2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
62 tls_close_construct_packet,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
80 tls_close_construct_packet,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
87 tls13_setup_key_block,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls13_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
97 tls_close_construct_packet,
101 OSSL_TIME tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return ossl_seconds2time(60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
120 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
122 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
127 OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.session_ticket);
131 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
133 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
141 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
142 sc->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
144 sc->version = s->method->version;
149 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
154 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
155 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
156 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
157 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
158 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
159 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
160 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
161 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
162 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
163 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
164 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
165 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
166 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
167 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
168 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
169 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
170 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
171 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
172 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
173 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
174 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
175 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
176 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
177 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
178 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
179 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
180 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
181 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
182 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
183 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
184 {NID_brainpoolP256r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13},
185 {NID_brainpoolP384r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13},
186 {NID_brainpoolP512r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13},
187 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A},
188 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B},
189 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C},
190 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D},
191 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A},
192 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B},
193 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C},
194 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
195 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
196 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
197 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
198 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
201 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
202 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
203 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
204 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
207 /* The default curves */
208 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519, /* X25519 (29) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448, /* X448 (30) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
213 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
214 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A, /* GC256A (34) */
215 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B, /* GC256B (35) */
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C, /* GC256C (36) */
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D, /* GC256D (37) */
218 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A, /* GC512A (38) */
219 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B, /* GC512B (39) */
220 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C, /* GC512C (40) */
221 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
222 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
223 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
224 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
225 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
228 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
229 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1,
230 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1,
233 struct provider_group_data_st {
235 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
238 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
239 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
240 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
242 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
243 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
244 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
246 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
247 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
249 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
252 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
253 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
255 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
256 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
257 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
259 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
260 (ctx->group_list_max_len
261 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
262 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
265 ctx->group_list = tmp;
266 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
268 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
269 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
272 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
274 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
275 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
276 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
279 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
280 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL)
283 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
284 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
285 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
288 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
289 if (ginf->realname == NULL)
292 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
293 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
294 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
297 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
299 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
300 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
301 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
304 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
305 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL)
308 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
309 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
310 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
314 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
315 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
316 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
319 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
321 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
322 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
323 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
327 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
328 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
329 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
333 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
334 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
335 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
339 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
340 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
341 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
345 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
346 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
347 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
352 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
353 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
355 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
356 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
358 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
359 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
360 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
361 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
362 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
363 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
366 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
367 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
368 ctx->group_list_len++;
371 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
376 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
377 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
378 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
379 ginf->algorithm = ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
384 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
386 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
389 pgd.provider = provider;
390 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
391 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
394 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
396 size_t i, j, num_deflt_grps = 0;
397 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default)];
399 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
402 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default); i++) {
403 for (j = 0; j < ctx->group_list_len; j++) {
404 if (ctx->group_list[j].group_id == supported_groups_default[i]) {
405 tmp_supp_groups[num_deflt_grps++] = ctx->group_list[j].group_id;
411 if (num_deflt_grps == 0)
414 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
415 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
417 if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL)
420 memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
422 num_deflt_grps * sizeof(tmp_supp_groups[0]));
423 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len = num_deflt_grps;
428 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
432 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
433 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
434 || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
435 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
441 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
445 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
446 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
447 return &ctx->group_list[i];
453 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
461 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
462 * work for groups we don't know about.
464 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
466 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
467 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
469 if (!include_unknown)
471 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
474 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
479 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
480 * work for groups we don't know about.
482 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
484 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
485 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
492 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
493 * the number of groups supported.
495 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
498 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
500 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
501 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
502 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
503 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
504 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
507 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
508 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
512 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
513 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
518 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
519 *pgroups = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
520 *pgroupslen = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
522 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
523 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
529 int tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
530 int minversion, int maxversion,
531 int isec, int *okfortls13)
533 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
537 if (okfortls13 != NULL)
543 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
544 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
546 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
549 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
550 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
551 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
553 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
555 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
558 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
559 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
560 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
561 if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
562 *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
563 || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
566 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
567 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
568 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
573 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
574 int tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group, int op)
576 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
578 unsigned char gtmp[2];
583 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
584 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
585 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
586 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
589 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
590 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
593 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
600 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
601 * if there is no match.
602 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
603 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
604 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
606 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int nmatch)
608 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
609 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
612 /* Can't do anything on client side */
616 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
618 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
619 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
621 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
623 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
624 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1;
625 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
626 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1;
627 /* Should never happen */
630 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
634 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
635 * otherwise peer decides.
