2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/evp.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
62 tls_close_construct_packet,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
80 tls_close_construct_packet,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
87 tls13_setup_key_block,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls13_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
97 tls_close_construct_packet,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
120 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
122 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
126 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
131 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
132 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
134 s->version = s->method->version;
139 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
144 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
145 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
146 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
147 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
148 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
149 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
150 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
151 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
152 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
153 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
154 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
155 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
156 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
157 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
158 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
159 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
160 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
161 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
163 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
164 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
165 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
167 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
168 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
173 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
174 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 0x0022},
175 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 0x0023},
176 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 0x0024},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 0x0025},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 0x0026},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 0x0027},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 0x0028},
181 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
182 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
183 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
184 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
185 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
189 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
192 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
194 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
196 /* The default curves */
197 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
198 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
199 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
200 29, /* X25519 (29) */
201 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
204 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
206 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
207 34, /* GC256A (34) */
208 35, /* GC256B (35) */
209 36, /* GC256C (36) */
210 37, /* GC256D (37) */
211 38, /* GC512A (38) */
212 39, /* GC512B (39) */
213 40, /* GC512C (40) */
215 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
216 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
217 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
218 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
219 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
220 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
223 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
226 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
232 struct provider_group_data_st {
234 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
237 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
238 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
239 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
241 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
242 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
243 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
245 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
246 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
248 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
251 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
252 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
254 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
255 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
256 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
258 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
259 (ctx->group_list_max_len
260 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
261 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
263 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
266 ctx->group_list = tmp;
267 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
269 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
270 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
273 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
275 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
276 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
277 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
280 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
281 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
282 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
286 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
287 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
288 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
291 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
292 if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
293 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
297 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
298 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
299 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
302 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
304 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
305 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
306 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
309 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
310 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
311 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
315 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
316 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
317 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
321 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
322 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
323 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
326 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
328 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
329 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
330 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
334 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
335 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
336 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
340 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
341 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
342 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
346 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
347 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
348 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
352 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
353 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
354 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
358 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
359 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
361 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
362 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
364 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
365 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
366 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
367 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
368 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
369 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
372 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
373 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
374 ctx->group_list_len++;
377 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
381 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
382 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
383 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
384 ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
389 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
391 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
394 pgd.provider = provider;
395 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
396 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
399 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
401 return OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx);
404 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
409 /* See if we can identify a nid for this name */
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
411 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(name);
413 if (nid == NID_undef)
414 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(name);
415 if (nid == NID_undef)
416 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(name);
418 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
419 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
421 && nid == tls1_group_id2nid(ctx->group_list[i].group_id,
424 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
430 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
434 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
435 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
436 return &ctx->group_list[i];
442 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
450 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
451 * work for groups we don't know about.
453 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
455 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
456 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
458 if (!include_unknown)
460 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
463 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
468 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
469 * work for groups we don't know about.
471 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
473 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
474 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
481 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
482 * the number of groups supported.
484 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
487 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
488 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
489 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
490 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
491 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
492 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
493 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
496 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
497 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
501 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
502 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
508 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
509 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
510 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
512 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
513 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
520 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
523 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion)
525 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
531 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
532 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
534 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
537 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
538 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
539 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
541 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
543 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
546 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
547 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
548 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
554 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
555 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
557 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
558 unsigned char gtmp[2];
563 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
564 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
565 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
566 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
569 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
570 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
573 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
580 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
581 * if there is no match.
582 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
583 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
584 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
586 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
588 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
589 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
592 /* Can't do anything on client side */
596 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
598 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
599 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
601 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
603 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
604 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
605 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
606 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
607 /* Should never happen */
610 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
614 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
615 * otherwise peer decides.
617 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
618 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
619 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
621 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
622 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
625 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
626 uint16_t id = pref[i];
628 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
629 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
637 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
641 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
642 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
647 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
648 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
650 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
651 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
652 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
655 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
658 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
659 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
662 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
663 unsigned long idmask;
665 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
666 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
668 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
669 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
670 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
684 /* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
685 # define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
690 uint16_t gid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
693 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
695 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
702 if (garg->gidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
704 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
706 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
709 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
712 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
713 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
715 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
719 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
720 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
728 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
734 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
737 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
741 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
745 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
746 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
748 const uint16_t *groups;
754 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
755 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
756 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
758 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
759 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
761 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
762 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
765 /* Should never happen */
770 if (check_own_groups) {
771 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
772 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
773 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
777 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
780 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
784 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
785 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
788 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
789 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
790 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
791 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
795 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
799 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
803 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
805 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
806 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
807 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
809 *pformats = ecformats_default;
810 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
812 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
814 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
818 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
819 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
823 unsigned char comp_id;
826 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
827 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
829 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
830 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
832 /* Get required compression id */
833 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
834 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
835 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
837 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
842 int field_type = EC_GROUP_get_field_type(grp);
844 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
845 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
846 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
847 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
852 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
853 * supported (see RFC4492).
