uint16_t ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(uint16_t curve_id)
459 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1:
460 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1:
461 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1:
463 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13:
464 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1;
465 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13:
466 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1;
467 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13:
468 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1;
474 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
478 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
479 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
480 return &ctx->group_list[i];
486 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
494 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
495 * work for groups we don't know about.
497 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
499 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
500 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
502 if (!include_unknown)
504 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
507 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
512 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
513 * work for groups we don't know about.
515 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
517 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
518 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
525 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
526 * the number of groups supported.
528 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
531 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
532 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
533 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
534 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
535 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
538 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
539 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
543 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
544 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
549 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
550 *pgroups = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
551 *pgroupslen = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
553 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
554 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
560 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion,
561 int isec, int *okfortls13)
563 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
566 if (okfortls13 != NULL)
572 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
573 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
575 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
578 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
579 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
580 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
582 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
584 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
587 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
588 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
589 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
590 if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
591 *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
592 || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
595 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
596 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
597 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
602 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
603 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
605 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
606 unsigned char gtmp[2];
611 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
612 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
613 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
614 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
617 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
618 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
621 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
628 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
629 * if there is no match.
630 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
631 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
632 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
634 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
636 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
637 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
640 /* Can't do anything on client side */
644 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
646 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
647 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
649 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
651 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
652 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1;
653 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
654 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1;
655 /* Should never happen */
658 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
662 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
663 * otherwise peer decides.
665 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
666 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
667 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
669 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
670 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
673 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
674 uint16_t id = pref[i];
677 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
678 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
679 cid = ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(id);
681 cid = id = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(id);
683 if (!tls1_in_list(cid, supp, num_supp)
684 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
692 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
696 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
697 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
702 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
703 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
705 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
706 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
707 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
710 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
713 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
714 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
717 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
718 unsigned long idmask;
720 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
721 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
723 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
724 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
725 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
739 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
740 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
748 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
750 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
753 char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
757 if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
759 OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
762 garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
765 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
767 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
770 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
772 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
773 "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
776 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
777 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
779 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
783 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
784 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
792 gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
793 gcb.gid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.gidmax * sizeof(*gcb.gid_arr));
794 if (gcb.gid_arr == NULL)
797 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
805 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
808 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
812 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
815 OPENSSL_free(gcb.gid_arr);
819 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
820 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
822 const uint16_t *groups;
828 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
829 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
830 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
832 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
833 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
835 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
836 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
839 /* Should never happen */
844 if (check_own_groups) {
845 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
846 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
847 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
851 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
854 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
858 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
859 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
862 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
863 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
864 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
865 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
869 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
872 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
876 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
878 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
879 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
880 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
882 *pformats = ecformats_default;
883 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
885 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
887 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
891 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
892 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
894 unsigned char comp_id;
898 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
899 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
903 /* Get required compression id */
904 point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
907 if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
908 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
909 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
911 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
916 int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
918 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
919 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
920 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
921 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
926 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
927 * supported (see RFC4492).
929 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
932 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
933 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
939 /* Return group id of a key */
940 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
942 int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
944 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
946 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
950 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
951 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
953 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
957 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
960 /* If not EC nothing to do */
961 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
963 /* Check compression */
964 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
966 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
968 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
971 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
974 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
977 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
981 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
982 if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
983 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
984 else if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
985 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
987 return 0; /* Should never happen */
988 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
989 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
998 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
1000 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
1002 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
1003 * is compatible with the client extensions.
1005 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
1007 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
1009 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
1010 if (!tls1_suiteb(s))
1011 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
1013 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
1016 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
1017 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, 1);
1018 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
1019 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, 1);
1024 /* Default sigalg schemes */
1025 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1026 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1027 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1028 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1029 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1030 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1031 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1032 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1033 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1035 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1036 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1037 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1038 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1039 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1040 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1042 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1043 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1044 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1046 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1047 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1049 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1050 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1052 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1053 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1055 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1056 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1057 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1060 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1061 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1062 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1063 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1064 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1069 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1070 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1071 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1074 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1075 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1076 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1077 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1078 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1079 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1080 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1081 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1082 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1083 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1084 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1085 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1086 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1087 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1088 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1089 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1090 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1091 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1092 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1093 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1094 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1095 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1096 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1097 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1098 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_brainpoolP256r1, 1},
1099 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1100 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1101 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_brainpoolP384r1, 1},
1102 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1103 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1104 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_brainpoolP512r1, 1},
1105 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1106 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1107 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1108 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1109 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1110 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1111 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1112 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1113 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1114 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1115 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1116 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1117 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1118 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1119 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1120 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1121 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1122 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1123 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1124 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1125 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1126 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1127 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1128 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1129 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1130 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1131 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1132 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1133 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1134 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1135 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1136 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1137 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1138 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1139 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1140 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1141 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1142 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1143 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1144 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1145 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1146 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1147 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1148 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1149 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1150 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1151 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1152 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1154 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1155 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1156 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1157 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1158 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1159 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1160 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1161 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1162 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1163 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1164 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1165 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1166 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1167 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1168 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1169 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1170 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1171 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1172 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1173 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1176 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1177 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1178 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1179 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1180 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1181 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1185 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1186 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1188 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1189 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1190 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1191 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1192 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1193 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1194 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1195 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1196 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1197 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1200 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1203 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1204 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1205 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1206 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1209 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1213 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1214 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1220 * Check hash is available.