637 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
638 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
639 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
641 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
642 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
645 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
646 uint16_t id = pref[i];
648 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
649 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
657 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
661 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
662 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
667 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
668 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
670 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
671 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
672 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
675 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
678 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL)
680 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
681 unsigned long idmask;
683 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
684 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
686 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
687 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
688 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
702 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
703 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
711 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
713 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
716 char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
720 if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
722 OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
725 garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
728 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
730 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
733 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
735 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
736 "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
739 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
740 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
742 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
746 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
747 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
755 gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
756 gcb.gid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.gidmax * sizeof(*gcb.gid_arr));
757 if (gcb.gid_arr == NULL)
760 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
768 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
771 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
775 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
778 OPENSSL_free(gcb.gid_arr);
782 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
783 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
784 int check_own_groups)
786 const uint16_t *groups;
792 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
793 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
794 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
796 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
797 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
799 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
800 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
803 /* Should never happen */
808 if (check_own_groups) {
809 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
810 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
811 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
815 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
818 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
822 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
823 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
826 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
827 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
828 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
829 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
833 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
836 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
840 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
842 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
843 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
844 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
846 *pformats = ecformats_default;
847 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
849 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
851 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
855 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
856 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
858 unsigned char comp_id;
862 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
863 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
867 /* Get required compression id */
868 point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
871 if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
872 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
873 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
875 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
880 int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
882 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
883 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
884 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
885 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
890 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
891 * supported (see RFC4492).
893 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
896 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
897 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
903 /* Return group id of a key */
904 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
906 int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
908 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
910 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
914 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
915 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
917 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
921 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
924 /* If not EC nothing to do */
925 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
927 /* Check compression */
928 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
930 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
932 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
935 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
938 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
941 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
945 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
946 if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
947 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
948 else if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
949 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
951 return 0; /* Should never happen */
952 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
953 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
962 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
964 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
966 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
967 * is compatible with the client extensions.
969 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
971 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned long cid)
973 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
975 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
977 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
980 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
981 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, 1);
982 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
983 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, 1);
988 /* Default sigalg schemes */
989 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
990 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
993 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
995 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
997 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1000 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1001 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1002 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1003 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1004 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1006 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1007 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1008 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1010 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1011 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1013 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1014 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1016 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1017 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1019 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1020 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1021 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1024 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1025 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1026 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1027 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1028 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1033 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1034 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1035 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1038 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1039 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1040 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1041 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1042 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1043 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1044 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1045 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1046 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1047 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1048 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1049 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1050 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1051 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1052 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1053 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1054 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1055 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1056 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1057 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1058 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1059 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1060 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1061 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1062 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_brainpoolP256r1, 1},
1063 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1064 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1065 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_brainpoolP384r1, 1},
1066 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1067 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1068 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_brainpoolP512r1, 1},
1069 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1070 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1071 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1072 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1073 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1074 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1075 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1076 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1077 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1078 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1079 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1080 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1081 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1082 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1083 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1084 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1085 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1086 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1087 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1088 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1089 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1090 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1091 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1092 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1093 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1094 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1095 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1096 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1097 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1098 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1099 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1100 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1101 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1102 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1103 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1104 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1105 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1106 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1107 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1108 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1109 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1110 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1111 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1112 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1113 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1114 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1115 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1116 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1118 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1119 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1120 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1121 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1122 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1123 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1124 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1125 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1126 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1127 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1128 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1129 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1130 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1131 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1132 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1133 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1134 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1135 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1136 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1137 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1140 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1141 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1142 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1143 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1144 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1145 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1149 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1150 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1152 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1153 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1154 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1155 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1156 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1157 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1158 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1159 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1160 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1161 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1164 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1167 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1168 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1169 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1170 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1173 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1177 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1178 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1184 * Check hash is available.
1185 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1186 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1187 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1188 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1189 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1191 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1192 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1193 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1197 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1198 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1201 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1202 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1204 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1205 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1208 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1213 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1214 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1218 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1219 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1223 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1225 for (i = 0, lu = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1226 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1227 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1229 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
1237 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1238 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1244 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1245 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1248 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1258 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1260 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1261 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1262 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1264 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1265 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1266 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1272 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1274 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1280 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1281 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1282 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1283 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1284 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1286 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1293 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1294 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1295 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1299 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1306 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1308 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1311 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1313 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1320 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1321 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1323 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1326 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1328 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1335 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1338 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1340 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1341 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1345 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, NULL))
1347 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1351 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1353 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1355 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1356 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1359 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1361 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1363 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1366 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1370 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1373 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1376 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1378 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1379 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1381 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1382 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1385 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1386 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1390 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1391 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1392 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1394 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1395 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1396 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1397 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1398 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1399 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1401 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1402 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1407 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1408 * specified EC curve.