855 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
858 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
859 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
865 /* Return group id of a key */
866 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
868 int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
870 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
872 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
876 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
877 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
879 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
883 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
886 /* If not EC nothing to do */
887 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
889 /* Check compression */
890 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
892 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
894 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
897 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
900 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
903 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
907 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
908 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
909 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
910 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
911 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
913 return 0; /* Should never happen */
914 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
915 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
924 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
926 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
928 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
929 * is compatible with the client extensions.
931 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
933 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
935 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
937 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
939 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
942 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
943 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
944 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
945 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
952 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
957 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
959 /* Default sigalg schemes */
960 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
962 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
963 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
964 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
965 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
969 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
970 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
971 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
972 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
973 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
974 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
976 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
977 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
978 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
981 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
982 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
984 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
985 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
987 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
988 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
990 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
995 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
997 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
998 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1004 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1005 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1006 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1010 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1012 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1013 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1014 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1015 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1016 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1017 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1018 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1019 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1020 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1021 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1022 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1023 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1024 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1025 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1026 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1027 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1028 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1029 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1030 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1031 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1032 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1034 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1035 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1036 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1037 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1038 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1039 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1040 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1041 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1042 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1043 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1044 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1045 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1046 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1047 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1048 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1049 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1050 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1051 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1052 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1053 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1054 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1055 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1056 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1057 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1058 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1059 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1060 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1061 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1062 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1063 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1064 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1065 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1066 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1068 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1069 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1070 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1071 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1072 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1073 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1074 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1075 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1076 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1077 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1078 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1079 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1080 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1081 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1082 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1085 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1086 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1087 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1088 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1089 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1090 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1091 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1092 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1093 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1094 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1095 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1096 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1097 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1098 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1099 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1100 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1101 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1102 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1103 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1104 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1107 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1108 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1109 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1110 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1111 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1112 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1116 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1117 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1119 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1120 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1121 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1122 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1123 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1124 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1125 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1126 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1127 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1128 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1131 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1134 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1135 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1136 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1137 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1140 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1144 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1145 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1151 * Check hash is available.
1152 * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1153 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1154 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1155 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1156 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1158 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1159 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1160 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1164 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1165 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1168 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1169 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1171 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1172 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1175 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1180 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1181 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1185 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1186 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
1189 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1191 for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1192 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1193 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1195 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg)
1200 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1201 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1206 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1207 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1210 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1220 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1222 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1223 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1224 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1226 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1227 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1228 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1234 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1236 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1242 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1243 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1244 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1245 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1246 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1248 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
1254 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1255 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1256 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1258 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1265 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1267 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1270 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1272 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1279 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1280 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1282 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1285 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1287 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1294 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1297 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1299 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1300 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1302 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1304 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1308 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1310 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1312 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1313 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1316 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1318 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1320 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1323 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1327 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1330 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1334 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1335 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1336 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1337 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1340 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1343 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1344 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1349 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1350 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1351 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1353 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1354 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1355 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1356 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1357 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1358 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1360 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1361 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1367 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1368 * specified EC curve.
1370 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1372 const uint16_t *sigs;
1375 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1376 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1377 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1379 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1380 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1383 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1384 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1388 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1389 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1390 && curve == lu->curve)
1399 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1402 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1404 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1407 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1411 int md_type = EVP_MD_type(md);
1413 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1414 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
1416 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1417 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1418 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1420 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1421 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1422 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1423 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1425 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1427 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1429 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1432 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1433 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1435 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1442 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1443 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1446 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1448 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1449 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1451 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1453 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1456 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1457 /* Should never happen */
1460 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1461 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1462 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1466 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1467 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1468 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1470 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1472 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1473 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1476 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1477 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1478 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1482 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1483 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1484 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1490 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1492 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1493 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1495 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1499 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1500 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1501 int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
1503 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1508 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1509 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1510 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1514 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1515 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1516 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1517 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1519 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1524 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1530 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1531 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1532 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1533 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1536 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1537 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1538 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1542 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1547 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1548 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1550 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1551 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1552 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1554 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1555 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
1556 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1560 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1561 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1565 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1567 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1569 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1573 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1575 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1577 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1582 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1583 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1584 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1586 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1589 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1591 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1593 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1594 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1595 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1596 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1597 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1600 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1601 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1602 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1603 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1605 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1607 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1608 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1609 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1616 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1617 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1618 * @c: cipher to check
1619 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1620 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1622 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1624 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1626 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1627 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1629 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1631 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1632 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1635 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1636 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1638 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1639 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1640 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1642 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1645 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1646 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1649 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1652 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1654 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1656 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1659 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1663 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1664 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1665 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1666 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1667 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1668 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1669 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1671 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1672 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1674 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1675 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1676 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1677 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1679 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1680 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1685 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1686 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1687 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1688 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1696 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1700 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1703 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1705 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1710 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1712 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1713 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1714 * point to the resulting session.