1221 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1222 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1223 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1224 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1225 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1227 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1228 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1229 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1233 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1234 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1237 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1238 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1240 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1241 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1244 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1249 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1250 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1254 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1255 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
1258 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1260 for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1261 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1262 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1264 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
1272 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1273 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1278 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1279 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1282 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1292 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1294 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1295 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1296 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1298 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1299 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1300 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1306 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1308 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1314 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1315 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1316 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1317 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1318 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1320 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
1326 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1327 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1328 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1332 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1339 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1341 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1344 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1346 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1353 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1354 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1356 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1359 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1361 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1368 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1371 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1373 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1374 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1378 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1380 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1384 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1386 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1388 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1389 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1392 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1394 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1396 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1399 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1403 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1406 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1409 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1410 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1411 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1412 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1414 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1415 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1418 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1419 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1423 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1424 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1425 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1427 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1428 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1429 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1430 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1431 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1432 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1434 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1435 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1440 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1441 * specified EC curve.
1443 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1445 const uint16_t *sigs;
1448 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1449 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1450 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1452 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1453 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1456 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1457 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1461 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1462 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1463 && curve == lu->curve)
1471 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1474 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1476 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1479 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1483 int md_type = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
1485 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1486 secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
1488 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1489 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1490 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1492 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1493 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1494 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1495 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1497 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1499 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1501 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1504 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1505 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1507 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1514 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1515 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1518 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1520 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1521 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1523 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1525 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1528 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
1529 /* Should never happen */
1532 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1533 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1534 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1538 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1539 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1540 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1542 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1544 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1545 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1548 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1549 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1550 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1554 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1555 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey), &cidx)
1556 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1561 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1563 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1564 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1566 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1570 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1571 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1572 int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1574 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1575 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1579 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1580 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1581 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1585 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1586 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1587 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1588 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1590 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1595 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1600 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1601 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1602 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1603 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1606 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1607 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1608 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1612 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1617 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1618 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1620 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1621 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1622 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1624 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1625 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
1626 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1630 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1631 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1635 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1637 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1639 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1643 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1645 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1647 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1652 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1653 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1654 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1656 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1659 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1661 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1663 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1664 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1665 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1666 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1667 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1670 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1671 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1672 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1673 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1675 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1677 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1678 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1679 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1686 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1687 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1688 * @c: cipher to check
1689 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1690 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1692 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1694 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1696 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1697 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1699 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1701 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1702 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1705 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1706 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1708 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1709 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1710 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1712 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1715 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1716 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1719 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1722 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1724 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1726 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1729 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1733 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1734 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1735 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1736 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1737 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1738 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1739 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1741 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1742 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1744 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1745 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1746 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1747 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1749 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1750 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1755 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1756 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1757 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1758 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1766 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1770 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1773 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1775 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1780 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1782 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1783 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1784 * point to the resulting session.
1786 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1790 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1793 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1796 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1797 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1800 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1801 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1803 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1804 if (!ticketext->present)
1805 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1807 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1809 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1810 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1814 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1816 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1817 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1818 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1819 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1822 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1823 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1824 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1825 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1826 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1827 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1829 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1830 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1831 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1832 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1833 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1834 * point to the resulting session.
1836 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1837 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1838 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1840 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1841 unsigned char *sdec;
1842 const unsigned char *p;
1843 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1844 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1846 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1847 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1848 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1849 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1851 if (eticklen == 0) {
1853 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1854 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1856 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1859 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1861 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1862 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1863 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1864 * calculate the master secret later.