1410 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int curve)
1412 const uint16_t *sigs;
1415 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1416 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1417 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1419 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1420 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1423 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1424 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1428 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1429 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1430 && curve == lu->curve)
1438 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1441 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1443 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1446 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1450 int md_type = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
1452 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1453 secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
1455 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1456 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1457 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1459 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1460 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1461 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1462 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1464 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1466 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1468 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1471 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1472 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1474 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1481 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1482 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1485 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1487 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1488 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1490 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1492 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1495 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
1496 /* Should never happen */
1499 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1500 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1501 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1505 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1506 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1507 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1509 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1511 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1512 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1515 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1516 && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1517 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1518 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1522 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1523 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey), &cidx)
1524 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1529 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1531 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1532 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1534 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1538 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1539 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1540 int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1542 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1547 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1548 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1549 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1553 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1554 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1555 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1556 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1558 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1563 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1564 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1568 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1569 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1570 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1571 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1574 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1575 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1576 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1580 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, &md)) {
1581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1585 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1586 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1588 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1589 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1590 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
1592 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1593 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
1594 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1598 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1599 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1603 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1605 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
1610 if (sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1612 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1616 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1618 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
1623 if (sc->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1625 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1630 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1631 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1632 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1634 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1637 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1639 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1641 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1642 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1643 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1644 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1645 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1648 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1649 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1650 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1651 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1653 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1655 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1656 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1657 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1664 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1665 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1666 * @c: cipher to check
1667 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1668 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1670 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1672 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c,
1675 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1676 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1678 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1680 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1681 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1684 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1685 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1687 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1688 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1689 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1691 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1694 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1695 && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1696 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1699 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1702 int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1704 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1706 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1709 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1713 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1714 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1715 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1716 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1717 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1718 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1719 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1721 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1722 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1724 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1725 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1726 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1727 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1729 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1730 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1735 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1736 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1737 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1738 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1746 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1750 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1753 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1755 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1760 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1762 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1763 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1764 * point to the resulting session.
1766 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1767 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1771 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1774 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1777 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1778 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1781 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1782 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1784 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1785 if (!ticketext->present)
1786 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1788 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1790 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1791 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1795 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1797 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1798 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1799 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1800 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1803 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1804 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1805 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1806 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1807 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1808 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1810 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1811 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1812 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1813 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1814 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1815 * point to the resulting session.
1817 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1818 const unsigned char *etick,
1820 const unsigned char *sess_id,
1821 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1823 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1824 unsigned char *sdec;
1825 const unsigned char *p;
1826 int slen, ivlen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1827 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1829 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1830 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1831 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1832 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1834 if (eticklen == 0) {
1836 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1837 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1839 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1842 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1844 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1845 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1846 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1847 * calculate the master secret later.
1849 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1853 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1854 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1855 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1859 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1860 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1862 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1865 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1867 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1871 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1873 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1876 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1879 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1880 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
1881 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1883 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1886 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1887 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1888 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
1889 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1890 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1893 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1897 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1903 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1904 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1906 /* Check key name matches */
1907 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1908 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1909 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1913 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1915 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1916 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1917 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1919 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1920 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1921 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1922 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1923 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1926 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1927 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1931 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1934 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1936 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1940 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1942 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1946 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1947 if (eticklen <= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen + mlen) {
1948 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1952 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1953 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1954 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1955 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1959 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1960 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1963 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1964 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1965 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
1966 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
1967 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1968 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1969 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1971 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1974 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1976 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1982 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1986 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1988 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1990 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1994 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1995 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1996 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2000 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2001 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2004 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2006 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2011 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2013 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2016 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2017 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
2020 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2021 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2022 * performs any action
2024 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
2025 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2026 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2027 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2028 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
2029 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
2032 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
2033 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
2034 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2035 sess, etick, keyname_len,
2037 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
2039 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
2040 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2043 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
2044 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2045 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2049 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2050 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2051 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2052 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2053 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2057 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2058 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2059 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2060 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2061 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2062 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2063 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2065 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2069 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2073 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2075 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2076 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2077 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2078 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2087 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2088 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op,
2089 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2091 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2094 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2096 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2097 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2100 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2103 if (!s->server && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2104 && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2105 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2106 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2107 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2110 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2111 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu->sig_idx))
2114 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2115 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2116 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2117 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2118 if (s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
2121 && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2122 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2124 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2127 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2128 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2129 * ciphersuites enabled.