1716 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1720 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1723 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1726 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1727 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1730 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1731 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1733 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1734 if (!ticketext->present)
1735 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1737 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1739 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1740 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1744 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1746 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1747 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1748 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1749 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1752 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1753 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1754 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1755 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1756 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1757 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1759 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1760 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1761 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1762 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1763 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1764 * point to the resulting session.
1766 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1767 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1768 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1770 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1771 unsigned char *sdec;
1772 const unsigned char *p;
1773 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1774 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1776 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1777 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1778 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1779 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1781 if (eticklen == 0) {
1783 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1784 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1786 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1789 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1791 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1792 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1793 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1794 * calculate the master secret later.
1796 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1800 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1801 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1802 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1806 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1807 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1809 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1812 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1814 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1818 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1820 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1823 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1826 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1827 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1828 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1830 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1833 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1834 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1835 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1836 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1837 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1840 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1844 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1850 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1852 /* Check key name matches */
1853 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1854 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1855 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1859 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1861 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1862 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1863 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1865 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1866 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1867 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1868 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1869 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1872 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1873 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1877 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1880 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1882 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1886 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1888 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1889 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1893 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1894 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1895 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1896 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1900 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1901 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1904 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1905 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1906 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1907 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1908 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1909 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1910 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1912 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1915 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1917 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1923 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1927 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1929 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1931 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1935 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1936 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1937 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1941 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1942 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1945 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1947 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1952 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1954 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1957 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1958 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
1961 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1962 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1963 * performs any action
1965 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1966 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1967 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1968 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1969 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1970 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1973 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1974 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1975 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1977 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1979 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1980 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1983 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1984 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1985 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1989 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1990 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1991 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1992 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1993 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1997 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1998 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1999 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2000 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2001 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2002 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2003 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2005 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2009 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2013 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2015 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2016 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2017 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2018 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2027 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2028 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2030 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2033 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2035 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2036 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2038 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
2039 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2040 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2041 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2042 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2045 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2046 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, lu->sig_idx))
2049 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2050 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2051 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2052 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2053 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
2056 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2057 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2059 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2062 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2063 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2064 * ciphersuites enabled.
2067 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2070 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
2071 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2072 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2073 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2075 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2076 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2077 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2080 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2088 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2089 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
2090 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2091 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2092 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2096 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2097 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2101 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
2103 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2104 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2105 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2107 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2110 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2111 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2112 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2113 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2118 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2122 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2123 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2124 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2125 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2127 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2130 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2131 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2136 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2137 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2139 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2141 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2144 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2145 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2147 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2148 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2149 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2150 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2154 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2158 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2159 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2160 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2161 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2163 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2164 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2165 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2166 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2168 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2169 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2171 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2172 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2183 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2184 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2186 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2187 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2189 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2191 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2193 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2194 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2195 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2196 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2197 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2198 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2199 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2200 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2201 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2202 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2204 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2205 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2208 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2209 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2213 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2214 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2216 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2218 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2219 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2222 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2226 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2227 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2231 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2237 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2239 /* Invalid data length */
2240 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2245 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2246 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2249 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2257 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2264 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2266 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2267 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2269 /* Should never happen */
2270 if (s->cert == NULL)
2274 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2275 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2277 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2278 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2282 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2284 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2287 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2289 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2292 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2295 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2296 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2297 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2299 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2300 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2302 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2303 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, idx))
2304 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2309 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2310 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2311 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2313 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2314 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2315 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2318 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2320 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2324 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2326 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2327 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2329 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2331 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2332 if (psignhash != NULL)
2333 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2335 return (int)numsigalgs;
2338 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2339 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2340 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2342 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2343 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2345 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2346 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2348 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2350 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2352 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2353 if (psignhash != NULL)
2354 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2356 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2358 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2359 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2362 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2363 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2367 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2368 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2371 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2373 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2374 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2375 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2376 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2377 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2378 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2379 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2380 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2382 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2383 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2384 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2387 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2388 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2390 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2392 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2394 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2395 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2396 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2399 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2401 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2403 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2405 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2407 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2408 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2409 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2410 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2411 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2412 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2416 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2418 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2419 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2423 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2430 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2431 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2432 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2434 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2436 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2437 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2441 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2445 /* Reject duplicates */
2446 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2447 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2456 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2457 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2459 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2463 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2467 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2470 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2475 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2476 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2479 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2482 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2483 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2484 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2486 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2487 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2488 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2494 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2496 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2501 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2502 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2505 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2507 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2508 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2509 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2511 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2513 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2514 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2519 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2524 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2525 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2526 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2528 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2529 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2530 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2536 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2540 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2542 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2544 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2546 if (default_nid == -1)
2548 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2550 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2552 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2554 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2555 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2556 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2558 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2561 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2563 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2564 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2565 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2566 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2567 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2573 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2574 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2576 const X509_NAME *nm;
2578 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2579 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2580 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2587 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2588 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2589 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2590 * attempting to use them.