1866 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1870 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1871 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1872 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1876 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1877 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1879 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1882 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1884 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1888 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1890 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1893 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1896 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1897 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1898 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1900 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1903 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1904 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1905 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1906 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1907 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1910 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1914 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1920 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1922 /* Check key name matches */
1923 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1924 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1925 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1929 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1931 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1932 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1933 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1935 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1936 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1937 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1938 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1939 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1942 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1943 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1947 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1950 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1952 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1956 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1958 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1959 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1963 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1964 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1965 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1966 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1970 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1971 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1974 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1975 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1976 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1977 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1978 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1979 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1980 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1982 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1985 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1987 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1993 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1997 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1999 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2001 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2005 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2006 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2007 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2011 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2012 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2015 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2017 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2022 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2024 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2027 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2028 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
2031 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2032 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2033 * performs any action
2035 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
2036 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2037 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2038 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2039 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
2040 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
2043 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
2044 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
2045 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
2047 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
2049 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
2050 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2053 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
2054 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2055 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2059 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2060 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2061 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2062 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2063 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2067 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2068 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2069 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2070 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2071 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2072 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2073 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2075 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2079 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2083 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2085 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2086 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2087 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2088 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2097 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2098 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2100 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2103 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2105 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2106 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2109 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2112 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2113 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2114 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2115 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2118 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2119 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, lu->sig_idx))
2122 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2123 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2124 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2125 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2126 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
2129 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2130 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2132 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2135 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2136 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2137 * ciphersuites enabled.
2140 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2143 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
2144 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2145 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2146 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2148 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2149 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2150 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2153 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2161 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2162 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
2163 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2164 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2165 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2169 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2170 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2174 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
2176 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2177 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2178 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2180 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2183 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2184 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2185 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2186 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2191 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2195 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2196 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2197 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2198 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2200 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2203 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2204 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2209 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2210 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2213 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2215 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2218 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2219 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2221 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2222 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2223 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2224 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2228 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2232 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2233 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2234 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2235 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2237 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2238 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2239 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2240 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2242 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2244 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2246 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2247 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2258 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2259 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2261 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2262 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2264 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2266 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2268 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2269 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2270 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2271 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2272 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2273 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2274 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2275 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2276 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2277 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2279 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2280 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2283 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2284 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2288 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2289 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2291 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2293 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2294 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2297 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2301 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2302 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2306 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2312 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2314 /* Invalid data length */
2315 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2320 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2321 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2324 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2332 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2339 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2341 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2342 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2344 /* Should never happen */
2345 if (s->cert == NULL)
2349 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2350 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2352 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2353 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2357 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2359 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2362 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2364 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2367 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2370 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2371 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2372 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2374 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2375 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2377 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2378 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, idx))
2379 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2384 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2385 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2386 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2388 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2389 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2390 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2393 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2395 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2399 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2401 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2402 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2404 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2406 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2407 if (psignhash != NULL)
2408 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2410 return (int)numsigalgs;
2413 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2414 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2415 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2417 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2418 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2420 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2421 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2423 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2425 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2427 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2428 if (psignhash != NULL)
2429 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2431 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2433 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2434 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2437 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2438 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2442 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2443 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2446 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2448 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2449 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2450 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2451 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2452 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2453 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2454 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2455 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2457 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2458 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2459 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2462 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2463 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2465 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2467 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2469 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2470 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2471 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2474 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2480 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2482 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2483 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2484 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2485 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2486 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2487 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2491 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2493 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2494 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2498 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2505 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2506 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2507 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2509 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2511 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2512 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2516 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2520 /* Reject duplicates */
2521 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2522 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2531 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2532 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2534 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2538 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2542 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2545 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2550 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2551 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2554 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2557 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2558 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2559 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2561 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2562 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2563 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2569 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2571 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2576 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2577 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2580 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2582 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2583 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2584 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2586 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2588 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2589 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2594 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2599 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2600 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2601 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2603 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2604 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2605 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2611 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2615 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2617 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2619 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2621 if (default_nid == -1)
2623 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2625 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2627 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2629 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2630 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2631 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2633 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2636 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2638 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2639 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2640 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2641 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2642 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2648 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2649 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2651 const X509_NAME *nm;
2653 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2654 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2655 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2662 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2663 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2664 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2665 * attempting to use them.
2668 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2670 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2671 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2672 /* Strict mode flags */
2673 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2674 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2675 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2677 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2682 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2683 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2686 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2687 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2689 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2692 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2694 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2695 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2697 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2699 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2700 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2709 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2712 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2714 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2715 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2717 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2724 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2725 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2726 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2727 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2728 else if (!check_flags)
2733 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2734 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2736 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2739 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2740 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2742 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2746 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2747 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2750 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2751 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2752 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2756 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2757 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2760 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2761 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2762 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2765 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2766 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2767 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2770 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2771 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2772 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2781 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2782 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2784 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2786 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2787 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2788 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2790 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2793 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2800 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2801 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2803 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2804 * so check_flags is always set.