2132 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2135 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
2136 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2137 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2138 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2140 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2141 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2142 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2145 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2153 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2154 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
2155 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2156 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2157 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2161 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2162 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2166 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op)
2168 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2169 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2170 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2172 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2175 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2176 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2177 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2178 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2183 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2187 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2188 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2189 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2190 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2192 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2195 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2196 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2201 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2202 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2205 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2207 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2210 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2211 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2213 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2214 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2215 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2216 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2220 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2224 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2225 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2226 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2227 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2228 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2230 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2231 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2232 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2233 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2235 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2237 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2239 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2240 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2251 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2252 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2254 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2255 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2257 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2259 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2261 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2262 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2263 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2264 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2265 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2266 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2267 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2268 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2269 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2270 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2272 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2273 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2276 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2277 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2281 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2282 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2284 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2286 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL)
2288 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2292 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2293 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2297 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2303 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2305 /* Invalid data length */
2306 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2311 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL)
2313 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2321 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2328 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2330 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2331 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2333 /* Should never happen */
2334 if (s->cert == NULL)
2338 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2339 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2341 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2342 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2346 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2348 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2351 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2353 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2356 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2359 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2360 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2361 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2363 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2364 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2366 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2367 if (pvalid[idx] == 0
2368 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), idx))
2369 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2374 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2375 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2376 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2380 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2385 psig = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2386 numsigalgs = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2388 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2391 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2393 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2397 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2399 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2400 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sc, *psig);
2402 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2404 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2405 if (psignhash != NULL)
2406 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2408 return (int)numsigalgs;
2411 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2412 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2413 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2415 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2416 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2421 if (sc->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2423 || idx >= (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen
2424 || sc->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2426 shsigalgs = sc->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2428 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2430 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2431 if (psignhash != NULL)
2432 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2434 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2436 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2437 return (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen;
2440 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2441 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2445 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2446 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2449 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2451 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2452 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2453 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2454 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2455 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2456 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2457 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2458 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2460 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2461 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2462 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2465 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2466 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2468 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2470 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2472 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2473 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2474 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2477 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2479 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2481 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2483 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2485 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2486 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2487 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2488 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2489 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2490 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2494 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2496 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2497 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2501 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2508 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2509 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2510 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2512 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2514 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2515 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2519 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2523 /* Reject duplicates */
2524 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2525 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2534 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2535 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2537 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2541 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2545 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2548 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2553 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
2555 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2558 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2559 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2560 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2562 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2563 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2564 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2570 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2572 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2577 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
2579 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2581 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2582 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2583 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2585 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2587 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2588 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2593 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2598 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2599 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2600 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2602 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2603 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2604 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2610 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2614 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2616 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2618 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2621 if (default_nid == -1)
2623 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2625 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2627 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2629 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2630 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2631 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2633 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2636 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2638 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2639 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2640 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2641 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2642 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2648 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2649 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2651 const X509_NAME *nm;
2653 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2654 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2655 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2662 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2663 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2664 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2665 * attempting to use them.
2668 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2670 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2671 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2672 /* Strict mode flags */
2673 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2674 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2675 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2677 int tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk,
2678 STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx)
2682 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2683 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2686 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2688 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2690 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2693 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2695 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2696 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2698 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2700 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2701 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2710 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2713 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2715 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2716 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2718 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2725 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2726 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2727 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2728 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2729 else if (!check_flags)
2734 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2735 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2737 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
2742 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2743 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2745 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2749 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2750 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2753 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2754 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2755 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2759 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2760 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2763 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2764 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2765 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2768 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2769 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2770 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2773 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2774 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2775 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2784 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2785 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2787 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2789 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2790 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2791 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2793 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2796 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2803 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2804 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2806 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2807 * so check_flags is always set.