2593 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2595 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2596 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2597 /* Strict mode flags */
2598 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2599 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2600 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2602 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2607 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2608 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2611 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2612 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2614 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2617 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2619 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2620 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2622 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2624 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2625 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2634 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2637 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2639 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2640 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2642 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2649 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2650 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2651 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2652 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2653 else if (!check_flags)
2658 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2659 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2661 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2664 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2665 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2667 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2671 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2672 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2675 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2676 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2677 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2681 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2682 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2685 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2686 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2687 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2690 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2691 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2692 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2695 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2696 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2697 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2706 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2707 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2709 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2711 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2712 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2713 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2715 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2718 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2725 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2728 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2729 * so check_flags is always set.
2731 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2732 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2733 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2737 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2738 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2739 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2740 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2742 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2749 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2750 else if (check_flags)
2751 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2753 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2754 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2755 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2756 else if (!check_flags)
2759 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2760 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2761 else if (strict_mode) {
2762 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2763 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2764 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2765 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2767 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2774 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2775 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2778 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2779 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2780 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2781 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2782 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2783 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2786 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2789 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2790 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2791 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2795 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2798 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2801 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2803 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2804 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2806 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2807 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2808 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2810 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2811 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2812 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2813 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2814 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2819 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2822 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2824 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2825 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2829 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2830 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2832 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2835 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2839 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2842 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2843 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2850 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2851 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2853 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2854 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2855 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2856 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2857 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2858 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2859 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2860 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2861 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2864 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2865 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2867 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2870 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2872 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
2874 int dh_secbits = 80;
2875 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2876 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2877 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2879 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2880 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2881 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2886 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2888 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2892 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2893 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2894 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2895 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2896 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2897 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2898 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2899 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2901 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2905 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
2907 || EVP_PKEY_key_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
2910 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2912 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2913 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
2916 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
2917 if (params == NULL || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, params) != 1)
2921 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params);
2922 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2923 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2928 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2931 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2934 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2935 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2936 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2937 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2939 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2942 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2944 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2947 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2949 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2950 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2951 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2952 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2954 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2956 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2957 if (nid == NID_undef)
2960 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2962 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2965 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2968 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2970 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2971 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2973 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2974 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2976 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2977 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2982 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2983 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2984 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2987 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2989 int rv, start_idx, i;
2991 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2996 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3000 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3001 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3002 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3010 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3011 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3014 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3016 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3017 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3019 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3021 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3022 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3023 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3026 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3030 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3031 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3033 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3035 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3038 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3039 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3043 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
3044 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3047 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
3053 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3054 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3056 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3057 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3059 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3060 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3065 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3066 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3067 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3068 * signing certificate.
3070 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3077 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3078 * a viable public key is permitted.
3084 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3085 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3086 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3087 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3088 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3090 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3092 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3095 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3098 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3099 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3103 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3104 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3106 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3111 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3114 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3115 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3118 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3122 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3123 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3124 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3126 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3128 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3135 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3136 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3137 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3139 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3140 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3141 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3142 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3143 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3145 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3146 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
3148 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3149 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3152 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3153 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3155 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3158 curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3159 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3164 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3165 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3166 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
3172 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3179 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3180 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3182 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3183 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3185 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3186 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3187 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3189 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
3191 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3194 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3195 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3197 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3198 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3203 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3207 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3208 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3210 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3213 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3215 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3219 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3222 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3227 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3230 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3231 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3234 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3237 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3239 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3240 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3243 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3244 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3246 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3247 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3248 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3250 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
3253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3254 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3260 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3261 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3262 * we have to assume GOST support.
3264 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
3265 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3269 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3273 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3277 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3281 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3286 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3288 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3289 size_t sent_sigslen;
3291 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3295 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3299 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3300 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3301 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3302 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3303 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3306 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
3310 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3315 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3319 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3325 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3326 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3327 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3328 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3332 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3334 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3335 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3336 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3340 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3344 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3346 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3347 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3348 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3352 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3356 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3358 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3362 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3364 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3366 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3367 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3372 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3373 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3374 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3379 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3380 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3385 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3391 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3394 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3396 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3402 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3407 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3409 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3411 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3412 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3413 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
3414 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3415 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
3418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3419 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3420 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3425 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3427 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3428 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3430 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3431 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3436 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3439 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3440 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3442 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3443 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3448 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3450 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3451 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3453 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3454 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);