2806 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2807 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2808 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2812 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2813 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2814 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2815 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2817 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2824 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2825 else if (check_flags)
2826 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2828 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2829 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2830 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2831 else if (!check_flags)
2834 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2835 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2836 else if (strict_mode) {
2837 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2838 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2839 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2840 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2842 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2849 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2850 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2853 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2854 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2855 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2856 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2857 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2858 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2861 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2864 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2865 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2866 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2870 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2873 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2876 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2879 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
2880 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2881 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2883 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2884 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2886 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2887 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2892 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2895 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2897 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2898 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2902 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2903 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2905 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2908 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2912 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2915 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2916 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2923 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2924 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2926 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2927 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2928 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2929 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2930 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2931 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2932 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2933 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2934 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2937 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2938 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2940 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2943 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2945 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
2947 int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
2948 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2949 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2950 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2952 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2953 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2954 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2959 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2961 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2965 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
2966 sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(s, NULL, NULL);
2967 if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
2968 dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
2970 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2971 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2972 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2973 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2974 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2975 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2976 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2977 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2979 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2983 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
2985 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
2988 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2990 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2991 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
2994 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
2996 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1)
3000 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
3001 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
3002 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3007 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3010 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3013 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3014 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3015 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3016 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3018 secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
3021 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3023 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3026 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3028 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3029 int secbits, nid, pknid;
3030 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3031 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
3033 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
3035 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3036 if (nid == NID_undef)
3039 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
3041 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
3044 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
3047 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3049 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
3050 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3052 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
3053 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3055 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
3056 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3061 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3062 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3063 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3066 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
3068 int rv, start_idx, i;
3070 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3072 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3077 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3081 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3082 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3083 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3091 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3092 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3095 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3097 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3098 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3100 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3102 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3103 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3104 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3107 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3111 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3112 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3114 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3116 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3119 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3120 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3122 const char *mdname = NULL;
3125 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3126 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3128 if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
3129 mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
3130 supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, s->ctx->libctx,
3137 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3138 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3140 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3141 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3143 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3144 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3149 * This does not differentiate between the
3150 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3151 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3152 * signing certificate.
3154 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3161 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3162 * a viable public key is permitted.
3168 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3169 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3170 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3171 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3172 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3174 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3176 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3179 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3182 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3183 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3187 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3188 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3190 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3195 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3198 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3199 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3202 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3206 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3207 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3208 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3210 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3212 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3217 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3218 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3219 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3221 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3222 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3223 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3224 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3225 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3227 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3228 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
3230 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3231 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3234 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3235 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3237 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3239 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3240 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3242 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3243 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3244 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
3250 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3257 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3258 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3260 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3261 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3263 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3264 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3265 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3267 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
3269 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3272 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3273 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3275 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3276 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3281 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3285 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3286 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3288 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3291 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3293 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3296 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3298 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3302 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3305 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3306 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3309 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3312 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3314 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3315 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3318 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3319 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3321 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3322 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3323 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3325 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
3328 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3333 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3334 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3335 * we have to assume GOST support.
3337 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
3338 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3342 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3346 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3350 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3354 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3359 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3361 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3362 size_t sent_sigslen;
3364 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3368 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3372 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3373 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3374 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3375 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3376 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3379 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3383 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3388 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3392 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3398 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3399 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3400 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3401 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3405 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3407 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3408 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3409 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3413 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3417 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3419 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3420 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3421 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3425 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3429 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3431 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3435 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3437 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3439 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3440 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3445 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3446 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3447 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3452 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3453 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3458 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3464 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3467 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3469 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3475 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3480 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3482 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
3484 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3485 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3486 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3487 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx, key, len, params))
3490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3491 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3492 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3497 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3499 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3500 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3502 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3503 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3508 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3511 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3512 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3514 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3515 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3520 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3522 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3523 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3525 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3526 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
3531 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3533 char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
3535 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
3536 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);
3541 __owur int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
3542 const unsigned char *enckey,
3545 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH")) {
3546 int bits = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey);
3548 if (bits <= 0 || enckeylen != (size_t)bits / 8)
3549 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
3551 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) {
3552 if (enckeylen < 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
3553 || enckey[0] != 0x04)
3557 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey, enckey, enckeylen);