2809 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2810 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2811 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2815 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2816 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2817 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2818 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2820 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2827 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2828 else if (check_flags)
2829 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2831 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2832 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2833 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2834 else if (!check_flags)
2837 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2838 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2839 else if (strict_mode) {
2840 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2841 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2842 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2843 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2845 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2852 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2853 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2856 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2857 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2858 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2859 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2860 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2861 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2864 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2867 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2868 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2869 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2873 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2876 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2879 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2882 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
2883 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2884 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2886 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2887 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2889 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2890 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2895 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2898 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2900 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2901 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2905 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2906 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2908 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2911 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2915 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2918 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2919 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2926 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2927 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2929 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2930 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2931 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2932 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2933 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2934 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2935 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2936 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2937 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2940 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2941 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2943 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2948 return tls1_check_chain(sc, x, pk, chain, -1);
2951 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2953 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
2955 int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
2956 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2957 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2958 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2959 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2961 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2962 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2963 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2968 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2970 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2974 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
2975 sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2977 if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
2978 dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
2980 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2981 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2982 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2983 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2984 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2985 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2986 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2987 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2989 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2993 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
2995 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
2998 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
3000 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
3001 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
3004 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
3006 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1)
3010 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
3011 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
3012 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3017 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
3021 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3025 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3026 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3027 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3028 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3030 secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
3033 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3035 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3038 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
3041 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3042 int secbits, nid, pknid;
3044 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3045 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
3047 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
3049 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3050 if (nid == NID_undef)
3053 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
3055 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
3058 int ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy,
3062 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3064 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
3065 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3067 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
3068 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3070 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
3071 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3076 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3077 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3078 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3081 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
3084 int rv, start_idx, i;
3087 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3089 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3094 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3098 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3099 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3100 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3108 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3109 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3112 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3113 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3115 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3116 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3118 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3120 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3121 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3122 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3125 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3129 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3130 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3132 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3134 static int check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig,
3135 X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3137 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3138 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3140 const char *mdname = NULL;
3141 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3144 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3145 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3147 if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
3148 mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
3149 supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, sctx->libctx,
3156 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3157 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3159 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3160 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3162 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3163 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3168 * This does not differentiate between the
3169 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3170 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3171 * signing certificate.
3173 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3180 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3181 * a viable public key is permitted.
3187 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3188 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3189 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3190 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3191 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3193 static int has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3195 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3198 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3201 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3202 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3206 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3207 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3209 static int is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3214 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3217 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3218 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3221 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3225 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3226 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3227 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3229 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x,
3232 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3236 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3238 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3239 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3240 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3242 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3243 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3244 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3245 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3246 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3248 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3249 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, NULL))
3251 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3252 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3255 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3256 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3258 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3260 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3261 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3263 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3264 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3265 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, tmppkey, lu))
3271 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3278 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3279 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3281 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3282 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3284 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3285 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3286 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3288 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int fatalerrs)
3290 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3293 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3294 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3296 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3297 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3302 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3306 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3307 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3309 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3312 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3314 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3316 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3318 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3320 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3324 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3327 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3328 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3331 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3334 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3336 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3337 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3340 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3341 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3343 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3344 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3345 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3347 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, pkey, lu))
3350 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3355 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3356 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3357 * we have to assume GOST support.
3359 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen
3360 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
3361 & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) != 0) {
3362 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3366 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3370 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3374 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3378 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3383 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3385 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3386 size_t sent_sigslen;
3388 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3392 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3396 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3397 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3398 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3399 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3400 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3403 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3407 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3412 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3416 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3422 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3423 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3424 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3425 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3429 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3431 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3432 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3433 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3437 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3441 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3443 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
3448 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3449 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3450 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3454 sc->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3458 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3460 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3464 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3466 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3468 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3469 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3474 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3475 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3476 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3481 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3482 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3487 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3493 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3496 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3498 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3504 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3509 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3511 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
3513 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3514 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3515 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3516 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx, key, len, params))
3519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3520 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3521 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3526 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3528 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3529 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3531 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3532 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3537 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3540 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3541 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3543 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3544 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3549 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3551 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3552 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3554 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3555 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
3560 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3562 char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
3564 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
3565 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);
3570 __owur int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
3571 const unsigned char *enckey,
3574 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH")) {
3575 int bits = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey);
3577 if (bits <= 0 || enckeylen != (size_t)bits / 8)
3578 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
3580 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) {
3581 if (enckeylen < 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
3582 || enckey[0] != 0x04)
3586 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey, enckey, enckeylen);